The Works Of Gilles Deleuze Volume I 1953-1969
the works of gilles deleuzevolume I 1953-1969jon roffe
The Works of Gilles Deleuze I: 1953-1969
AnamnesisAnamnesis means remembrance or reminiscence, the collection and recollection of what has been lost, forgotten, or effaced. It is therefore amatter of the very old, of what has made us who we are. But anamnesis isalso a work that transforms its subject, always producing something new.To recollect the old, to produce the new: that is the task of Anamnesis.a re.press series
The Works of Gilles Deleuze I: 1953-1969Jon Roffere.press Melbourne 2020
re.presshttp://www.re-press.org re.press 2020The moral rights of the author are automatically asserted and recognized under Australian law (Copyright Amendment [Moral Rights]Act 2000).This work is ‘Open Access’, published under a creative commons license which means that you are free to copy, distribute, display, andperform the work as long as you clearly attribute the work to the authors, that you do not use this work for any commercial gain in anyform whatsoever and that you in no way alter, transform or build onthe work outside of its use in normal academic scholarship withoutexpress permission of the author (or their executors) and the publisher of this volume. For any reuse or distribution, you must makeclear to others the license terms of this work. For more informationsee the details of the creative commons licence at this nd/2.5/ISBN: 9780992373481 (paperback)ISBN: 9780992373498 (hardback)
The use of philosophy is to sadden. A philosophythat saddens no one, that annoys no one, is not aphilosophy. It is useful for harming stupidity, forturning stupidity into something shameful.Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy
ContentsAbbreviationspage xiAcknowledgementsxiiiIntroduction1Three formal constants in Deleuze’s workAbout this book1. Empiricism and Subjectivity247Two Humes, two empiricismsBelief, illusion and reasonFiction and madness in the understandingThe moral worldThe genesis of subjectivity2. Nietzsche and Philosophy81418212933Nietzsche as philosopherStructural account I: force and qualityStructural account II: the will to powerThe doctrine of the eternal returnGenealogical account I: from consciousness to bad conscienceGenealogical account II: nihilism and transformation3. Kant’s Critical Philosophy33384145475257The doctrine of the faculties and the transcendental methodThe doctrine of the faculties in the Critique of Pure ReasonThe doctrine of the faculties in the Critique of Practical ReasonThe doctrine of the faculties in the Critique of the Power of JudgementHistory and ‘the ruse of nature’4. Bergsonism576065707577Two kinds of multiplicity and their confusionThe method of intuitionvii7880
The Works of Gilles DeleuzeviiiMemory as virtual co-existenceThe actualisation of virtual memory in experienceSpace and time in science and metaphysicsThe élan vital5. Coldness and Cruelty‘Are Sade and Masoch complementary?’The language of Masoch and SadeFrom the drives to disavowal with FreudFive problems with Freud’s account of masochismFathers and mothersContracts and institutions, humour and ironyPerversion and repetition6. Proust and SignsThe spider, the sign, the apprenticeshipFirst regime: the empty worldly signsSecond regime: the signs of loveThird regime: sensuous signsFourth regime: the signs of artEssence: singularity, commonality, series, groupsThe plurality of timeThe nature of the searchThe subject of the search7. Difference and RepetitionDifference and repetition reconsideredCRITIQUEObjective and subjective misrecognitions of differenceThe objective misrecognition of difference in the history of philosophyUnivocityThe subjective misrecognition of differenceCONSTRUCTIONWhat is Deleuze’s positive project in Difference and Repetition?The virtual I: Kant and MaimonThe virtual II: differential calculusThe virtual III: defining the virtualIntensityThe intensive individualTemporal synthesis: identity and change over timeHuman 8159159160173176190190191197203204213218231242
Introduction8. Logic of SenseThe three guiding questions of the Logic of SenseTwo eventsThe Stoic distinction between bodies and eventsFive propositions on the eventLanguage and senseSense and nonsenseElements of psychoanalysisFirst genetic moment: simulacra in the schizophrenic depthsSecond genetic moment: the Icon in the heightsThird genetic moment: the bodily surface and the image of the phallusCastration and the phantasmFourth genetic moment: thought and senseAn ethics of the orks of Gilles Deleuze315Other Works Cited317Postscript325
