The Grand Strategy Of The Byzantine Empire
The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire
The Grand Strategy ofthe Byzantine EmpireE D WA R D N . L U T T WA KTHE BELKNAP PRESS OFH A R VA R D U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S SCambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England2009
Copyright 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard CollegeAll rights reservedPrinted in the United States of AmericaLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataLuttwak, Edward.The grand strategy of the Byzantine Empire / Edward N. Luttwak.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-0-674-03519-5 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Byzantine Empire—Military policy.2. Strategy—History—To 1500. 3. Military art and science—Byzantine Empire—History. 4. Imperialism—History—To 1500. 5. Byzantine Empire—History, Military.6. Byzantine Empire—Foreign relations. I. Title.U163.L86 2009355′.033549500902—dc222009011799
ContentsList of MapsPrefaceviiixI The Invention of Byzantine Strategy1 Attila and the Crisis of Empire1172 The Emergence of the New Strategy49II Byzantine Diplomacy: The Myth and the Methods3 Envoys974 Religion and Statecraft1135 The Uses of Imperial Prestige6 Dynastic Marriages1241377 The Geography of Power8 Bulghars and Bulgarians1451719 The Muslim Arabs and Turks19795
vi ContentsIII The Byzantine Art of War23510 The Classical Inheritance23911 The Strategikon of Maurikios12 After the Strategikon26630413 Leo VI and Naval Warfare32214 The Tenth-Century Military Renaissance33815 Strategic Maneuver: Herakleios Defeats Persia393Conclusion: Grand Strategy and the Byzantine“Operational Code” 409Appendix: Was Strategy Feasible in Byzantine Times?Emperors from Constantine I to Constantine XIGlossaryNotes427433Works Cited473Index of NamesGeneral Index491495423421
Maps1.2.3.4.5.The division of the empire afterthe death of Theodosius I in 395The Great Eurasian Steppe 8The defenses of Constantinople268The empire at the accession anddeath of Justinian, 527–565 82The empire in 1025 at the death of Basil II1946.7.The Muslim offensives, 662–740 200The empire in 668, after the Slav, Lombard,and Muslim invasions 2138.The empire in 780, after the Muslim conquestsand the Bulghar settlement 216The empire in 1081 at the accession ofAlexios I Komnenos 2289.10.11.The empire in 1143 at the death of John II KomnenosThe empire at the death ofMichael VIII Palaiologos in 1282 23312.13.The Sasanian empire, ca. 226–ca. 651 394The empire in 565, 1025, and 1360 411230
PrefaceOnce largely neglected, as if the entire Roman empire had really endedin 476, the eastern half that we call Byzantine by modern habit now attracts so much attention that it is even the subject of popular histories.While many are interested in the culture of Byzantium, it is the epicstruggle to defend the empire for century after century against an unending sequence of enemies that seems to resonate especially in our owntimes. This book is devoted to one dimension of Byzantine history: theapplication of method and ingenuity in the use of both persuasion andforce—that is to say, strategy in all its aspects, from higher statecraftdown to military tactics.When I first started to study Byzantine strategy in earnest, I had justcompleted a book on the strategy of the Roman empire up to the thirdcentury that continues to attract both inordinate praise and strenuouscriticism. My original intention was simply to write a second volume tocover the subsequent centuries. What ensued instead was the discoveryof an altogether richer body of strategy than the earlier Romans hadever possessed, which called for a vastly greater effort of research andcomposition. In the end, this lasted for more than two decades, albeitwith many interruptions—some due to my not entirely unrelated workin applying military strategy in the field. There was one compensationfor this prolonged delay: several essential Byzantine texts once availableonly as scarcely accessible manuscripts, or in antiquated editions repletewith errors, have now been published in reliable form. Also, a consider-
x Prefaceable number of important new works of direct relevance to Byzantinestrategy have been published since I started on my quest long ago.For in recent years Byzantine studies have indeed flourished as neverbefore. A great wave of first-class scholarship has illuminated many adark corner of Byzantine and world history—and it has also inspired aclimate of high-spirited generosity among the practitioners. Although Iam more student than scholar in this field, I have experienced this generosity in the fullest measure.Soon after I started reading for this book, circa 1982, George Dennis,whose translation of the Strategikon is the most widely read of Byzantine military texts, gave me an advance typescript of his work thatwould be published as Three Byzantine Military Treatises. Twenty-sixyears later, he sent me a typescript of part of his eagerly awaited editionof Leo’s Taktika, which I urgently needed to complete this book; generosity is mere habit for George T. Dennis