Hayman Fire Case Study: Summary - US Forest Service
United StatesDepartmentof AgricultureRocky MountainResearch StationHayman Fire Case Study:SummaryGeneral TechnicalReport RMRS-GTR-115Russell T. Graham, Technical EditorForest ServiceSeptember 2003
AbstractGraham, Russell T., Technical Editor. 2003. Hayman Fire Case Study: summary. Gen. Tech. Rep.RMRS-GTR-115. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky MountainResearch Station. 32 p.This publication summarizes the findings in the 400-page companion document, Hayman Fire CaseStudy, Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. This summary document’s purpose is to convey informationquickly and succinctly to a wide array of audiences.In 2002 much of the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado was rich in dry vegetation asa result of fire exclusion and the droughty conditions that prevailed in recent years. These dry and heavyfuel loadings were continuous along the South Platte River corridor located between Denver andColorado Springs on the Front Range. These topographic and fuel conditions combined with a dry andwindy weather system centered over eastern Washington to produce ideal burning conditions. The startof the Hayman Fire was timed and located perfectly to take advantage of these conditions resulting ina wildfire run in 1 day of over 60,000 acres and finally impacting over 138,000 acres. The Hayman FireCase Study, involving more than 60 scientists and professionals from throughout the United States,examined how the fire behaved, the effects of fuel treatments on burn severity, the emissions produced,the ecological (for example, soil, vegetation, animals) effects, the home destruction, postfire rehabilitation activities, and the social and economic issues surrounding the Hayman Fire. The Hayman FireCase Study revealed much about wildfires and their interactions with both the social and naturalenvironments. As the largest fire in Colorado history it had a profound impact both locally and nationally.The findings of this study will inform both private and public decisions on the management of naturalresources and how individuals, communities, and organizations can prepare for wildfire events.Keywords: Wildfire, fuel treatments, wildfire behavior, social and economic wildfire effects, ecologicaleffects of wildfiresAcknowledgmentsThe Hayman Fire Case Study involved the timely assembling, analyzing, and reporting onlarge volumes of data. A project of this size cannot be accomplished without the help andunderstanding of the families, friends, and coworkers of all of those involved. We, the StudyTeam, thank them all. We thank the many people who attended our public meetings andthose who provided critical reviews of our Interim Report and the peers who reviewed our finalreports. The devil is in the details of a study such as this, and the Publication Team is thankedby the other Team members for their excellent work in producing the publications.Cover photo: Photograph taken from the headquarters of the Manitou Experimental Forestlocated on the eastern perimeter of the Hayman Fire, as the fire approached on June 18, 2002.
Hayman Fire Case Study: SummaryCase Study LeaderRussell T. GrahamResearch ForesterUSDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research StationMoscow, IdahoFire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression Team LeaderMark A. FinneyResearch Physical ForesterUSDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research StationMissoula, MontanaEcological Effects Team LeaderWilliam H. RommeProfessorDepartment of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed StewardshipColorado State UniversityFort Collins, ColoradoHome Destruction Team LeaderJack CohenResearch Physical ScientistUSDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research StationMissoula, MontanaPostfire Rehabilitation Team LeaderPete RobichaudResearch EngineerUSDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research StationMoscow, IdahoSocial/Economic Team LeaderBrian KentResearch ForesterUSDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research StationFort Collins, Colordao
Hayman Fire Case Study Team Members and AffiliationsExecutive CommitteeMarcia Patton-Mallory, Station Director, USDA Forest Service,Rocky Mountain Research Station (RMRS), Fort Collins, CORick Cables, Regional Forester, USDA Forest Service, RockyMountain Region, Golden, COJim Hubbard, Colorado State Forester, Colorado State Government,Fort Collins, COCase Study LeaderRussell Graham, Research Forester, USDA Forest Service, RockyMountain Research Station (RMRS), Moscow, IDFire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression TeamMark A. Finney, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,Missoula, MTRoberta Bartlette, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MTLarry Bradshaw, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MTKelly Close, Poudre Fire Authority, Fort Collins, COBrandon M. Collins, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COPaul