AbbreviationsABCBDIDRESLATLSMNNPPSTRMWPDeleuze from A to Z (video interview)BergsonismDesert Islands and Other TextsDifference and RepetitionEmpiricism and SubjectivityLettres et autres textesThe Logic of Sense‘Coldness and Cruelty’ in MasochismNegotiationsNietzsche and PhilosophyProust and SignsTwo Regimes of Madness and Other TextsWhat is Philosophy?xi
AcknowledgementsThis book originated in the Deleuze seminar that I have given, over thecourse of more than a decade now, at the Melbourne School ofContinental Philosophy. I would, consequently, like to thank all of thestudents who attended to labour alongside me, but also all of the School’sother members who made this seminar possible, particularly AJ Bartlett,Bryan Cooke, and James Garrett. The volume would not have beenpossible without Paul Ashton and Justin Clemens at re.press, and theircapacity to temper their incredulity.While it would be impossible to list all the scholars who work onDeleuze that have been formative in this effort, the idea of not recallingthe most important of them is equally unthinkable: Ron Bogue, GreggFlaxman, Gene Holland, Christian Kerslake, Anne Sauvagnargues, Daniel W. Smith, and James Williams.I would also like to thank Marg Horwell, who drew two excellent diagrams for the book, one biological (p. 216) and one topological (p.266). JohnCleary, Justin Clemens, Bryan Cooke, Simon Lumsden, Craig Lundy andMairead Phillips read and commented on parts the book, saving me fromnumerous errors. Graham Jones read the whole manuscript, and, yearsbefore all of this, introduced me to Maimon’s philosophy and in doing soopened my narrow rhizomism onto Deleuze’s thought as such. Reviewersof the text for re.press also picked up a number of embarrassing errorsthat I am pleased will no longer be attributed to me. What remains is theresult of my own intransigence.For numerous other reasons, let me recall with gratitude Alex, Bartlett,Bellla, Ben, Cat, Charlotte, Dean, Georgia, Isabelle, Jack, James, Joe, Joeri,Mark, Mathilda, Marg, Nathan, Steve, Sophie, and Virginia.xiii
IntroductionThis book is an introduction, not to ‘the philosophy’ or ‘the work’ of GillesDeleuze, but to each of his individual works.A number of general introductions already exist. The synopticapproach that they tend to adopt, however, make an assumption thatcarries a strong risk, particularly in the case of Deleuze. They assume, inshort, that the body of works under consideration are fundamentallyhomogenous.It is true of course that the synthetic mode of summary sometimesgives rise to insightful and even daring portraits of Deleuze; more frequently it has led to the production of inaccurate and unhelpful caricatures. Some are only correct about some aspects of Deleuze’s thoughtwhile belittling or ignoring others; some do not manage to systematicallythink through these concepts and their difficult and often obscure connections; others yet again are formed too heavily in the image of the author’sinvestments. Given that there is no simple and apparent unity to Deleuze’swork, the synoptic vision too easily distorts its object in one or other fashion: the interpretive assumption becomes a Procrustean bed, leading tothe lopping off of some parts that don’t easily fit and the bloating of thosethat remain.This is why the aim of the current book is not to be an introduction toDeleuze, but to each of Deleuze’s books on their own terms. In this way, Ihope to avoid the dangers of the synoptic approach by resisting the urge—often provoked by perplexity—to rise up from the particular work underexamination to the level of Deleuze’s oeuvre as a whole. I would like simplyto summarise what Deleuze says on the pages of each of his books. It ismy conviction that we must read Deleuze, at least initially, in the mode of1
