CRITICALITY HANDBOOK Volume I
ARH-600C R I T I C A L I T YH A N D B O O KVolume IJune 30, 1968R. D. CarterG. R. KielK. R. RidgwayAdvance Process Development SectionResearch and Development DepartmentChemical Processing DivisionAtlantic Richfield Hanford CompanyRichland, Washington 99352NOTICETHIS R E P O R T W A S P R E P A R E D FOR U S E WITHINT H E C O U R S E OF W O R K U N D E R A T O M I C E N E R G YA N D A N Y V I E W S OR OPINIONS E X P R E S S E D INO N L Y . THIS R E P O R T IS S U B J E C T T O REVISIONLEGALA T L A N T I C RICHFIELD H A N F O R D CO. INC O M M I S S I O N C O N T R A C T A T (45-1)-2130,T H E R E P O R T A R E T H O S E OF T H E A U T H O RU P O N C O L L E C T I O N OF A D D I T I O N A L D A T A .NOTICET H I S R E P O R T W A S P R E P A R E D A S AN A C C O U N T O F G O V E R N M E N T S P O N S O R E D W O R K .N E I T H E R T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S , NOR T H E C O M M I S S I O N , NOR A N Y P E R S O N A C T I N G ONB E H A L F OF T H E C O M M I S S I O N * .A . M A K E S A N Y W A R R A N T Y OR R E P R E S E N T A T I O N , E X P R E S S E D OR I M P L I E D , W I T HR E S P E C T T O T H E A C C U R A C Y , C O M P L E T E N E S S , OR U S E F U L N E S S O F T H E I N F O R M A T I O NC O N T A I N E D I N T H I S R E P O R T , OR T H A T T H E U S E O F A N V I N F O R M A T I O N , A P P A R A T U S ,M E T H O D , OR P R O C E S S D I S C L O S E D I N T H I S R E P O R T M A Y N O T I N F R I N G E P R I V A T E L YO W N E D R I G H T S ; ORB . A S S U M E S A N Y L I A B I L I T I E S W I T H R E S P E C T T O T H E U S E O F , OR FOR D A M A G E SR E S U L T I N G F R O M T H E U S E O F A N Y I N F O R M A T I O N , A P P A R A T U S , M E T H O D , OR P R O C E S SDISCLOSED IN T H I S REPORT,A S U S E D I N T H E A B O V E , " P E R S O N A C T I N G ON B E H A L F O F T H E C O M M 1 S S I O N " I N C L U O E S A N Y E M P L O Y E E OR C O N T R A C T O R O F T H E C O M M I S S I O N , OR E M P L O Y E E O FS U C H C O N T R A C T O R , T O T H E E X T E N T T H A T S U C H E M P L O Y E E OR C O N T R A C T O R O F T H EC O M M I S S I O N , OR E M P L O Y E E O F S U C H C O N T R A C T O R P R E P A R E S , D I S S E M I N A T E S , ORP R O V I D E S A C C E S S T O , A N Y I N F O R M A T I O N P U R S U A N T T O H I S E M P L O Y M E N T OR C O N T R A C T W I T H T H E C O M M I S S I O N , OR H I S E M P L O Y M E N T W I T H S U C H C O N T R A C T O R .UNCLASSIFIEDS4-6000-020 ( 1 - 6 9 )„ . „ , „,C„LAND. WASH.
