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Toward Combined Arms Warfare:A Survey of 20th Century Tactics,Doctrine, and Organizationby Captain Jonathan M. House, U.S. ArmyAugust 1984U.S. ArmyCommand and GeneralStaff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KS 660274900

Libraryof CongressGatalogingHouse, Jonathan M. (Jonathan Mallory),Toward combined arms warfare.inPublicationDatal&X?-(Research survey / Combat Studies Institute; no. 2)“August k984.”Bibliography: p.1. Tactics--History--20thcentury. 2. Armies-Organization--History--20thcentury. 3. Militaryart and science--History--20th century. I. Title.II. Series: Research survey (U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College. Combat Studies Institute; no. 2)U165.H8 1985355.4’285-WFor sale by the Superintendentof Documents,U.S. GavemaentPrintting OWce, WeshEngton, D.C. 28402

CONTENTSiiiContents.ivFigures.Maps.VIntroduction1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .to 1914 .7.19Chapter One.PrologueChapter Two.World War I.Chapter Three.TheInterwarPeriod. .79. . .1051945 . . . . e . . . . . . .141. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .181Chapter Four.World War II:Chapter Five.World War II:The ComplexityChapter Six.Conclusion43The Axis Advance, 1939-1942.Combined Arms Afterof TotalWar, 1942-1945.Notes .191Bibliography207.iii

FIGURES1‘Type French and German Divisions,1914. . . . . . . . e .102.Type British1914. a . e . e * . 113.Trench System, World War I. , . . a e . . .234.Type U.S. and German Divisions,1918. . . . e . . . . a .415.Type German Panzer Division,1935 . . a (F . c m . . * * .566.French Light Mechanized Division,1934, andArmored Division,.1940e a s . . . . a . e e . . . t s62Soviet Mechanized Carps, December 1935, andMotorizedDivision,1939.*.**.*. .678.U.S, Triangular749.British7.and Russian Divisions,Infantry. . . * .Division,Armored and InfantrylJune 1941. . . . e .Divisions,90. m. . . . . . .9810.Schematic of Blitzkrieg11.SovietTank Corps5 1942, and Tank Army, 1943. * . . . . .10112.Type U.S. Armored Division,March 1942 andSeptember 1943. . . f . . . . c . . . . . . . e e * . .10913.SovietV . . * . . . . . . . . .12414.Type Soviet Tank Division,1947, andMechanized Division,1946/51. e . . . . . . . . . . . .143.148. . . * e . .156ROAD, 1965-1983 . e m . . . .159AssaultEncirclement.1942. . * . . t .Group Formation.15.Type U.S. Infantry16.U.S. Pentamic Infantry17.Type U.S. Armored Division,18.1st CavalryDivisionand Armored Divisions,Division. e m. .(Airmobile),iv1947. . . .ll1965. . . . . . . * . e163

MAPS1.Battle2.Second Battle3.The Maginot4.Khalkin-Gol,5.SidiBarrani,6.SidiBou Zid - Kasserine7.Imphal-Kohima,8.Task Force Dolvin,9.Lam Son 719, February-March10.of Cambrai,of Armageddon, 19-24 September 1918 .Line and the 1940 Campaign. .lo-3170December 1940 .7th Armored Brigade92Pass, FebruaryMarch-April1943. .Korea,5 February1971. .at Abu Agheila,1956. .1201361944 .Anyang-ni,3859August 1939. .V-3020-30 November 1917. .1951. .151166175