2The Works of Gilles Deleuzea Dostoyevskian idiot that he invokes in Difference and Repetition; we must bewilling to maintain the position of ignorance for long enough to see whatis on the page in front of us, rather than much too quickly insisting on what‘everyone already knows’ about Deleuze.THREE FORMAL CONSTANTS IN DELEUZE’S WORKNow, while the content of Deleuze’s works varies in numerous ways, itpossesses a number of formal invariants. This is to say that while whatDeleuze says varies to some degree, how he says it remains largely consistent. There are three of these important formal constants, structural features that are in some cases so ubiquitous as to be all but overlooked bymany of Deleuze’s readers. Being important, they must be kept in mind;being invariant, they fall outside of the proper content of this book. Consequently, I would like to briefly enumerate them here.The first is the seemingly banal fact that every one of Deleuze’s booksunfolds through a complex dialogue with other thinkers. Not one makesits claims in a vacuum. As has been remarked almost ad nauseam, it is oftendifficult to precisely locate the position of the author in Deleuze: is he writing about Nietzsche? With the goal of integrating his own position withNietzsche’s? Is Nietzsche’s name just a mask for Deleuze’s own philosophy?And so on. While these questions can sometimes be resolved, often it appears impossible to say. Consider, for example, Difference and Repetition,which makes contact with almost every well-known philosopher in theWestern canon, along with a large number of more obscure figures. So itis essential to note that Deleuze’s own position is a garment stitched out ofthe full variety of these different fabrics. He may be the one who puts thesemoments together in the way that he does, but the product would be inconceivable without reference to them. So a good deal of what is involvedin reading Deleuze’s various works is the reading of the work of others thatunderlies, informs and directs Deleuze himself.Deleuze’s works are also, from beginning to end, systematic in formand ambition. While Deleuze will engage in a series of important reflections on what constitutes a system as such, his works manifest a perennialdrive to elaborate a systematically coherent vision of the material underdiscussion. There is a certain dogmatic vision of Deleuze that has likelyarisen on the basis of a slavish reading of the concept of the rhizome in AThousand Plateaus, according to which Deleuze is an anti-systematic thinker.But it is very clear at the level of his own discourse that Deleuze moves in
Introduction3the opposite direction. He says it himself: ‘Today it is said that systems arebankrupt, but it is only the concept of system that has changed’. (WP 9)Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, for example, itself runs counter to thewidespread view that he is a kind of poetic, elusive writer, in which theaphoristic form functions to undermine systematicity in thought. ForDeleuze, nothing is further from the truth. Likewise, and despite howstrange this seems, Deleuze will present Lewis Carroll’s fiction in terms ofa systematic investigation, alongside a different but analogous reading ofArtaud, in The Logic of Sense—where even Humpty Dumpty is presented asa philosopher of language. Elsewhere, Maurice Blanchot, Francis Baconand Hollywood musicals are considered in the same way. It is this drive tosystematize that is the real reason we must take Deleuze at his word andread him as a classical philosopher, even when his theory of system orstructure is decidedly unorthodox. This makes Deleuze’s way of readingother thinkers an inversion of a certain view of deconstructive reading. Forthe latter, the goal is to find those symptomatic weaknesses and lacunae atthe systematic level—to show, for example, how Edmund Husserl’srigorous and intricately structured phenomenology relies upon adisavowed privileging of self-presence. For Deleuze, as Graham Jones oncememorably put it, the goal is the opposite: to show that, howeverfragmentary they may seem, the works of great thinkers always manifest anascent systematicity.Third, Deleuze’s systematic vision is metaphysical in nature. His effortis always to engage his topic on the grounds of the fundamental questionsthat have never ceased to exercise philosophy from its Platonic and preSocratic beginning. Thus, in his hands, the art of Francis Bacon is treatedneither on the basis of any existential concerns nor a psychoanalytic account, nor any form of linguistic analysis (elements of a painting taken assignifiers). Colour, line, even art itself are conceived of in strong, metaphysical terms. The same holds for the infamous pair capitalism and schizophrenia: in the end, these are not social, economic or psychological termsin Anti-Oedipus, but metaphysical categories that speak of being as such.Proust and Signs invokes at its heart the category of essence, that archetypalmetaphysical concept. Again, the precise content of Deleuze’s metaphysicschanges in a variety of ways, some quite fundamental, but the form of everyone of his investigations has the status of foundational investigations. Thisis equally why we must always recall the philosophical register of his work,even when the books in question appear very far removed from philosophyin a traditional sense. It’s all philosophy, ‘nothing but philosophy, in thetraditional sense of the word’. (TRM 176)