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UNCLASSIFIEDiiARH-6 00GENERAL CONTENTSI.ADMINISTRATIONII.ENGINEERING DATAUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDiiiARH 6 00PREFACEThis Handbook was produced primarily to aid Atlantic RichfieldHanford Company employees whose work involves criticalitysafety considerations. Use of this book is not intended toreplace final analysis of problems by a qualified criticalitysafety specialist, but it should permit greater freedom inpreliminary studies.The mere existence of a fissile material in quantities greaterthan a minimum critical mass creates some finite risk thatcriticality will occur. This risk of criticality can be heldto an acceptably low probability by imposing restrictions onthe manner in which the fissile material is processed, transported, and stored. This Handbook provides guidance in suchareas for the process engineer or designer in the initialsteps of equipment and process design or modification priorto review by a criticality safety specialist. In addition,the Handbook combines a number of fissile material handlingrequirements into a single reference manual and supplementsmore widely recognized reference works.Because the increasing amount of experimental data permits(and sometimes demands) periodic revision of criticalityparameters and because those of us in criticality safetywork sometimes have peculiar ideas about what constitutesan applicable, useful or safe set of data for our ownpeculiar problems, we have designed the Handbook in a looseleaf form. Thus, pages can be updated, new material addedor sections rearranged to the desire of the user.Some of the data included here is less conservative thanmaterial from TID-7016 and TID-7028, the normally acceptedgeneral references on criticality parameters. This isprimarily due to a greater amount of available experimentaldata and to greater confidence in the computer programspresently used in criticality calculations. The computercodes used are generally indicated with each set of data.Those used within the Atlantic Richfield Hanford Companyare currently:UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDivARH-6 00For cross section generation andreactivity calculationsGAMTEC IIHAr4I4ERFor critical size and reactivitycalculations, one and For reactivity calculations ofsingle units and arrays inthree dimensionsGEM 4KENONo attempt has been made initially to generate "safe"parameters. VJherever generated parameters are considered tohave a potential for being nonconservative, comparisons withexisting experimental data (if any) are shown or referenced,and an attempt is made to indicate the degree to which thedata is nonconservative.The proper use of the enclosed information requires a basicunderstanding of criticality. Improper use of this information can result in a criticality incident with the possibleloss of life and many lost man-hours during recovery.UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDvARH-600DISTRIBUTIONInternalAtlamtic Richfield Hanford Company1-2.ARHCO 3. R. A.h. L. I.5. L, E.6. M. H.T. R. D.8. R. P.9. D. T.10. J. B.11. H. H.12. W. P.13. R. E.ll . G. R.15. L. M.IT. G. A.18. C. E.19. Files20. R. E.21. W. E.22. L. M.23. K. R.2k. J. B.25. J. W.26. P. W,27. R. E.28. R. A.3h. H. L.36. C. A.37. R. J.38. D. A.39. M. J.U8. R. E.5U. W. A.55-56. D. E.56. R. 3.65. D. FIED
viARHCO Nuclear Diversification Department1 1-it2.H. C. RathvonExternalAEC Richland Operations Office1 0.J. D. WhiteAEC Division o f Compliance - Region Ikl.H. W. Crocker66.W. G. BrownAEC Division of Technical Information Extensioni»3.FilesAEC Headquarterskk.61.62.63.6 egaardenStevensonAEC Idaho Operations Office72.B. F. EstesAerojet Nuclear Corporation, Idaho F a l l s , Idaho71.J. A. EggertAktiebolaget AtoracncrgiStudsvik, S-61101 NykSping 1 , Sweden69.R. EkarvAllied Chemical Corporation, Idaho Falls, Idaho70.W. G. MorrisonAtomics International, Canoga Park, California67.* . Ketzlach
viiBabcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia68.Mrs. Anne M. SchwartzBettis Atomic Power Laboratory, Westinghouse Electric Corporationk9.Philip B. BeilinCEN MolHealth PhysicsBoeretung 200Mol, Belgiiim52.J. P. DeWormDouglas United Nuclear32.33.51.H. TofferR. L. MillerA. K. HardinE. I. diiPont de Nemours & Co. , Inc. , Savannah River Laboratory60.H. K. ClarkLos Alamos Scientific Laboratory50.D. R. SmithN a t i o n a l Lead Company of Ohioh6.D. L. DunawayNuclear Materials and Equipment Corporationit5.B. B. ErnstOak Ridge National Laboratories59.J. T. ThomasPacific Northwest Laboratories29.30.31.35.73-7 .C.E.i .C.C.L.D.G.L.E.BrownClaytonWittenbrockBrownNewton (Emergency Control Center)
viiiWADCO Corporation16.C. A. RogersWestinghouse Electric Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa.53.FilesUnion Carbide Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee57.W. T. Mee