INTRODUCTIONWe have gottenintothe fashionof talkingoftactics,and infantryartillerytactics,cavalryThis distinctionis nothingbut a meretactics.Thereisbutoneart,andthatis theabstraction.tacticsof the combined arms. The tacticsof a bodyof mounted troopscomposed of the three arms issubjectto the same establishedprinciplesas isthat of a mixed force in which foot soldiersbulklargely.The only differenceis one of mobility.-MajorGerald Gilbert,BritishArmy, 1907’lbutThe concept of llCombined Arms” has existed for centuries,the nature of the combinationand the organizationallevel atPrior to the seventeenthwhich it occurred have varied greatly.therewasoftenno need to combinecentury,forexample IEachand cavalry at the small-unitlevel.infantry,artillery,branch served a specificfunctionon the battlefield,and onlythe senior commanders present needed to coordinatethe effectsofIn succeeding centuries,the general trendthe differentarms.has been to combine the arms at progressivelylower levelsoffromgonecommanders hasThe concernoforganization.coordinatingthe separate actionsof separate arms, to gainingto combining theirgreatercooperationbetween them, and finallyactions to maximize the effect of their various properties.At the time that Gilbertmade his plea, many officerspaidlip serviceto “combined arms,” but few understoodthe need toachieve such cooperationor combinationbetween the branches atcentury warfare andSince then, twentieththe small-unitlevel.have developed to the pointatespeciallymechanized warfarewhich some form of combined arms is essentialfor survival,letYet the very complexityofalone victory,on the battlefield.thiswarfareleadsto specializationin bothtrainingandmaintenance,a specializationthat is currentlyreflectedin theformationof companies and battalionsconsistingof one or atA mechanizedmajorweapons sys terns.most threedifferentinfantrybattalion,for example, apons, antitankweapons, and limitedSuch asupport in the form of mortars and grenade launchers.battalionhas littleor no organic capabilityin the areas oflong-rangeindirectfire,or airarmor, air defense, engineers,A tank or artillerybattalionis even more specializedsupport.and restrictedin its equipment.1

Althoughthese units are task organizedand cross attachedforfieldoperations,the demands of specialization,unitidentity,and maintenancenaturallycause many soldierstoconcentrateon the use of one weapon or arm to defeatthecorrespondingweapon or arm of the enemy. Such a narrow view hwhonaturallyto conservetechniquesThisthatseem effective.simplisticapproachisperhapslesscommon among seniorcommanders and s,where the differentweapons are integratedon amore frequentbasis than in some other organizations.Still,atleast some tank crews trainprimarilyto fightenemy tanks,tacticalfighterunits seek air superiorityover enemy fighters,and engineers concentrateon enhancing the mobilityof their ownforces while impeding the mobilityand eountermooilityeffortsofenemy engineers.All of these tasks are essentialfor combatbut none by itselfwillensure properinteractionsuccess,almostbybetween the differentarms and weapons.Indeed,definitiona particulararm or weapon system has most of the samestrengthsand weaknesses of its enemy counterpart,and thus maynot provide the best means of defeatingthat enemy.The very term "combined arms" often means differentthings todifferentpeople, or is left undefined and vague.As a minimum,however, this term includes at least three related elements:1‘The combined arms concept is the basic idea thatdifferentarms and weapons systems must be used in concerttomaximize the survivaland combat effectivenessof each other.The strengthsof one system must be used to compensate for theweaknesses of others.Exactlywhich arms and weapons areincluded in this concept varies greatlybetween armies and overtime.Today, however, the list of combined arms would include atleast the following:infantry(mechanized, motorized,airborne,airassault,light,and specialor llery,cavalry/reconnaissance,forces,air defense,attack helicopters,andcombat engineers,some form of close air support.Under certaincircumstances,thislistmay lear and chemical fires.Beyond this basic list,all the combat support and serviee support elements are equallyimportant if the force is to fightin a coordinatedand sustainedmanner.In the interestsof brevity,however, logisticalaspectsof combined arms will be discussed only brieflyin this study.2.(company,Combinedbattalion,arms ngslevelthese