4The Works of Gilles DeleuzeABOUT THIS BOOKDue to the approach I have adopted, each of the chapters to follow areindependent entities, each devoted to a summary explication of one ofDeleuze’s books on its own terms.I have not attempted to be comprehensive. Aside from the fact that notone of his works is exhaustively comprehended by anyone—somethingthat is a positive feature of any good work of philosophy as much as it is athorn in the side of its readers—any attempt to do justice to any book in ascant handful of pages would be doomed to failure. This said, I have nevertheless striven to present definitive accounts of Deleuze’s works. Each ofthe chapters that follows should provide a skeletal overlay, delineating thespine and major structural bones of the book in question. The more delicate ossature, muscle tissues and other microstructures should then be ableto be fit into place.It may go without saying that to strive to give a definitive account isnot necessarily to have done so; I am not the one who will have graspedthese books in their totality, if this was even possible. But, contrary to theview espoused by some who have taken too many hits on the rhizome, elucidation and explanation of Deleuze’s work remains a valuable endeavor.A glance at the contents page may have alerted you to the fact thatDeleuze’s complementary thesis, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, is notdiscussed. While many of Deleuze’s works are studies of other philosophers, thereby giving any effort of summary an occasionally awkward tertiary character, this book is an extreme case (the Kant volume is a closesecond). So much exposition of Spinoza’s thought is required in order toexplain what is novel in Deleuze’s reading that the goal of skeletal summary simply became impossible. If you come to the current volume looking for a summary of his reading of Spinoza, and are already in possessionof an understanding of the latter’s work, then let me simply say: readDeleuze’s book itself.On a related note, I have made use of Negotiations, and the two posthumous collections Desert Islands and Other Texts, and Two Regimes of Madness,only in passing, and only where what Deleuze says or writes there reflectsdirectly on the book under discussion.The abbreviations I will use to refer to Deleuze’s texts are fairly selfevident; a list can be found at the front of this volume. Thanks to the capitalist vigour of the academic publishing industry, there are now two andas many as five editions of each of Deleuze’s books, which makes the clearuse of pagination increasingly difficult. We await a proper critical edition
Introduction5of his work. Here I have elected to cite the first version of the English textthat appeared.I have often modified the existing translation, but I will only make anissue of it when it concerns the content of Deleuze’s argument. For themost part, errors in the existing versions are the result of the translator’szeal for the book exceeding their grasp of the intellectual context withinwhich Deleuze is working. I have otherwise dispensed with much of theusual academic cutlery of citations. This includes, after some oscillation,the absenting of page references to the original French.Where I cite other works, it is almost exclusively to clarify the sourceof Deleuze’s argument. In these cases, I use only their title and the formof appropriate page reference: for instance, references to both editions ofKant’s Critique of Pure Reason (e.g., A297/B354), or the essay number andsection of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. Full bibliographic detailsfor all works cited can be found at the end of the book.Gone too are any references to the secondary literature on Deleuze,which constitutes an ever-growing and increasingly unmanageablecorpus. I do not mean to pretend that all of this material is pointless, orthat this book replaces them. I am simply interested in giving to readersof Deleuze’s works a considered vantage point that—in its presentation,if not my interminable labour to understand it, which has always beenfed by many fine secondary works—relies upon extrinsic material as littleas possible.