ONB.ADMINISTRATIVE POLICYC.CRITICALITY CONTROL CRITERIAD.AUDITSE.EMERGENCY AND TRAININGF.CRITICALITY PREVENTION IN FIRE FIGHTINGG.TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGEUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDA.I.A-1ARH-600INTRODUCTIONThe a d m i nl ii s trative portion of this book is specific fort h e A! v . t l a n t i c Richfield Hanford Company (ARHCO), but othersmay f i n d i t useful and instructive. The policies and proc e d u r e s f o r imposing restrictions on the processing, transp o r t i n g , a n d storage of fissile materials within ARHCO ares u m m a r i z e d here. This material covers lines of responsib i l i t y , c r iticality prevention criteria and emergencyconditions much of which has been extracted from ARHCOPolicy Guid es. Operating Instructions, and TechnicalCriteriaUNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDB.I.B-1ARH-600POLICYThe management policy of the Atlantic Richfield HanfordCompany (AJRHCO) regarding criticality prevention infacilities designed to process,transport,and storefissile materials is defined in a series of policyguides and operating instructions that delineatespolicy, reikponsible personnel and the appropriateauthority necessary to assure compliance with thepolicy. Tlie policy for criticality prevention is that,in all of its activities involving fissionablematerials, ARHCO shall exercise control such that theprobability of a criticality incident is held at thelowest practical level. Where practicable, the designof manufadjuring and laboratory facilities and equipmenthandling fissionable materials will include geometriclimitations to minimize the probability of a criticalityincident. In addition, there will be a criticalityprevention system based on written specifications andimplemented by written administrative procedures. Thespecificatz.ons will establish limits so that no singlecredible ecjuipment failure or human error can cause acriticality incident. The written specifications willdefine limits in practical and administrativelycontrollable terms. Appropriate personnel trainingand enforcement assure understanding of the specificationsand appropi'iate use of the administrative procedures.Table B.l ;hows the responsibilities and relationshipsfor criticcility control and Figure B.l shows the pathfor criticcility prevention specification developmentapproval and auditing within ARHCO.UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDI.B-2ARH-600TABLE B.lCRITICALITY CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIESControl Mechanisms Initiate (1)ApproveImplementAdviseTechnical CriteriaR&DVice PresidentOperationsDesign ReviewFER&DHazards ReviewPlant, OSEFE, R&DOperatingSpecificationsR&D, OSE,FEQuarterly AuditsOSEOSE, R&DAnnual Reviewand entEachComponentEachComponentR&D, FE,OSEEmergency PlansPlantPlantPlantR&D, FE,OSEOSE, FEPlantR&D, OSEFacility ChangesExternalExpertsPlantR&DPlant, FE, R&D, FEOSER&D, OSEPlantExternalExpertsR&D, FE(1)R&DOSEFEPlant Research and Development DepartmentOperations Support Engineering DepartmentFacilities Engineering DepartmentAny of the operating facilities.UNCLASSIFIED
I.B-3UNCLASSIFIEDARH-600FIGURE B . lPATH FOR CRITICALITY PREVENTION SPECIFICATIONSRESEARCH ANDI3EVEL0PMENTOPERATIONSSUPPORT ENGINEERING8dMANUFACTURINGLEPARTMENT Q) RESPONSIBLEOSE SECTIONSEPARATIONSCHEMISTRYRESPONSIBLEMFG SECTION- -KZ)- JADVANCE PROCESSDEVELOPMENT8c123k5678NUCLEARMATERIALS- N-iNeed for CritlcaLity Prevention Specifications (CPS) is identified.CPS is formulate ., drafted, reviewed, and signed "by issuer.Reviewed for tecimical content by Senior Engineer Criticality Prevention.Approved by Ifenai,?er of Research and Development.Approved by Mana ger of Operations Support Engineering,Accepted by Man'ufacturing Section, Separations Chemistry Laboratory, orPu Process Engineering.Administered by the responsible Section or Laboratory.(a) Continual seLf audit by responsible Section or Laboratory,(b) Continual audit by responsible OSE Section.(c) Quarterly formal audit by representatives from Nuclear Materials,APD and OSS.