CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS

IntroductionIntroductionMulugeta Gebrehiwot BerheChina’s involvement in African affairs dates back to the 1950s. The time markedthe beginning of African states breaking free from the yoke of colonialism. China’srelationship with Africa in modern times was thus characterized by the formersupporting liberation movements that had then been in momentous stages leadingto independence of most African countries from the colonial masters in the 1960s.Initially, China’s support was mainly motivated by ideology, but this would change inthe coming decades. A major shift in the dynamics of the China-Africa relationshipscame about in the 1980s when China embarked upon its “Opening up and ReformPolicy” –a wide-ranging policy that gave birth to the new China as we know ittoday. Economic and geo-strategic interests rather than the desire to export a specificpolitical philosophy drive China’s current relationship with Africa. The intensity ofrelations also changed: with its increasing economic and political power as well ashunger for resources China’s relations with Africa intensified.China’s opening up and re-discovery of Africa coincided with Africa’s deterioratingeconomic performance as a result of conflicts, mismanagement as well as structuraladjustment policies. China brought a viable alternative of social, political andeconomic development formula to the uni-polar world of the 1990s. Frustrated bycomplex donor policies and the high overhead costs of multilateral developmentprojects, African governments continue to appreciate the alternative presented byChina in an increasingly multipolar world.China is a nation that knows what it means to be poor and to be so in a time whenthe industrialized world managed to create unprecedented wealth and affluence. Thatreality and the negative experience it begot are still fresh in the memories of theChinese people, old and young. Thanks to the transformation made possible in aspan of four decades, China, which is home to a fifth of the world population, hasnow managed to assert itself as one of the major powers. Considered to be nothingshort of “miraculous”, China’s rise came about through its Reform and Opening upPolicy – a hugely successful wealth creation formula developed and perfected as the“Chinese Model”. Today, China seems willing to share its successful, albeit unique,growth and development model with developing countries. As a result, China’s1

China-Africa Relationsimportance in African politics, governance and development is growing. Thelaunching in the wake of the 21st century of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation(FOCAC), coupled with the increasingly higher participation of African Heads ofState and Government in the Forum, is evidence to the enhancement of the ChinaAfrica partnership. The attendance of a record 42 African Heads of State andGovernment at the 5th FOCAC meeting in Beijing attracted much attention amongthe international community.This growing relationship has become the focus of much scrutiny and triggeredunending intellectual discourse in Africa, Europe and North America. As part of thisgeneral discourse, politicians, economists, historians, businesspeople, journalistsand others have been forming widely divergent opinions. Let us see some of thehighlights that characterize this discourse.Many argue that Chinese policies on Africa are inferior to the policies pursued bywestern counterparts. A close examination, however, exposes that such allegationsdo not hold water. Chinese trading regime in Africa (its exports to Africa) is criticizedas being focused on consumer goods; a business strategy that apparently benefitsAfrican consumers by offering affordable goods of reasonable quality, while at thesame time increasing unemployment as African industries are unable to compete.As much as this is true, the same can be said about Africa’s trade with the NorthAmerica or the European Union trade blocs that openly offer subsidies to theirfarmers and put up tariff barriers—practices undermining the competitive edge ofAfrican producers and exporters.Chinese investment in the continent is also criticized for being opportunistic. Thiscriticism is lodged in the sense that companies look for niche markets regardless ofthe political environment, often taking up investment opportunities that have beenignored or even relinquished by others. Chinese companies are also perceived tobe willing to take greater financial risks than their western competitors. While it istrue that Beijing is backing the expansion of its private and state-owned enterprisesinto Africa through soft loans and export credits, this policy is not inherentlydifferent from the behavior of other governments. It is also true that governmentsand companies from Europe and North America are quite willing to ignore badgovernance and human rights abuses, despite the strict regulatory frameworks theyswear to adhere to. This is clear in places such as Angola, Chad, Equatorial-Guinea,2

