THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE ARCTIC STRATEGY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCEARCTIC STRATEGYENSURING A STABLE ARCTIC THROUGH VIGILANCE, POWER PROJECTION, COOPERATION, AND PREPARATIONi

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The Department of the Air ForceArctic StrategyExecutive Summaryactivities in the region by great power competitorswith increased physical access due to receding landice and sea ice, yields the potential for intensifiedregional competition as well as opportunities forcooperative endeavors with allies and partners.The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategyfully supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy(NDS) and implements the 2019 Department ofDefense (DoD) Arctic Strategy embracing the DoD’sdesired Arctic end-state: A secure and stable regionwhere U.S. national interests are safeguarded, thehomeland is protected, and nations address sharedchallenges cooperatively.The Department of the Air Force contributions toU.S. national security in the Arctic are large, butrelatively unknown. Given the Arctic’s vast distancesand challenges to surface operations, air and spacecapabilities have long been essential to gain rapidaccess and provide all-domain awareness, earlywarning, satellite command and control, andeffective deterrence. Offering a solid foundation onwhich to build and project power across the region,the Department of the Air Force is the most activeand invested U.S. military department in the Arctic.2The strategy outlines the Department of the AirForce’s unique role and optimizes Air Force andSpace Force capabilities for the region. The Arctic’sincreasing strategic importance, coupled with theServices’ significant regional investment, requiresthe Department to have a unified, deliberate, andforward-looking approach, ensuring the Air andSpace Forces can compete and defend the nation’sinterests in the Arctic region.The strategy identifies the Arctic as a region ofstrategic opportunity for the Air and Space Forces,Joint Force, allies, and partners. It providesrecommendations in light of the Arctic’s mostsignificant strategic threats and opportunities,based on Combatant Commander requirements andthe Air and Space Forces’ missions.Residing at the intersection between the U.S.homeland and two critical theaters, Indo-Pacific andEurope, the Arctic is an increasingly vital region forU.S. national security interests. The Arctic’s capacityas a strategic buffer is eroding, making it an avenueof threat to the homeland, due to advancementsby great power competitors. Additionally, it hostscritical launch points for global power projectionand increasingly accessible natural resources.While the DoD analyzes the immediate prospectof conflict in the Arctic as low,1 the confluence of1.2.The Department approaches the Arctic with fourmain lines of effort: Vigilance, Power Projection,Cooperation, and Preparation. The strategy outlineshow the Air and Space Forces will organize, train,and equip to provide Combatant Commanderswith combat-credible assets capable of conductingoperations throughout the Arctic into the future.DoD Report to Congress: Arctic Strategy 2019.DoD Report to Congress: Resourcing the Arctic Strategy 2016.2

First, through investments in missile warningand defense, as well as command, control,communications, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (C3ISR), the Air and Space Forceswill defend the homeland by maintaining vigilance.Third, strong alliances and partnerships in the Arcticare a strategic advantage for the United States. Thestrategy outlines ways to enhance cooperation aswell as interoperability, operations, and exercisesbetween the United States and its Arctic partners.To uphold the international rules-based order in theArctic, the Air and Space Forces must leverage thestrong defense relationships among Arctic nationsand work closely with regional and joint partners.Second, the Air and Space Forces will utilize uniquepositioning afforded by bases in locations likeAlaska and Greenland to project combat-credible,all-domain air and space power. Infrastructure,focused on thermal efficiency and durability, will becombined with fifth generation aircraft and lethalcapabilities to ensure the Air and Space Forcesremain agile and capable in the future.Finally, the strategy outlines essential trainingand preparation for operations within thisunique environment. To meet this challenge, theDepartment will renew focus on training, research,and development for Arctic operations, whileleveraging the Arctic expertise of the Total Force.3

