Limits Of Togetherness - Paul Pangaro, PhD
rNFORMA nON PROCESSING 80, S.H. LavUlgton (ed.)Nonh·HoUaJ!d Publishing Company LFIP.1980lnviled Paper,THE LIMITS OF TOGETHERNESSGordon PASK·System Research Ltd., Woodville House, 37 Sheen RoadRichmond. SUrrey. UKThis paper makes a distinction between conversa tion and communication (signal trans fer whichmay, or may not, be conversational) . The word " conversation" is given an interpretation, whichref.1nes its COIIBDonsense meaning. conversation maintains the autonor;Jy or identity of systemsand, also , generates independencies between systems (human , societal , or others), which isa prerequisite of dialogue.The natural habitat of human beings is, increasingly, an "information environment" wherecommunication and computation have altered suppositions about signal distance, or"togetherness". Limits are discussed with emph . sis upon the hazards engendered by too muchtogetherness in person-person or wan-machine interaction. Because it is possible to comment,cogently, upon the nature of conversation. these limits can be recognised and remedie's tothe malfunctioning which is likely to occur if they are exceeded, are proposed .The Limits of togethernessThe technical aspect of the paper is devotedto saying what Conversation is . As a preliminary definition, Conversation is "Conceptsharing" .The popularised word "togetherness" aptlycapture s a general notion of human proximity,of meeting and speaking, or dancing together ata fes tival. Social groups. be they familiesurban communities Or the older universi ties,have institutions which promote togetherness;the dining table , a market, or a cafe 3S thecase may be. On more or less ritualisedocc3sions, and in the traditional places, humans converse; either verbally, or by imageand gesture. I submit that the oonversationwhich occurs, debate and sometimes agreement ,is the stuff of ciVilised life and togetherness is essential to i t . On the other handthe r e are also limits upon "togetherne ss"; toomuch of it, for example. gives rise tospecific symptoms of individual and soc ialmalaise. These symptoms typically appear whenthe communication, allowed by proximity. isnot conversation.1 . 1 Logical Discrimination.The value of a communication is accuracy andveridicality imag ed by thea ndvalues of propositional or descriptive logic(or its prob3bi lis tic e xtrapola tion) wher e"True" or " False" are usually mode lled asstates 1, O. In contrast, the v alue of aconversation is agreement, reached bycommanding and obeying or questioning andanswering (neither questions nor commands havefactual truth values). Agreement may be imagedby the coherence truth values of a procedurallogic and these values are convenientlymodelled by phySical coherence b etween nonlinear processes .In communication. inform4t!on transfer isfounded upon sele ction, albeit statistical ,3mOngst states of t ransmitters and receiversthat are extra- theore tically specified asindependent. (apar t fr om the cOllllllUnicationchannels) but synchronised . for example, by arecognisible punctuating symbol . Notion s suchas "noise" and "capacity" rest upon t hesefoundations. In contrast, the informationtransfer of a conversation is of the PetriBolt [1]t he extent to which otherwise independent participants are renderedlocally dependent , Or otherwise asynchronousparticipants become locally synchro nised whenagreements are reached, as a result of conceptsharing. Unlike transmitters and receivers,t he participants. who converse dOd shareconcepts, are not unambiguously predefined andare not extra-theoretical importat ions. Theact of conversing surely depends upon theirautonomy or distinction but, also. this actgenerates a dis tincti on .1 . IntroductionCommunication and conversation are distinct,and they do not always go hand in hand. Supposeth a t communication is liberally construed asthe t r ansmission and tran sformation of signals.If so, conversation requ ires at least somecommunication . But , enigmatically perhaps, verybad communication may admit very good conversation and the existence of a perfect channelis no guarantee that any conversation will takeplace.Bec3use communicatio n theory is well known,differences between communication and conversation can be pointed out by comparison andcon trast, at this juncture. System Re8earon. Ltd.and Brun.eZ Univer8i ty, Engtand.Netn.e1'Iandsfop Advanced Studies,Wassenaar, Netn.erlands.999
