Karim Mezran Is Resident Senior Fellow At The THE MENA .
is resident senior fellow at theRafik Hariri Center for the MiddleEast at the Atlantic Councilin Washington, DC.Arturo Varvelliis senior research fellowand co-head of the Middle Eastand North Africa Center at theItalian Institute for InternationalPolitical Studies (ISPI) in Milan, Italy.Cum intra sul hocchustam los tus denteriti, que octumsentilicaes res sul creo con tum di ci et pubi sendacipoptimusus am publis, scessent, iam quast L. Damconsus hos, Patoraella re criocci inatiae, vid foris conrenihilicio ut diemus ompopti, querrae perente rederitfinveri, uteris licibunum orterfi rmantere mum invere,te, qui in sed pondam nons nox silissu perfex noverrit.Aximunt, qui si pectant eatiam pat, nesensu ltorei confecerecremp ecerem, P. Gra resi coreis nocaeditus; iam erachi, Casdachuc fui cupimil interit, quam. Es halestio nosMula obuncep optemol udacepopte, qua res effrei posmo ipse et videestroris verteriam orestil icerit fursultuamil unt. Occhus? Moverox mendit L. Ravoc, ne pere temvirmis horunt voculem publis, defex sed morum invendeminprobus et fausquo hoc, vas poste, nondii potatquemhossena tilintuam storis crum omne cum.Ibus ius; ipientem ium hos ressici emortus, uteatisseconsus porum, o patus, facit. Labem, ves? Palerrae quamresinatus hossimovem senaticioc, nitandum revivas tissillegerra? Que num nocreo et? Natusum atalesid fue crumeuro 12,00THE MENA REGION: A GREAT POWER COMPETITIONKarim MezranTHE MENA REGION:A GREAT POWERCOMPETITIONedited by Karim Mezran, Arturo Varvellipreface by Frederick Kempe, Giampiero MassoloFounded in 1934, ISPI isan independent think tankcommitted to the study ofinternational political andeconomic dynamics.It is the only Italian Institute– and one of the very few inEurope – to combine researchactivities with a significantcommitment to training, events,and global risk analysis forcompanies and institutions.ISPI favours an interdisciplinaryand policy-oriented approachmade possible by a researchteam of over 50 analysts andan international network of 70universities, think tanks, andresearch centres. In the rankingissued by the University ofPennsylvania, ISPI placed firstworldwide as the “Think Tankto Watch in 2019”.
the MENA Region:A Great PowerCompetitionedited by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli
2019 Ledizioni LediPublishingVia Alamanni, 11 – 20141 Milano – Italywww.ledizioni.itinfo@ledizioni.itThe MENA Region: A Great Power CompetitionEdited by Karim Mezran and Arturo VarvelliFirst edition: October 2019The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflectthe position of ISPI.This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic CouncilPolicy on Intellectual Independence. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine,nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions.To cite this report: Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (eds.), TheMENA Region: A Great Power Competition, ISPI and Atlantic Council, 2019, il.org/Print ISBN 9788855260718ePub ISBN 9788855260725Pdf ISBN 9788855260732DOI10.14672/55260718ISPI. Via Clerici, 520121, Milanwww.ispionline.itCatalogue and reprints information: www.ledizioni.it
The Atlantic Council is a nonpartisan organization thatpromotes constructive US leadership and engagement ininternational affairs based on the central role of the Atlanticcommunity in meeting today’s global challenges.Atlantic CouncilRAFIK HARIRI CENTERFOR THE MIDDLE EASTThe Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle Eaststudies political and economic dynamics in the Middle East andrecommends US, European, and regional policies to encourageeffective governance, political legitimacy, and stability.