The Air & Space Forcesin the ArcticThe Arctic is a region of immense geostrategicsignificance and a key location for global powerprojection. With two large Alaska air bases, JointBase Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson AirForce Base (AFB), and other strategic facilities,the Air and Space Forces project power intotwo critical theaters: Indo-Pacific and Europe.Often unrecognized, Alaska offers the quickestflight access to strategic locations across thePacific region and western Russia. As evidence ofAlaska’s strategic location, once the planned F-35bed-down is complete, Alaska will be home tomore advanced fighters than any other location inthe world.The Arctic represents a cornerstone of the nation’sdefense. The Department of the Air Force providesclose to 80% of DoD resourcing to the Arctic region.3Installations across Alaska, Canada, and Greenlandinclude large bases, training complexes, satellitecommand and control stations, and a constellationof more than 50 early warning and missiledefense radars. For reference, page 5 highlightsDepartment of the Air Force Arctic equities.As strategic as the Arctic is to power projection, itis equally critical to deterrence and U.S. defense.From an air and space power perspective, it is theshortest distance for adversaries to threaten thehomeland with strategic air and missile attacks. TheAlaska Radar System and the 50-plus radars thatcomprise the North Warning System across Canadaprovide vital early warning for homeland defenseand North American Aerospace Defense Command(NORAD). Locations like Clear, Alaska and Thule,Greenland uniquely enable missile warning anddefense in addition to space domain awareness,helping USSPACECOM track tens of thousands ofobjects daily.Geographically, the Arctic region consists of theArctic Ocean, adjacent seas, and parts of eightnations: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark(including Greenland), Finland, Iceland,Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.4Demographically, among the millions of Arcticinhabitants, indigenous communities possessmillennia of knowledge about the Arctic domainpassed down through generations.Several factors make the Arctic particularly relianton air, space, and cyberspace power to providerapid access, reach, and domain awareness. Thearea above the Arctic Circle (above 66 degreesNorth latitude) is vast, almost 2.5 times thesize of the continental United States. Lackingthe climate-moderating effect of the warmGulf Stream, the North American Arctic hosts amuch harsher environment than the EuropeanArctic and significantly less road and maritimeinfrastructure. Alaska epitomizes this geographicaldisparity in infrastructure. It is the largest state(twice the size of Texas) covering 586,000square miles, but offering only 5,600 milesof highway.53.4.5.From aerial refueling tankers to the Air NationalGuard’s ski-equipped aircraft, the Air Force bringsmobility capabilities that provide access to someof the harshest and most remote locations in theArctic. Meanwhile the Alaska Rescue CoordinationCenter and affiliated rescue squadrons work closelywith partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard, onhundreds of search and rescue missions annually.DoD Report to Congress: Resourcing the Arctic Strategy 2016.The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy uses the definition of the Arctic codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4111. The Arctic means all U.S.and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon,and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the AleutianIslands chain.Alaska Department of Transportation & Public Facilities. Department Fast Facts Prepared for Legislative Session 2020.4

F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska RescueCoordination Center: HC-130, HH-6079%EarecksonEIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, PolarASSurvival SchoolDAF is responsible forof DoD Arctic ResourcingDepartment of the Air Force Equities in the ArcticUSAUSAF EQJBER & ALASKAAlaska RescueJOINT PACIFICRANGE COMPLEXCoordination Center(JPARC): Airspace & Training GroundsSource: 2016 DoD Report to CongressCLEARAFS:Ballistic Missile Early Warning,Eielson AFB,ClearAFS, DomainJPARCSpaceAwareness79%79%ALASKADAF is responsible forBarrow& NorthPOINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE:AlaskaWarningSystemof 3DoDArcticDAFresponsibleforRadar System(15isradars,part ofNorthResourcingofDoDArcticResourcingWarning System)JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON (JBER):F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska RescueCoordination Center: HC-130, HH-60EARECKSON AS:Source:Missile DefenseRadar2016 DoDReport to CongressNorth WarningSystemSource: 2016 DoDReport to CongressEIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, PolarSurvival SchoolCANADAALASKAThuleALASKANORAD: NorthABWarning System ( 50 radars)JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX(JPARC): Airspace & Training GroundsJOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSONSAMPLE OF(JBARJOINTBASEELMENDORF-RICHARDSON(JBER):F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska RescueGREENLANDCenter:HC-130,HH-60F-22, E-3, CoordinationC-17, C-130, C-12F,AlaskaRescueUNITED STATEPOINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE: AlaskaCoordinationCenter:HC-130,HH-60THULEAB: BallisticMissileEarlyWarning,RavenEIELSONAFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135,PolarDENMARK/GRRadar System (15 radars, 3 part of NorthSpace DomainCampAwarenessEIELSON AFB:F-35,F-16, ANG KC-135, PolarSurvivalSchoolWarning System)RAVENCAMP:ANG Training for LC-130SurvivalSchoolEARECKSON AS: Missile Defense RadarJOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEXJOINT PACIFICALASKARANGECOMPLEX(JPARC):Airspace& roundsCANADAASCLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning,Map Source: National Geospatial-IntellCLEAR AFS:BallisticMissileEarly Warning,SpaceDomainAwarenessNORAD: North Warning System ( 50 radars)JBER & Alaska RescueSpace Domain AwarenessBARROW/NORTHSLOPE: AlaskaMILITARYFACILITIESCoordination CenterSAMPLE OF ARCTIC m(15radars,3part of ningEarecksonEielson AFB, ClearUNITED STATESSWEDNORWAY System)FINLANDCANADAASAFS, JPARCWarning System)THULE AB: Ballistic MissileEarly Warning,EARECKSONAS:Missile Defense RadarDENMARK/GREENLANDRUSSIAICELANDSpace Domain AwarenessJBER & Alaska RescueBarrow & North EARECKSON AS: Missile Defense RadarCoordination CenterCLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning,Space Domain AwarenessAF EQUITIES IN THE ARCTIC%USAF EQUITIES IN THE ARCTIC%N (JBER):ueWarning SystemRAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130CANADACANADAEielson AFB, ClearAFS, JPARCNORAD: North Warning System ( 50 radars)NORAD: North Warning System ( 50 radars)Barrow & escueGREENLANDGREENLANDNorth WarningSystemThule5,EXPolarABTHULE AB: Ballistic Missile Early Warning,THULE AB:BallisticMissileEarly Warning,SpaceDomainAwarenessSpace Domain AwarenessRAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130RAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for parMap Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agencyradars)ars)ning,g,0Map Source: National Geospatial-Intelligence AgencySAMPLE OF ARCTIC REGION MILITARY FACILITIESSAMPLE OF ARCTIC REGION MILITARY FACILITIESUNITED STATESNORWAYDENMARK/GREENLANDRUSSIAUNITED AYFINLANDRUSSIAICELAND5SWEDENCANADASWEDENUD