(d) Annual audit of Chemical Processing Division by external experts.NOTE:Criticality Prevention Specifications applicable to the FacilitiesEngineering aptivities follow a route analogous to that outlinedfor the Separ tions Chemistry Laboratory. Operations SupportEngineering i involved only in the quarterly audit function.UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIEDC.I.C-1ARH-600TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRITICALITY -"- INTRODUCTIONAtlanti c Richfield Hanford Company (ARHCO) PolicyGuide 1 .6.6, "Criticality Prevention," and OperatingInstruction 1.6.6.2, "Criticality Prevention inProcess Facilities," present the policy of the Chemical Proces sing Division with respect to the controlof cri tiLcality hazards, and delegate the responsibilityfor spe cifying safe limits for the design and operationof proces s facilities to the Manager, Research andDevelopment Department. The purpose of this documentis to def ine the technical criteria to be used indeveloping the limits within which CPD facilities areto be de signed and operated. These criteria are basedon the JDperating experience accumulated from the processing of fissile materials since the year 1944.The mere existence of a fissile material in quantitiesgreater than a minimum critical mass creates somefinite risk that criticality will occur. This risk ofcritica lity can be held to a very low value by imposingrestri ctions on the manner in which the fissile materialis sstored or handled. Such controls are to be imposedas needfedPOLICYIn all of its activities involving fissile materials,ARHCO sIiall exercise control such that the probabilityof a cr ticality incident is held at the lowest practical levfe 1.3.SPECIFICATIONSARHCO Policy Guide 1.6.6 and Operating Instruction1.6.6.2 require that criticality prevention specifications define the limits within which operating orexperimental work may be performed; before issuance,these s]pecifications must be reviewed for technicaladequac;,*- by a specialist in criticality calculationsand approved by the Manager, Research and Development.(1)R. E. Tomlin son, "Technical Criteria for the Prevention ofCriticality, Chemical Processing Division, ARH-468 REV,April 1971UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED3.1I.C-2ARH-600Materials to be CoveredAll fissile materials shall be controlled byspecifications unless specifically exemptedbelow. Fissile materials are those nuclidescapable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction.Known fissile nuclides are: U, U, Np, Pu, 2 Pu, - opu, - ipu, - Am, " Am, '' Am,2'*'*Cm, 2'»7cjn 2I. cf 25icf.The following materials are exempt from needfor specifications:Natural and depleted uranium.Fifteen grams of " Am or any fissile nuclidewith atomic number 95.Two grams of any fissile nuclide with atomicnumber 95.Uranium solutions, compounds and metal, if notlatticed, enriched to 1.0 percent u or itsnuclear equivalent.3.2 Np, Pu, "" Am, and '*'*Cm with H/X 5 inany amounts.AssumptionsIn formulating design and operating limits, theresponsible process engineer shall consider allpertinent process conditions and failure possibilities. The worst foreseeable combination offissile material density, diluent compositionand distribution, reflection, interaction, andmeasurement uncertainty must be assumed. Someconditions may be assumed to be incredible ifspecifically excluded by technical or designconsiderations. For example, allowances may bemade for neutron absorbers, i.e., nitrogen,boron, uranium-238, etc., that will be associated with the fissile material, provided thepresence of the absorber can be satisfactorilyassured by technical factors or operationalcontrol. The use of the assumed conditions bythe criticality specialist in reviewing theproblem implies his consideration and acceptanceof them.UNCLASSIFIED
I.C-3UNCLASSIFIEJD3.3ARH-600Technical Reviewo:: specifications that are clearly referable toLonally recognized criticality prevention data,ai:ith 5 technical review may be based on agreementbetween the specification and the data. Forspecifications based on calculations that cannotbe checked by simple reference to recognized data,th review shall be made using two independentca J.culational methods or a specialist other thanth«;th. one making the original review will check theca Iculations.3. 4Ex] erimental BasisThe specified limits shall be derived fromex]3erimental data whenever possible. In theabsence of directly applicable experimentalmeasurements, the limits may be based on theorei:ical calculations, provided the validity ofthe calculational method has been proven byco::relation with experimental data. Attemptsshall be made to assign limits of error to bothex]3erimental and calculational results.3. 5Sa::ety FactorsSa ety factors must be included in all limitsand shall be appropriate for the degree of riskinvo Ived. Minimum safety factors may be usedwhen the specified limits are directly referab e to experimentally verified values, whenoperatioropns and design limits can be held withinth specified limits with a high degree of confid nce, and when an accidental nuclear reactionWOlflId produce a minimum of risk to operating1 or production continuity and no hazardpepe::sonneto the public.Th i keff to be used as peannissible upper limitsfo:: the worst foreseeable conditions is definedbelow for three levels of confidence in theaccuracy of the calculated k ff value:a.If reliable experimental data exist forclosely similar systems and adequate calculational techniques exist for relativelyUNCLASSIFIED