1Empiricism and SubjectivityBefore being published in 1953, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay onHume’s Theory of Human Nature was Deleuze’s diplôme d’études supérieures, therough equivalent of a masters degree, submitted the year before andsupervised by the great Hegelian Jean Hyppolite. The thesis itself wastyped up by Deleuze’s friend Michel Tournier; Deleuze inscribed his copyof the book with the words ‘For Michel, the book that he typed andcriticized, roundly protested, and may have even shortened since I’m surethat it was longer’. (Dosse, Intersecting Lives, 111)Deleuze had come into contact with Hume’s thought and empiricismmore generally in a number of ways. He had attended a course on Humegiven by Hyppolite (to whom Empiricism and Subjectivity is dedicated) in the1946-47 academic year; but it is certainly Jean Wahl who was a more significant influence. Wahl’s own principal PhD thesis was entitled Les Philosophies pluralists d’Angleterre et d’Amérique [The pluralist philosophies of Englandand America], and this material was the subject he taught between 1944and 1948 at the Sorbonne, classes attended by Deleuze. Wahl himself isless than keen about Hume’s philosophy, but it seems all but certain thathe was the inspiration for Deleuze working on the latter’s thought.It is also worth noting that Deleuze, along with his friend AndréCresson, published another text on Hume the year prior to the appearanceof Empiricism and Subjectivity. David Hume, sa Vie, son Oeuvre avec un Exposé desa Philosophie [David Hume, his Life and Thought, with an Exposition of hisPhilosophy] is composed of a selection of Hume’s writings, along with abiography and general summary of his thought. Though the latter is cosigned by Deleuze and Cresson, it bears all of the hallmarks of Deleuze’sown take on Hume; he was doubtless the author of the text.7
8The Works of Gilles DeleuzeTWO HUMES, TWO EMPIRICISMSThe best way to introduce Deleuze’s reading of Hume is to contrast itto the famous reading offered by Immanuel Kant. This contrast, offeredby Deleuze himself, also allows us to distinguish between two conceptionsof empiricism, and, beyond this, to make sense of the definition of philosophy that Deleuze advances in Empiricism and Subjectivity.Schematically speaking—and here I’m following the opening moments of Hume’s precocious masterpiece Treatise of Human Nature (1739)—the traditional Kantian reading emphasises the following points:1. Because the search for knowledge is undertaken by human beings,the claims of science are bounded by human nature. What can beknown with certainty is limited by what human beings can knowwith certainty.2. Consequently, the first and most fundamental science has to be thescience of human nature. Discovering what this nature is will tell uswhat we can know.3. As a result, the science of human nature must be based in ‘acautious observation of human life’. (Treatise, Introduction.10)4. All knowledge is drawn from experience. To be more precise, all ofour ideas—our mental images of things, which constitute thesubstance of ‘thinking’—have their source in impressions, the namewe can give to sensing or ‘feeling’, as we do when we see or touchsomething, or feel pleasure or pain.5. Most knowledge, however, involves more than just simple ideas thatcorrespond to single impressions. They are, rather, complex ideas,which are composed of a number of simple ideas.6. Complex ideas are formed according to certain tendencies that wecan observe at work in thinking. These are the principles ofassociation. I tend to associate ideas—I habitually associate ideas—that are similar to each other (principle of resemblance); I tend toassociate ideas whose impressions arise in temporal proximity(principle of contiguity); I tend to associate ideas in terms of causeand effect (principle of cause and effect)Hume as epistemologistThe reading of Hume advanced by Kant and the interpretive traditionthat comes in his wake focusses on point 4, its presuppositions and its consequences. It does so in the context of a very specific belief: the belief in
Empiricism and Subjectivity9the reality of causality. It is unsurprising that the following example of billiards from the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is among Hume’smost well-known texts:When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; [ ] may I not conceive, that a hundred different eventsmight as well follow from the cause? May not both these balls remainat absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leapoff from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions areconsistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference toone, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All ourreasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for thispreference. (Hume, Enquiry, 