The Changing StrategicEnvironmentGreat Power Activity in the ArcticRussia is an Arctic nation. No other country has asmuch permanent military presence above the 66thparallel. Russia’s recent Arctic initiatives includerefurbishing airfields and infrastructure, creatingnew bases, and developing an integrated networkof air defense, coastal missile systems, and earlywarning radars to secure its northern approaches.Further, Russia seeks to regulate maritime traffic onthe Northern Sea Route in ways that may exceedits authority permitted under international law.Close to 25% of Russia’s gross domestic productcomes from the Arctic region. Reflecting this, Russiais expected to continue investing in the region toadvance its economy and bolster national identity.The Russian military plays a significant role insecuring these interests and may leverage ostensiblydefensive capabilities for other purposes. Finally,Russia tightly manages its Arctic messaging tohighlight its capabilities and control.The United States is an Arctic nation, and a numberof trends impact U.S. interests in the complexsecurity environment.Changing Physical EnvironmentChanges in the Arctic environment are transformingArctic ecosystems.6 The environment is often citedas the greatest adversary to Arctic operations.Variations in weather and climate forecastinghamper missions and long-term planning for JointForce needs and capabilities. Thawing permafrostaffects infrastructure across the region, includingDepartment of the Air Force hangars and runways.Reductions in single and multi-year polar ice areaccelerating the rate of coastal erosion, puttingAir and Space Forces’ already sparse infrastructureat risk.China is not an Arctic nation (its northernmostcity, Mohe, shares roughly the same latitude ofPhiladelphia and Dublin), but it sees the region asimportant to its long-term economic and securityinterests. China’s Arctic narrative attempts tonormalize Chinese presence in the region, enhancepolar operating capabilities, and gain a regionalgovernance role. In 2018, China linked its Arcticactivities to its One Belt, One Road initiativeunderscoring its strategic ambition toward theregion’s vast quantities of rare earth minerals,hydrocarbons, and fisheries.Increasing Access & Human ActivityMelting ice, transportation advances, and extractioninnovation are exposing resources once thoughtinaccessible. The Arctic is estimated to harborover 90 billion barrels of oil reserves, 30% of theworld’s untapped natural gas, and around onetrillion dollars’ worth of rare earth minerals.7Extended seasonal access, growth in commercialtraffic, and an uptick in tourism increaseinternational competition and the potential needfor disaster response.6.7.National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Richter-Menge, J., M. L. Druckenmiller, and M. Jeffries: Arctic Report Card 2019.U.S. Geological Survey. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Natural Gas North of the Arctic Circle 2008.6

