AUTHOR Webster, James G. - Ed
DOCUMENT RESUMEED 339 045AUTHORTITLEPUB DATENOTEPUB TYPEEDRS PRICEDESCRIPTORSIDENTIFIERSCS 507 529Webster, James G.Audience Models in Communications Policy.May 9129p.; Paper presented at tne Annual Meeting of theInternational Communication Association (41st,Chicago, IL, May 23-27, 1991).Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports Evaluative/Feasibility (142)MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage.Audience Analysis; *Audience Awareness;*Communications; *Mass Media; Media Research;*Models; *Policy Formation*Media Government Relationship; Public InterestABSTRACTThis paper explores three audience models which havetraditionally animated American communications policy: the EffectsModel, in which the audience is victim; the Marketplace Model, inwhich the audience is consumer; and the Commodity Model, in which theaudience is a coin of exchange. In separate sections, the models aredefined, their varying elements are listed, and quotations fromspeeches, judicial opinions, and rulemaking procedures demonstratetheir applications or manifestations. The paper also warns that whileit is possible to distill these three distinct models of the audiencefrom the work of policy makers, most players in the process willadopt whatever model suits their purpose. The paper then goes on tooutline how each of these models might evolve in a new mediaenvironment without structural limitations, noting that whatspecifically needs to be considered is what becomes of these modelswhen: (1) all who wish to electronically communicate to a massaudience are free to do so; and (2) people can pay directly for themedia they consume. Finally, the paper suggests developing anExposure Model of the audience which would embrace the effects,marketplace, and commodity models, and create a more unified systemof audience analysis to inform public policy. (Thirty-one referencesare attached.) **************************Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be madefrom the original ******************************
Audienc Modelsin Communications PolicyJames G. WebsterNorthwestern University(May, 1991)PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THISBYMAT RIAL HAS BEEN GRANEDDEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONURerearch and Improvement()nice of EducationalINFORMATIONRESOURCESEDUCATIONALCENTER tERICIreproduced s/idbeenX\ This OoCument ha{prsonor organizationreceoattl from theonfa.nat.ng itMmor changs hiliver epr odtbeen made to improve()Leidydocuopinions statd in thisotficfalment do not neCeVillfily fepfSentRESOURCESPoints Of vleof ofTO THE EDUCATIONALINFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)OE Pi Pr:Million Or MOW,'Paper presented at the annual meeting of the InternationalThe author thanks PatriciaCommunication Association, Chicago.Phalen for her many useful comments on this manuscript.2BEST COPY AVAILABLZ
Audisnc Modelsin Communications PolicyFor the better part of this century, the official goal ofAmerican communications policy has been to serve the "publicinterest, convenience, or necessity" (Federal Radio Commission,1928).Putting aside the actual quality of service that thepublic has received, it's difficult to imagine a policy thathasn't somehow cloaked itself in the "public interest."Forthose who deal with media law and regulation, the relevant publicis almost always an audience.Hence, to argue for or againstsome law or regulation one must conjure up a vision of theaudience that portrays its needs, its wants, its weaknesses, orperhaps even its economic value.No single vision of theaudience, however, has dominated the policy making process.Instead, different, sometimes contradictory, models of theaudience have been advanced at different times, allowing diverseconcerns to claim the mantle of the public interest.I should note at the outset that my use of the term "model,"may be a bit generous.A review of the policy making processdoes not reveal clearly articulated, uniformly understood,concepts of the audience.rather than explicit.More often, the models are impliedThey emerge in bits and pieces fromjudicial opinions, rulemaking procedures, and law articles.such, they can easily elude notice.3AsMy purpose here is to draw