differe:ltarms and weapons systems together for combat.This maypeacetime tables of organizationand ad hocinclude both fixed,or task-organizedcombinations of elements in wartime.Combined arms tacticsand operationsare the actual3.roles performed and techniquesappliedby these differentarmsand weapons in supportingeach otheronce they have beenorganizedinto integratedteams.This is the area that is ofyet it is preciselythismost concern to professionalsoldiers,area where historicalrecords and tacticalmanuals often neglectcombinedarmstat ticsandimportantdetails.Moreover,techniquesat the levelof battalionor below are the mostdifficultaspects about which to generalizehistorically,becausethey are most subject to frequent changes in technology.A short study such as this cannot possiblyconsider all thecomplexitiesthat these three elements bring to recent militaryHhat it can do is tracesome recurringthemes orhistory.problems in the recent conduct of combined arms warfarein theBritish,French, German, Soviet,and United States armies.Atvarioustimes,each of these armies has led the world in thedevelopment of tacticsand doctrine.For the period since 1948,the IsraeliDefense Force (IDF) must be added to thislist,because the Israeliexperiencehas had a major influenceonIn particular,this paper willweapons and doctrineelsewhere.trendsin the developmentof tacticalandidentifygeneralorganizationalconcepts for integratingthe differentarms andThis does not meanweapons systems at divisionlevel and below.describingthe thousands of minute changes that have occurred indivisionalstructurein these armies since the divisionbecame athe trendsin terms offixedtableof organization.Yet,proportionsof differentarms and levels at which those arms wereintegratedcan be illustratedwith a limitednumber of line andSuch trends should provide an historicalframeworkblock charts.and background for readers who are developingtheirown moredetailedconcepts of how to organize and employ the combined armstoday.This study is a tentativeoverview rather than an exhaustiveMy hope is that it willprompt others to develop oranalysis.therebythe trendsdescribedin these pages,even contestadvancing the study of a central issue in land combat.Before proceedingto specifichistoricaldevelopments,someMostbasic comments on the combined arms concept are in order.but they may assistreadersof these comments are self-evident,in placing the followingchapters into context.In thecombinationabstract,tacticalwarfaremay be consideredprotection,elements :mobility,threeof3as aand

offensivepower.2Mobilitymeans not onlythe abilitytomaneuver and concentrateforcesover terrain,but alsotheabilityto move men and units when exposed to the fireof thebut must be measuredenemy.Mobilityis not an absolute,relativeto the difficultyof the terrainand to the mobilityofother friendlyor enemy forces.For a combined arms team, theleast mobile element may determinethe mobilityof the entireforce.Without mobility,the principlesof mass, maneuver, andoffensivecannotbe applied,andsurprisebecomes verydifficult.Protectionmeans both securityagainst enemy surpriseattack and protectionto allow offensivemaneuver or defense onthe battlefield.This battlefieldprotectionmay be accomplishedby using terraindefiladeand defensivefortifications,or byemploying artificialmeans such as armor.Qffensiveor firepower is necessary in order to impose onefs will on the enemy, toovercome his protection.These three elements have interactedcontinuouslythroughoutmilitaryhistory.In particular,the past centuryhas beencharacterizedby a vast increasein weapons power, an increasethat can be overcome only with great difficultyby a carefullydesigned combinationof protectedmobilityand other firepower.The most obvious example of this is the defensive system of WorldWar I.That combinationof firepowerand protectionhad to becounteredby close coordinationof infantryfire(mobility),support(offensivepower),and armor(whichtheoreticallycombined all three elements).Even this explanationof World WarI is simplistic,but the threebaskelementsof mobility,protection,and offensivepower are presentin most tacticalequations.At a more practicallevel,these three elements are combinedtechnicallyin the design and employment of individualweaponsand tacticallyin the eombination of differentweapons and arms.The 1982 editionof Field Manual 100-5, Operations,dividestheconceptand practiceof combined arms intotwo procedures:supplementaryor reinforcingcombined arms, and complementarycombined arms.As the name implies,supplementarycombined armsmeans increasingthe effect of one weapons system or arm with thesimilareffectsaf other weapons and arms.For example, theeffectsof mortars and artillerymay reinforceor supplement eachother in an integratedfireplan,Engineers may enhance theprotectionof armored vehicles by digging in those vehicleswithengineerequipment.Complementary combined arms, by contrast,have differenteffectsor characteristics,so that togethertheypose a more complicatedthreat,a dilemma for the enemy. Thedefender may place a minefieldso that it halts an enemy force ata point where observed artilleryor antitankfirescan attackthat enemy as he clearsthe minefield.The defender has thusintegratedthe differentweapons to provide a much greater effect4