Gleason, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and WatershedStewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COWei Min Hao, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MTPaul Langowski, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,Lakewood, COErik J. Martinson, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COJohn McGinely, NOAA Forecast Systems Laboratory, Boulder, COCharles W. McHugh, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,Missoula, MTPhillip N. Omi, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and WatershedStewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COWayne D. Shepperd, RMRS, Fort Collins, COKarl Zeller, RMRS, Fort Collins, COEcological Effects TeamWilliam H. Romme, Team Leader,Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University,Fort Collins, COGeneva Chong, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural ResourceEcology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COJan E. Cipra, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, ColoradoState University, Fort Collins, COCatherine Crosier, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado StateUniversity, Fort Collins, COLynn M. Decker, USDA Forest Service, Washington OfficeLaurie Huckaby, RMRS, Fort Collins, COMerrill R. Kaufmann, RMRS, Fort Collins, COEugene F. Kelly, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, ColoradoState University, Fort Collins, COJeffrey L. Kershner, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office,Logan, UTNatasha B. Kotliar, U.S. Geological Survey, Fort Collins, COZamir Libohova, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COLee MacDonald, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, COGreg Newman, Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, ColoradoState University, Fort Collins, CORebecca Parmenter, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Lakewood, COEric Patterson, Rocky Mountain Ecological Services, Fort Collins, COClaudia M. Regan, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Lakewood, CODavid A. Shadis, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,Lakewood, CORosemary Sherriff, Department of Geography, University ofColorado, Fort Collins, COSara Simonson, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado StateUniversity, Fort Collins, COTom Stohlgren, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural ResourceEcology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CODave Theobold, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado StateUniversity, Fort Collins, COThomas T. Veblen, Department of Geography, University ofColorado, Boulder,CODavid Winters, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,Lakewood, COHome Destruction TeamJack Cohen, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,Missoula, MTRick D. Stratton, Systems for Environmental Management,Missoula, MTPostfire Rehabilitation TeamPeter Robichaud, Team Leader, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Moscow, IDLouise Ashmun, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Moscow, IDJeff Freeouf, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain RegionLee MacDonald, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CODeborah Martin, U.S. Geological Survey, Boulder, CODan Neary, RMRS, Southwest Forest Science Complex, Flagstaff, AZSocial/Economic TeamBrian Kent, Team Leader, RMRS, Natural Resources ResearchCenter, Fort Collins, COGreg Alward, USDA Forest Service, Inventory and MonitoringInstitute, Fort Collins, COHolly Wise Bender, Integrated Resource Solutions, Boulder, CODavid Calkin, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory,Missoula, MTMatt Carroll, Department of Natural Resources, WashingtonState University, Pullman, WAPatricia J. Cohn, Department of Natural Resources, WashingtonState University, Pullman, WACarol Ekarius, Coalition for the Upper South Platte, Hartsell, COKrista Gebert, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MTYoshitaka Kumagai, Department of Natural Resources, Washington State University, Pullman, WAWade Martin, Department of Economics, California State University, Long Beach, CAIngrid Martin, Dept. of Marketing, California State University,Long Beach, CASarah McCaffrey, USDA Forest Service, North Central Station,Evanston, ILErvin Schuster, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MTDan Williams, RMRS, Natural Resources Research Center, FortCollins, COSpatial TeamJim Menakis, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,Missoula, MTCommunications TeamDavid Tippets, Team Leader, RMRS, Ogden, UTDoug Young, Congressman Mark Udall’s staff, Westminster, COBill Rice, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,Lakewood, COJohn Bustos, Front Range Fuels Partnership, Fort Collins, COKatharine Timm, Colorado State Forest Service, Lakewood, COBarbara Timock, Pike-San Isabel National Forest, Pueblo, COPam Gardner, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,Lakewood, COPublications TeamLouise Kingsbury, Team Leader, RMRS, Team is stationed inOgden, UTNancy ChadwickSuzy Stephens
