New Ideas In Psychology
New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 147–155Contents lists available at ScienceDirectNew Ideas in Psychologyjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsychWhat is behavior? And so what?Raymond M. BergnerDepartment of Psychology, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61790-4620, United Statesa b s t r a c tKeywords:BehaviorConceptual analysisPre-empiricalUnificationIntegrationThis article addresses a longstanding problem in the field of psychology, that of lacking anadequate explication of what is arguably our central concept as a “science of behavior,” theconcept of “behavior” itself. The three sections comprising the paper are devoted,respectively, to (a) presenting a conceptual formulation of behavior; (b) discussing thisformulation by, among other things, addressing objections to it and noting its advantagesover psychology’s currently preferred definition of behavior as observable activity; and (c)relating why having such a formulation is important. The final section includes severaluses to which the present formulation has already been and can in future be put, includinga sketch of how it may be used to integrate the various subfields of our currently fragmented science of behavior.Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.“Certain things should never be taken for granted,among them.the precise meaning of words that are atthe heart of your discipline.”N. Angier, 2009“What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goesup from the fact that I raise my arm?”L.Wittgenstein, 1953, #621.Psychology, although describing itself as “the science ofbehavior,” has not to date arrived at any consensus in thematter of what the concept of “behavior” means. It has not, inAngier’s (2009) terms, conceptually formulated the precisemeaning of a term that is clearly “at the heart of (its) discipline.” A review of 26 psychology dictionaries (both standardand online) and textbook glossaries by this author revealedthat only seven of them offered definitions of “behavior” atall, reflecting a widespread tendency in the field to ignore thequestion entirely. Of those sources that did include definitions of the term, the most prevalent formulation is typifiedby the following: behavior is “any observable overt movement of the organism generally taken to include verbalbehavior as well as physical movements” (webref.org/psychology/b/behavior.htm7). According to this definition,E-mail address: rmbergn@ilstu.edu.0732-118X/ – see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights avior is essentially observable physical activity: a pigeonpecks a disk, a woman says “hello,” a student raises his hand,and so forth. Comparable definitions may be found in TheOxford Dictionary of Psychology (Colman, 2006), and in King(2008) and Levitis, Lidicker, and Freunda (2009).This article, as its title indicates, addresses two broadquestions. What is this empirical phenomenon that goes bythe name “behavior?” And so what – what difference doesit make that we are without a scientifically adequateconsensus formulation of this term, and what differencewould it make were we to achieve and collectively adoptone? The three sections comprising the paper are devoted,respectively, to (a) presenting a conceptual formulation ofbehavior; (b) discussing this formulation by, among otherthings, addressing objections to it and noting its advantagesover psychology’s currently preferred definition ofbehavior as observable activity; and (c) relating why havingsuch a formulation is important. This final section includesseveral uses to which the present formulation has alreadybeen and can in future be put, including a sketch of how itmay be used to integrate the various subfields of ourcurrently fragmented science of behavior. The formulationof behavior that is pivotal to this entire presentation istaken from the broader conceptual framework of Descriptive Psychology (Ossorio, 2006).