IntroductionNigeria and recently Eritrea, where oil and other precious minerals exploration rightsare at stake. It would be hypocritical to expect China and others to adhere to higherethical standards than their competitors.China is also accused of supplying arms to ‘rogue states’ in Africa. But again, a closeexamination of the available evidence shows that these accusations are unfounded.The Middle East and Asia are the main destinations of Chinese arms exports, a mere7% of Chinese arms exports reach Africa. In terms of global sales in the decadebetween 1998 and 2007, the United States, Russia and Germany were the biggestexporters of arms to Africa, while China held the tenth position. Even in Sudan,a country of key strategic importance to Beijing, 87% of all arms procurementsbetween 2003 and 2007 came from Russia, China’s share accounting for only 8%during the same period (SIPRI, 2008).Therefore, one can conclude that Beijing’s role in Africa does not deviate muchfrom the norms and practices put in place by the more established powers suchas the United States, Great Britain or France. The historic track record of Westerngovernments in propping up dictatorships, clandestine arms transfers and thepromotion of trade interests through financial aid is every bit as bad as Beijing’scurrent controversial policies, a point often overlooked outside the continent.The key problem for us, Africans, is that our economies are weak in value creation.What our workers and factories produce is produced more efficiently, with betterquality and at lower cost, by other economies. In such circumstances, makingmoney is easier through rent than through value creation. African governmentsshould be capable of guiding their private sector towards value creation, a key factorfor achieving a sustainable competitive edge in the global market. Furthermore,partnerships that Africa forges should be targeted to enhance such an environment.By the same token, a ‘rent collecting’ Africa cannot sustain the current partnershipwith China in the long term. A relationship forged around this drive of backingAfrica’s value creation endeavor is the only relationship that can be considered as agenuine South-South cooperation and one that would last in a win-win.Discussing the China-Africa relationship can only be of any practical significanceif taken from the perspective of whether or not it is driven by a genuine spirit ofSouth-South cooperation in a sustainable manner. Chinese foreign policy led by a3

China-Africa Relationspolicy of ‘non-interference’ should by no means be misconstrued as ‘indifference’ toAfrican problems and realities. We now know that China has been taking stapes andmaking its presence more and more felt with growing participation in developmentassistance, humanitarian aid and UN-led peace support operations in Africa. It istherefore in line with its policy to be tailoring its relationships to African realitiesand to be perfecting the structures that direct its ties with Africa as a continent ingeneral, and individual countries in particular.The FOCAC provides a unique and genuine opportunity for both parties to moldtheir relationship in a way that serves their long-term interests on the basis of mutualbenefits, respect and equality. Furthermore, the CATTF serves as a platform forAfrican and Chinese scholars and academics to critically study issues relevant to andin the context of Sino-African relations and propose whatever options that can behad for better ways of furthering and cementing the partnership. This gives Africanresearchers and scholars the opportunity to learn from past mistakes and assist theirgovernments in developing new policies and/or perfecting existing ones towards asustainable and fruitful relationship.The book has fourteen chapters, excluding the introductory and concluding ones,structured in three sections. The first section presented in four chapters deals with theinterpretation, practice and evolution of the non-interference principle from differentangles. A streak of the issue of China’s non-interference principle could be discernedas well in the next two consecutive sections. The second section mainly focuseson aspects of China-Africa relations, with one chapter having a continental focus,two chapters dedicated to discussions of regional matters while the remaining twobring to the spotlight country specific cases. The last section comprised five chapterswhich cover economic and political aspects of the China-Africa relations examiningcountry specific cases. Below we have summarized the arguments of each chapter.Section I: Dealing with Africa’s Peace and Security Challenges: TheNon-Interference Principle of ChinaMathews takes us through changes in China’s stance to peacekeeping in the past fourdecades: from a complete aversion in 1971 to its current active engagement. The first‘Yes’ vote China gave to a peacekeeping operation was in 1981 (in Cyprus) and itsfirst troop contribution was to the 1988 mission in Namibia. China endorsed all UN4