4.25)The discussion is famous. There is no logical contradiction involved inclaiming that the second billiard ball could doing anything whatsoeverafter coming into contact with the first. Any motion or lack of motion iseasily conceivable. But, we might respond, causality is not a logicalstructure but a real, physical one—physics can give us certitude wherethought cannot. It is here that the primary consequence of point 4appears. Our only knowledge of physics, of the laws supposed to governthe movement of bodies, is drawn from experience. But this knowledge isnot gained by any kind of direct intellectual intuition of the structure ofnature. Indeed, we have no direct access to nature—if we have any at all.What do we know about billiards? Only that, in the cases we happen tohave seen, a certain set of outcomes have taken place. But, we can replyagain, haven’t we always seen the white ball causing the red ball to movein a certain predictable fashion? Aren’t there pool sharks who make aliving on it? What we certainly haven’t directly experienced are causes. Iam in the habit of associating two ideas that commonly occur one afterthe other—smoke from my cigarette in the wake of the argument. This iswhat Hume calls ‘constant conjunction’, (Treatise 1.1.8) and it is the realkernel of beliefs about cause and effect.While he provides his own transcendental solution to this problem,Kant thought that, despite his skepticism, Hume had discovered something essential:The famous David Hume was one of these geographers of human reason [ ] He dwelt primarily on the principle of causality, and quiterightly remarked about that that one could not base its truth (Indeednot even the objective validity of the concept of an efficient cause ingeneral) on any Insight at all (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A761/B789)
10The Works of Gilles DeleuzeThis is the negative or critical facet of Hume’s argument. It is doubledby a second positive, or constructive moment. Hume’s ‘sceptical solution’(Enquiry 5.1) to this apparent impasse is grounded not in nature—which wehave no direct access to—but, as point 6 of the summary indicates, in theprinciples of association, and therefore in human nature. Our grasp of billiards is not a result of the operation of the balls themselves, but the resultof the habitual association of ideas.So, on the one hand, we have no reason to think that real causationexists or does not; on the other, we have good reason to think that all causality is a matter of habit in thought. This problem, Hume’s problem ofinduction, is taken by the Kantian tradition to be emblematic. The moregeneral perspective has the same double character. On the one hand, nobelief about the world itself is either justified or falsified by direct access tothe world—because we have no such access. On the other hand, the legitimacy of belief is conveyed by factors internal to human thought. Thus,from this Kantian perspective, then, empiricism appears as a fundamentally epistemological affair. It is a philosophical doctrine concerned aboveall with ascertaining the reliability of our beliefs. This is a first version ofHume, and a first vision of empiricism to go along with it.Hume as a social and political thinkerNotice that the very idea of knowledge itself is undone by this line ofanalysis. We cannot know anything about how the world itself is, and thealleged objects of our experience are not present to thought. In its place,Hume advances a certain conception of belief. What the minimalistepistemological Hume appears to provide us with—though, as we will see,things are more complicated than they appear—is a rule for distinguishinglegitimate from illegitimate beliefs, and not truth and falsity or knowledgeand opinion.Now, Deleuze is certainly impressed with this line of argument. In thepreface to the English translation of Empiricism and Subjectivity, he writes thatHume ‘established the concept of belief and put it in the place ofknowledge. He laicized belief, turning knowledge into a legitimate belief ’.(ES ix) What he will not sanction is the idea that this argument, and theconcept of belief, are anything like the main points of Hume’s thought.The classical definition of empiricism proposed by the Kantian tradition is this: empiricism is the theory according to which knowledge notonly begins with experience but is derived from it. But why would theempiricist say that? And as the result of which question? [ ] The definition is in no way satisfactory: first of all, because knowledge is not the