148R.M. Bergner / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 147–1551. What is behavior?How does Descriptive Psychology (DP) address thisquestion regarding one of psychology’s most fundamentalconcepts, that of “behavior?” It begins by noting that allbehavior is describable as an attempt on the part of anindividual to bring about some state of affairs – either toeffect a change from one state of affairs to another, or tomaintain a currently existing one (Ossorio, 2006, p. 49). Jillcombs her hair, drives to work, reads a book, plays herfavorite song over again, and mentally calculates how manybottles of wine she will need for her upcoming party. In allof these behaviors, whether they involve overt physicalmovements or not, she is attempting to bring about somestate of affairs – to change her unkempt hair to a morepresentable state, to continue her enjoyment of the song, togo from being unclear to being clear about how manybottles of wine she must purchase, and so forth. (NB: It maybe noted that this characterization of behavior excludesphenomena such as patellar reflex movements, andincludes ones such as performing mental calculations.).Going beyond this general characterization, the DPposition maintains that human behavior is an empiricalphenomenon that is not amenable to either of psychology’straditional means of capturing the meaning of concepts,those of classical definition or of prototype analysis (Mervis& Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1973). It is instead amenable toa third procedure, that of parametric analysis (Ossorio,2006). While little used within psychology, parametricanalysis is a standard conceptual tool in other sciences(especially physics) and in mathematics. It may be illustrated briefly by recalling the familiar example of anempirical phenomenon traditionally captured in this way,that of color. The concept “color” is neither formallydefinable nor well suited to prototype analysis. However,the empirical domain of color – the set that has as itsmembers all colors and possible colors–can be capturedcompletely for scientific (and other) purposes by employing a system that specifies values for three parameters: hue,saturation, and brightness (Gleitman, Fridlund, & Reisberg,2004, pp. 190–191). On the three dimensional coordinatesystem that is the color solid, when one gives values to eachof these parameters, one identifies a specific location on thecolor solid, which location is a specific color. Further,employing this parametric system, we are able to articulateprecisely the ways in which one color is the same as, ordifferent from, another.Paralleling this, DP maintains that the empirical domainof behavior – the set that has as its members all behaviorsand possible behaviors – can best be captured for scientificpurposes by employing a formulation that includes eightparameters:hBi ¼ hI; W; K; K H; P; A; PC; Si;where.B ¼ Behavior (e.g., the behavior of Peter moving his rookduring a chess match)I ¼ Identity: the identity of the person whose behavior it is;an aspect of every behavior is that it is someone’s behavior(e.g., Peter)W ¼ Want (the motivational parameter), the state of affairsthat the person seeks to bring about; an aspect of everybehavior is that it is an attempt to bring about some state ofaffairs (e.g., to achieve an improved strategic position in thechess match)K ¼ Know (the cognitive parameter): the distinctions(concepts) that are being acted on; an aspect of everybehavior is that it is a case of acting on distinctions (e.g., rookvs. queen, knight, etc.; permissible rook movements vs.nonpermissible ones)K-H ¼ Know-How (the skill or competency parameter): anaspect of every behavior is that it entails the here and nowexercise of some broader or more general competency orcompetencies (e.g., when Peter makes his move, he exercises his general ability to move the various chess pieces inthe manner appropriate to each)P ¼ Performance: the process, or procedural aspects of thebehavior, including all bodily postures, movements, andprocesses that are involved in the behavior; an aspect ofevery behavior is that it involves the occurrence of physicalprocesses, which processes can in principle be described atany level of analysis appropriate to the describer’s needs,ranging from the very molar to the very molecular (e.g.,Peter’s grasping and moving the rook, or the relevant brainevents transpiring as he does so). (On the DP account,a description of such molecular events is not, ontologicallyspeaking, a description of what is “really real” about thebehavior, or of its “basic building blocks.” It is, rather,a description of one aspect of the behavior, the physicalprocess aspect, given, one might say, “to the last decimalpoint.”)A ¼ Achievement: (the outcome parameter): an aspect ofevery behavior is that it is the bringing about of someoutcome – something is different by virtue of the behaviorhaving occurred (which may or may not coincide with thedesired state of affairs specified in W) (e.g., Peter’s rookbeing in a new position; his opponent being in check)PC ¼ Personal Characteristics (the individual differenceparameter): an aspect of every behavior is that in itsenactment personal characteristics of the behaver areexpressed; these may include Dispositions (Traits, Attitudes, Interests, Styles, Values), Powers (Abilities, Knowledge), and/or Derivatives (Capacities, Embodiments, States,Statuses) (e.g., Peter’s competitiveness, knowledge of chess,or tendency to prefer bold, unexpected moves)S ¼ Significance: what the person is doing by doing theconcrete thing he or she is doing; the more inclusivepattern of behavior enacted by virtue of enacting thebehavior in question (e.g., by making his concrete, specificmove of relocating a piece of onyx from one square toanother on a board, Peter is “making a chess move” and“participating in the broader social practice of playingchess”; depending on the context, he might also be gainingrevenge for an earlier defeat, teaching his child the game ofchess, or trying to show the world that a grand master candefeat a computer at the game of chess).The recommended reading of the foregoing parametricanalysis is this: Whenever a state of affair of the kind“behavior” is the case, a state of affairs of each of the kindsspecified by the parameters is also the case. Alternatively,we can say: “Any behavior (e.g., one that might be described
R.M. Bergner / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 147–155simply as ‘Peter moved his rook’) is a complex state of affairsthat includes as component states of affairs a specificperson’s acting to accomplish purposes W1.Wn, acting ondiscriminations K1.Kn, exercising competencies K-H1.KHn, engaging in physical processes or performances P1.Pn,achieving outcomes A1.An.expressing personal characteristics PC1.PCn, and engaging in actions having significances S1.Sn.” (Compare: “The state of affairs that can bedescribed simply as ‘lemon yellow’ is the same as the totalityof states of affairs that includes the having of Hue value Hn,Brightness value Bn, and Saturation value Sn.”).Aside from their use as a means for capturing andarticulating empirical domains, parameters, in science or ineveryday life, are a means by which we specify the ways inwhich one instance of a concept (e.g., a behavior or a color)can be the same as, or different from, another instance(Ossorio, 2006). If all of the values for two behaviors areidentical, the behaviors are identical (compare: if hue,saturation and brightness are identical for two patches ofcolor, they are the same color). If one or more values aredifferent, the behaviors (or colors) are different. Forexample, suppose that Pat and Terry engage in the sameconcrete overt performance of raising their right hands tothe side of their head with their palms forward. However,a primary value (among others) of the W (Want) parameterfor Terry is “to win passage of House Bill 27,” while a primaryvalue of the W parameter for Pat is “to secure ownership ofthe painting being auctioned off.” This parametric difference renders Terry’s behavior a different behavior thanPat’s. Colloquially, despite the identity of their physicalmovements, we characterize this difference by giving quitedifferent behavior descriptions: we say that what Terry isdoing is “voting,” while what Pat is doing is “bidding.”In principle, one could give an exhaustive description ofany behavior by specifying all of the values of all of theabove parameters. In practice, however, on any givenoccasion, whether scientific, therapeutic, or everydayinteractional, persons make descriptive commitments tothose parameters that serve their purposes in the giving ofthe specific description. They commit to the W (Want)parameter (among others) when they want to describewhat Pat is doing as voting. They commit to the K(distinction made) parameter when they want to describewhat Kathy is doing as treating the remark as a joke ratherthan an insult. They commit to the PC (Personal Characteristic, subtype Trait) parameter when they want tocharacterize Senator Smith’s vote on a child care bill as anexpression of political ambition, not humanitarianism.A final point here involves going beyond what spacepermits into matters that one can perhaps only glimpse fromthe foregoing discussion. The DP conception, in formulatingthe domain of behavior via parametric analysis, is in effectsaying that, in giving behavior descriptions by assigningvalues to parameters, we are working a system. By analogy, itis as if we had here explicated the concept of “algebra,” and indoing so had given only a short, simple description much asone might find in a standard dictionary. However, we wouldbe aware that what had been referred to by the word“algebra” was not something simple and thing-like that onecould point to, but an entire complex system that is in use bypersons. Where in working the algebraic system one might149say, “I think x ¼ 3”, so in working the system of behaviordescription, one is in effect saying things such as, “I think onevalue of K (one distinction being acted upon) in Peter’sbehavior is rook (vs. queen, etc.)”, or “I think a value of PC forSenator Smith’s behavior is ‘political ambition’ (vs. ‘humanitarianism’).” The interested reader is referred to Ossorio,2006, for an in-depth discussion of this matter.2. Discussion2.1. Arbitrary or ad hoc?The above analysis could seem arbitrary or ad hoc and,relatedly, could arouse doubt about the necessity of one ormore of these parameters. However, as a thought experiment, it is instructive to consider the following picture ofwhat results if one attempts to eliminate any of theseparameters from the formulation of behavior (i.e., to denythat it is a necessary aspect of behavior): “Peter moved hisrook,” but.no one moved the rook (I).no distinctionswere involved between rooks and other chess pieces, boardposition X vs. other board positions, etc. (K).no new stateof affairs was sought by Peter (W).no personal competence of his came into play in the act (K-H). no