3them out so their implications can be more fully considered.Indoing so, I will state the elements of each model more baldlythan even those who invoke them might wish.A short story of media regulationTo appreciate the audience models that have animated publicpolicy, one should recognize the context in which they have beenused.At the expense of greatly oversimplying a long andcomplicated history of legislation, rulemakings, and court cases,this section identifies certain tensions that have unleashedthese disparate notions of the audience.In the United States, the story of media regulation is oneof a struggle between government control of the media andreliance on a largely unregulated marketplace to serve the publicinterest.For print media, this has never been much of a fight.The clear applicability of First Amendment protections to "thepress," as well as the conventional wisdom that all who wished topublish were free to do so, has tipped the scales heavily infavor of the marketplace.For broadcasting and the electronicmedia the balancing act has been much trickier.From the earliest days of broadcasting, there was widespreadconcern that the marketplace could not be relied upon to give thepeople what they needed.The most serious deficiency in thebroadcast marketplace was a shortage of frequencies relative tothe number of people who wished to use them.This so called"scarcity" argument sustained considerable government regulationof broadcasting, including programming requirements deemed to be4
4in the public interest.The broadcasters' reliance on advertising for financialsupport has further rationalized government regulation.Thismethod of funding took hold in the 1920's and has accounted forvirtually all industry revenues ever since.While it has beenargued that advertiser support is consistent with the publicinterest because it requires broadcasters to "give the peoplewhat they want," many are unconvinced.Critics point out thatbroadcasters actually cater to advertisers, not the wishes of thepublic.They are, therefore, unlikely to serve small orotherwise undesirable audiences, especially if there are only afew stations in the market.Moreover, people have no way toexpress the intensity of their program preferences as might bethe case if they paid directly for the media they consumed.Consequently, reliance on the marketplace to serve the publicinterest was suspect.Because of these oddities, broadcasting has been ripe withcontradictions and occasions for government regulation.On onehand, broadcasters have been expected to maximize their audiencesand sell them to almost anyone willing to pay.On the otherhand, they have been "trustees" of the public's airwaves andcompelled to provide programming, even if it were not in theireconomic self interest to do so.Underpinning these twophilosophies were very different ways of thinking about theaudience.protected?Were audience members potential victims to beWere they rational consumers making appropriate
5program choices?and sold?Or were they simply a commodity to be boughtDepending upon one's view of the audience, ratherdifferent policieJ could be prescribed.Strangely enough, the same market deficiencies that ledpolicy makers to imply one or another model often allowed them toavoid an explicit declaration of their model.As long as thesystem was somehow faulty, a final judgement on the nature of theaudience itself was premature.That situation is coming to anend, since changes in the structure and funding of electronicAs thismedia have begun to ameliorate those deficiencies.happens, it seems likely audience concepts which have beenimplied or fragmentary will have to emerge from beneath thesurface and be considered in their own right.The Effects Model: Audience as VictimIt's common to represent the audience as a potential victimof the mass media.The notion that people are somehow harmed bywhat they hear or see is as old as the media themselves.On onehand, this model of the audience has great intuitive appeal, asreflected in popular opinion about the "power of the media."Onthe other, an "effects" model of the audience has the weight of"scientific" research and theory behind it, ranging from earlywork on propaganda and attitude change, to more contemporarynotions of cultivation and agenda setting.This potentcombination, has allowed policy makers to summon up an effectsmodel of the audience with considerable success.as it is, has the following elements.The model, such
61) Audience members are vulnerable to the intrusive natureof media.2) The media can cultivate an appetite for vulgar, hateful,or trivial programming.3) Audience members may chose to consume media materialsthat are not in their own best interests.4) The public interest is served by a media system thatlimits exposure to undesirable programming and promotesexposure to meritorious content.The effects model manifests itself in a number of differentways.The most obvious applications are found in regulationsdesigned to protect the public from specific categories of"harmful" content.Among the offending materials are obscenity,violence, and certain forms of commercial speech. Governmentefforts to assess and control these have been well documentedelsewhere (e.g., Lowery & DeFleur, 1987; Rowland, 1983).course the audience of greatest concern is children.OfWell beforethe arrival of broadcasting, children were judged to be a specialcategory of people particularly suseptible to harm.The easyaccessibility of electronic media has only heightened anxieties.The most apt example of the effects models in contemporarypolicy making is the FCC's on-again-off-again battle withindecency in broadcasting.In the late 1980's Ronald Reagan'scommission, which had acted so vigorously to reduce governmentintervention in broadcasting, took several stations to task forairing indecent material.In doing so, the commission unsettled7
