The Implications Of Linguistic Relativity For Language .
The Implications of Linguistic Relativity for Language LearningJOHN A. LUCYIn recent years there has been increasing interest in the relationship between secondlanguage learning and linguistic relativity (Cook & Bassetti, 2011; Han & Cadierno, 2010; Jarvis& Pavlenko, 2008; Pavlenko, 2011). In some ways this is a natural development since both linesof inquiry concern themselves with how meaning systems in language affect behavior. But thetwo traditions differ in the behaviors they attend to. In the case of language learning, the interestis in how the meaning systems in a first language might affect speakers’ learning of and ultimateattainment in a second language. In the case of linguistic relativity, the interest is in how themeaning systems in a language might affect thought about reality more generally, that is,speakers’ cognitive processes and views of reality. Thus bringing the two lines of inquiry intodialogue requires not only attending to how they treat meaning systems, but also articulating therelation between second language learning and how speakers think about reality.The current paper focuses on how the emergence of linguistic relativity during middlechildhood holds implications for the ability to learn a second language. The first section willcharacterize linguistic relativity and highlight a few important theoretical distinctions. Thesecond section will describe the emergence of linguistic relativity during child development,including the associated changes in first language acquisition. Finally, the third section willoutline the implications of these developmental changes for second language learning, includingthe challenges of distinguishing relativity effects from other effects on language learning.
Linguistic relativity characterizedLinguistic relativity can be characterized in several distinct ways. First, it can bedistinguished externally from other types of language influences on thought. Second, it can bedefined internally in terms of the formal elements it brings together into a proposed relationshipso as to distinguish it from closely related, but distinct proposals.Types of language influence on thoughtThe potential influences of language on thought can be classed into three types or levels(Lucy, 1996).The first, or semiotic, level concerns how speaking any natural language at all mayinfluence thinking. The question is whether having a code with a symbolic component (versusone confined to iconic and indexical elements) transforms thinking in certain ways. If so, we canspeak of a semiotic relativity of those aspects of thought with respect to other species orindividuals lacking such a code. For example, here we would include not only animalcomparisons, but also studies showing cognitive deficits arising from lack of access to verbalinput during early periods of life (e.g. among the deaf) as well as the cognitive advantages forclassification and memory abilities arising from the mere presence of a verbal or other symboliclabel. The influence of language on thought at this level has long been recognized, althoughmuch remains to be learned about the specific mechanisms.The second, or structural, level concerns how speaking one or more particular naturallanguages (e.g., Hopi versus English) may influence thinking. The question is whether quitedifferent morphosyntactic configurations of meaning affect some aspects of thinking aboutreality. If so, we can speak of a structural relativity of thought with respect to speakers usingdifferent language codes. This has been the level traditionally associated with the term linguistic
relativity and will be the focus here. Long controversial, the existence of cognitive effects is nowwidely recognized although controversies still exist over how profound they are in terms ofprocess type or behavioral impact (Lucy, 2014). But the overall trend of the evidence is clear.The third, or functional, level concerns whether using language in a particular way (e.g.schooled, scientific) may influence thinking. The question is whether verbal discursive practicesaffect some aspects of thinking either by modulating structural influences or by directlyinfluencing the interpretation of interactional context. If so, we can speak of a functionalrelativity of thought with respect to speakers using language differently. This level can beconveniently referred to as discursive relativity. Although there is an abundance of evidence thattraining in these functional regimes has effects, there is much disagreement as to whether theeffects are due to social or cognitive factors, especially in the context of schooling. Claims aboutdiscursive relativity assert that in addition to any social factors, some functional practicesactually enhance the cognitive power of language with regard to certain goals.So when we consider whether linguistic relativity has an influence on second languagelearning, we are asking specifically about structural relativity, that is, whether general cognitiveeffects arising from first language structure are affecting second language learning. Do speakerssee language and its referents as aspects of reality like any other aspect, that is, through the lensof cognitive categories engendered by the morphosyntactic structure of their first language? It isalso true that the other two levels of relativity can also be relevant to second language learning.For example, semiotic relativity may emerge when we entertain the possibility of age of onseteffects and functional relativity may emerge when second language learning occurs in school andother social contexts. Indeed, the three types of language influences on thought are notfunctionally independent and always interact in important ways. Thus the emergence of symbolic