process ofa physical sort took place (P).nothing was different byvirtue of the behavior having occurred (A).no personalcharacteristic of Peter’s was expressed (PC).or, finally, hisbehavior of physically moving a carved piece of onyx fromone square to another had no significance beyond theconcrete moving of a physical object from one location toanother (S).2.2. Advantages over conception of behavior as observablemovementThe present formulation of behavior contrasts sharplywith, and has many advantages over, the most prevalentconception of behavior as the observable overt movementof an organism. These include the following:2.2.1. Greater complexityIn the present formulation, human behavior is treated asa vastly more complex phenomenon. It may be noted thatthe behavior-as-observable-movement notion, viewedfrom the present perspective, is essentially saying thatbehavior corresponds to only one of the eight parameters,that of P (the physical performance parameter). In responseto Wittgenstein’s famous question, “What is left over if Isubtract the fact that my arms goes up from the fact that Iraise my arm?” (1953, # 621), psychology’s standard definition in effect replies, “Nothing!” The present formulation,like Wittgenstein himself, answers, “Almost everything!”2.2.2. Enhanced conformity with actual usageThe present formulation, despite its initial strangeness, isarguably far more intuitively acceptable as corresponding tothe concept in actual use by persons, in scientific or othercontexts, when they characterize the behavior of themselvesand others. When asked, “What is Peter doing?” (i.e., what ishis behavior?), they could and might give very concrete,performative descriptions such as “He moved that piece of
150R.M. Bergner / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 147–155carved onyx from location A to location B.” However, almostinvariably, and far more informatively, they give descriptionsin which they commit to the various parameters: “He isplaying chess”; “She is questioning his credentials”; “He istrying to subtly suggest that Desdemona has been unfaithful”; and so on ad infinitum. In doing so, the DP conception,unlike the behavior-as-observable-movement one, providesformal conceptual access to the descriptions of behavior thatare virtually always at issue in human affairs.2.2.3. Inclusion of mental actsThe present formulation includes private or mental actssuch as planning, calculating, or problem solving “in one’shead.” When Einstein performed his famous thoughtexperiments such as imagining what it would be like toleave earth at the speed of light, the present conceptionwould maintain that he was behaving – that he was doingsomething. The observable movement view, if one takes itliterally and seriously, would not.2.2.4. Exclusion of involuntary movementsThe DP formulation excludes involuntary bodily movements such as patellar and eyeblink reflex reactions. Theparameters of behavior, as noted previously, are parameters of a set, or domain, of empirical phenomena. As such,like hue, saturation, and brightness in the case of color, theyare also the criteria for set membership. The empiricalphenomena at issue in reflex and other involuntarymovements would not be considered amenable to, orintelligible in terms of, analysis via these behavioralparameters. One would not, for example, describe or try tounderstand a person’s knee jerking forward upon a tapfrom the physicians mallet in terms of that person’smotives, traits, attitudes, or distinctions made.2.2.5. Straw man?A cognitive psychological colleague, upon reading theforegoing, stated that attacking the behavior-as-movementconception seemed to her a case of attacking a straw man.After all, she noted, the cognitive revolution has been goingon for forty years and it certainly has attended to overtlyunobservable mental or “private” processes.Two brief replies: First, psychologists have been studyingmany things for decades – cognition, neuroscience, personality, psychopathology, development, and more. The fact thatthey have been studying them is not the same as saying,“Therefore they have provided an adequate conceptualformulation of the term ‘behavior’.” Factually, they have notdone so (Angier, 2009; Levitis et al., 2009). Second, investigating cognitive processes is ambiguous with respect to thepresent issue. Indeed, on cognitive psychology’s still dominant input-processing-output computer model of humanfunctioning (Thagard, 2007), the “output” – the behavior – istypically taken to be some overtly observable product such asa verbal utterance or motor behavior, and thus fits theobservable movement formulation.2.3. What about animal behavior?The analysis of behavior presented has been portrayedthus far as one pertaining to human behavior. What ofanimal behavior? Upon inspection, it can be seen that theparameters of behavior – discriminations, wants, knowhow, performances, achievements, knowledges, etc. – arereadily applicable to animal behavior. An aspect of thepigeon’s behavior of pecking the disk is that it discriminates(K) the disk from other
behavior, including all bodily postures, movements, and processes that are involved in the behavior; an aspect of every behavior is that it involves the occurrence of physical processes, which processes can in principle be described at any level of analysis appropriate to the describer’s needs, ranging from the very molar to the very molecular (e.g., Peter’s grasping and moving the rook .
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