than any one by itselfcould achieve.The resultingdilemmaforces the enemy to accept casualtieswhile clearingthe mines,or to seek a passage elsewhere.It is not sufficient,however, to develop a doctrineforIn order to practice,combining the differentarms and services.refine,and employ this doctrine,at least five other elementsare necessary.First,an army must design and procure weaponswith the characteristicsrequiredby the doctrineand must stayabreast of technicalchanges that may invalidateor modify thoseweapons and doctrine.Second,the doctrinemust be effectivelyexplainedanddisseminatedto the commanders who are expectedto use it.Third,the commanders must believethatthe doctrinecan beeffectivewith the organizations,weapons, and troops available.Disseminationand acceptanceare hampered by the factthatsoldiersnaturallyrely on past experience,so that a colonel mayunconsciouslyexpect platoons to functionas they did when he wasa lieutenant,years or even decades before,Experienceis apricelessasset to any army, but it naturallyretards or distortsthe applicationof changes in technologyand doctrinethat mayrender parts of that experience obsolete.Fourth, in the eyes of the commander, his unit must have theA recurringthemetrainingand morale to implement the doctrine.tend tosoldiersprofessionalof thisstudywillbe thatoverestimatethe amount and qualityof trainingnecessary for theThere is noeffectivelyin war.rank and fileto performsubstitutefor good training,but historicallyleaders with highstandards have rejectedor modifieddoctrinethat theirtroopsseemed incapableof executing.On the other hand, trainingmaydot trineorgenuinelybe an obstacletoa particularorganization.If company commanders are, on the average, capableof coordinatingonly eighty men and two types of weapons systems,itwould be uselesstento design170-man companies withTrainingofficersto handle thesedifferentweapons systems.may be prohibitivelyexpensiveinlarger,more complex unitspeacetime.Finally,a combined arms system cannot work without effectiveIndeed,command and control to integrateand directthat system.speed of decisionmaking,factorsthat improve span of control,and leadershipabilitycan be as importantas the weaponsthemselves.Successfulcommanders throughouthistoryhave instinctivelyOne could argue thatneitherunderstoodthese requirements.the Great of Prussia,Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, nor Fredericknor Napoleon I of France actuallydeveloped major new doctrines5

and weapons for the combined arms.What they did well was toprocure weapons, understand and disseminatedoctrine,traintheirtroops, and apply the resultsin battle,With the larger armiesand technicalcomplexityof weapons in this century,it may bebeyond the capabilityof a singleleader to fulfillalltheserequirements.This possibilityfurthercomplicatesa militaryrealityin which, since 1914, the combinationof differentarmshas become essentialforsurvivalratherthan ingandinstitutionalizingthe combined arms concept,organization,andtacticsin this century is the focus of this study.Jonathan M. HouseCaptain, MilitaryIntelligenceCombat Studies InstituteU.S. Army Command & GeneralStaff College

