TRADITIONS IN SOCIAL THEORY
TRADITIONS IN SOCIAL THEORYFounding Editor: Ian CraibSeries Editor: Rob StonesThis series offers a selection of concise introductions to particular traditions insociological thought. It aims to deepen the reader’s knowledge of particular theoretical approaches and at the same time to enhance their wider understanding of sociological theorising. Each book will offer: a history of the chosen approach and the debatesthat have driven it forward; a discussion of the current state of the debates within theapproach (or debates with other approaches); and an argument for the distinctivecontribution of the approach and its likely future value. The series is a companion tothe Themes in Social Theory series, edited by Rob Stones.PublishedPHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (Second Edition)Ted Benton and Ian CraibCRITICAL THEORYAlan HowSTRUCTURATION THEORYRob StonesMARXISM AND SOCIAL THEORYJonathon JosephMICRO SOCIAL THEORYBrian RobertsForthcomingTHE DURKHEIMIAN QUESTDavid HowarthPOST-STRUCTURALISM AND AFTERWillie Watts Miller and Susan Stedman Jones
THEMES IN SOCIAL THEORYThis series explores how cutting-edge research within the social sciences relies oncombinations of social theory and empirical evidence. Different books examine howthis relationship works in particular subject areas, from technology and health to politics and human rights. Giving the reader a brief overview of the major theoreticalapproaches used in an area, the books then describe their application in a range ofempirical projects. Each text looks at contemporary and classical theories, provides amap of primary research carried out in the subject area and highlights advances in thefield. The series is a companion to the Traditions in Social Theory series, founded byIan Craib and edited by Rob Stones.PublishedHEALTH AND SOCIAL THEORYFernando De MaioForthcomingCRIME AND SOCIAL THEORYEammon CarrabinePOLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORYWill LeggettTECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORYSteve MatthewmanHUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL THEORYLydia MorrisINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND SOCIAL THEORYKaren O’ReillyENVIRONMENT, NATURE AND SOCIAL THEORYDamian White, Alan Rudy and Brian GareauFurther titles in preparation
Philosophy of Social ScienceThe Philosophical Foundations ofSocial Thought2nd EditionTed BentonandIan Craib
Ted Benton and Ian Craib 2001, 2011All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of thispublication may be made without written permission.No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmittedsave with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of theCopyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licencepermitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publicationmay be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.The authors have asserted their rights to be identifiedas the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act 1988.First edition 2001Second edition 2011Published by PALGRAVE MACMILLANPalgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,Hampshire RG21 6XS.Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companiesand has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States,the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.ISBN 978–0–230–24259–3 hardbackISBN 978–0–230–24260–9 paperbackThis book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fullymanaged and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturingprocesses are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of thecountry of origin.A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.1020919818717Printed in China616515414313212111
ContentsPreface to the Second Editionix1Introduction to the First Edition1Philosophy and the Social SciencesA Philosophical ToolkitPolitics and Political PhilosophyThe Book and Its ArgumentsHow to Read the Book138811Empiricism and Positivism in Science13IntroductionEmpiricism and the Theory of KnowledgePositivism and SociologyFurther Reading13132227Some Problems of Empiricism andPositivism28Introduction: Two Ways to Criticize PositivismSome Problems of EmpiricismFurther Problems of PositivismFurther Reading28294549Science, Nature and Society: Some Alternativesto Empiricism50234Marxism and ScienceWeber, Merton and the Sociology of ScienceHistorical Epistemology and Structural MarxismRevolutions and Relativism: From Kuhn to the‘Strong Programme’Gender and Science: The Feminist VisionThe Reflexive Turn: ‘Constructing’Nature and SocietyConclusionFurther ReadingPost-scriptv505355586367737474
vi5678ContentsInterpretive Approaches 1: Instrumental Rationality76Weber’s Discussion of the Objects of the Social SciencesWeber’s Methodology: Understanding and Ideal TypesWeber on Objectivity and Value FreedomPhenomenology: A Philosophical Foundationfor Instrumental RationalityInstrumental Variations I: Rational Choice TheoryInstrumental Variations II: Pragmatism and SymbolicInteractionismReasons and CausesIndividualism, Holism and Functional ExplanationConclusionFurther ReadingPost-script778082Interpretive Approaches 2: Rationalityas Rule-Following: Cultures, Traditionsand Hermeneutics838687899091929394IntroductionPeter Winch: Philosophy and Social ScienceLanguage, Games and RulesUnderstanding Other SocietiesWhat Can We Do with Winch?Alisdair MacIntyre: Narratives and CommunitiesHermeneutics: Hans-Georg GadamarConclusionFurther retive Approaches 3: Critical Rationality108Introduction: Hegel, Marx and the DialecticThe Dialectic of the EnlightenmentIdeologyHabermas: The Possibility of an Emancipatory ScienceCritical Theory and the Linguistic TurnConclusionFurther ReadingPost-script108111112114116118119119Critical Realism and the Social Sciences120IntroductionRealism and Natural Science120122