1000G. Pask/The limits of togetherness1.2 Some Background, 1.3 An Information Environment My own conviction about the importance ofconversation and its critical relation witht ogetherness took shape slowly. During thelater 19505 and early 60s, We constructed whatwere glibly called "adaptive teaching machines'!These devices operated in Sk i lls as varied astypewriting, track ing and problem solv i ng[ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 ].I n this context the word "machine" means apiece of hardware constrained, algebraically,to act as a computer; nowadays ,for example, thesystems are more reliably implemented usingstandard microprocessors . 'Ihe word "teaching"suggests that someone engages in conversation,usually non-verbal, but with the "te achingmachine" ,Only in the 1960s and early 1970s was i t clearthat this suggestion is utter nonsense. Thealgebra i c constraints wh i ch give "machinehood"to the hardwa r e are designed to prohibitconversation with machines . For instance, youcannot, by definition, "disagre e" with amachine ; you can on l y say i t is a "brOken"machine, Of cou r se, people may and docommunicate with machines (which, if theybelong to this category are better called"training machines") . Also, given a differentdesign, such as the learning monitor CASTE[ 10, 11, 12] Conversation may take placethrough (not with) machines, which exteriorisethe concepts that are shared as tangible records , As a result, it was possible to obtainempirical support for a theory of such trans actions and, going a little further, to construct hardware artifacts which do have convers ational capability because they-are not, formally speaking, machines. (Conversation withmachine s is disallowe d for i!llgehraic reasons,not to do with material embodiment . Brains arebiologicalafter all).These man/machine studies were set in thecontext of learning, hypothe sis construction,and various k i nds of design. At the moment, thechief fo c us is upon complex team decisionmaking, which includes planning and strategygeneration. The work provides a lar ge, butlaboratory contrived, si t uation in which thetogethernes s of people (or even the perpectivesand roles they adopt) is determined by a communication/computation medium in whichsome, but only some, of the transactions areconversational. Itseem'that this miniatureworld is a long way from a real world ofgeographical distance and transportationdelays, the traditional indices ofThere is, of course, a great difference inscal e , but I claim (a) that the real world i5changing, due to various trends and technologies, so that its form is strictly comparableto these laboratory situations; (b) that themaladies and misfunctions due to a failure forone rea s on Or another to converse,are typifiecby mechanisms observable, in the miniature,and (c) that remedies which p r omote conve r sat ion in the miniature situation are likelyto p r ove e f fective in the r eal world of thefutu r e .In the past, conversation has often beenhampered by lack of communication . In thefuture, the familiar barriers, such as geographical distance, are unlikely to be obtrusive; conversation will be more endangered byexcessive togetherness; the possibility ofcommunication can be safely assumed to exis t.The matter is especially significant i n thecontext of well known developments in communi cation, data storage, and (classical) computation, which are rapidly creating an "information environment".,There are,first of all, technological developments. For example, in communication, fibreoptic techno l ogy, provides virtually unlimitedbandwidth channels in urban districts, microwaveand satellite communication over larger distances, in stor age, video discs,high capacity( 80 megabyte) magnetic disc s , and thecomplementa-ry main store techniques of lowenergy semiconductors and magnetic domain(bubble) devices; in computation, widelydisseminated microprocessors to connec t storagemedia to channels and provide local processingcapability; optical and array processors.Others, amongst them Hines [13J, have argued,cogently and convicingly, for these technologies and the soc i al". national and industrialpressures