CHAPTERONEPROLOGUE TO 1914In the 169Os, European armies developedand fieldedthesocket bayonet , a long spike-shapedblade that could be fixed onthe end of a musket withoutobstructingthe bore of the weaponduringloadingand antryto withstandnorse cavalrychargeswithout the aid of specializedweapons such as the pike.For thenext 150 years,infantryunitsarmed solelywithsmoothborefirearmsand bayonets were the backbone of all Western armies.Skilledseniorcommanders understoodhow to coordinatethisinfantrywith cavalry and with direct-firesmoothbore artillery,importantat the levelofbut such coordinationwas rarelyregiment or below, because these units were basicallyarmed witha single type of weapon.The need to maximize the firepowerofinaccuratesmoothbore weapons led to extremely linear deploymentson the battlefield.The infantrymaneuvered into long formationsof two or three ranks, with the artillerylocatedbetween orslightlybehind the infantrybattalions.The limitedeffectofeven such carefullyarrayedfirepowermade itpossible,ifdangerous, for dense masses of cavalry and Infantryto attack ata specificpointand break the thinlinesof the defender.Fire-supportcoordinationwas simple,because the infantryandartilleryunit commanders had face-to-facecontact or used handsignals to designate targets.The fundamentalsof weaponry,technology,and small-unittacticswere refinedbut remained basicallyunchanged untilthemid-1800s.Stabilitymade professionalsoldiersskepticalofinnovationseven when they came from serious students of tactics.Technologyand ManpowerDuringthe period1827-1870,the firstof two waves oftechnologicalchange In the nineteenthcentury revolutionizedthebattlefield.The most importantinnovationof this firstwaveThewas the developmentof ith a bullet-shapedproJectileinitiallyRiflingand an improved sealreplacedthe smoothbore musket.between bulletand bore increasedthe velocityand accuracy ofrange of nearly500out to an effectivesmallarms firemeters .2Duringthe American CivilWar of 1861-1865,denseinfantryformationsin daylightprovidedlucrativetargetsforBoth sides learned to spread outdefendersarmed with rifles.for theirpart,Defenders,into skirmishlines when attacking.had to dig in to reduce their own vulnerabilityto the attackers’riflefire.7

The muzzle-loadingriflesused by most soldiersduring theCivilWar were already obsolescent,the resultof the PrussianArmy ' s developmentofbreeeh-loadingrifle. 3theUnlikebreedh:loaderscould be reloadedin a pronemuzzle-loaders,position,allowinginfantryto remain under cover while firingmetallic-easedammunition made loadingSoon fixed,repeatedly,the Franco-PrussianWar ineven faster.By the time ofhad adopted breech-loadingartilleryas1870- 187 1, most armieswell as rifles.The firstwave of technologicalchange also includedtheThese inventionsintroductionof the railroadand the telegraph.greatlyincreasedthe speed of communication,mobilization,andAt thetroop movement at the strategicand operationallevels.maneuvered on foot or ontacticallevel,though,troops stillhorseback.The second wave of technologicalchange came in the 1880s owder,improved artilleryfuzes,artillery,recoilingand rapidmachine guns,srmecession e With the exception of the engine, these developmentsall increasedthe volume, range, and accuracy of fire,placingthe soldierin the open at a tremendous disadvantagecompared toGeneral staffswere createdthe soldierin prepared mobilizeand deploy enormous armies using these new weapons.Although radiotelegraphsexisted in the armies of 1974, the radiohad not yet improved to the point where staffscould follow anddirect events on the battlefield.The cumulativeeffectof thesetwo waves was to makecooperationand coordinationbetween differentunitsand armsabsolutelyessential.Anything less than totalcoordinatkoninthe attack might well resultin defeat by defensivefirepower.Canverse ly , an uncoordinateddefense inviteddisaster.The American CivilWar and the Wars of German Unification61864-1871)gave professionalsoldiersmany opportunitiestoThatchange,technologicalfirstwave oftheevaluatein combinationwith an effectivereserve componentteehnology,strugglestosystem, provided the tools of victoryin Prussia’sWhen World War I began, however, professionaluniteGermany.soldiershad not yet digested and agreed upon the effectsof theAs willbe seen below, most tacticalsecond wave of change.daetrinesin 7914 showed a healthyrespectfor the effectsofsolvedthe resultingbut such doctrineshad notfirepower,problems on the battlefield,