7an easily understood, if simple-minded, body of law thatprohibited broadcasting certain words at times of the day whenchildren were likely to be in the audience (Fcc v. PacificaFoundation, 1978).Instead, the commission explored a blanketprohibition on indeceny, which would have reduced the adultaudience to hearing "only what is fit for children" (Butler y.s.Michigan, 1957, p. 383).These actions were rooted in a beliefthat exposure to indeceny can cause significant harm to theaudience - an argument that persuaded Congress to legislate around-the-clock ban on indeceny despite the fact that a)indecency in other contexts is constitutionally protected speech,and b) the scientific evidence of harmful effects on children,let alone adults, is equivocal. (Comments of Action forChildrep's Television. et al., 1990)As problematic as these regulations may be, the fact is thatgovernments have always succeeded in branding some forms ofspeech harmful and have thereby prohibited or punished theirexpression.This was true before the days of broadcasting, andwill undoubtedly remain so long after technology makes electronicmedia legally indistinguishable from other forms of publication.There is, however, another concept of victimization that hasdriven the regulation of broadcasting.Even if people are not harmed by exposure to specific kindsof vulgar or deceptive messages, they may nonetheless bevictimized by the poor judgement of the masses and thewillingness of the media to give them what they want.Under this
8version of the effects model, it is not so much a question ofprotecting people from that which is harmful, as it is ensuringthat people receive that which is good.Nowhere are the elements of this alternate effects modelgiven greater force than in Newton Minow's "Vast Wasteland"speech of 1961 - arguably the most influential public addressever made by an FCC Chairman.Minow takes as given the"overwhelming impact" (Minow, 1978, p. 284) of broadcasting onthe American people.While naming a few "good" televisionprograms, he chides broadcasters for their slavish pursuit ofhigher ratings, and asserts that "if parents, teachers, andministers conducted their responsibilities by following theratings, children would have a steady diet of ice cream, schoolholidays and no Sunday School" (p. 286).Throughout, he makes itclear that people are not served just by giving them what theywant - "some say that the public interest is merely whatinterests the public.I disagree." (p. 283)One senses that Minow is a bit uncomfortable with how hisown remarks portray the American people, for he is at pains tocredit them with "good sense and good taste" and being "wiserthan some of the broadcasters - and politicians - think." (p.286).In the end, he finesses the issue by asserting that "mostof television's problems stem from a lack of competition .withmore channels on the air, we will be able to provide everycommunity with enough stations to offer service to all parts ofthe public."In the early 1960's, at least, it was possible to
9indict commercial media without rendering a final verdict on theaudience itself.Deficiencies in the marketplace were moreeasily blamed for the media's failure to give the people whatthey really wanted.The rather abstract assertion that under limited channelsthe choices of the mass audience could result in an inapprctpriatemix of programming was translated into public policy through asuccession of FCC actions and court cases sometimes known as theradio format controversy.The central question of thecontroversy was whether the commission should preserve a uniqueradio format, like classical music, even though the station'sowner believed a more popular format could be found.In 1974,the Court of Appeals provided its answer.There is a public interest in a diversity of broadcastentertainment formats.The disappearance of a distinctiveformat may dep,ive a significant segment of the public ofthe benefits of radio, at least at their first preferencelevel. (Citizens Committee to Save WEFM V. FCC, 1974, p.262)Like Minow, the court pointed out deficiencies in themarketplace that caused the extinction of certain formats whichwould otherwise be economically viable.Once again, blame wasplaced on the system rather than the behavior of listeners.long as these flaws persisted, it was the government'sresponsibility to protect the public interest by providingdiversity in both news and entertainment.In reaching thisAs