signs enables the complex and diverse morphosyntactic systems based on them, which provide inturn the essential means for the discursive interactions central to all cultures. Or inversely,thinking functionally, the impetus to engage in discourse drives linguistic development, which inturn drives the development of the symbolic capacity. Ultimately, then, investigation ofstructural relativity leads to a consideration of the other two levels. Likewise, the implications oflinguistic relativity for second language learning will raise questions as to whether secondlanguage issues at other levels (e.g., age of onset, schooling effects), might also be mediated byrelativity effects.Formal aspects of linguistic relativityLinguistic relativity proposals claim that each language embodies interpretations ofreality and that these interpretations can influence thought about that reality (Lucy, 1992a, 1997).The interpretations arise from the selection of substantive aspects of experience and their formalarrangement into systems of referential meaning in the verbal code. Such selection andarrangement is, of course, necessary for language, so the crucial emphasis here is that eachlanguage involves a particular interpretation, not a common, universal one. Influences on thoughtensue when the particular interpretations guide or support cognitive activity and hence the beliefsand behaviors dependent on it. Accounts vary in the specificity of the proposed mechanisms ofinfluence and the degree of power attributed to them, but in all cases, claims for linguisticrelativity require a demonstration that speaking a specific language influences thinking generally.We now have evidence for such general effects on thought from grammatical categoriessuch as tense, number, gender, complement constructions, and causal forms; from referentialdomains such as color, object construal, causation, space, and motion, counterfactuals; and fromconstructions such as metaphors in the areas of music and time, terminology in mathematics, co-
speech gesture, etc. (e.g. Boroditsky, 2003; Casasanto 2008; Levinson 2003; Lucy 1996, 1997,2011; Neirmeier & Dirven 2000; Wolff & Holmes 2011). The patterns of thinking affectedinclude attention and perception, similarity judgments and classification, short and long termmemory, and learning and reasoning. And these effects are evidenced in everyday experiences,specialized contexts, or ideational traditions.We can illustrate this type of finding with an example from my own work comparing thespeakers of American English and Yucatec Maya (Lucy, 1992b; Lucy & Gaskins, 2003). Thetwo languages differ in the way they mark number for nouns referring to a stable object (e.g.candle) in comparison to a malleable object (e.g. clay): English requires plural marking formultiple stable object referents whereas Yucatec does not, and Yucatec requires numeralunitizers for them whereas English does not. Thus in acts of referring, English speakers attendmore to the number and unit (or shape) of referent, whereas Yucatec speakers ignore number andunit (or shape) and focus instead on material. These differences yield reliable cognitivedifferences: English speakers reliably attend more to number and shape in nonverbalclassification and memory tasks than do Maya speakers. But where the two languages are thesame in their number marking, that is, in the treatment of malleable objects, they show nocognitive differences. Thus the specific number marking patterns both across and withinlanguages predict the specific cognitive responses. And this particular pattern recurs in a widerange of languages of similar types (Lucy, 2014).The concept of “thinking for speaking” is often confused with linguistic relativity, but isanalytically distinct. This distinction was made clear in the original formulation where “thinkingfor speaking” meant “a special form of thought that is mobilized for communication” in one’snative language “while we are speaking” and which may therefore affect “one’s mastery of the
grammatical categories of a foreign language” (Slobin, 1987: 436). So in the first instance, theconcept was confined to language effects on language learning, rather than language effects oncognition more generally as in the relativity case. Second, even in considering second languageeffects, special emphasis was put on categories that “cannot be experienced directly in ourperceptual, sensorimotor, and practical dealings with the world” but which language alonerequires us to make (Slobin, 1996: 91). By distancing possible effects from our conceptual orpractical dealings with the world, it is clear that the concept does not refer to a general impact oflanguage on experience. Eventually evidence has emerged (e.g. Slobin, 2006) showing thatthinking for speaking can in fact lead to broader cognitive effects, that is, to linguistic relativity.Nonetheless it remains important to keep the two concepts distinct because it remains highlylikely that some thought associated with speaking remains confined to language use. Moregenerally, similar arguments about cross-linguistic influence, transfer, or interference (Jarvis &Pavlenko, 2008) typically need not appeal to category effects beyond language use itself. Bycontrast