Strategic Theory For The 21st Century
STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE 21st CENTURY:THE LITTLE BOOK ON BIG STRATEGYHarry R. YargerFebruary 2006This publication is a work of the United States Government as defined in Title 17,United States Code, section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under theprovisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.Visit our website for other free publication .mil/To rate this publication click here.
*****The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, theDepartment of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for publicrelease; distribution is unlimited.*****Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwardedto: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave,Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.*****All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSIhomepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may beordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.*****The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to updatethe national security community on the research of our analysts, recent andforthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute.Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on ourhomepage at .ISBN 1-58487-233-0ii
CONTENTSForeword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vPreface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viiSummary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixI. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1II. A Theory Stated: Strategy’s Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5III. The Strategic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17IV. Theory in the Real World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31V. The Strategy Paradigm in Short: A Theory Restated . . . . . . . . . 65VI. Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83iii
FOREWORDThe word “strategy” pervades American conversation and ournews media. We tend to use strategy as a general term for a plan, aconcept, a course of action, or a “vision” of the direction in which toproceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local,state, or federal—levels. Such casual use of the term to describenothing more than “what we would like to do next” is inappropriateand belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. Itreduces strategy to just a good idea without the necessary underlyingthought or development. It also leads to confusion between strategyand planning, confining strategic possibilities to near-time planningassumptions and details, while limiting the flexibility of strategicthought and setting inappropriately specific expectations ofoutcomes.This “little book”—actually a monograph—talks about bigstrategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It isapplicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, nationalmilitary strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monographdoes not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it providesa framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentionedabove. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects ofstrategy that appear to have universal application. The theory alsomay have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions,and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offeredherein focus on the nation-state.This Letort Paper is written to expose emerging senior leadersand strategists at the U.S. Army War College to the vocabulary,ideas, and concepts that will enable them to construct a frameworkfor developing their own strategic perspective of the trends, issues,opportunities, and threats confronting the United States in the 21stcentury.DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institutev
PREFACEThis monograph has been constructed by borrowing freelyfrom the ideas and concepts of others, some of whom have globalrecognition and others who toiled namelessly as faculty membersand students at various senior service colleges. I apologize to allfor those instances wherein I may have misrepresented their ideasor paraphrased too closely without proper recognition in my questfor a synthesis of thought that might qualify as pure theory. I alsoapologize to readers for the frequent redundancy and complexity ofmy work—but strategy is a complex thing that is better understoodwhen examined from different perspectives. In the same light, Ihave used examples very sparingly and reluctantly, only as a meansto indicate the path of my thinking. To do more would beg forthe illustration to be challenged instead of the thought, or suggestthe direct application of the “lessons” of the example to similarcircumstances. A theory of strategy is neither a simple checklistnor a cookbook solution. It is a way to understand how you mightdevelop a perspective and approach for defining and selectingalternative choices in an increasingly complex and rapidly changingworld—focusing on “how to think” as opposed to “what to think”—and articulating your choices in ways that can be understood andimplemented. Strategy is neither simple nor easy, but the goodstrategist seeks to express the logic of strategy in the simplest, clearestterms.vii
SUMMARYStrategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Goodstrategy demands much of the military professional whether he isformulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Few do itwell. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mindsetand adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This isparticularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when asuccessful military strategy must be closely integrated with and maydepend on other national strategies of the interagency community. Atheory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professionaland disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monographadvances a theory of strategy that provides essential terminologyand definitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions andpremises, and substantive hypotheses that explain the nature of thestrategic environment and the role and expectations of strategy. Theenvironment is explained in theoretical and practical terms, and theimplications for strategic thinking are developed with a distinctionbeing made between strategy and planning mindsets. The typicalproblems practitioners have in formulating and articulating strategyare discussed. Strategy formulation is recognized as both an art andscience, and the U.S. Army War College strategy model of ends,ways, and means is expounded on and advocated as a methodologyfor articulating strategies.ix