10conclusion the Court of Appeals seemed fully in step with the RidLim decision which had proclaimed "the right of the public toreceive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,and other ideas." (Red Lion Broadcasting Co,InD. v. FCC,1969, p. 390).By the end of the 1970's cable, the "television ofabundance," made it more difficult for policy makers to avoid theimplications of an effects model of the audience.As the FCCconfronted the growth of cable it recognized a potential threatto one if its most cherished objectives.The commission had along history of favorinr news and public affairs programming, aswell as encouraging "localism" in broadcasting.These biaseswere motivated, at least in part, by a desire to keep peopleinformed about issues of public importance.Cable television,however, seemed capable of undermining that function by divertingviewers to less up lifting fare.One passage in the commission's1979 report on the relationship between cable and broadcasting isparticularly revealing.Television may have an important effect in shaping theattitudes and values of citizens, in making the electoratemore informed and responsible, and in contributing togreater understanding and respect among different racial andethnic groups. Historically, the FCC has encouragedparticular types of programming - local news, publicaffairs, instructional programs - on these grounds.extent that a change in broadcast-cable policy wouldTo the
11dramatically change the amount by which these programs arenot only broadcast but viewed, these issues could be animportant component of a policy debate (FederalCommunications Commission, 1979, pp. 638-639).In a line of reasoning that is the mirror image of itsindecency rules, the FCC expressed concern that undesirablesocial consequences might flow from people not watching certaincontent.Surely this argument could be made in a marketenvironment where entry is unconstrained by limited channels, andaudience members are able to pay directly for what they consume.In such a world, the effects model suggests a policy prescriptionthat people not only have a right to hear diverse ideas, but thatgovernment has an obligaiion to enforce a certain breadth ofexposure.With the possible exception of providing "equalopportunities" under Sec. 315 of the Communications Act, or someattempts at balancing audiences under the old Fairness Doctrine,few public policies have explicitly sought to provide an audiencefor certain viewpoints.In part this is because the same marketdeficiencies that justified government intervention rendered theneed for audience guarantees moot.In a world of limitedchannels, the right to speak is effectively a right to be heard.Perhaps more importantly, though, it is because another model ofthe audience began to dominate policymaking in the late 1970'sand 1980's.12
12AudienceConsumerAn alternative view of the audience casts them in the roleof consumers who enter the marketplace and select the productsthat suit their tastes.Like the effects model, this concept ofthe audience has considerable intuitive appeal.Most Americansare comfortable with the idea of entering a market and shoppingwisely.The marketplace model is also at the heart of a powerfulbody of economic theory.In fact, as early as the 1950'sneoclassical economists began developing a variant of theirtheories that, by the 1970's was holding sway among many policymakers (see Noll, Peck, & McGowan, 1973; Owen & Wildman, 1991;Steiner, 1952).The elements of the marketplace model are:1) Audience members are rational, well informed individualswho will act in their own self interest.2) Audience members come to the media with well formedprogram preferences which cause them to choose specificcontent.3) The public interest is served by a media system that isfully responsive to audience preferences as revealed intheir choice of programming.This concept of the audience helped rationalize the movetoward deregulation that began during the Nixon administration,continued through the Carter presidency, and reached its zenithduring the Reagan years.No one argued the marketplace modelwith more conviction than Mark Fowler, chairman of the FCC duringmost of the 1980's.Nowhere is Fowler's vision made more plain13
13than in his 1982 manifesto, "A Marketplace Approach to BroadcastRegulation" (Fowler and Brenner, 1982).There, in directcontradiction of Newton Minow, he declares "the public's interest.defines the public interest." (p. 210)The ascendancy of the marketplace model is evident in anumber of regulations and court decisions that rely upon thechoice-making of audiences to guide public policy.the radio format controversy illustrates the point.Once again,By the mid-1970's, the commission was determined to test, and hopefullyoverturn, the requirement that it be involved in formatselection.In a 1976 Memorandum Opinion and Order, which madesignificant reference to a paper by economist Bruce Owen (seeOwen, 1977), the commission wrote.the marketplace is the best way to allocate entertainmentformats in radio, whether the hoped for result is expressedin First Amendment terms (i.e., promoting the greatestdiversity of listening choices for the public) or ineconomic terms (i.e., maximizing the welfare of consumers ofradio program).(Federal Communications Commission, 1976,p. 863).The commission went on to argue that the Court of Appealsstrategy to "maximize format diversity through regulatory fiatcould very well result in a dimunition of consumer welfare." (p.684).While recognizing the imperfections of the marketplace, in1981, the Supreme Court put the matter to rest by finding thatthe commission could rely ".on market forces to promote