A secure and stable Arctic region, founded on respectfor national sovereignty and the internationalrules-based order, benefits the United States. Manychallenges transcend borders. Arctic nations havehistorically respected sovereignty and constructivelyengaged even when interests diverge. In recognitionof the Arctic’s strategic significance to the defenseof the homeland and American national securityinterests, the region remains a focus for theDepartment of the Air Force.1.The Air and Space Forces’ ability to protect thehomeland requires Arctic domain awarenessincluding threat detection, targeting and tracking,communications, and weather forecasting sufficientto build a reliable operational picture.Missile DefenseDoD Arctic ObjectivesDefending the homeland is the first priority for theDoD. The Department of the Air Force is responsiblefor the majority of the architecture used to detect,track, and engage air and missile threats that couldtransit the Arctic. These architectural assets includeCOBRA DANE, which provides real-time missile data,and the new Long Range Discriminating Radar atClear, Alaska, which provides persistent long-range,mid-course discrimination, precision, and trackingof missile threats. Adding to these capabilities,cooperation with Canada through NORAD is criticalto the defense of the northern approaches. NORADrelies on radar systems like the aging North WarningSystem, a network of aerospace surveillance radarsin northern Canada and Alaska, for early detectionof adversary air threats.The Department of the Air Force will contribute tothe achievement of the three objectives set out in the2019 DoD Arctic Strategy:Defend the homelandCompete when necessary to maintainfavorable regional balances of powerEnsure common domains remain freeand openLines of EffortThe DoD’s ability to detect threats and defendNorth America is challenged by rapidly advancingstrategic competitors’ capabilities. Today’s threatshave longer range, better precision, and lower radarcross-sections. To counteract evolving threats:The Air and Space Forces will enhance vigilance,reach, and power through four coordinated linesof effort:1.Vigilance in All Domains2.Projecting Power through aCombat-Credible Force3.Cooperation with Allies & Partners4.Preparation for Arctic OperationsVigilance in All DomainsThe Department of the Air Force will enhanceits missile defense surveillance system in thenorthern tier while continuing to work withCanada to identify materiel and non-materielsolutions to the North Warning System.The Department of the Air Force will improvedomain awareness through new technologiesranging from over the horizon radar tospace assets.7

Command, Control, Communications,Intelligence, Surveillance &Reconnaissance (C3ISR)Space CapabilitiesArctic communications capabilities and capacityabove 66 degrees North latitude must meet JointForce and Air and Space Forces’ needs for the region.Environmental and geographic limitations challengethe Air and Space Forces’ three main communicationscapabilities in the region: satellite communications,high frequency radio, and long-haul terrestrialsystems. In response to these impediments:Space assets reduce the need for a physical footprintin the demanding Arctic operating environmentwhile supporting ISR, missile defense, satellitecommand and control, and all-domain awareness.Challenges in the space domain are particularlyacute in the Arctic. To operate effectively, theSpace Force must overcome Arctic-unique orbitalmechanics and electro-magnetic obstacles as wellas rising threats from the United States’ principalcompetitors. The Department can no longer assumespace superiority. In response:The Air and Space Forces will work aspart of the Joint Force to develop an Arcticcommunications roadmap that examinescurrent capabilities and emerging technologies.The Space Force will work closely with allies,partners, and the private sector to establishmutually beneficial relationships that addresscommon goals in space and the Arctic region.The Department will pursue satellitecommunications options with the Joint Forceand ally and partner nations to developcritical communications and data links foroperations in the region.The Space Force will develop new technologiesand modernize existing assets in the Arcticnecessary to ensure access to and freedom tooperate in space.The Space Force will devise capabilitiesto mitigate and predict environmentaldisturbances unique to the Arctic region.The Air and Space Forces will work as part ofthe Joint Force and with interagency partnersto ensure adequate C3ISR coverage to matchprojected activity in the region.Terrestrial WeatherForecasting & PredictionWeather in the North American Arctic remainsdifficult to predict due to terrain, scarce surfacebased sensors, and underdeveloped climate models.Frequent winds, fog, and icing are hazardous toair operations. In response:The Air and Space Forces will collaborate withinteragency partners to address understudiedareas and expand meteorological coverageincluding terrestrial and nascent air and spacesurveillance systems.Thule Early Warning Radar8

The De

4 The Air & Space Forces in the Arctic The Arctic represents a cornerstone of the nation’s defense. The Department of the Air Force provides close to 80% of DoD resourcing to the Arctic reg

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