Introductionresolutions for a peacekeeping mission on African soil after 1999. This change wasconcomitant to shift in Chinese rhetoric from anti-colonialism and anti-imperialismto one of engagement (primarily economic) as part of its opening up policy. On topof economic considerations, Mathews adds other more potent reasons: The needfor China to fulfilling expectations in a manner befitting its increasing stature in theglobal arena and its intention to get practical lessons from “being on the ground.”Starting off by sending a small number of observers, China now got accustomedto sending military personnel too as part of its contribution to peacekeepingmissions in Africa, in addition to other experts and technicians. Mathews also seemsto indicate that China is increasing its contribution when contributions from theUS and European countries receded after the debacle in Somalia and the formerYugoslavia. China is now the 15th largest contributor worldwide and the largestcontributor among the permanent members of the UNSC. As most endorsedpeacekeeping missions are deployed on African soil and as China sees peacekeepingas a positive contribution to achieving peace and security on the continent (whichis stressed in numerous documents) three quarter of Chinese peacekeepers serve inAfrica. Gradual change is also seen with China’s perception of the use of force bypeacekeepers: in the 1980s China resisted the use of force under any circumstances,but the crises in Bosnia and Somalia forced it to change its stance and accept use ofminimum force if peacekeeper or civilians are threatened, and by end of 1990s if themission has a UN authorization. Mathews finally recommends that for an effectivepeacekeeping engagement China should adopt a strategic approach rather than thereactive approach.Chris Alden and Daniel Large start by agreeing with Mathews that despite constraintsplaced by its foreign policy China’s peacekeeping engagement gradually increased.They then take the debate to a more complex and sensitive issue of peacebuildingin post-conflict African states. Currently China is yet to have a ‘post-conflict andfragile state’ policy and its involvement in the operations of the Africa Peace andSecurity Architecture (APSA) is not clear. However, Alden and Large contend “anew agenda is in the making” as evinces China’s greater participation in and greaterfinancial contribution towards post-conflict intervention and peacebuilding debates.This, they argued, is the beginning of Chinese “assertive engagement unseenoutside of the East Asian region” attributing the changes to gradualist and pragmatic5

China-Africa Relationsresponse to pressure from the international community to see China to be playing amore substantive role in Africa. China does not seem to simply join the prevailingpeacebuilding practice and norms, neither does it intend to challenge or purposefullycompete with traditional peacebuilding. Rather, China supports AU initiatives andpractices, within the bounds of its non-interference principle and not engaging in theinterventionist praxis of liberal peacebuilding. An alternative modality is presentedin which China perceives peace as “a historical inevitability” to materialize afterdealing with development challenges.Admore Kambudzi is the man to listen to when it comes to matters of preventing andcontaining Africa’s conflicts, and in his paper he details what the non-interferenceprinciple means to the APSA. Kambudzi characterizes the China-Africa relationsas a give-and-take process with each side having something to offer and receive.He argues that it would have proved difficult for China to get the permanent seatat the UNSC without the support of African states; in return it provides invaluabletechnical, financial, diplomatic support. China works with Africa to bring abouteconomic development, and is among the partners supporting the APSA in dealingwith violent conflict situations, which is one of the serious obstacles to development.Although relations on peace and security issues started only recently, he highlightsthat the adherence, in theory as well as practice, of China to its non-interferenceprinciple makes it a valuable supporter of the APSA activities. The APSA envisagesoperating independently with the support, not interference, of the internationalcommunity. The very principle of the APSA is for the continent to do its homeworkby itself, and master the technique of “making peace happen” in an African way.In this regard, and remembering the “regular interference” of the West in Africancountries, China seems to have offered a better alternative. He concludes his paperby noting that China will not be able to indefinitely apply the non-interference policyin the classical sense. He rightly argues that this principle is a product of globalconditions of the past decades. In the coming one, China’s role in global affairs isexpected to increase and this policy to evolve up to the demands of the time. It seemsthat he is convinced that Africa should make use of China’s non-interference stancewhile it lasts.Zhongying Pang examines re-interpretation of China’s non-interference principle inrecent years. China’s increasing economic power has burdened it with the challenge6

Introductionof acting as a responsible global actor. It appears that China is aspiring to keep aunified UN Security Council as well as keeping its promise of non-interference todeveloping countries. Pang figures that scholars are grappling to understand this trendand have not yet grasped what it entails fully, but have named it creative involvement(Wang, 2011) and constructive intervention (Lu, 2012). He highlights the contours ofchange in the interpretation of the non-interference principle by describing China’scomplicated response to the Arab Spring. It abstained during the approval of the NoFly Zone against Libya and vetoed sanctions against Syria four times. China, Pangargues, then tried to constructively engage with the respective countries. He citeslines from the speeches made by the outgoing as well as incoming Presidents fromthe late 2012 and foresees a more active role on the part of China in internationalaffairs. He stipulates that both China and Africa recognize their relationship as“strategic” and value dearly non-interference in each other’s affairs. Pang concludeshis paper by stressing that the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership forPeace and Security adopted in mid-2012 “seems to define the style and substance”of how China intends to constructively involve in African affairs within the widerframework of the non-interference principle.Section II: China-Africa Economic Relations: Challenges andOpportunitiesAnna Stahl’s chapter starts by noting that traditional donors—the US and EU tobe specific—are slowly lo

China need a better understanding of the needs, expectations and social psyche of Africans and identify the right approach to promote the long-term interests of China. By the same token Africa needs to clearly articulate its long term interests in its relationship with China and cautiously evalu