linguistic relativity proposals claim that the referential categories of language affect ourcognitive engagement with the world generally and it is this broader pattern of engagement thathas its own implications for second language learning.Linguistic relativity and first language acquisitionOne key question in linguistic relativity research is when and how cognitive effectsemerge in development. Knowing this developmental trajectory can confirm that the languagepatterns precede the cognitive ones, an important step in establishing the causal priority oflanguage in the association of language and thought. And it can also illuminate the generalprocess of child development by revealing when and how language-specific categories becomeimportant in cognition. In terms of the levels outlined in the first section, we are using semiotic
developments to inform our analysis of structural relativity and our analysis of structuralrelativity to inform our understanding of semiotic developments. In the present context we areconcerned with the second aspect, that is, what the onset of linguistic relativity can tell us aboutthe child’s language development. The main issues are the age of onset of cognitive effects, theco-occurring language developments, and the possible mechanisms linking the two.Emergence of linguistic relativity in childhoodLanguage-specific effects on general cognition first appear in middle childhood, aroundage eight (Lucy & Gaskins, 2001, 2003). Before age seven children speaking different languagesperform in very similar ways on the cognitive measures used with adults. By age nine they haveshifted such that each group performs more like adult speakers of their language. That is, wherethe adult groups differ, so do the older children, and where the adult groups are the same, so arethe older children. So children go from being more like each other across language communitiesto being more like adults in their own language community.Again, an example can clarify the pattern here. Returning to the contrast of AmericanEnglish versus Yucatec Maya discussed above, the Figure 1 presents the results of a nonverbalsorting task involving stable objects that assesses preference for shape versus material by age.Percent Material Choices8060YUCATEC40ENGLISH20079Age in Years15
Figure 1. Developmental pattern for English and Yucatec nonverbal classification preferenceswith stable objects: material versus shape (from Lucy, 2004: 13)As the figure makes clear, at age seven, both groups favor classifying stable objects on the basisof shape. Yet by age nine the two groups have diverged as the Maya move toward favoringclassification on the basis of material, in line with the adult pattern. There is no change in theEnglish preference in this case because the adult preference accords with the childhoodpreference. (In other cases, as in the development of memory for stable objects, it is the Englishchildren who change their behavior.)Continuing this example, Figure 2 shows the results of a nonverbal sorting task involvingmalleable objects, where the two languages agree in their referential patterns. As the figuremakes clear, in sorting these malleable objects, both groups favor material at about the same rateat all ages and there is no reliable difference in sorting preference by age, despite the slight drifttoward more shape preferences by adult English speakers. In short, the childhood preferencepattern fits both languages and thus requires no cognitive reorganization during development.Percent Material Choices8060YUCATEC40ENGLISH20079Age in Years15
Figure 2. Developmental pattern for English and Yucatec classification preferences withmalleable objects: material versus shape (from Lucy, 2004: 15)Before this period, there are language-specific effects on the language learning processitself, but not on the general cognitive measures used with adults. Such language-internal effectsappear throughout the period between two and eight in comprehension and production, in theability to keep two languages separate, in the treatment of novel forms, etc. For example, tocontinue with our number marking example, children start show sensitivity to number markingpatterns in novel word learning tasks by age four, but not in their nonverbal sorting behavior(e.g. Imai, 2000; see also Imai & Gentner, 1997; Li et al., 2009). Such patterns confirm theimportance of recognizing that there may be effects on language learning that operateindependently of linguistic relativity.Clearly, early language learning in itself is not sufficient to create relativity effects.Indeed, children already speak quite well by age seven and have been applying and extending thebasic categories in their languages for years. In the case of number marking, for example,English-speaking children have substantial command of plurals by age seven and Yucatecspeaking children have substantial command of numeral classifiers by this age. Children in bothgroups reliably comprehend and use the appropriate forms and will judge constructions misusingthem as faulty. Although they have yet to master all the details, there is no question whatsoeverthat the basic structural characteristics of each number marking system are firmly in place andhave been in routine habitual use for many years. So something more is required for relativity toemerge. This late emergence of linguistic relativity thus directs our attention to the later languagedevelopment in relation to cognitive changes during the middle childhood period.