that are, willy nilly, going to carrytechnical breakthroughs int o t angible structures .Nex t, there are developments,for the most partanticipating the currently burgeoning technolOgical base, concerned with information handlingand processing. For examfle there are systemslike Nelson's Hypertext 14]Winograd and Kaye's[15 J KRL. There is Negroponte's "data space",and the video disc store of Aspen, Colorado, s oaccessed that a user can drive through thestreets, industries, history or everydayactivity of that town l16J. My OWn entai l mentmeshes, perhi!lps, are candidates -[171. There is ahost of re a ctive animated graphics facilities ,exemplified by De Fantis' work .These developments, combined with the technicaladvances and the pressures to implement them,lend substance to the claim that communication/computation proximity is no longer just a matterof geography. Rather, the natural environmen tof mankind becomes increasingly an informationenvironment, chiefly determined by thesecommunication/computation systems. Thi s c l aim isnot confined to dense conurbations (as it mighthave been a few years ago), nor is it a claimabout the unforseeable future. It is a simpleextrapolation from currently available factsand figures.- Forseeably, the industrial, social and nationalpressures which promote information technologywill also give riSe to legis l a t ion againstprivacy o r isolation, all qui t e ju s tifiable and"for our Own good". Before long, the statutebooks will ordain that any partition, wall orenclosure is penetrated by a channe l o f so manymegahertz capacity, and will inClude rules like"a f ibre - optic-cable shall connect each legalhouse" . ,
G. Pask/The limits of to get he mess1001 Little is known about the ecology of an information environment where distance is 5igna1distance conjoined .to localised storage andcomputerit is fair to suppose thatthe pathOlogies manifest today at the limi t sof togetherness on the occasions when there iscommunication which looks like conversation butis not at all conversational, will be amplified.tn an information environment. They appear asmajor haz ards in the future.1.4 Il lustrationsThe following maxims e x emplify the pathologiesin question. (a) "Communication need not beconve rsation". For example, committees areoften said to decide as a result of debate(conversat ion) between their members. Byof ·debates the committee members ag ree, or theyagree to be at loggerheads . On salient topics,however a coherent view is reached. This idealis seldom approximated, at any rate amongstthe committees that proliferate in academia.Of course, a committee plays a socia l role;i t gives reason for the members to gather andit provides a valuable forum for rhetoric. But,whaterer else, big committees do not themselvesdecide. On the contrary, the communication of"business in hand" absorbs, rather than promotes, debate (Atkin [18J). In practice, deci s ion s are made by persons, or small groups whodo converse. The larger consensus amounts todistr.i,bution of blame; a "committee decision",for which no one is responsible.(b) "Both subhuman and suprahuman organisationscommunicate with humans, but do not conversewith them" . It is a truism that any organism,such as a human bei ng , depends upon communication with, and amongst, organs o f t he bodyand resources, for example, of food . AS humanswe call these necessary components and resources "subhuman". We may credit them with lifebut do not, as a rule, converse with them . Thebounds are not entirely clearcut. For instance,after practice (perhaps, a i ded by biofeedback)you may, in a very real sense, l earn tocon ditionally regula t e your heart beat andrationally influence a functional system whi chusually operates automatically. Contrariwisethere is ample evidence (Beer [2 1J, Robb [22J, Eclectically minded anthropologists andRobinson [23] [24] amongst many others) thatviable medium-to-large corporations, schoolsof thought (maybe committees) are "supr3human"organisms which have, in a very real sense, anautonomy of their own. We communicate with them,by posting memoranda, receiving edicts, fiats,etc., but do not converse (s.hare c;on,"-epts) withthem. Again, the boundaries are not clearcut;we do converse with our families, our extendedfamilies, memb ers of a club, personal friends .But can one, for example, converse with theentire colloquy of professional peers ? Thatlargely depends upon whether we have learned totranslate natural-language concepts into theesoteric-language concepts, natural for organsof the body or diviSions of an industrialenterprise.