T"OFT9@roman T heater ofOperat ion&Study Number 12
THE c z " A L BOARDUnited S t a t e s Forces, European TheaterEUROPEAN TKEATER OF OPERATIIONSMISSIONr Prepare report and recommendation on the & l i t a r y InteLUgence Service h the &ropean Theater of Operations-thepx%curement, t r a i n i n g , supply, administration and u t i l i z a t i o n of intelligence personnel,The General Board was e s t a b l h h e d ,by General Orders 128, Headquarters,European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1943, asamended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945, and General Orders312, dated 20 November 194.5, Headquarters, United S t a t e s Forces,European Theater, to prepare a factual anelysis of the strategy, tact i c s , and sdrnidstration employed by the United S t a t e s forces in theEuropean Theater0File: R Ol.3/1Study Meer 12
THE G E W WARDUni tad S t a t e e Forces European TheaterTHE MXLITARY INTEUIGFNCE SERVICE IN THEEUROPEAN THElATER OF OPERATIONSPrepared by:Colonel Robert A. Schow, 0 12180, GSC (C-2), Chairman and Chiefof SeotionColonel John H. Claybrook, 0 15817, GSC (G-2)Lieutellant Colonel William E, Ecklos, 0 254154, GSC (12-2)k j o r Jamec K. Roblaon, 0 264548, Car (G-2)kuajor P a r b u r a t C. Hough, 0 1288056, Inf (G-2)Major Le Roy C. Hill, 0 357943, Cav (G-2)k j o r Michael A, Cavaruugh, 0 1015294, Inf (G-2)F i r s t Lieutenant John S. D, Ef8enhoWer, 0 26607, I n f (G-2)Second Lieutenant Bert P. Schloas, 0 2026795, AB (G-2)P r i n c i p s l consultants:Brigadier Gencral Edrin L, S i b e r t , 0 11193, USABrigadier General C. Br.yan Conrad, 0 12226, USAColonel C a r t e r C o l l i n s , o &%, GSCColonel Hamor P. Ford, 0 36!,!7, OSCColonel Cleo A, Hsrper, 0 232778, GSCColonel Charlea A , Masson, 0 1036R1, CSCColonel Francis P. M i l l e r , 0 524591, GSCColonel Charles J. Norman, 0 217635, OSCColonel Georg H. Swerderski, 0 285051, CSCColonel James M. White, 0 251611, GSCLieutenant Colonel A f l l i a m M. Black, 0 138988, CSCLieutenant Colonel John H, Matgomsrp, Jr. 0 20754, InfLieutenant Colonel Paul S. Reinecke, 0 23284, InfLieutenant Colonel Cooper E, Rhodes, 0 258656,Lleutenaht Colonel Howard 8. S t . Cl%ir,0 22017, I n fLieutenant Colonel Dupre Sassard, 0 3 5 2 0 8 , CSCLieutenant Colonel John C. Schmuck, 0 1W251, GSCLieutenant Colcnel Rnlph E. Rsllace, 0 914071, ArndMajor William H. C a r r e a l e , 0 196483, Engrahjcr Maurice P. Frary, 0 295765, InfMajor Joseph C. Hazer! 0 324219, FAMajor Martin M. P h i l l i p s h o r n , 0 370523, CevCaptain Tbcmos E. Cassidy, 0 1302599, Inf,Other coneult a n t a :Repliea were received t o the questionp8lre ( s e e Appendix 2) frcmt h e follcwing:38 Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, I n f a n t r y Divisions12 Aselstant Chiefe of Staff, G-2, Armcred DivisionsI A s s i s t a n t Chiefs o f Staff, G-2, Alrborne Divisicns15 Aaaistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, Corpa3 Assistant Chiefs of Staff, C-2, Armies4 Aasistant Cbiefs of S t a f f , C-2, Bxse Seotious.
TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGE.,Chapter 1: The Military I n t e l l i g e n c e Service. . . .Chapter 2: Procurement and Training of Personnel forMilitary Intelligence Teamse. . .- Training . .Administration. . .- ProcuremntSection 1,ISection 2Chapter 3:eand SupplySection 1- AdministrationSection 2- SupplyChapter 4:Chapter5:e.I 19Recommendationse ee ee. . . . .- ii -e e11.IConclusions719*eSection 2Appendix2.b7,. . . . . .Operations. . . . . .Conclusions and. .1. . . .- Recormendations . . . .SectionAppendix1ex.* .23253030313338
CHAPTER 1THE AULITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE1. Definition of t b i l i t a r r Intsllinence Service. Tha term U i l i tary IntelLigence Service,t1 a s employed i n the European Theater ofOperations, may be defined as an over-all nrou innof intellinenceagencies which had operational, a s diatinct f r b m i t a f f , functions. Itcomprised most of the f i e l d agencies which operated under the ultimatedirection o f the Assistant Chief o f Staff, 0 2 . It was concoiwd as ameans o f relieving the iissistant Chief of Staff, 0 2 , Europoan ThDaterof Operations, from the necessity of exercising administrative c o n t r o lover a multitude of u n i t s and individuals o p r a t i n g i n the f i e l d , whileat the same t i m e giving the f i e l d agencios the advantages of a roasonable degree of autonomy.'2. Establishment of the F i r s t Oporational IntelliRence Agmcies.The first operational intelligence a m " t o bo established. i n m i n tof time, for operation w e r s e i s , and-which l a t e r operated e;ten&velyin tMIE lropan Thoater of Operations, was the Counter IntelligenceCorps.T h i s body, however, was never closely integrated w i t h the M i l i t a r y Intelligence Service i n t h e European Theater of Operations.a.MS-X ( M l i t a r y Intelligence Section-X).T Oh istory ofthe Udilitary Intelligence Service i n the European T k a t e r of Operationsbegan, f o r practical purposes, w i t h the organization i n Washington,D i s t r i c t of Columbia, in November, 191;2, of D h i g h l y specialized i n t e l ligence unit which was given t h e arbitrary designation of uIS-X.2 Thesymbolic designation of t h i s u n i t was intended a t the time t o mask i t sr e a l functions, and, as a m t t e r of fact, it CnrriQd on i t s a c t i v i t i e sbehind a carefully drawn v e i l of secrecy. MIS-X was concerned with thepmblems presented by the capture of our personnel by the enemy. I ttrained selected military porsonnel, particularly idr Forces personnel,i n what t h e i r conduct should be i n caw of capture by the enemy o r ofi d n e n t danger of such capturo; how th y should conduct themselves inan enemy prison camp; under what cfrciunstances they should attempt escape and the moans of effec .!.ng esca?; and how they Right contact andu t i l i z e agents of the escapc routes cst.ablished In occupied countries.&I important feature of t h t ? work of 6GS-X was t.0 colloct positive intelligence concerning the e'ieqv. 3'0 i h i s and, it taught an elaboratecode by m u a s of whick t,me?ic: nsle .:c?lf;.x2 as priuoncrs-of-war mightsend out inteuigence j.0.i f&lr j .?;,!.?;.s; tnd i f interrogated b P i C a n swho aucceoded i n oscapinrf .'.tw e?my ix.?ritory. k part of as-X wast r m s f e r r e d to the United li!Lng.:om, whsi-3 it began operating Fn February, 19W.b. XS-Y ( W i t m y Intclligence &ction-Y). h o t h e r i n t e l u gence agency, designated as MIS- , was S e t UP i n the Europlm ' h a t e rThis Was the Pmcnt of the -Yof Operations i n Fobruary, 19W,agencies concernod K i t h the collection Of into1figencR by mems of the1. See Wrganization and Operation of the Counter IntelligenceCorps i n the Baropean Theater of Oporotions,tt Study No 13, of theGeneral Board, USFET, Ducember, 1945.2. See d r a f t of 1fHistox-yof the Military Inteuigence Service,European Theater of Operations,ll compiled by the Historicdl Section,u l i t a r y Intelligenca Service, no date, Chap 1, Par 1. T h i s work,&illi n tb course of preparation i n Novembar, 1945, w i l l be r e f e r r e dt o hereinafter as "History Of MIS."llfistory of M I S , C M 1, Par 2.3,-1-