of the Society of Jesus. WalterE. Kaegi Jr., whose works illuminate the field, also gave me valuable advice early on.Others whom I had never even met, but simply importuned withoutprior introduction, nevertheless responded as if bound by old friendship and collegial obligations. Peter B. Golden, the eminent Turcologistamply cited in these pages, answered many questions, offered valuable suggestions, and lent me two otherwise unobtainable books. JohnWortley entrusted me with the unique copy of his own annotated typescript of Scylitzes. Peter Brennan and Salvatore Cosentino offered important advice, while Eric McGeer and Paul Stephenson and Denis F.Sullivan, whose work is here conscripted at length, read drafts of thisbook, uncovering errors and offering important advice. John F. Haldon,whose writings constitute a library of Byzantine studies in themselves,responded to a stranger’s imposition with a detailed critique of an earlydraft.Because what follows is intended for non-specialists as well, I askedtwo such, Anthony Harley and Kent Karlock, to comment on thelengthy text; I am grateful for their hard work, considered opinions, andcorrections. A third reader was Hans Rausing, not a specialist but a profound and multilingual student of history, and to him I owe valuable observations. Stephen P. Glick applied both his encyclopedic knowledge ofmilitary historiography and his meticulous attention to the text, leavinghis mark on this book. Nicolò Miscioscia was my able assistant for aseason. Christine Col and Joseph E. Luttwak researched and graphicallyprepared all the maps, no easy task amidst endless revisions. Michael
Preface xiAronson, senior editor for social sciences at Harvard University Press,was the active proponent of my earlier book on Roman grand strategy along time ago. It was with unending patience over two decades that heasked for this book as well, and his experienced enthusiasm is manifestin the physical quality of the publication, an effort in which he was ablyassisted by Donna Bouvier and Hilary S. Jacqmin of the Press. It wasmost fortunate that they commissioned Wendy Nelson to serve as manuscript editor. With infinite care and talented discernment she uncoveredmany a stealthy error, and gently indicated infelicities in need of remedy.Finally, it is a pleasure to thank Alice-Mary Talbot, also here cited, Director of the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, andthe always helpful Deb Brown Stewart, Byzantine studies librarian atDumbarton Oaks. I might have dithered forever instead of finally composing the text had I not met Peter James MacDonald Hall, who demanded the book and removed the excuse of all other work.
The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire
Wpart oneThe Invention ofByzantine StrategyWhen the administration of the Roman empire was divided in the year395 between the two sons of Theodosius I, with the western portion going to Honorius and the eastern to his brother Arkadios, few could haveforetold the drastically different fates of the two halves. Defended byGermanic field commanders, then dominated by Germanic warlords,increasingly penetrated by mostly Germanic migrants with or withoutimperial consent, then fragmented by outright invasions, the westernhalf of the empire progressively lost tax revenues, territorial control,and its Roman political identity in a process so gradual that the removalof the last imperial figurehead, Romulus Augustus, on September 4,476, was mere formality. There were local accommodations with the invaders in places, even some episodes of cultural integration, but thenewly fashionable vision of an almost peaceful immigration and a gradual transformation into a benign late antiquity is contradicted by thedetailed evidence of violence, destruction, and the catastrophic loss ofmaterial amenities and educational attainments that would not be recovered for a thousand years, if then.1Very different was the fate of the eastern half of the Roman empirecommanded from Constantinople. That is the empire we call Byzantineby modern habit though it was never anything but Roman to its rulersand their subjects, the romaioi, who could hardly identify with provincial Byzantion, the ancient Greek city that Constantine had convertedinto his imperial capital and New Rome in the year 330. Having subdued its own Germanic warlords and outmaneuvered Attila’s Huns inthe supreme crisis of the fifth century that extinguished its western
Map 1. The division of the empire after the death of Theodosius I in 395