(c) "Too much togetherness inhibits conversation". This maxim is illustrated by life admidstopen-plan architecture, in vogue some years ago;apartments and houses whe re (as a phrase of thatepoch)) "parents grew up with their children".Under these circumstances conversation is impaired. If people live in such indecent proximity they cannot easily sustain the autonomyof partici pants, who might converse together,having distinct perpectives and pOints of(d) "When there is too much togethernesscommunication acts as a mechanism of isolationrather than a vehicle for dialogue". Forexampl e, in my culture, dinn er is an occasionfor di 9 cussion. It is frightening to see afamily who gaze at a television set over theirevening meal, althQugh the behaviour is typicalof open'- plan living. Clear ly, a simultaneousconversation is out of court. Again clearly,the televisual communication serves to isolatethe diners and give them the autonomy they needin order to be people (but al so , the communication of TV prevents the use of that autonomyfor conversing with each other).( e) "Too little apPflrent-togetherness xemplify thiS dictum. If you live 20 milesfrom your office, then you commute in a uniformpattern, See and hear the mass - media, are partof the market for microprocessor games, and,l ikely as not, your young s t ers play gamesidentical to their geographically dispersedneighbours. Amongst the mechanisms promotinguniformity, temporal synchronisation whetherof rush hours, or viewing peaks, produces acovert togetherness devoid of conversation 1 .5 Commentaryecol-ogists p01:nt ou t that if man is to sU"('1)iVe hemust learn to live with nature. Bateson [l9Jand Illieh [20], for example, support thi sview in very different ways . But both of themare auxu e that naive images of "returning tonature" have no more than wcal relevance (theloealities in question can be quite large, ofcoupse), and that renders communication!computation essential .These examples of potential pathologybeenchosen because they are poignant, generallyrelevant to such issues as computer conferencing (it could be a boon, or i t could destroythe social raison d'etre of committees), anduniversally available microprocessors . They arealso snapshots of amplifying, self- replicating,and self-stabilising processes that grow andstereotype by entirely systemic mechaniSms.In some conditions the mechanisms are intellectual, in others, the mechanisms a re concrete.For instance, the "togetherness-movement" g,,-verise to open p lan structures which were, inturn, adopted by property developers as cost
1002.C. Pask/The limits oflogelhemesse ffective . In tur n , ag ai n, the existence ofopen-pla n a ccommodation induced a social phenomenon of "open -plan living" .Because the mechanisms are systemic, it isreasonable to suppose that they will operate ina n information environment, wh ere theconstraints imposed by temporal or geographicalboundaries are of decreasing COnsequence.computation substantially eliminates thet emporal dimension and signal neighbour hoodbends the spatial dimension . System d esignerswill be responsible for the kind of communication and computation that goes on , a nd forwhether or no t conversation may take place .They will be the engineers of togetherness ,and must respect its limits.2. Main ThemeThe ma i n conte ntion of this essay is tha t mostcurrently available theories of communicationand computation are not adequate tools fore ngineering togetherness. Although thesetheories ar e beautifully developed and havemathema t ical e legance , they are unable, withoutextra- theoretic props , t o distinguish betweencommunication and conversation . InSOfar aspathologies arise when conmunication lookslike conversa tion but is" not conversationa],t hese theories do not provide a framework inwhi ch the pathol09ical lim! tso f t ogetherness can be detected.Certainly there are e xceptions which do notwarrant this stricture (the work of Braten[25] , Byshovsky [26] , Flores and Winograd[27] , Gaines29] , Gergely [30, 31] ,Goguen,Varela [ 35] , Maturana [36J , McCulloch[37] and Von Foerster [38, 39 , 40 , 41, 42] ) .In order to give technical substance to thediSCUSSion, one of these theories, due to myown group, wil l be outlined . It is calle d"Conversation Theory" (abbreviated henceforward , to c or ) . [ 11 , 12 , 43 , 44, 45 , 46, 47,48, 49 . SO] "CT is a ref lective (or participant) theory andcomments upon the "concept sharing" of"participant s" (A, B, . ), upon their agreementand failure to agree. CT is also a r elativistictheory . The dat a structu re s re l ative to whi chit is speci fied (entailment meshes), have al ogic of distinction and coherence. They arethe " environme nt" or "domain" of conver sationsa nd offer an index of p r ox imity which isinterpretable a s togethe r ne ss .Although terms like " concept" or "stableconcept" have a perfectly straightforwardconnotation, t hey are also used, with some re finement o f meaning, as technical terms.2. 1 Concep tsPhilosophers s ay that a concept is the meaningof a word, (or any perceptible symbol , it neednot be wri t t e n or spoken) . Psychologi s ts ascribe concepts ' t o people and speak of A' S conceptof a hOllse , (or riding a bicycle or A's greatunc le) as distin ct from B's concept of a house(or riding a bicycle, or B' s great uncle ) . A' slind B' S concep t s of a cOWll\only name '! e ve nt or entity may be quite alien, even if they areconcepts of an abstract kind, like " circle" or"rectangle" , which hav e standard tex tbook definitions .So, if l\ and B are asked about " circle", theyprobably come up with d ifferent explanations,for example, A draws a circle with a compass onpaper, B slices a cylinder. Equivalent ly, theywould write different computer programs inorder to generate circles . Even if A and B knowthe standard defini t ion , "locus of a ll points ,equidistant from a given point , on the plane "(for ins t ance, because they are s tuden ts in thesame geometry course) , the definition isusuallyfor examinations .A and B Can share concepts that are stable andg1ve.n names T , T , in a language ( s ay) L.BConversely, tJ1:e common concept, t he "meaning ofthe word ", exists because of a concensus amongs ta whOle community of L users, A, B, . . N .Concepts are shared by means of requests, COl'lImands, persuasions, etc ., from A, obeyed by B,or vice versa; through questions posed by A andanswered by S, or vice versa . This activity ,whether it is verbal or in a language foreXchanging, executing and debugging programs(or a language of graphics, gesture, etc) !!. aconversation .it re s ults in a sharing ofsome o r a ll of A' s, B'S concept, then there isan agreement TAB between A and B, or, inan agreeme nt, t he meaning of which forA, B, . N is a ·concept whe re "T"(omitting s ubscripts) is the word, i n thelanguage, L, of this cmmnunity, that designatesit.There is a danger of confusion between II staticsymbol , lik e T, and the philosopher ' s "meaningof T ". In the company of psychologist s, it iseasy to believe that a concept is a s toredtemplet, or pattern, in A' s or B'sforthat is ofte n suggested . So far as this paperis concerned, the sugges tion is outrigh t deni ed;concepts , in either case, are kine ti c . Speci fically, concepts are near - coherent bundles ofprocedures (that is, programs composed in alanguage , L, and compiled for execution in abrain Or some collection of brains) . Personalconcepts are executed to produce personalbehaviours (like ridi ng a bicycle) , which implicate A's or B's environment, or else theyare execu t ed only in A's or B' s brain to produce descriptions, such as A's or B' s imagination of riding a bicycle . Concepts determineskilled behaviour and , in the sense that A o rB have skills, concepts ar e skills, and, forinstance when thinking about geome try, arepurel y i ntellectual skills .2.2 Stable Concepts"Momorable" or " resili ent" concepts (in contrast,to the evanescent trac e of a phon! number wh i lstit is dia lled), are stable because they a r eproductive and reproduced (learned and relearned) . Without unique commitment to mentaloperations, the criterion of stability equivalent to "productive and r eproduced", is ,,