ContentsviiExperiments, Laws and MechanismsReality as StratifiedStratification, Emergence and ReductionReality as Differentiated: Closed andOpen SystemsRealism and Social ScienceCritical Realism and Human EmancipationFurther ReadingPost-script124125126Feminism, Knowledge and Society142Introduction: Objectivity and CulturalDiversityFeminist Politics and Social KnowledgeFeminism and EpistemologyDebating the Feminist StandpointPost-modern FeminismFurther uralism and Post-modernism163IntroductionPost-structuralism: The Move to the SignifierFoucault: The Construction of the SubjectDerrida and DeconstructionPost-modernism: Losing PhilosophyThe Politics of Post-structuralism andPost-modernismWhat Do We Do with the Posts?Further ReadingPost-script16316616716917111Conclusion: In Defence of Philosophy17712Commentary on Recent Developments183Peter Winch and HermeneuticsMeaning, Action and ExplanationUnderstanding Other Cultures and CriticizingOne’s Own‘Limiting notions’, Human Nature and SocialScience 92
ContentsviiiPost-Marxism and Post-StructuralismCritical Realism and Social Science195202Appendix I: Personal Conclusions218Appendix II: Obituary for Professor Ian Craib (1945–2002)228Glossary231Bibliography239Index255
Preface to the Second EditionThe death of my co-author, Ian Craib, on the 22 December 2002 has madethe preparation of this second edition both poignant and somewhat awesome.Although, rather to the surprise of both of us, we were able to co-write a bookwith little or no discomfort, there were quite deep differences of philosophicalorientation between us (see Appendix I – originally intended to be included asChapter 11 of the first edition). I have therefore refrained from any attempt atrevision of Ian’s chapters and, as a consequence, have left my own as they wereHowever, in the 10 years or so since we wrote our respective sections of thebook, the literature of the philosophy of social science has grown. As the rateof change in philosophy and its sub-disciplines is usually quite slow – even‘glacial’ – it is unlikely that a topic such as ours will have been transformed inso short a time-span. Where new developments have seemed to me of particular significance, in clarifying, developing or calling into question our lines ofargument in the first edition, I have added a short post-script to the relevantchapter. In most cases, this will refer the reader to a more detailed treatment inthe new chapter ‘Commentary on Recent Developments’, written specificallyfor this edition. Again, published work that has appeared since the first editionhas been added to the bibliography. Inevitably, the selection of new work fordiscussion in this edition would have been different if I had been sharing thetask with Ian. Almost certainly significant new thinking has appeared but noone volume could cover all materials. Partly this is because the world of academic publishing has escalated in sheer volume to the point where any claim to‘completeness’ must be treated with scepticism.But also, some of the developments that have taken place more recently bearupon topics and traditions of thought that belong to Ian’s share in the divisionof labour between us. As well as being less familiar with those topics than wasIan, I also have a somewhat different ‘take’ on the issues. So, where I commenton some of this literature (especially in relation to Chapter 6), I have taken theopportunity to include some thoughts of my own that open up differenceswith Ian’s arguments. In fact, this was part of our original intention for thebook – Ian and I had conducted one very long discussion, often includingother colleagues and students, through the quarter-century that we workedtogether. Our initial thought was that we might actually emphasize our differences in this book and continue the debate in print. In the end, the book tookthe form of something closer to a conventional textbook than either of us hadintended. If this new edition takes us back in this respect to something morelike the original intentions of its authors, then the only sadness is that Ian is noix
xPreface to the Second Editionlonger around to add his characteristically pithy and insightful rejoinders. Thatsaid, enough of Ian remains in my head for me to hear him chortle a wittydemolition.I have also taken the liberty of responding to one of the reviewers of the firstedition. Garry Potter (2002), in a very generous set of comments, argues for arather different pedagogy. Maybe Ian and I were too scrupulous in being fairto the various positions we discussed – perhaps we should have made it clearerwhere we thought the arguments were more convincing? Should we have‘come out’ more with our own (albeit provisional) intellectual positions? Ofcourse, I cannot speak for Ian (though his contribution to Appendix I shouldgive some illumination), but hopefully my own sympathies will be more evident in the new ‘Commentary on Recent