It was concerned with t h einterrogation of enemy prisoners-of-war.long-range and l e i s u r e l y interrogation of selected e n e g prisoners-ofwar believed to' possess information of t a c t i c a l or strategical value.Thoatarc. Military Intelligence Service D e t a c h n t , &"enof Operations. I n the early months of the existence of LUS-X and MIS-Yi n the European Theater of Operationa, d i f f i c u l t i e s developed KIto thestatus of their personnel. I n s p i t e of the recamendations of t h eAssistant Chief of S t a f f , 0 2 , end the Theater Commander, EuropeanTheater of Operations, i t was prescribed t h a t tho personnel of theseunits should bo charged to Thoakr overhead and not to t h e 0-2 Section,War Department. In hpril, 1943, t h e tno units, UTS-X d MIS-Y, Werecombined and dotivated as the U i l i t a r y Intelligence &.piceDetachment,t h e preonnol being charged to Theater overhead. At the samo tu, thedesignation of t h e u d t s ms changed to, respectively, F% and X. TheDetaclMsnt was a88igned to t h e 6 2 Section, EXlropean Theater O f Operatione, for o p p r a t i m a l control, and a t the end of May, 1943, t h e kss i s t a n t Chief of Staff, 0 2 , European Theater of Operations, waa givenan additional a l l o h n t of grades and ratings for t h e U l i t a r y Intelligence Senrice h t a c h e n t . Thia precedent, which g r o w i n t o the p r i n c i ple that special provision would be mde for grades and r a t i n g s i n theoperational units assigned to the 0 2 Section, wag of inestimable valuei n t h e later dewlopment o f the Ktllta ry Intelligence Service.3. Other Operational Intelligence igencies. I n t h e meantime,other o m r a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e oaencles had arrived i n the United Kingdom, 0; had tmon a c t i v a t e 2 ttxwe; a8 follows:4, Military Intelligence Sp'uialist Team. The first Nixt a r y Intelligence Specinlist Teams, product of the Niilitary I n t e l l i gence Training Center a t Camp Ritchie, Uaryland, arrived i n t h e UnitedKingdom i n April, 1943, and w m assign6d t o t h e 0 2 Sac ion, EuropeanI n SeptemTheater of *rations,for processing and re-assignmentber, 19U, 12 I terrogator of Prisoner-of-War T e w were present i n theunitad Kin".?b. Field Interrogation Detachment. A small u n i t , known asthe Field Interrogation DotacMnt, having jurisdiction O v e r t h e training of Interrogator of Prisoner-af-Rar a d Military InteUgence I n t e r p r e t e r Teems, t h Q l a t t e r of which had not yet begun t o a r r i v e f r o m theUnited States, was ostabllehed i n the United Kingdom in the BUmmer of1943c. Home Forces I n t e m g e n c e Detachment. A small unit, knmas the Home Force6 Intelligence Detachment beoauee of I t s c l o s e association nLth tho BritFsh Army, was estabLished i n tho United Kingdom i nthe surrmer of 19W, and was prapnring i t s e l f t o t r a i n s p e c i a l i s t s i nthe interprotation of aerial photographs.d, F i r s t Photo Procurernont Detachment. Anothor small u n i t ,known as t h e F i r a t Photo Procurament Detachment, was ostabllshod i n theUnited Kingdom i n the summer of 1943, and naa engagod, i n close cooperation w i t h t h e British, i n the procurament O f photographs doemoduseful t o the War DLpwtmnt and the Offico of Strategic Sorvicos.e . Inter-Service Topographical Ibtachment. knother emanunit, known aa the Zntur-Service Topographical Detachment, w a s estabUshod i n the United Kingdom in t h e -rOf 1943, a d was engwed,4.5.See "History of 1(IS,fl Chap 1, Par 3.Soe "History of US,11Chap 1, Conclusione.-2-
also i n clode co-operation with, the British, i n the preparation of t o p graphical materials a s a i d s In s t r a t e i c a lplanping.f; Censorship Service. Several branches of censorship wereestablished and functioning i n the United Kingdom i n the emmer of 1943.ehese i c h d e da balf-dozen Base Censor Offices; the Press. Radio. andCable Censor Offjce: and the Prisoner-of-Ww Postal Censorship Office-t h e latter being engaged in the censorehlp of the nail of enemy prisoneriwJfCmrwho were confined i n t h e United Kingdom. All of t h e s e ageno i e g of censorship were engaged. i n work which we deemed t o be of lmpbrtance i n m f l i h r y intel!lgence.Fnr t h i s reason t h e r had 311 beenplaced under t h e nominal supervision of the Assistant Chief of S t a f f .G*2. European Thester of Operatione.4 . & &&jshmentpf the Mlllt%Ey