Quite apart from changes in weaponry, the Prussian example oflarge cadre and reservistforces overwhelming professionalarmiesconvinced other European governments that they must develop massEuropean general staffsthereforeproducedarmies of reservists.elaborateplans to mobilizeand deploy such reserves by railroadAs a resultof these efforts,by 1900,at the outbreak of war.Germany had only 545,000 men on active duty but a total wartimestrengthof 3,013,OOO; France had 544,450 men in peacetime and4,660,OOO in war; and Russia could mobilize over 4,000,OOO from apeacetime strengthof 896,OOO.Q In contrast , the BritishArmyExpeditionaryForce of 1914 consisted essentiallyof regularsandcontainedonlya limitedpercentageof reservistswho hadpreviouslyserved on active duty.The Prussian reserve and militia(Landwehr) formationsof the1860s were successfulpartlybecause they were filledwith theveteransof previousPrussian wars.By 1914, however, a longperiod of peace had deprivedmost armies of such experiencedreservists.Every continentalarmy had to develop its own systemof reservetrainingand organization,and every army had todecide what percentageof reservistscould be absorbed into anMany officersdistrustedtheactive duty unit on mobilization.competence of theircitizen-soldiers.The absence of reservistsfrom regulararmy formationsduring most of the year meant thatunitswere well below authorizedwartime strengthand were inthus making realistictrainingforeffectskeletonformations,both officersand conscriptsdifficult.Organizationand DoctrinePre- 19 14 armies organizedthe differentcombat arms intodivisionsand corps that bore a superficialresemblance to thoseof today.The most obvious differencewas the absence of theBy thevehiclesand electronicsassociatedwith modern combat.end of the NapoleonicWars, European armies had accepted theinfantryandcombiningunitfordivisionas the war timeartillery,althoughmost cavalry was concentratedinto separatedivisions,or even corps.5brigades,As in so many otheragreementareas, the Prussian example had produced considerableMostby 1914 on the basic organizationof an infantrydivision.divisionscontained twelve battalionsof infantry,each with twomachine guns eitherassigned or in directsupport (see Figures 1and 21.6Battalionswere usuallygrouped into four regimentsalthough the Britishregimentalheadquartersnoand two brigades,longer had a tacticalcommand functionand thereforeremained inDivisionalcavalry was universallyvery small, becausegarrison.most functionsof screeningand reconnaissancewere assigned toThese large cavalrythe separate cavalry brigades or divisions.9

TYPE FRENCHDIVISION,191415,000men. 36 guns,24 machinegunsxxHQ2 x machineTYPE GERMANDIVISION,17,60019146gunmen, 72 guns, 24 machineElun18 x 77mm18 x 77mmFigure 1. Type French and German Divisions,84-3330-lO-1914gunscl18 x 106mm

TYPE BRITISHra0DIVISION,191418,000men, 76 gunr,24 mechine1xxOFiE!la2 x mschine18 x 83.8mmcl 0gun18 x 4.6”;4 x 127mmTYPE RUSSIANDIVISION,21,0001914Figure 2. Type British84-3330gun6men, 48 guns, 32 mschineand Russian Divisions,-11-1914.Egun6

formationswere almost pure cavalry,with a few horse artillerybatteriesattached.Not until1923-14)for example, did theGermans add company-sizedelementsof mounted engineersandbicycle-equippedinfantryto their cavalry divisions.7Where the armies differedmost markedly was in the proportionandcalibersof lartilleryvaried from as few as thirty-l&xlightgunsof 75-min the French dkvisionto as many’asseventy-six(114.5 rsand four 127 mm guns, in the tureref leetedprofounddisagreementover the role of artilleryand the importanceofcombined arms.In order to understandthe doctrinalinterrelationshipsofthe differentarms before World War I, some conskderationof eacharm is in order.Cavalry and engineers may be discussed briefly;deserve a more detailedexplanation.infantryand artilleryBecause the U.S. dfviskonwas only just developingduring theperiod 1911-17,it is omitted from this discussion.mobilityin the days beforeCavalryhad the greatestautomobilesand was thereforecloselyassoeiatedwith functionsrequiringsuch mobility.Traditionally,cavalryhad threemissions : reconnaissanceand securitybefore the battle,shockactionon the battlefield,and pursuitafterthe battle.Theincreases in firepowerduring the later1800s led many tacticiansto suggest that shock action was no longer a feasiblerole exceptbecause the chargeThey argued that,under rare circumstances.seemed almost obsolete ) cavalry should be reequipped as dragoonsThis would enable the mounted arm toor mounted infantry.continueitsreconnaissanceor securityalsomission I whilefunctioningas highlymobile infantrythat dismounted to fightaftermaking contact with the enemy. Cavalry actuallyoperatedin thismanner duringthe American CivilWar, the Boer War(1899-1902))and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).By 1974, theBritishand German armies had equipped their cavalry with machineguns and trained them to fight dfsmounted when necessary.Yet the desireto e,security,and pursuiteaused many cavalrymen toprefermounted fightingwhenever possible,despitethe largetarget a horse and rider presented to the enemy. Another factor,also helped preserve the traditionalCavalrysocial conservatism,of lances and sabers in most armies.In additisn,defenders ofcavalry shock action justifiedtheir views by citingone cavalryknowncharge of the Franco-PrussianMar, an action appropriatelybattleoftheride.”AtBredow” sdeath“‘VOE?;Tonville-Mars-la-Touron 76 August 1870, NaJ* Gen. von Bredow12