Empiricism and Subjectivity11most important thing for empiricism, but only the means to some practical activity. (ES 107)The first reason, then, why Deleuze wishes to break with the Kantianreading of Hume is that it gives pride of place to a secondary, subordinateelement. By giving pride of place to the epistemological register, this reading has located the centre of gravity of Hume’s empiricism in the wrongplace. What is essential, instead, is social reality, and knowledge or beliefis only properly understood if we adopt this perspective.Before arriving at these topics, Deleuze makes three central claims.The first of these finesses point two on our numbered summary above:Hume proposes the creation of a science of humanity, but what is reallyhis fundamental project? [ ] Hume’s project entails the substitution of apsychology of the mind with a psychology of the mind’s affections. The constitution of a psychology of the mind is not at all possible, since this psychology cannot find in its object the required constancy or universality; onlya psychology of affections will be capable of constituting the true science of humanity. (ES 21)We cannot avoid starting with human nature, but, Hume tells us, whenwe ask what this is exactly, the answer is not an encouraging one: ‘when Ienter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on someparticular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love orhatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without aperception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume,Treatise, 1.4.6.3) According to another famous passage, my mind isfundamentally ‘nothing but a bundle or collection of differentperceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, andare in a perpetual flux and movement [ ] The mind is a kind of theatre,where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass,repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures andsituations. (Hume, Treatise, 1.4.6.4) This is what Deleuze means when hesays that a psychology of the mind does not find enough constancy oruniversality in its object (the mind itself) to study it.Obviously this is a problem! If Hume wants to ground all the sciencesin the science of the mind, but the mind appears to be nothing more thana fleeting s
Two kinds of multiplicity and their confusion 78 The method of intuition 80. . Fourth regime: the signs of art 140 Essence: singularity, commonality, series, groups 143 . Deleuze’s works are also, from beginning to end, systematic in
May 02, 2018 · D. Program Evaluation ͟The organization has provided a description of the framework for how each program will be evaluated. The framework should include all the elements below: ͟The evaluation methods are cost-effective for the organization ͟Quantitative and qualitative data is being collected (at Basics tier, data collection must have begun)
Silat is a combative art of self-defense and survival rooted from Matay archipelago. It was traced at thé early of Langkasuka Kingdom (2nd century CE) till thé reign of Melaka (Malaysia) Sultanate era (13th century). Silat has now evolved to become part of social culture and tradition with thé appearance of a fine physical and spiritual .
On an exceptional basis, Member States may request UNESCO to provide thé candidates with access to thé platform so they can complète thé form by themselves. Thèse requests must be addressed to esd rize unesco. or by 15 A ril 2021 UNESCO will provide thé nomineewith accessto thé platform via their émail address.
̶The leading indicator of employee engagement is based on the quality of the relationship between employee and supervisor Empower your managers! ̶Help them understand the impact on the organization ̶Share important changes, plan options, tasks, and deadlines ̶Provide key messages and talking points ̶Prepare them to answer employee questions
Dr. Sunita Bharatwal** Dr. Pawan Garga*** Abstract Customer satisfaction is derived from thè functionalities and values, a product or Service can provide. The current study aims to segregate thè dimensions of ordine Service quality and gather insights on its impact on web shopping. The trends of purchases have
Deleuze’s work in the cinema books, or a key to assist in unlocking and unpacking Deleuze’s cinema project. To this end, I: a) analyze Deleuze’s approach in the cinema books because it illuminates his metaphysics; b) provide an explication of key elements of Deleuze’s Bergson-inspired metaph
dominant Saussurean conception. Deleuze starts Proust and Signs with a rejection of a common opinion: the «search» of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time is not, says Deleuze, a matter of recollection, of the involuntary memory with which Proust is most associated, but rather what Deleuze calls an «apprenticeship» (Deleuze 2008: 3).
Deleuze, Gilles. [Mille plateaux. English] A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia/Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari; translation and foreword by Brian Massumi. p. cm. Translation of: Mille plateaux, v. 2 of Capitalisme et schizophrenic. A companion volume to Anti-Oedipus: capit