I. INTRODUCTIONLike politics, strategy is the art of the possible; but few can discern whatis possible.1William Murray and Mark GrimsleyIn simplistic terms, strategy at all levels is the calculation ofobjectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk tocreate more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chanceor at the hands of others. Strategy is defined in Joint Publication 102 as “the art and science of developing and employing instrumentsof national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion toachieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”2 Both ofthese definitions are useful, but neither fully conveys the role andcomplexity of strategic thought at the highest levels of the state. Atthese levels, strategy is the art and science of developing and usingthe political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers ofthe state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects thatprotect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, orcircumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy and symmetry of objectives,concepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy successand the favorable consequences that follow from that success. It isa process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity tocircumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishesthis by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, andmeans.Strategy is far from simple, and understanding a theory of strategyallows us to grasp and work with its complexity by understandingits logic. A theory of strategy provides essential terminology anddefinitions, explanations of the underlying assumptions and premises,substantive propositions translated into testable hypotheses, andmethods that can be used to test the hypotheses and modify thetheory as appropriate.3Why study a theory of strategy? Theory’s value lies not in aprescription for success but in how it helps us expand and disciplineour thinking. As Clausewitz reminds us, theory should be for study,not doctrine.1
Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about warfrom books; it will light his way, ease his progress, training his judgment,and help him to avoid pitfalls. . . . Theory exists so that one need not startafresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but willfind it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mindof the future commander. . . .4A theory of strategy educates the strategist’s mind. It helps disciplineour thinking in order to deal with the complexity and volatilityof the strategic environment and the changes and continuities,issues, opportunities, and threats inherent to it. It encourages us torethink our own assumptions and prejudices, but it also encouragesus to consider the possible assumptions and prejudices of ouradversaries and other actors. Strategic theory opens the mind toall the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to considerthe costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences ofthose of our adversaries, allies, and others. On another level, theoryallows the members of the military profession and the interagencycommunity to communicate intelligently in regard to strategy. Itserves as a common frame of reference for the development andevaluation of an appropriate strategy and the communication of it tothose who must implement it. A disciplined theory of strategy alsoallows the professional to evaluate the merits of a particular strategyand critique it in meaningful terms for those who determine policyand make decisions.Strategic thinking is difficult. It is best viewed as both an artand a science. The framework of theory provides a methodologicalbasis for a disciplined thought process to assist the strategistin developing strategy, and it also serves as a guide for others tofollow in comprehending, evaluating, and critiquing the merits of aparticular strategy. While theory is an important aid for educating themind, it is not a substitute for “genius” as described by Clausewitz.History’s great strategists possessed “a very highly developed mentalaptitude” for both the art and science. They had the ability to perceivethe realities and relationships of their environment, and apply themsuccessfully in developing strategy.5 True genius is rare, and somesay that it is no longer applicable in the modern, complex world. Itis, they argue, too difficult for a single person—even a genius—to2
comprehend all the nuances of the modern world, and they proposethat strategy is better served by an organizational process. In spiteof these views, however, strategies often are linked to individualpersonalities in the public eye, and some individuals appear to havea particular talent for this art and science.6It is useful to consider the roles of strategists today. At the U.S.Army War College, three roles for strategists are considered: leader,practitioner, and theorist. Each of these roles requires a distinctset of skills and competencies. The leader provides the vision,inspiration, organizational skills, direction, and personal impetusnecessary to enable others to act in a focused and coherent manner.The practitioner thoroughly comprehends the levels of strategy andtheir relationships and develops strategy. He translates broad policyguidance into integrated strategies that lead to policy success. Thetheorist develops theoretical concepts through study and thought andteaches and mentors others. A master of the strategic art is proficientin all three of these areas and may approach Clausewitz’s genius.7Strategists function at different levels or in different roles withinthe state’s organizational hierarchy, but they all need to understandcomprehensive strategies and communicate them effectively amongthemselves and to the leadership, the planners, and the people whomake up the organizations that ultimately implement strategy.Strategy, then, provides direction for the state, seeking tomaximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes, as thestate moves through a complex and rapidly changing environmentinto the future. Strategists thoroughly examine the environment anddevelop a strategy that identifies objectives, concepts, and resourcesrequired to accomplish the goals established by policy. Theorydisciplines strategic thinking by explaining strategy’s inherent logic;it serves to remind all involved with strategy neither to promisetoo much nor fail to consider any of the attributes of strategy. Acoherent theory also helps leaders, planners, and others to evaluateand execute strategy.3
II. A THEORY STATED: STRATEGY’S LOGICThere is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods ofhistory because nothing vital to the nature and function of war andstrategy changes.8Colin S. GrayStrategy provides a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap betweenthe realities of today and a desired future. It is the disciplinedcalculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and resources withinacceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomesthan might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others.It is the consideration of the relation of how to apply resources toachieve desired results in a specific strategic environment over time.In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specificinstruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military,and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state incooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own—possibly conflicting—objectives.9 In other words, it is the applicationof the power inherent in the natural and societal resources of thestate toward policy ends in an emerging, dynamic, and competitivestrategic environment. Both strategy and planning are subordinateto the nature of the environment. Strategy has distinct attributes anddiffers from planning in its scope, assumptions, and premises, but itprovides the structure and parameters for more detailed long-rangeand short-term planning. Both strategy and planning use ends, ways,and means, and are bounded by the criteria of suitability, feasibility,and acceptability. Strategy has its own inherent logic that can beunderstood and applied.An underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspectiveis that all nation-states and nonstate actors have interests they willpursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end statescategorized in terms such as survival, economic well-being, favorableworld order, and enduring national or group values. Interests arederived from these broad categories as reflected in the strategicenvironment and can be stated more specifically in the context ofissues. The elements of power are the resources used to promote or5