led his Prussian cavalrybrigade down a depressionto withinafew hundred meters of the left flank of the French VI Corps.TheFrench had alreadysufferedfrom artilleryfireand were notentrenched when von Bredow charged out of the smoke. The chargeachieved its objective.Yet during an attack that took less thanfive minutes and produced only a momentary tacticaladvantage,380 out of 800 German cavalrymen were killedor wounded.8Of the four combat arms, engineers were the most neglected indoctrine.They caltasks and maintainingweapons or equipmentin additionto theirmobilityand countermobilitymissions.Because of these missions,engineers were often the only troopstrainedin the detailedconstructionand destructionof obstaclesand field fortifications.9With respect to infantry,a riflebattalionbefore 1914 wasjust that--fourcompanies of rifle-armedinfantryplus, in mostcases,two heavy machine guns.Such milarshort-range,indirect-fireweapons that we today associatewith “infantry.”To some extent,armies neglectedthese weapons because of thespecializedtrainingthey required,or because, in the case ofthepieces were too heavy tothe heavy machine gun and mortar,keep pace with advancing infantry.Machine guns were usuallycast in an economy-of-forcerole,such as protectingan openflank.Moreover,once an infantrybattaliondetrainedandwas neithermore mobilenor moreadvanced to contact , itprotectedthan infantryin the eighteenthor nineteenthcentury.magazine-fedriflesand machineThe firepowerof breech-loading,guns had greatlyoutstrippedthe mobilityand survivabilityofAs everyone discoveredin the falloffoot-mobileinfantry.theonlyimmediateremedy was toentrench.All1914,professionalsoldierswere aware of this problem before the war,but they regarded defensivefirepoweras a costly obstaclethathad to be overcome by a highlymotivatedattacker.At tackinginfantrywas expected to forego protectionin order to maximizeits own firepowerand mobility.In order to understand this belief,we must consider the warThe Warsthat professionalsoldiersexpected to fightin 7914.of German Unificationhad provided models of short wars won byOver and over during the summer ofdecisiveoffensiveaction.and better-armedFrench infantryhad1870, the better-trainedonly to beselecteddefensivepositions,taken up carefullyoutflankedand drivenback by determinedand costlyGermanattacks . JO Thus, many soldiersconcluded that standingon theIn any event,no onedefensivewas a sure road to defeat.believedthat a war that mobilizedthe entiremanpower of a

nation could gothat an entirerough t . Undercollapse if theWar in ?914 meanton for mare than a few months.economy halted while the reserves mobilizedandsuch circumstaneesSsocietiesand economies wouldwar dragged on.Tfiis beliefin a short war determined many of the tacticalWith few excegtfons,they didexpectationsof European soldiers.not anticipateassaultingpreparedfortificationsacross openenvisaged a seriesof meetingInstead I most soldiersground.engagements or encounterbattles.lfEach commander hoped thathis cavalryscreen or his infantryadvance guard would find aweak pointwhioh he w

this warfare leads to specialization in both training and . most three different major weapons sys terns. A mechanized infantry battalion, for example, normally includes direct-fire infantry weapons, antitank weapons, and limited indirect-fire

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