Table of ContentsPreface. 9Frederick Kempe and Giampiero Massolo1. US Withdrawal from the Middle East:Perceptions and Reality. 13William F. Wechsler2. Same Ends but Different Means:Change, Continuity andMoscow’s Middle East Policy. 39Mark N. Katz3. The Astana Model: Methods andAmbitions of Russian Political Action. 53Andrey Kortunov4. Redistribution of Power in the Middle East:Moscow’s Return to Syria. 65Chiara Lovotti5. Iraqi-Russian Relations amidstUS Security-Focused Engagement. 79Abbas Kadhim6. Russia and the United Statesin the Cases of Egypt and Libya. 93Andrey Chuprygin7. Turkey’s Russian Roulette. 107Gönül Tol, Ömer Taşpınar
8. Russia’s Strategy Toward Iran and the Gulf. 127Nicola Pedde9. Avoiding Zero-Sum:Israel and Russia in an Evolving Middle East. 141Scott B. Lasensky, Vera Michlin-ShapirConclusions. 159Karim Mezran, Emily BurchfieldAcknowledgements. 163About the Authors. 165
PrefaceFrederick Kempe, Giampiero MassoloOver the last few years, a crisis of legitimacy has beset the liberal orientation of the post-bipolar world order, which has beenreflected in the strain on the multilateral fabric of international coexistence, the functioning of international organizations,and even the institutions of individual states. Most recently, inparticular, the signs of disintegration of the international orderhave multiplied. A sense of global withdrawal of the UnitedStates has contributed to the weakening of the international order created at the end of World War II also and definitively consolidated at the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the growingpower of China and the renewed assertiveness of Russia seem tobe a prelude to a new phase of depreciation of Western impacton the rest of the world, if not the opening of a great competition for the redistribution of power and international status.In the context of this global reassessment, the configurationof regional orders has come into question, illustrated by the extreme case of the current collapse of the Middle Eastern order.Such a phenomenon has been ongoing for several years, and hasrecently accelerated. This was particularly evident in the periodafter the uprisings that erupted in the Middle East and NorthAfrica (MENA) in 2011, when the United States signaled itschoice to rebalance resources and commitments abroad andaway from the region. This choice shifted the regional balanceof power and ultimately challenged the United States’ effectiveness as the external provider of security in the area, leading to apower vacuum that other players have endeavored to fill. On the
10The MENA Region: A Great Power Competitionone hand, the United States’ choice has allowed for the ascentof regional actors: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, Iran,Turkey, and Israel have each gained an increasingly prominentposition on the Middle Eastern stage and become determinantin the fate of multiple MENA crises. As a result, competitionover the MENA region has gradually – but steadily – extendedto a much broader array of players than it used to be in the past.The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for instance, is having an impact on the many theaters where the two are fightingtheir proxy wars, especially in Yemen. Similarly, Turkey’s abilityto establish partnerships with different players in the region hasexpanded Ankara’s network of allies in the Arab and non-Arabworld, increasing its reach and influence and allowing Ankarato further pursue its ambitions. On the other hand, more importantly, the American choice to scale down engagement inthe region has paved the way for Russia’s resurgence.From the end of World War II through the years of the ColdWar, indeed, competition for influence in this important areawas dominated by confrontation between the United States andthe Soviet Union (USSR). While assessing the actual impact ofthis competition on the MENA countries might be challenging, one can surely argue that the US-USSR confrontation inthe Middle East shaped the region’s security architecture for theyears to come. Overall, the “Pax Americana” model applied toMENA region as well: the regional order that emerged after theend of World War II sanctioned the supremacy of the UnitedStates as the sole external provider and guarantor of securityin the area. Over the last few years, the idea of a Russian “return” to the MENA region has captured increasing attention bypolicymakers and scholars throughout the region and beyond,to the point that today Moscow is seen as a major player inthe area and set to take the place of the United States as thedominant power. The decision of former US President BarackObama, in 2015, not to intervene in Syria, marked a watershedtoward American strategic disengagement from the MiddleEast. Following a decade of relative absence from the region,