G. Pask/TIle limits of togetherness, "organisational closure"!! , orwhich the classical stabilitiescases. The criterion is in lineN",umann's (51), Burke ' s (52) or"autonomy"; ofare specialwith VonLofgren's (53,(themselves concepts), th en (1) the originalprocedures are reproduced, and (2) fresh means(procedures) for achieving the same end areenerated and rendered eventuall , coherent54) work on self reproducing automata, andFig 1 is an outline of it. Concepts are prod-WIth other members of the collection (the nearcoherent-cluster'; of proced ures, some or all ofwhich may be executed simultaneously). That is,"some process is executed" and "collections ofprocess es tend to (but do not necessarily reach )coherence" .uctive and reproduced (relearned, reconstructed) if, when operated upon by operationsExecution (Ex)of Productive andNotice that the structure of an organisationallyclosed system is rebuilt by the behaviours itsustains ., and vice versa.Consequently, thecustomary differentiation of structure/behaviour is arbitrary.ReproductiveOther !dl!lA10032.3. ConversationCon ATA conversation is sketched in Fig 2. Here,II( CmlAT)a descriptionFi 9 1a behaviourth e stable concepts of A and B are "organisationally closed" but also "informationallyopen" . Conversation, the act oE concept sharing, is a pt"ocess of conjoint concept execution,by participants A and B, as a result of whichthe agreed part of the concept is distributedor shared and cannot be func t iona lly assigned"to A" or "to B" .TA"A(product ive and reproduced) concept (ConAT) inA . !he execution Ex (ConBT)produces-adescrlptlon (o r l mage) and possib ly a behaviour such asdriving or drawing circles. Productive and reproductiveoperations are a lso of the type "concept" but act upon!&.oAT, TA or other concepts (saywhere PA i s aplane surface and WAO, where OA- is a compass) toreconstruct ConATIn Fig 2 participant A is shown as constructingand reproducing a concept for TA (a circ l e)from concepts for PA (a plane) and QA (a compass) ; B constructs and reproduces a conceptfor TB from concepts for RB (cylinder) andSB (slice).II Mope 01' less independently, I devi3ed P In -Thesederivations are convenientlyre p resente d by the s horthand notation in Figdividuation around "[970. Var ela and Goguen '3"Cl03uI'e" is rruthematical"[y more elegant, Mat "Urana's autopoiesis is a special case of it,rrunifest in biologicalBartlett (55)and Weptheimer ( 56) amongst other'S, are pespon.sibLe for prowNtion and reoroduction.Fig I and Fig 2 can beexpanded intoconcurTently opercrting free production systemssuch that the integrity of the productionscheme is internally deteI'rllined, and not, ailusual, determined by an external controZleI',or ppogram. The );Jordmeans "usually parallel, and 11ot , as a puLe, confUctfree" . One s cheme for agreement over a siableconcept is given in "The Organisational Clos ure of Potent ially Conscious System3" (48) ,3.As a result of agreement both A and B haveconcepts that are distributive der ivationsrepresented by the same shorthand notation ,in Fig 4, where T*, P*, Q*, R* , S*, are thenames of shat""ed concepts.Under what circumstances may A and B converse(learn, do each others' intellectual labour,as in Fig 2)?One prerequisite of conversation 1.S proximityor togetherness. Hut if, as submitted, togetherneSS is increasingly a matter of communicationLABA', Gue,ti"", to BE.cutian ( Ex) ofproductive and"".Execot;"" (Ex) ofproductive .nd""producti ve,,"IB' s q.",Uions to Arprocedure in !&nATh A's l - explonation""Other CilllA((Q!IAP, !&nAQ)"'"-I aescripti"" or beh.viour,,",'Ow,''. '--.Other Coo B(CongR. CO"gS)Representative procedure in !&!lglis S', L-expl.n.tion to Ab(!&! ST) behaviourTAor L description- ,. description TBorLM.'behaviourdescriptionFig 2: An A. B. conv"".ti"" in L.ngu.!!'! l result of which, if .gre. . nt is reached. so,,", of A·, procedure. caneouted .nd . produced as p.rt of ClwsT and SOIOC of 8's procedure, can be executed and . produced "' put of CnnA T. i; i'OIOOrph;''' . TA h port, or .11, of TA, and IS h part, or all. of IS51""01