First language developments in middle childhoodDuring middle childhood (ages six to twelve) there are substantial changes in thestructure and use of a child’s first language (Romaine, 1984; Nippold, 1998). These changesappear in measures of verbal comprehension and production and they collectively strengthen andexploit language-internal structural relationships to support new narrative and discursive effects.The structural changes occur at several levels. The lexicon expands rapidly and the childbecomes more sensitive to the system-structural values of these forms (Lucy 2010; Vygotsky,1987). Likewise grammatical categories achieve fuller functionality and the child becomesincreasingly sensitive to argument tracking (e.g. case marking) (Chomsky, 1969) and predicatecoordination (e.g. time marking) (Berman & Slobin, 1994). Of course children are sensitive tostructural effects well before this age (Bowerman, 1982). What seems to change is theirwillingness and ability to attend to a structural entailment and then merge it with the concreteworld knowledge embodied in denotational regularities. That is, an existing awareness isrecruited in such a way as to reconcile conflicts between what interlocutors say and what thechild knows or to create and express a novel stance on events.Building on these structural changes, various functional transformations appear as well,that is, the functional level mentioned above becomes relevant to the discussion. Narrativesbecome more textually cohesive and discursive interaction becomes more interactionallyappropriate and pragmatically effective (e.g., Berman & Slobin, 1994). Again, the child has beennarrating and interacting for years, so the change again is one of recruiting existing devices toachieve new capabilities. Since the changes often operate across larger segments of speech ininteraction, the difference can be difficult to detect with simplified sentence-based situationsfocused on a single speaker (Karmiloff-Smith, 1980). As a consequence, these changes have
been much less studied, with the exception of studies concerned with school instruction.Mediating many of these functional changes are a set of indexical forms, or “shifters” (Jakobson,1971 [1957]), such as pronouns and tense markers that change from mostly indexing aspects ofthe surrounding context to also indexing aspects of the discourse itself.To illustrate the operation of these developments, we can look at the acquisition ofdefinite and indefinite articles (e.g. English a and the), which sit at the intersection of lexicalnumber (e.g., count/mass status), grammatical number (singular/plural status), and discoursepresupposition (e.g. pronominal/definiteness systems). Children begin using these forms in thesecond year of life and some would thus say they have been acquired by that age. But their use ofthe forms remains heavily confined to the immediate denotational context. When asked torespond to more complex questions requiring appropriate consideration of the communicativecontext, they continue to make errors well into middle childhood. Thus, for example, KarmiloffSmith (1979) presented the following sort of probe to children at different ages:Experimenter: In the forest lots of squirrels and cats were chasing each other. There werelots and lots of them. Suddenly one of the animals ran up a tree. Guess who it was.Child: A
concept was confined to language effects on language learning, rather than language effects on cognition more generally as in the relativity case. Second, even in considering second language effects, special emphasis was put
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