The Invention of Byzantine Strategy 3counterpart, the Byzantine empire acquired the strategic method withwhich it resisted successive waves of invaders for more than eight hundred years by the shortest reckoning.Again and again the eastern empire was attacked by new and old enemies advancing from the immensity of the Eurasian steppe, from theIranian plateau homeland of empires, from the Mediterranean coastsand Mesopotamia, which came under Islamic rule in the seventh century, and finally from the reinvigorated western lands as well. Yet theempire did not collapse in defeat until the conquest of Constantinople inthe name of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, to then revive once more inmuch-diminished form until the final Ottoman victory of 1453.Sheer military strength was enough to provide ample security for theRoman empire when it was still undivided and prosperous, encompassing all the lands around the entire Mediterranean and reaching deepbeyond them. Moderate taxation and voluntary recruitment were sufficient to keep fleets and some three hundred thousand troops in constant training in frontier forts and legionary garrisons, from which detachments (vexillationes) could be gathered in field armies to suppressrare internal rebellions or repel foreign invaders.2 But until the thirdcentury, the Romans rarely had to fight to obtain the benefits of theirmilitary strength.In every frontier province there were flourishing cities and imperialgranaries to tempt the empire’s neighbors, but they usually preferred ahungry peace to the certainty of harsh Roman reprisals or even outrightannihilation. Commanding superior combat strength, the Romans attheir imperial peak could freely choose between pure deterrence withretaliation if needed, which required only field armies, and an activedefense of the frontiers that required garrisons everywhere, and bothwere tried in succession during the first two centuries of our era. Evenlater, when old and new enemies beyond the Rhine and Danube coalesced into mighty warrior confederations, while in the east formidableSasanian Persia replaced its weaker predecessor Arsacid Parthia, Roman armies were still strong enough to contain them effectively with anew strategy of defense-in-depth.3The Byzantines never had such an abundance of strength. In 395the empire’s administrative division—it was not yet a political division,for both brothers jointly ruled both parts—followed the boundariesbetween east and west first decreed by Diocletian (284–305), whichbisected the entire Mediterranean basin into two almost equal halves.It was a neat division, but it left the eastern Roman empire with three
4 The Invention of Byzantine Strategyseparate regions on three different continents. In Europe the easternboundary, marked off by the provinces of Moesia I and Praevalitania,now in Serbia and Albania, also encompassed the territories of modernMacedonia, Bulgaria, the Black Sea coast of Romania, Greece, Cyprus,and European Turkey—the ancient Thrace—with Constantinople itself.In Asia, imperial territory consisted of the vast peninsula of Anatolia,now Asiatic Turkey, as well as Syria, Jordan, Israel, and a slice of northern Iraq in the provinces of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene. In North Africa, the empire had the provinces of Egypt, reaching far up the Nile inThebais, and the eastern half of modern Libya, composed of the provinces of Libya superior and Libya inferior, the earlier Cyrenaica.This was a rich inheritance of productive and taxpaying lands for thefirst ruler of the eastern empire, Arkadios (395–408). Grain-exportingEgypt and the fertile plains of coastal Anatolia were especially valuable,and only the Balkans had recently been seriously damaged by the raidsand invasions of Goths, Gepids, and Huns.But from a strategic point of view, the eastern empire was at a greatdisadvantage as compared to its western counterpart.4On its long eastern frontier, running some five hundred miles fromthe Caucasus to the Euphrates, it still had to face the persistently aggressive Sasanian empire of Iran, which had long been the most dangerousenemy of the united empire—but it could no longer summon reinforcements from the armies of the west. It has recently been argued that theRomans had an Iran complex dating back to the humiliating defeatat Carrhae of 53 BCE, while in reality the Sasanians were not especially expansionist.5 Perhaps so, but their rulers styled themselves “Kingof Kings of Eran and non-Eran” (Šahan Šah Eran ud Aneran) and theIran part alone encompassed Persia, Parthia, Khuzistan, Mesan, Assyria, Adiabene, Arabia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Caucasian Albania, Balaskan, Pareshwar, Media, Gurgan, Merv, Herant, Abarsahr,Kerman, Sistan, Turan, Makran, Kusansahr, Kashgar, Sogdiana and themountains of Tashkent, and Oman on the other side of the sea—therebyincluding some actual Byzantine territory, important Byzantine dependencies in the Caucasus, Armenian client states, and central Asian landsthat the Byzantines certainly never ruled but in which they had criticalstrategic interests, notably a succession of valiant allies.6The situation in the northeast was almost as bad; the Byzantines hadto defend the Danube frontier against successive invaders from the greatEurasian steppe—Huns, Avars, Onogur-Bulghars, Magyars, Pechenegs,and finally Cumans—all of them mounted archers inherently more dan-