ContentsPageIntroduction . 1Fire Behavior . 9Fire Ecology and Fire Effects . 19Home Destruction . 24Postfire Rehabilitation . 25Social and Economic Issues . 27Conclusions . 31References . 32The use of trade or firm names in this publication is for reader information and does notimply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Agriculture of any product or service
Hayman Fire Case Study:SummaryIntroductionHistorically, wildfires burned Western forests creating and maintaining avariety of forest compositions and structures (Agee 1993). Prior to Europeansettlement lightning along with Native Americans ignited fires routinelyacross many forested landscapes. After Euro-American settlement, firescontinued to be quite common withfires ignited by settlers, railroads,and lightning (Pyne 2001). In August 1910 came a pivotal changein how Westerners in particular,and policymakers in general,viewed fire. Starting early in thatsummer, fires were ignited andcontinued to burn throughoutwestern Montana and northernIdaho. By mid August over 1,700fires were burning throughoutthe region, but most forest managers figured the area couldweather these fires if no dry strongwinds developed. On August 20and 21, the dry winds did blow,Figure 1—The wildfires of the Northern Rocky Mountains in 1910and by the time the flames subburned over 3.1 million acres, destroying valuable timber resources.sided over 3.1 million acres of thenorthern Rocky Mountains burned (fig. 1).These fires killed 78firefighters and sevencivilians and burnedseveral communitiesincluding one-third ofWallace, Idaho (fig. 2)(Pyne 2001; USDA1978). This event soFigure 2—Over one-third oflidified the negativeWallace, ID, burned duringaspects of wildfires inthe wildfires of 1910.the view of the publicand policymakers andled to the strongUSDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 20031
firefighting ethic that prevails yet today (fig. 3) (Pyne 2001).Wildfires continue to be aggressively extinguished with smoke-jumpers, hot-shot crews, retardant bombers, and sophisticated firefightingorganizations. Even with this aggressive approach, wildfires continue toburn throughout the West, and thetotal area burned in the United Statesdecreased until the 1960s when thetrend reversed with the number ofacres burned each year increasing(Agee 1993). This trend was exempliFigure 3—Early fire prevention postersfied by the fires that burned in andshowing the urgency of suppressing wildfires.around Yellowstone Park in 1988 andonce again brought under scrutinythe wildfire policies in the United States (fig. 4) (Carey and Carey 1989).What appears to be different about the recent fires is the number of ignitionsthat contributed to burning large areas. More than 1,700 fire starts wereresponsible for burning the 3.1 million acres of the Northern Rocky Mountains in 1910, and 78 starts burned more than 350,000 acres in the BitterrootValley in western Montana in July 2000 (fig. 5) (USDA 1978, 2000). Contrastthese fire events to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire where only two fire starts burnedFigure 4—Photograph showing one of the many wildfires that burned in YellowstonePark during the summer of 1988.2USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003
Figure 5—Seventy-eight wildfires burned in theBitterroot Valley of western Montana during thesummer of 2000. (Photo by Karen Brokus)more than 450,000 acres in 2002 in Arizona. Similarly, onJune 8, 2002, one start along the Colorado Front Range ofthe Rocky Mountains led to the Hayman Fire burningmore than 138,000 acres in 20 days (fig. 6).The weather systems along the Colorado Front Rangebeginning in 1998 tended to bring below-normal precipitation and unseasonably dry air masses. These conditionsoccurred approximately the same time as the phenomenon known as La Nina began forming in the easternPacific Ocean. The winter of 2001 and 2002 saw a markedworsening of drought conditions. The predominantly ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests throughout the regionbecame drier with each passing season, and by the springFigure 6—The Hayman Fire was ignited on afternoon of June 8, 2002, and bythe morning of June 9 it was uncontrollable.USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 20033