In;twC 8 ServTheater of Qlbzwiisu.a. The direction of so marv snd such highlv specisllaed f i r l ds e r v i c e s presented problems of serious proportions t o the G-2 Section.European Theater of Oprations. As the massing of trrops and materials.In the United Kingdom progressed. w i t h the attendant increase i n m i l i t s r y intelligence personnel and functions. the 0-2 Section was bocoeingtop-heaw witb adminlstratlve personnel and duties. and was i n danger offinding i t s proper functions of pollcv-forming and planning on t h e staffl e v e l obscured behind a mas8 of d e t a i l . A t the same time, the f l c l dagencies tended t o lose contact with the G-2 Section. and thus d i d nothave tho broad supervision and direction which was needed t o co-ordinatet h e i r a c t i v i t i e s w i t h the policies of tho Asslfltsnt Chief of S t a f f . C-2.Durinp t h e m”er of 1943, these problems received serlous considerst i o n . and a staff study resulted i n recommndations design d t o r e d w et h e G-2 Section t o reasomble proportions and t o safegunrd i t i n Itsproper functions. It was decided to relieve the Assistant Chief ofS t n f f . G - 2 . of the necwaitv of providing f o r the detailed s u p e m i s i o nand administratior of flold sgercioe, and to s e t up a nm agrnov toachievs theso ends, vhlle preservine t o t h e Assletant Chief of S t n f f ,G-2, t h e brosd power t o d i r e c t the operations of the f i e l d sgencies.b. Tho Milltsr-J Intellieence Service, European Thester of Oper a t i o n s , r a s n tivated by an order dated 17 August 1943, e f f e c t i v e ns of1 Augnst 19/ 3!This order had the effect of consolidating moat of t h ee x i s t l n g f i e l d agencies into a single service f o r the l o r purposes ofudmlnistration, procurement ard tralning o f personnel. and the day-byday direction of operatlons. The order contained a Table of Orgalrimt i o n which gave an a l l o t m n t of wsdes snd ratinps f o r the Headquartersof the lilitarv Intelltgence Service and f o r 11 of the operstlonal i n t e l l l g r c eagoncles that hsve h e n mntioned above, ercept t h e M i l i t a r yIntel! ignnce Specialist Teams. Subsequent ordors. dated 6 September1943. and 1 October 19Ud3,7assigned the above-mentioned agancles to thenewly created Mil itarf Intalligence Service. including t h e I n t e r r o g a t o ro f Prisoner-of-lrsr Teams that had already arrived i n the Un3ted Kingdomana Bsse Censor Officaa Numbere 1.2.3, and 4 , but c a i t t l n g the CounterIntelligence Corps. Other Base Censor Offices and Censorsh p S e r v i c e swere soon after added t o the Militam Intelljgence Service.8 For allprnatical purposes, those early additions may be considered as going t o-.-I6.Swcial Tr00ps. ETOUSA. General Order No 3, 17 A U g 1943. f i l eNo A . 6 Sep 1943; No 8 ,1 o c t i943:Press. Radio, and Ca8 . Base Censor Offices Nos 5 and 6, and the General Order No 9,b l e CenRor Office; see Hq Special Tr-ope, EMIGA.- 3 -
mate up the oriRina1 composition of the Mllitarv Intelligence Service inthe European !Chester of Operations, Thus, the plan of uniting a l l thef i e l d intelligence .igenc!es i n t o a single Yilltarv I n b e l l i g e m e ServiceW E 8 realized I n i t a e n t i r e t y , w i t h the importsnt exception of theCounter Intelllgence Corps, Orlglnally, only the Headquarters of theCounter I n t e l 1igence Corps r a e assigned t o the Milltwy Intel1 igaaceService. and t h e l a t t e r had jurisdiction over the former only i n t h epublication snd d i s t r i b u t i o n of orders r e l a t i n g t o the assignment o fpersonnel. Even l a t e r on, beginning i n Julv, 19&, vhsn detmhments ofthe Count& Intelligence Corps vere attached to the Militarv I n t e l l l gence Service, t h e relatfonshlp was l i m i t e d t o certain adminietrativemetteru.a. Compositlon 35 of 17 December 19L3. A studv made by t h eC-2 dection, European Theater of Operations, 9s of 17 December 1913,showed t h z t t h s compoeiflon of the Military Intelligence Service had notchanged i n any l m p r t a n t respect, except t h a t it included a t t h a t d a t eYilltax Intelligence S p e c i a l l a t Teams in a l l four categories, namely (1)Interrogstor of Prifioner-of-war.(2)U l i t w j Intelligence Interpreter.