I.C-4UNCLASSIFIEDARH-60 0small extrapolation of the data, the kgffof spheres and cylinders shall not exceed0.98 and the k of slabs shall not exceed0.97. b.If limited experimental data exist for asimilar system and relatively large butreasonable extrapolations are necessary,the calculated keff of the system shallnot exceed 0.95.c.If no applicable experimental data areavailable such that calculations must bebased on theory derived from experimentaldata, the calculated k ff of the systemshall not exceed 0.90.Increased safety factors should be usedin some conditions as noted below.3.5.1Probability of ErrorSafety factors shall be proportionateto the probability that the specifiedcriticality prevention limits will beexceeded. For example, it is possible to specify the exclusion ofwater or equipment dimensions with ahigh degree of confidence. On theother hand, a possible operatingerror has a finite probability ofbeing committed at some time in thefuture.3.5.2Risk to PersonnelSizable and multiple safety factorsare desirable when personnel are tobe located in the proximity offissile materials; conversely, whena massive shield is interposedbetween the fissile material andpersonnel, a somewhat higher riskof criticality can be tolerated.In this context, a massive shieldis defined as at least two feet ofordinary concrete or its attenuationUNCLASSIFIED»
UNCLASSIFIEDI.C-5ARH-600equivalent for the neutrons andgamma rays emitted during a nuclearexcursion; the shield and othercontainment barriers should havesufficient mechanical strength toconfine any materials dispersed bythe potential reaction.3.6Al!LoWance for EmergenciesRe 3ognizing that gross contamination of theen ?'ironment would create a greater cumulativehazard than would be created by nuclear criticality, the specifications may permit actio
CRITICALITY HANDBOOK Volume I June 30, 1968 R. D. Carter G. R. Kiel K. R. Ridgway Advance Process Development Section Research and Development Department Chemical Processing Division Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Richland, Washington 99352 NOTICE THIS REPORT WAS
Nuclear Criticality Safety Directed Self-Study Learning Objective When you finish this section, you will be able to: 4.1.1 Define nuclear criticality safety. NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY Introduction Nuclear criticality safety has been defined as the protection against the conseque
Texts of Wow Rosh Hashana II 5780 - Congregation Shearith Israel, Atlanta Georgia Wow ׳ג ׳א:׳א תישארב (א) ׃ץרֶָֽאָּהָּ תאֵֵ֥וְּ םִימִַׁ֖שַָּה תאֵֵ֥ םיקִִ֑לֹאֱ ארָָּ֣ Îָּ תישִִׁ֖ארֵ Îְּ(ב) חַורְָּ֣ו ם
Keywords: cinematic theory of cognition, AM pattern, criticality, phase transition, Freeman K set, Hebbian assembly, graph theory, neuropercolation INTRODUCTION It is now commonplace to regard cerebral cortex as an organ maintaining itself in a dynamic state at the edge of criticality (de Arcangelis et al. ,2014;Plenz and Niebur ). Criticality
Defining Holistic Asset Criticality to Manage Risk by David J. Mierau, PE, CMRP This article presents how risks to safety, quality and productivity can be managed through asset control strategies, which are created based on specific asset criticality and failure modes. T he pharmaceutical and biotech industries have a wealth of information -
After failure position and mode analysis of engine, the following failure criticality analysis of components needs to be discussed. 2) Criticality analysis . The criticality analysis is aimed to find the most critical issues in terms of reliability, e.g. failure modes, failure causes and components. These are using quantitative
RSA NetWitness Asset List Device Type Device Content CMDBs Vuln. Scans IT Info Criticality Rating Device Owner Business Owner Business Unit Biz Process RPO / RTO Biz Context RSA Archer Asset Intelligence IP Address Criticality Rating Business Unit Facility Security analysts now have asset intelligence and business context to
Find the volume of each cone. Round the answer to nearest tenth. ( use 3.14 ) M 10) A conical ask has a diameter of 20 feet and a height of 18 feet. Find the volume of air it can occupy. Volume 1) Volume 2) Volume 3) Volume 4) Volume 5) Volume 6) Volume 7) Volume 8) Volume 9) Volume 44 in 51 in 24 ft 43 ft 40 ft 37 ft 27 .
Grouted pile connections shall be designed to satisfactorily transfer the design loads from the pile sleeve to the pile as shown in . Figure K.5-1. The grout packer may be placed above or below the lower yoke plate as indicated in Figure K.5-2. The connection may be analysed by using a load model as shown in Figure K.5-3. The following failure modes of grouted pile to sleeve connections need .