1()()4G. paskmlc limits of togethemessfind reasons why A and B will benefit fromconversing, as in cooperative action . Thesereasons are compelling and occasionallysufficient; quite litera ll y A and B mustconverse if they are to survive. But, just asphysical proximity is a specialist answer [0the initial question (A and B may conversebecause they are together), so these constituteFig 3: Initial condition of the conversation in2where arcs are derivations and nodes stand forconceptsvery special ised answers to why they mustconverse on some2.4 ParticipantsNow, if Fig 2 is taken seriously, t hesequestions can be reversed. What are A and B?How are they distinct? Can they exist withoutdistihction? Why should they not share all oftheir stable concepts, and be as one, on evetyoccasion?A'.c,e a,teragreement reacheda's repertoire after agreement reaChedThe standard answers, th t: itA and B are people,geographically distinct organisms" and that "Aand B are limited by perceptual motor capacity"are both perfectly valid, but both very specialised. For the last few decades people haveconsistently employed such exemplars in placeof genuine explanation or as though they werecanon law, which they are not. Quite obviously, you can also identify the participants ina conversation (and they can distinguishthemselves) as systems of belief , as gourmetsor wine connoisseurs, or gluttons, by theirpersonalities, the political factions andsocial groups they belong to; in short, asclusters of stable concepts. As the environment, the natural habitat for man, becomes increasingl y determined by communication /computation, so these answers gain utility.The relatively specialised standard answer isonly "connnonplace and evident" in limitedareas, such as neurosurgery (it is important topick the right person, in order to ab l ate bitsof a brain).The possibilities neither exclude nor deratethe traditional demarcation of A and B, butthey do open up some real and interestingpossibilities such as the following.(I) A and B are coherent points of view, orShared concept as common to participantsFig 4: Result of agreement betweenand computation, then an answer in terms ofneighbourhood (A and H, persons in the sameroom) is valid, but exceptionally specialised.Further, if A and B are close for any reason,this does not guarantee conversation. Theymight, instead, rctain the integrity ofLeibnizian Monads. It is often possible toperspectives coexisting and interacting in onebrain (for example, Minsky's [57J "proposer"and "critic", apposite in hypothesis formulation; my own "teacher" and "learner"appropriate to private study).(2) A and B are groups of peop l e, teams orsocieties.(3) A and B are self replicating schools ofthought; for example, Lakatos'[5S] "programmes of scientific research", or the organisations and cultures evolving in a society.(4) A and B are conglomerates of peop l e andthe machinery that exteriorises many of their,normally hidden, mental operations by computingon their behalf.(5) As a speculation, A and B may be collections of interacting but a - priori- independentprocessors; a computing medium made ofbiological or other-than-biological fabric.2.5 An Observer's Distinction of ParticipantsAn observer may distinguish the participants,
G. Past/The limits or togethCtneuA, B, inpr ovidedinternal(perhapsany way «I) t o (5) for example) ,that the i.solated !,lui tS maintai n anto A o r an internal to B conversationinterpreted as A' 5 though t s and H'sthoughts). as well as an optional "external"conversation between A and some other unit(like 81.As an al tern ative statement A, B, . . must each be able to adopt more than oneperpectio!' (point of view, intention), at once .In the role of scientis t s , we a r e anxious toobserve certain "hard valued" events, like "Aand B agree about T", and to c r ed it them withfactual t rut h (as a luxury, there may also beFuzzy events based upon the exis tence of a"hard va lu(!d " subst r ate) . This is sur elypossible . Equipment like CASTE includesmechani cal dct(!cto r s of evidence for agr eement .But is i t essential to recognize a n importantdifference be tween the hard data o f mechanics(say) and t he hard data of cr.In mechanics. a sentence like "x is a t y",designates a prOposition. In cr. the hard dataare sentences " A agrees wi th B over T " (whichreflect A and B coherence or
THE LIMITS OF TOGETHERNESS Gordon PASK· System Research Ltd., Woodville House, . and, also, generates independencies between systems (human, societal, or others), which is a prerequisite of dialogue. . upon the nature of conversation. these
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