(3) Photo Interpreter,(4) Order of Battle.Composition as of 19 April 19.U. A study prepared for theTheater of OFerations, d e t a i l h g the composlt3onof the Military Intelligence Service a s of 19 A p r i l 194.4, showed t h a tI t had not by t h a t d a t a undergone any ohange as t o Its component agenc i e s , but t h i t some of them bad been rechrietened with more d e r e r l p t l v et i t l e s , as followsib.C-2 Section, European(1) Home Forces Intellipenca Detachment had by t h i s d a t eacquired the new designation of Photo I n t e l l i g e n c eIndoctrination Center, (Later, i t W 3 8 b o r n simplya s the Photo Intelligence Center.)(2) I n t e r S e r v i c e Topgraphical Detachment had by t h i sdate acquired the new designation of United S t a t e sAmy Topographical Research Department.c, Later Changes i n Composition. Most of the s g e m i e s comprising the Military Intelligence Service underwent an erpanaion inpersonnel aad an internel d i v e r s l f i c s t i o n i n structure commensurate withthe inarease in t h e i r responsibilities. Headquarters soon expaded i n t oa Headquarters Company, and was later subdivided i n t o f o w standardstaff sections w i t h a Headquarters Command. Headquertere a l e o included,by mid-summer of 19U. Liaison Sections for action with Arm Croup3 andArmies. The Field Interrogation Detachment expanded to include DocuRents Sections and Mobile Fleld Interrogation U n i t s . The first majorFootnote 8 (Contd).6 Oct1943. The Risoner-of-War Postal Censorship Detachnent was assigned to tba Y l l 1 t . n Intelligence Service on 12 Feb 19M. See L t r , AG322 OpcC, 12 Feb 1944.
addition t o t h e Military Intelligence Service occurred on 25 October1944 1 the c r e a t l o n and assignment t c f t of the 6857 Order o f BBttleCenter? A t the end of October, 1944, two new units were aasigned tathe M l l l h r y Intelllgence Sorvice, narnely tho 682 Headquarters Company and the 6824 Detailed Interrogitl'on Center.18 On 21 February1945, the Trnining and Operations Eranch, G-2 Section, European Theat e r oflOperations , was consclidnted nfkh the M i l i t a q I n t e l l i g e n c e Service.l2 The Nobile Intelligence TraiMng U n i t was aeeigned on 21 March1945.d. Strength of tho Military Intelligence Sewice. Thestrength of the Military Intelligence Service, as of selected d a t e s f o rwhich figures are available, i s ehcrn i n Table I.TUmEIHq & Detachmenta!.-1 TeamsCensorshipMISOct 445135301436305 1654706591379 12038294449210593a3290 1854759452389 i3334461231 Mar 455209584793295 ,184 479 10312470 13501AT1325 FebI19. Hq MIS, General Order No 25, 25 Oat 1944.10. Hq Conmsnd, ETOUSA. Genernl Order No &o, 31 Oct 194.11. Hq MIS, General Order Nc 12, 21 Feb 1945.12. Hq ETOIGA, Trocp Aesignmont Order No 53, 21 Mar 1945,I
(2)The aver-all strength of t h e Military IntelligenceService inoreased during the period under conafderaf h n , The personne'l of the Headquarters and the Detachmenta increased moderitely, but the increase inavetr-all strength was due primnrily to the great expansion in the Militarv Intel1 jgence Speclalist T e m "6, c o p of this StudZ. From t h i spoint, this study 17111 be Zirriited t o t h e conaidemtion of the Mslitarv Intelligence Specialist Team,Some of the reasons f o r PO l f m l t i n g the scope of this study are 38 f o blows.,a r Numerically, the Milltsry Intelligence S p e c i a l i s t Tear8were t h e largest element In the Military Intelligence Serviceb, The Military Intelligence Specialist Team Pere a f l e l dagency, going sverymhere and camlng i n t o contact w i t h mny other elements-of the nilitam forces, Consequently, it is possible to obtainmore, and relatively impartlrrl, judgments of their work,Due to t h e i r numerical preponderance and the a3do range oftheir operations the Military Intelligence Specialist Teams attractedmore attention than any other part of the Millhrv Intelllgcnce Service,and t o mny people they represented the work of t h e larger organization,To B large extent, t h e re
Military Intelligence Service Detachnt, &"en Thoatar of Operations. In the early months of the existence of LUS-X and MIS-Y in the European Theater of Operationa, difficulties developed KIto the status of their personnel.In spite of the recamendations of Assistant Chief of Staff, 02, end the Theater Commander, European Theater of