Planning And Managing Security For Major Special Events

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Community Oriented Policing ServicesPlanning And ManagingSecurity For Major Special Events:Guidelines for Law Enforcement By Edward ConnorsILJ

Institute for Law and JusticeAlexandria, Virginiawww.ilj.orgPlanning and Managing Securityfor Major Special Events:Guidelines for Law EnforcementMarch 2007Prepared for the Office of Community OrientedPolicing Services, U.S. Department of Justice,Washington, D.C.Prepared by Edward ConnorsInstitute for Law and JusticeAlexandria, VirginiaThis project was supported by Cooperative Agreement#2004-CK-WX-K004 awarded by the Office ofCommunity Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Departmentof Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of theauthor and do not necessarily represent the official positionof the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specificcompanies, products, or services should not be consideredan endorsement by the author or the U.S. Department ofJustice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplementdiscussion of the issues.

vExecutive SummaryBackgroundThe U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) wasdirected by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, to submit a report to Congress on “bestpractices” developed by law enforcement to secure special events of national or regional importance,such as sporting events, concerts, and cultural exhibitions. The report, “Planning and ManagingSecurity for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement,” was prepared after a nationwidestudy that included: Consultations with representatives of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S.Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies charged withproviding high levels of security for major national events. Interviews with private security experts regarding such events as National Football League andNational Basketball Association games. On-site observations of security planning and management for the Republican andDemocratic National Conventions, Kentucky Derby, and other major events. Extensive telephone interviews with more than 40 local law enforcement agencies concerningbest practices for securing major events in their jurisdictions. Reviews of relevant security plans, reports, articles, guidelines, and other documentsproduced by experts in event security planning and management.Purpose of the Guidelines ReportThe guidelines report provides a framework to assist local law enforcement in planning andmanaging security for events that attract large numbers of people. It includes examples of bestpractices employed by federal agencies with security responsibilities, as well as strategies that havebeen effective for local law enforcement and private security. The focus is on national and regionalevents, which often include a variety of VIPs and may be targets for terrorists, other criminals, andprotestors. The variety of approaches discussed can be tailored to large or small local special events.Challenges and PrinciplesIn planning and managing major special events, law enforcement must: Plan for worst-case scenarios—extraordinary crimes, violence by protestors, a possible terroristattack, natural disasters—but also be thoroughly prepared to deal with ordinary crimes andincidents (fights, drunkenness, etc.). Weigh the security measures that conceivably could be taken (e.g., street closures, searches,highly visible tactical units) against the jurisdiction’s desire to produce events that areenjoyable, well attended, and profitable. Ensure that the event continues safely and at the same time respect Constitutional rights,including freedom of speech and assembly. Establish new and effective—but temporary—organizational arrangements, managementstructures, and methods of communication.Executive Summary

vi Ensure that the rest of the jurisdiction receives essential law enforcement services, regardless ofthe size or importance of the event. Ensure that appropriate federal officials, such as DHS State Homeland Security Advisors, areinformed in advance about events with national or international significance to guarantee federalawareness and possible support.The guidelines report offers principles for major event planning and management that recognizethese challenges. The most obvious principle—one that many in law enforcement said cannot beoverstated—is that timely, effective planning, communication, and training are critical.Pre-Event PlanningPre-event planning should begin 12-18 months before the date of the event, if possible. At the federallevel, pre-event planning may begin two to three years prior to a major special event. Often, majornational and regional events involve multiple federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.Additional key partners include fire, emergency medical services (EMS), transportation, public works,health, and other public agencies and the private sector—businesses affected by the event, as well asprivate security.Leadership Authority and StructureGoverning bodies must define events that require the highest levels of law enforcement attention tosecurity. For example, the Secretary of DHS, after consultation with the Homeland Security Counsel,is responsible for designating National Special Security Events (NSSEs). NSSEs are significant domesticor international events, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, andwarrant additional preparation, planning and mitigation efforts. By definition, an NSSE is an Incidentof National Significance as defined by the National Response Plan.By Presidential directive, the U.S. Secret Service is the lead agency for the design and implementationof the operational security plan for the NSSE. The FBI is the lead federal agency for crisismanagement, counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and intelligence, and the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency for consequence management (response andrecovery operations).Many special events are held on private property, with leadership shared among the venue owner/private security and the local police and fire departments. Even when one law enforcement agencyclearly has the lead and provides most of the resources—a July 4th celebration in a city park, forexample—assistance from other law enforcement agencies may be needed (e.g., sheriff’s office forprisoner transport, county police for standby tactical support).Inter-agency Agreement. In multiple agency situations, a simple, straightforward memorandumof understanding (MOU) or agreement (MOA) should be signed. It is critical to clarify the legalauthority of assisting agencies to enforce the law in the lead agency’s jurisdiction. This may not becovered by existing mutual aid agreements. For example, the Boston Police Department neededto involve many other law enforcement agencies to assist with the 2004 Democratic NationalConvention, but its existing mutual aid pacts covered only “emergencies” strictly defined as naturaldisasters. It needed help from the county sheriff to deputize outside law enforcement officers, militarypersonnel, National Guard members, and others. The MOU or MOA should also enumerate thecommitment of assisting agencies in providing personnel and equipment; state when and where otheragencies’ officers should arrive and the specifics of their assignments (duty posts, shifts, etc.); andclarify any compensation for labor costs, expenses, and equipment incurred by the assisting agencies.Executive Summary