The Invention of Byzantine Strategy 5gerous than the Germanic enemies of the western empire on the Rhinefrontiers. Even otherwise formidable Goths fled in terror from the Hunadvance—and that was before Attila had united the Hun clans andadded many foreign subjects, Alans, Gepids, Heruli, Rugi, Sciri, andSuevi, to his strength.Nor did the eastern empire have the safe hinterlands of the westernhalf: coastal North Africa, which was then fertile and exported muchgrain, the entire Iberian Peninsula shielded by the Pyrenees, the southern Gallic provinces safely distant from the dangerous Rhine, and Italyitself shielded by the natural barrier of the Alps. The geography of theeastern empire was very different: except for Egypt and eastern Libya,most of its territories were too near a threatened frontier to have muchstrategic depth. Even Anatolia, which certainly shielded Constantinoplefrom overland invasion from the east, was mostly settled and productive along its Mediterranean and Black Sea coastal strips, both exposedto attacks from the sea.With more powerful enemies and a less favorable geography, the eastern empire was certainly the more vulnerable of the two.Yet it was the western empire that faded away during the fifth century. In essence, the eastern, or Byzantine, empire so greatly outlastedits western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances by devising new ways of coping withold and new enemies. The army and navy, and the supremely importanttax-collection bureaucracy that sustained them both along with the emperor and all his officials, changed greatly over the centuries, but there isa definite continuity in overall strategic conduct: as compared to theunited Romans of the past, the Byzantine empire relied less on militarystrength and more on all forms of persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuadeenemies, and induce potential enemies to attack one another. Moreover,when they did fight, the Byzantines were less inclined to destroy enemiesthan to contain them, both to conserve their strength and because theyknew that today’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally.It was so at the beginning in the fifth century, when the devastatingstrength of Attila’s Huns was deflected with a minimum of force and amaximum of persuasion—they attacked westward instead—and it remained so even eight hundred years later: in 1282, when the powerfulCharles d’Anjou was preparing to invade from Italy intent on conquering Constantinople, he was suddenly immobilized by the loss of Sicily toexplosive revolt, the result of a successful conspiracy between emperorMichael VIII Palaiologos (1259–1282), King Peter III of distant Aragon,
6 The Invention of Byzantine Strategyand the master plotter Giovanni da Procida. Michael wrote in his memoirs: “If we should say that it is God who gave the Sicilians the freedomthey now enjoy, but trusting in us to bring it about, we would be sayingnothing but the strict truth.”7The epic survival of the Roman empire of the east was thus made possible by unique strategical success. This had to be more than just thewinning of battles—no sequence of fortunate victories could have lastedeight centuries in a row. Indeed the empire suffered many defeats, someseemingly catastrophic. More than once the greater part of imperial territory was overrun by invaders, and Constantinople itself was besiegedseveral times from its foundation in 330 to its ruinous seizure by theCatholic Fourth Crusade in 1204, after which it was not an empire thatwas restored but only the Greek kingdom that finally expired in 1453.The strategical success of the Byzantine empire was of a different order than any number of tactical victories or defeats: it was a sustainedability, century after century, to generate disproportionate power fromwhatever military strength could be mustered, by combining it with allthe arts of persuasion, guided by superior information. The currentterms would be diplomacy and intelligence, if one could disregard theirlargely bureaucratic character in modern conditions—all use of thosewords in what follows is to be understood in inverted commas. Havingneither a foreign ministry nor intelligence organizations as such, theByzantine empire did not have professional, full-time diplomats or intelligence officers, only varied officials who sometimes performed thosefunctions in between or along with other duties. To persuade foreignrulers and nations to fight against the enemies of the empire—most difficult precisely in times of weakness when such persuasion was mostneeded—was only the most elementary application of Byzantine diplomacy, though easily the most important.As for intelligence, the emperor and his officials could not even keepsystematic files, as far as we can tell, and espionage with all its eternal limitations was almost their only means of collecting intelligence.But however ill-informed they may have been by modern standards,the Byzantines still knew much more than most other contemporaryrulers.
The grand strategy of the Byzantine Empire / Edward N. Luttwak. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-674-03519-5 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Byzantine Empire—Military policy. 2. Strategy—History—To 1500. 3. Military art and science—Byza
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