Preface11the symbolic date of the Russian resurgence coincided withMoscow’s intervention in Syria in 2015. While the Russian return might not be considered as a surprise given Moscow’s historical interest in the region, the responsibilities that Moscow isundertaking today are indeed unprecedented. Moving from theSyrian battleground, the Kremlin has gradually expanded itsdiplomatic reach, asserting itself as the mediator of all MiddleEastern crises. With this purpose in mind, Moscow has exercised great effort in establishing relations with as many sidesas possible in each theater. The offer to mediate in the Yemenicrisis, the ability to talk to each of the main components of theLibyan puzzle, the rapprochement to Baghdad in the contextof Iraq’s reconstruction sided by close collaboration with theKurdish galaxy at the same time, increased military and economic cooperation with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, all providegood examples of the wideness of Moscow’s diplomatic reach.In the space of a few years, the Kremlin has been able to acquirediplomatic reach that currently appears to have few rivals inthe region, to the point that Moscow could effectively hope topursue a “Russian Pax” for the Middle East, in alternative tothe Western one. However, over the last year, difficulties experienced by Moscow in effectively bringing the Syrian crisis to anend might push the Kremlin to scale down its ambitions.In this framework, it seems that Washington might remain themain actor capable of influencing policy and affecting the courseof events in the region. The United States’ hesitation in actingon the declaration to withdraw from Syria and Afghanistan, stilltwo epicenters of regional chaos, has shown that US strategicinterests in the region have not disappeared, not least the threatof terrorism. On the contrary, the geopolitical weight, militarycapabilities, and economic power that Washington still enjoys inthe region put the United States at a net advantage compared toany other players on this chessboard. It is up to the Trump administration, though, to decide to what extent to engage, keeping in mind that Russia as well as the regional powers will nothesitate to fill the void left in the wake of a US withdrawal.
12The MENA Region: A Great Power CompetitionThe purpose of this report, published by ISPI and the AtlanticCouncil and edited by Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli, is togather analyses from some of the main experts and commentators on Middle Eastern affairs and deepen our understandingof the potential consequences of American disengagement forthe various countries of the MENA region. At the same time,this volume is meant to underline the growing role of Russia –and other regional actors – in the Middle East. The first partof the report will address the foreign policy choices pursued byWashington and Moscow for the MENA region, while the second part will focus on case studies of the two powers’ policiesin the countries beset by major crises and their interaction withemerging regional actors.Frederick KempePresident and CEOAtlantic CouncilGiampiero MassoloPresidentISPI
1. US Withdrawal from the Middle East:Perceptions and RealityWilliam F. WechslerWhen Britain’s Minister of State in the Foreign CommonwealthOffice toured its “Protected States” of the Persian Gulf inNovember 1967, he conveyed an important message of reassurance. Yes, they had encountered embarrassing military setbacksin the region recently. And, of course, there were voices at homearguing that the financial resources being dedicated to securingthe Middle East would be better used to improve the domestic economy. But any lingering perceptions of an impendingBritish departure reflected only rumors, and certainly not anyreality.Indeed, the Minister confirmed that “there was no thoughtof withdrawal in our minds” and that Britain would remain inthe Gulf “so long as was necessary and desirable to ensure thepeace and stability of the area”1. By all accounts the Ministerwas honest in his representations of British intentions and sincere in his confidence that British promises would be kept. Andyet, merely two months later, on 16 January 1968, the PrimeMinister publicly announced that Britain would soon beginwithdrawing all its forces East of Suez, to be completed by theend of 1971.The United States, closing in on a quarter millenniumsince its declaration of independence, is now an old state withW.R Louis, “The British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967-1971”, The Journal ofImperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 31, no. 1, 2010, pp. 83-101.1
14The MENA Region: A Great Power Competitiona short memory. Most Americans, even including some whohave helped craft US policies toward the Middle East in recent administrations, do not remember the details of what wasimmediately understood to be a terrible British betrayal of itslongstanding local partners. The Gulf states, most of which arenot yet a half century from their independence, are young buthave longer memories. None of their leaders have forgotten.Today it is the United States’ turn to be confronted withquestions about its withdrawal when visiting the Gulf and thewider Middle East. For many US diplomats and military officers in the region, such questions are baffling and their repetition frustrating. How can there be any doubts about the UScommitment when there are so many US resources dedicated tothe region? How can there be any question of American withdrawal when the United States has such clear national securityinterests at stake?Perpetual American InterestsIndeed, American policymakers’ recognition of US national security interests in the Middle East has remained remarkablyconsistent across administrations