viiExecutive Team and Subcommittee Model. Most major event planning begins with creation of anexecutive team headed by the overall event security director who represents the lead law enforcementagency. This team typically involves top command level personnel from all partners in securing the event.Key tasks: Identify all functional areas that need to be planned, create subcommittees to handle thoseareas, and issue timelines—who will plan what by when. Review subcommittee operational plans to ensure that they are comprehensive, consistent,and realistic, and that contingency plans are in place for each major function. Determine any changes needed in routine policies, practices, or laws (e.g., does the unioncontract permit 12-hour shifts to cover a major special event?).Subcommittees vary depending on the event, but 20 or more responsibility areas may be identified,including personnel resources; legal issues; communications; intelligence; field operations/venue safetyand security; transportation/traffic; tactical support; fire/EMS/hospital services; prisoner processing;credentialing; media relations; training; budget and logistics; and after-action evaluation. Additionalareas (especially for NSSEs) include airspace security; critical infrastructure/utilities; hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction; consequence management; crisis management; and cyber-security.Threat and Risk AssessmentsThe FBI, DHS, and International Association of Assembly Managers are among the organizationsthat offer criteria for classifying special events according to threat levels and corresponding securitylevels. The FBI uses eight factors to arrive at four Special Event Readiness Levels (SERLs). The SERLsrelate to anticipated levels of FBI support, but the eight factors are relevant to local law enforcement:size of event; threat (including known threats to the specific event); historical, political, or symbolicsignificance; duration; location; cultural, political, and religious backgrounds of attendees; mediacoverage; and dignitaries attending.Key Assessment Areas. Comprehensive threat and risk assessments involve (1) identifying potentialthreats, including common crimes (robbery, assault, etc.), fires, vandalism, natural disasters, protests,terrorism, or gangs; (2) gauging potential damages from such threats (impact analysis); (3) determiningthe likelihood that the problems will occur; and (4) developing cost estimates and actions to prevent thethreats.Resources. Guidelines and formulas for conducting threat and risk assessments are available fromDHS and take into account the intention and capability of an adversary, as well as vulnerabilities(e.g., building characteristics, security practices). The U.S. Secret Service has also developed threatassessment tools, primarily regarding protection of targets.Threat and Risk Categories. The main threat and risk categories are (1) harm to persons; (2)damage to property; (3) loss of revenue for the event and jurisdiction if incidents prevent peoplefrom attending or cause increased expenses; (4) increased liability due to negligence; and (5) loss ofreputation—tourists may not come to the jurisdiction or event again because of problems.Information Collection. General guidelines for the information collection phase are provided in thefull report, with additional details available from other sources. Briefly, critical tasks are to: Assign responsibility to experienced, qualified assessors Review available information (floor plans, utility layouts, maps, aerial photos, evacuationplans, fire inspection reports, etc.)Executive Summary