Developments’. However, despitetheir more ‘committed’ character, these notes are intended to retain the carefuland respectful attitude to alternative points of view which (I hope) were a feature of the first edition. Partly because of its more committed nature, the new‘commentary’ section will probably be experienced as more demanding in itslevel. New readers might be advised to read the relevant sections of the maintext before turning to the new material.In sum, this new edition includes brief updates on the state of debate on thetopics covered in most chapters. These updates are added as post-scripts to therelevant chapters. There is a more extended review and critical commentary onwhat has seemed to me the more significant of the additions to the literaturesince Ian and I wrote the book. This new ‘Commentary on Recent Developments’ includes a detailed engagement with a recent book staunchly defendingthe work of Peter Winch that allows me to take the discussion of Winch’s workrather further than Ian does in his Chapter 6. It also includes a discussion of animportant development among the ‘posts’ in the shape of post-Marxist discourse theory, together with an overview of the great recent proliferation ofwork in the critical realist tradition.This new edition also includes a slightly modified version of an obituary forIan that I wrote for publication in the journal Radical Philosophy. Finally, I haveincluded a chapter originally prepared for, but not published in, the firstedition. Ian and I both felt that it would help readers to make sense of theselection of topics and arguments used in the book if we owned up to our ownpersonal intellectual (and political) journeys. We accepted the advice of readersnot to include it at that time, but the lapse of time since we wrote it has made itseem more appropriate for this second edition. The insights Ian gave into hisown intellectual biography may be of particular interest.Finally, many new works are included in the updated bibliography.Ted Benton
1Introduction to the First EditionPhilosophy and the Social SciencesPhilosophy and the social sciences are usually seen to be separate subjects, sowhy should students of the social sciences be interested in philosophy? We hopethat this question will have answered itself by the end of our book, but we canmake a start with it right away. At the time when modern science was in theprocess of emergence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was verydifficult to say where the boundary between philosophy and science should beplaced. It was only later that it became more conventional to see a separationbetween the two. As this separation took place, there were two basic models ofthe relationship. In one view, philosophy could arrive at certain knowledge byrational argument. The most fundamental truths about ourselves and thenature of the world we live in, as well as the rules for arriving at such knowledge, could be established by philosophers. In this way, philosophy provided‘foundations’ for the research done in the particular scientific specialisms. Thisis sometimes called the ‘masterbuilder’ or ‘master-scientist’ view of philosophy,and it is associated with an approach to philosophy called ‘metaphysics’. Inmetaphysics, philosophers try to give an account of the universe, the world andeverything in it. Nowadays philosophers tend to be a bit more modest.The alternative view of the relation between philosophy and the sciences issometimes called the ‘underlabourer’ view. On this view, it is accepted thatarmchair speculation about the nature of the world cannot give us certain orreliable knowledge. Knowledge can come only from practical experience, observation and systematic experimentation. So, the special sciences don’t need towait for philosophers to provide them with foundations, or to tell them whatthey should think. On the underlabourer view, philosophy should be there toprovide help and support to the work of the scientists, as they get on with thejob of discovering how nature works. But what sort of help can philosophy give?There are various different views on this. One view is that in our common-sensethinking there are prejudices, superstitions and unquestioned assumptionswhich are obstacles to scientific progress. Philosophy can perhaps play a part inexposing these and criticizing them, so as to set science free. This is a bit likeclearing away the dead leaves on the railway line to let the trains run on.1
2Philosophy of Social ScienceAnother sort of help might be to provide a map of the pattern of existingscientific knowledge, so that scientific specialists can get some idea about wherethey are in the wider field of knowledge. A third possibility is that the philosophers can use their expertise in logic and argumentation in refining the methodsof investigation which scientists use.In this book, philosophy will be used in all these ways, but most importantlyit will be used to provide underlabouring in yet another way. To see what thissort of help might be, we can remind ourselves that philosophy is not just anacademic discipline. In everyday life people use the word to mean somethingrather different from its use in academic contexts. We sometimes say thatsomeone who has had to face up to very distressing circumstances, such as a jobloss, or bereavement, that they were ‘philosophical’ about it. Certainly, mostof us do not spend a great deal of time soul-searching about the meaningof life, or the ultimate basis of our values and attitudes. However, there aremoments in everyone’s life when we are faced with serious moral dilemmas,or with such life-challenging events as losing a job, or a loved one, or beingdiagnosed with a serious illness. It is at times like these when we are forcedto reflect on these questions of fundamental meaning and value in our lives.It is in this sense that, as the Italian Marxist philosopher, Antonio Gramsci(Gramsci 1971) said, ‘Everyone is a philosopher.’ But if we are philosophers atthese times of crisis, it is also true that in the way we interact with each otherin our everyday lives, in the way we choose to spend our free time, in the jobswe choose (if we are lucky enough to have that choice) and so on, we are stillimplicitly philosophers. Our lives display or represent, whether we are generallyself-conscious about it or not, a philosophical orientation to the world. We canthink of this as a tacit or practical philosophy of life.So, how does this relate to the question we started out with – the relationshipbetween philosophy and social science? If we go back to the map analogy, it isobvious that people don’t usually refer to a map if they are confident theyalready know where they are going, and how to get there. In everyday life,when things are going on smoothly, with no major problems, we aren’t forcedto question our basic attitudes and priorities in life. But in the social sciences,things do not run along smoothly. (As we will see, the natural sciences don’trun along smoothly either, but most of the time this fact is less obvious.) Thesocial sciences are often derided by public figures and in the media, and socialscientists themselves tend to be less confident about their achievements thanare natural scientists: they can’t prove their success by generating new andimpressive technologies, for example. Moreover, social scientists are themselvesdivided about what is the nature of their disciplines. Many, for example, wouldnot agree that their work is scientific in the same sense as the natural sciencesare. Even the ones who do will often disagree about what science is. For thisreason, social scientists, and sociologists in particular, tend to be more reflexiveabout their subjects than natural scientists – that is, they are more likely tospend time thinking about just what kind of activity sociology (or political
Introduction to the First Edition3science or anthropology or any other such subject) is, what sort of methods itshould use, what sort of relationship it should have with its subject-matter andso on. The kinds of questions we ask when we are being reflexive in this wayabout our own disciplines are philosophical questions. They are not imposedon us from outside, as in the masterbuilder view, but they arise from within oursubjects, as a result of the special difficulties and deep disagreements that wefind there. So, the main job of underlabouring we will be doing in this bookwill be an attempt to address the question: ‘What are we doing when weattempt to study human social life in a systematic way?’ Depending on how weanswer
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JAMAICA: TRADITIONS. ALIA HENRY ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN V. Jamaican traditions help is defining the island, which what makes it unique. Traditions are acted upon a representing a specific person, era, or event. For instance, some Jamaican traditions consist of drinking sorrel on
i-he Collection of Temne Traditions, Fables etc., as contained in the I. Part of the following pages, was received by the author from one of the oldest Temne men living at Port-Loko about twelve years ago, who has since died. These Traditions etc. were of course delivered orally not in writing. As regards the Traditions about the creation of .
theory and models / theory and practice / viewing the theory / types of theory / value of theory for social work / theoretical perspective of social work The ecological systems theory perspective 91 human ecology / systems theory
influence in modern complexity theory, and how it helps provide a unifying concept for the two major traditions of the theory of computation. 1 Introduction The two major traditions of the theory of computation, each staking claim to simi-lar motivations and aspirations, have for the most part run a parallel non-intersecting course.
Evolution is a THEORY A theory is a well-supported, testable explanation of phenomena that have occurred in the natural world, like the theory of gravitational attraction, cell theory, or atomic theory. Keys to Darwin’s Theory Genetic variation is found naturally in all populations. Keys to Darwin’s Theory
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traditions - such as barns, houses and plows - remain as permanent, unchanged documents of her early settlers' life style. Her performance traditions - songs, tales and fid dle tunes - also help us understand something of the everyday social life and beliefs of Virginia's people. These performance traditions, however, because they have been
Psychoanalytic Theory for Social Work Practice Written by practicing social workers and social work educators, this is the first book in over twenty years to introduce psychoanalytic theory to social work practitioners. The loss of psychoanalytic theory