ever since the region’s energyresources began to be exploited, and especially since the UnitedStates took on the mantle of global leadership.Some of these regional interests reflect the United States’ wider understanding of its global security requirements. As withany part in the world, the United States has a strong interest inensuring that no power in this region, either state or non-state,has both the will and capacity to directly attack the UnitedStates. As such, the United States has traditionally worked toensure that no single entity could militarily dominate the widerEurasian landmass, of which the Middle East is part, as such apower would inherently pose a direct military threat.Over this same time period the United States also concluded that its global interests are best protected by promoting theliberal international order. This order represents a remarkably
US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality15idealist break from historic norms of oligarchical societies,authoritarian governments, mercantilist economies, and adventurist militaries. But, with some notable exceptions, theAmerican approach to achieving these idealist aims has beenlargely defined by a realist reliance on incremental progress towards generational reform, and the clear willingness to compromise in the short term on matters of principle in supportof longer-term improvements, notwithstanding the inevitablecharges of hypocrisy.Overall this mix of idealist and realist polices has been remarkably successful, as the post-World War II era has witnessedthe greatest global advancement in the human condition everrecorded. And yet, nowhere has that realist acceptance of compromise and incrementalism been more evident than in theMiddle East, where representative governments remain scarce,a near-term threat of interstate conflict persists, and manyeconomies are still primarily organized for the benefit of thosewho rule.This dynamic cannot be understood without first appreciating the region’s unique role as a global energy producer. Oilremains the most important global energy source, representingover one-third of all energy consumption, ahead of coal andnatural gas, and far ahead of all renewable resources combined2.No matter the rate of the energy transition, oil is going to remain a crucial part of the energy mix for at least the lifetime ofanyone reading this, and most likely through the lifetimes oftheir children. Furthermore, although the effect is not nearly asdirect as it was decades ago, a long-term increase in the marketprice of oil still negatively affects both global economic growthand inflation, and a long-term decline in prices would makeenergy producers unstable.US policymakers must still grapple with these realities, notwithstanding the United States’ newfound “energy independence”. While breakthroughs in fracking and directional drilling2BP, BP Statistic Review of World Energy, June 2019, p. 11.
16The MENA Region: A Great Power Competitionhave doubled US production over the last decade3, this doesn’tmean that the United States is now in a state of energy autarky.Increasing domestic production and the growth of renewableenergy have indeed gone a long way toward mitigating the strategic risk of a foreign adversary cutting off distant energy supply lines in wartime, but they do nothing to protect the UnitedStates from increases in global oil prices. US oil companies donot offer American citizens discount pricing due to their nationality, nor do American consumers choose to pay above market rates for domestically sourced gasoline.Unfortunately, global oil prices are not the result of an entirely free market, absent from any foreign government influence.This is because roughly four-fifths of the world’s proven oil reserves are concentrated in the fourteen member states of theOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),and about two-thirds of these are located in the Middle East4.Saudi Arabia alone plays a particularly prominent role. It isnaturally blessed with some of the cheapest oil in the world tofind, develop, and produce. It possesses the second largest proven oil reserves (after Venezuela, which mainly has problematicextra heavy crude), maintains the second largest production(now to the United States due to fracking), and remains theoil market’s global swing producer with spare capacity that allows it to make the tactical shifts necessary to influence marketprices. These shifts are sometimes designed for global benefit,as when Saudi Arabia acts to prevent unwelcome price volatilityin moments of crisis, and at other times are made to maximizethe Kingdom’s own long-term market position and revenues.As a result, Saudi Aramco is by far the world’s most profitablecompany.Even more unfortunately, the Middle East is a fundamentally unstable region of the world, beset with interstate militaryU.S. Energy Information Administration, Total Petroleum and Other LiquidsProduction – 2018 (last retrieved on 26 September 2019).4OPEC, OPEC Sh
expanded Ankara’s network of allies in the Arab and non-Arab world, increasing its reach and influence and allowing Ankara to further pursue its ambitions. On the other hand, more im-portantly, the American choice to scale down engagement
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