Figure 7—On June 8, 2002, the winds in Colorado, created bya low pressure system centered in eastern Washington, wereconsistently exceeding 15 mph and gusting to over 30 mph.of 2002 the fuel moisture conditions wereamong the driest seen in at least the past 30years. The moisture contents of the largedead logs and stems along the Front Rangewere extremely low: most less than 10 percent and some less than 5 percent moisturecontent.During the first week of June 2002 a weakweather system passed through forests westof Denver and Colorado Springs, Colorado,dropping some precipitation, but this rainhad virtually no effect on the parched surfaceand dormant live fuels. On Saturday, June 8the air mass over Colorado was extremely dryand an upper level low pressure system centered over eastern Washington brought windsexceeding 15 mph all day with gusts exceeding 30 mph (fig. 7). The counter clockwisewinds circulating around this low alignedperfectly with the topography ofthe South Platte River corridor(fig. 8). At approximately 4:55p.m. just south of Tarryall Creekand Highway 77 near TappanMountain, the Hayman Fire wasreported (fig. 9). An aggressiveinitial attack response consistedof air tankers, helicopters, engines, and ground crews, but theywere unable to contain the fire(fig. 10). Within a few hours torching trees and prolific spottingadvanced the fire to the northeast, allowing it to burn severalhundred acres.Saturday night remainedwarm and dry (60 oF and 22 percent humidity at Lake Georgenear fire start) and by 8:00 a.m.on June 9, the fire was estimatedFigure 8—The southwest to northeastorientation of the South Platte Rivercorridor aligned perfectly with the windsblowing from the southwest.4USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003
Figure 9—The Hayman Fire started just south of Tarryall Creek and CountyHighway 77 near Tappan Mountain on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountainsbetween Denver and Colorado Springs, CO.Figure 10—An aggressive initial attack ofthe fire consisting of ground crews, fireengines, helicopters, and air tankers couldnot control the fire. (Photo by KarenWattenmaker)USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 20035
at 1,000 to 1,200 acres in size. Downwind from the ignition location for atleast 10 miles fuels were generally continuous with little variation in bothstructure and composition. Surface fuels generally consisted of ponderosapine duff and needle litter, short grasses, and occasional shrub patches. Lowcrowns of the ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, and blue spruce facilitated thetransition of the fire from the surface to burning tree crowns (fig. 11).As the day progressed, the southwest winds gusted to 51 mph and therelative humidity hovered around 5 to 8 percent (fig. 12) enhancing theFigure 11—The fuels down wind fromthe ignition point were continuous,consisting of trees with low crowns,shrubs, and a deep layer of needleson the forest floor.Figure 12—During the firstdays of the fire the windswere gusty, and the relativehumidity of the air was dry,hovering below 10 percent.6USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 2003
Figure 13—Photographs on June 9 showing pyrocumulusclouds developing to 21,000 feet over the fire.spread of the fire to the northeast. The combination of fuels, weather, andtopography positioned the fire for a major run lasting the entire day andburning 60,000 acres along the South Platte River corridor for 16 to 19 miles.Evacuations were performed in front of the fire, but no suppression actionswere possible forward (east) of Highway 24 (fig. 9). The fire burned withextreme intensity with long crown fire runs and long-range spotting (1 mileor more). Fire spread ratesaveraged more than 2 mphand pryocumulus clouds developed to an estimated21,000 feet (fig. 13).On the afternoon of June10, the high winds decreasedand the relative humidityincreased, moderating theweather (fig. 12) and persisting until the afternoonof June 17. During this period, the fire advancedmostly to the south and several miles to the east (fig. 14).The high winds and low humidity returned on June 17and 18, increasing the fireintensity across the entireeast flank of the fire, drivenby west to northwest windsFigure 14—From June 11 through the afternoon of June17 the weather moderated as did the fire intensity.USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-115. 20037
(fig. 15). The fire advanced to the east4 to 6 miles on June 18, crossingHighway 67 and encircling more than137,000 acres. Because moist monsoon weather arrived, the fire burnedsmall amounts of additional acresafter June 18. By June 28, theHayman Fire impacted more than138,000 acres of the Colorado FrontRange (fig. 16).The mountains and forests of theFront Range between Denver andColorado Springs are critical for supplying water to communities and cities, prized for their scenery, providenumerous recreational opportunities,are home to many fishes and aniFigure 15—On June 17 and 18 gusty winds and low humidity returned,mals, and are the setting for manyfacilitating intense fire behavior as the fire advanced to the east.homes, businesses, and communities.Because of the setting, the HaymanFire attracted intense local, regional, and national interest. Before theflames had died, Congressman Mark Udall of Colorado on June 26, 2002,Figure 16—By June 28 the Hayman Fire had impacted over 138,000 acres of the Front Range.8USDA Forest Ser
Rosemary Sherriff, Department of Geography, University of Colorado, Fort Collins, CO Sara Simonson, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO Tom Stohlgren, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO Da
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