advance national or group interests. Resources are applied throughthe use of instruments of power.The role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection,or advancement of these interests—which are achieved throughthe application of the instruments of power to specific objectivesto create strategic effects in favor of the interest based on policyguidance—is accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner.Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference fora future state or condition and determines how best to get there. Indoing so, strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors;and it addresses resource and organizational issues; even then somefactors simply will remain beyond control or maybe unforeseen.10Rational choice, chance and probability, irrational actors, allies,and competitors are all part of the strategic paradigm.11 Strategyis inherently comprehensive; its foremost purpose is to favorablyinfluence the complex and volatile strategic environment byproviding direction for the judicious application of power towardachievement of policy-driven objectives.12The strategic process is all about how (concept or way) leadershipwill use the power (resources or means) available to the state toexercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locationsto achieve objectives (ends) in accordance with state policy.13 Strategyprovides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this powerto achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive,but it is not predictive. Strategy assumes that while the future cannotbe predicted, the strategic environment can be studied, assessed,and, to varying degrees, anticipated and manipulated. Only withproper analysis can trends, issues, opportunities, and threats beidentified, influenced, and shaped through what the state choosesto do or not do. Thus good strategy seeks to influence and shapethe future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. Strategyis not crisis management. It is to a large degree its antithesis. Crisismanagement occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails toproperly anticipate. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy isthat strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive.A second premise is that political purpose dominates all strategy;this idea has been perhaps best set forth in Clausewitz’ famousdictum, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”146
Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of thedesired end state sought by the government. In its finest form,policy is the clear articulation of guidance for the employment ofthe instruments of power towards the attainment of one or moreobjectives or end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer.Nonetheless, policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the endstate and its guidance regarding resources, limitations on actions, orsimilar considerations. The analysis of the end state and guidanceyields strategic objectives. Objectives provide purpose, focus, andjustification for the actions embodied in a strategy.15 Achievement ofthe objectives creates strategic effects contributing to the desired endstate. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectivesdetermined by the political purpose. Yet, as Clausewitz notes, thatdoes not mean that policy is a tyrant. The development of strategyinforms policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the strategicenvironment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures thatstrategy pursues appropriate aims, while strategy informs policy ofthe art of the possible.16A third premise is th
strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering
May 02, 2018 · D. Program Evaluation ͟The organization has provided a description of the framework for how each program will be evaluated. The framework should include all the elements below: ͟The evaluation methods are cost-effective for the organization ͟Quantitative and qualitative data is being collected (at Basics tier, data collection must have begun)
Silat is a combative art of self-defense and survival rooted from Matay archipelago. It was traced at thé early of Langkasuka Kingdom (2nd century CE) till thé reign of Melaka (Malaysia) Sultanate era (13th century). Silat has now evolved to become part of social culture and tradition with thé appearance of a fine physical and spiritual .
On an exceptional basis, Member States may request UNESCO to provide thé candidates with access to thé platform so they can complète thé form by themselves. Thèse requests must be addressed to esd rize unesco. or by 15 A ril 2021 UNESCO will provide thé nomineewith accessto thé platform via their émail address.
̶The leading indicator of employee engagement is based on the quality of the relationship between employee and supervisor Empower your managers! ̶Help them understand the impact on the organization ̶Share important changes, plan options, tasks, and deadlines ̶Provide key messages and talking points ̶Prepare them to answer employee questions
Dr. Sunita Bharatwal** Dr. Pawan Garga*** Abstract Customer satisfaction is derived from thè functionalities and values, a product or Service can provide. The current study aims to segregate thè dimensions of ordine Service quality and gather insights on its impact on web shopping. The trends of purchases have
Bruksanvisning för bilstereo . Bruksanvisning for bilstereo . Instrukcja obsługi samochodowego odtwarzacza stereo . Operating Instructions for Car Stereo . 610-104 . SV . Bruksanvisning i original
Chính Văn.- Còn đức Thế tôn thì tuệ giác cực kỳ trong sạch 8: hiện hành bất nhị 9, đạt đến vô tướng 10, đứng vào chỗ đứng của các đức Thế tôn 11, thể hiện tính bình đẳng của các Ngài, đến chỗ không còn chướng ngại 12, giáo pháp không thể khuynh đảo, tâm thức không bị cản trở, cái được
10 tips och tricks för att lyckas med ert sap-projekt 20 SAPSANYTT 2/2015 De flesta projektledare känner säkert till Cobb’s paradox. Martin Cobb verkade som CIO för sekretariatet för Treasury Board of Canada 1995 då han ställde frågan