14diversity in radio and entertainment formats and to satisfy theentertainment preferences of listeners." (FCC v. WNCN Listeneraguild, 1981, p. 604)The foregoing model is best thought of as an economic modelin which audience members select the programs or formats to suittheir tastes.Whether the same model of the audience underliesthe "marketplace of ideas" is another matter.The latter isundoubtedly one of the oldest and most powerful metaphors used incommunications policy.As a result, one might imagine that therole of the audience in such a marketplace was well understood.If, as First Amendment theory holds, the truth will ultimatelyemerge from a clash of ideas, surely the audience must play acrucial role in the process.Does this metaphor assume, like theeconomic model, that audience members will choose ideas to suittheir tastes?Does that mean people will elect to hear diverseideas if they are available?Does the metaphor further requirethat people engage in thoughtful reflection upon what they haveheard?work?If not, how can the marketplace of ideas be expected toTo these questions, policy makers have offeredsurprisingly few answers.The most ardent proponents of the economic model areinclined to argue that these questions are largely irrelevant.All that the First Amendment requires is that individuals have a"right to speak."According to Owen (1975).this very freedom to enter the market, to test consumerresponse, which is guaranteed by the competitive mechanism,
15may be all that is essential to freedom of expression (froma constitutional viewpoint) provided consumers demand theright information about Political matters (emphasis added).Surely the framers of the constitution did not have in mindan absolute right to survival in the marketplace for allpotential purveyors of ideas. (p. 27).Under this model, the audience is sovereign over themarketplace.If the audience demands diverse content, then themarketplace will provide it in its most appropriate forms,especially if no provider is prohibited from entering themarketplace.This result would be very much in keeping with themore recent rhetoric of the commission and courts.If, on theother hand, the public does not demand diversity, none will beforthcoming.For true believers in the marketplace, that too isan acceptable policy outcome.Others, would surely be lesssanguine about such a result.The commodity model: Audience as coin of exchangeThere is a third model of the audience that seems to coexist with each of the other two.On any number of occasions,the government has conceptualized audiences as a commodity,leaving aside questions of victimization or rational choice.This model is less wedded to any notion of the audience asindividual decision-makers and is more a reflection of the factunder advertiser support, they are a common coin of exchange.The assumptions of the model are:1) Audiences have an economic value that is measured byf;
16their size.2) Measurements of size may function as a coin of exchangein economic transactions as well as policy making.3) Commercial media must be allowed to create and sellaudiences if they are to exist.4) The public interest is served by a media system thatprovides for an equitable distribution of revenues based onthe commodity value of the audience.Most laws and regulations have some effect on the financialcondition of the media and related industries.Since thesepolicies have an impdct on "the bottom line," they attract theattention of many participants in the policy making process.Even the FCC, which in recent years has favored increasedcompetition, cannot be oblivious to the economic consequences ofits policies.After all, the commission is responsible forseeing to it that broadcasting serves the public interest.Ifbroadcasters are driven out of business by some ill-conceivedpolicy, it could compromise the commission's most sacred mandate.While profit and loss statements would seem an obvioussource of information for policy makers, these data are 11(,.talways used.For one thing, the commission long ago stoppedcollecting firancial statements from broadcasters.For another,economic injury might be too far advanced by the time it shows upon company ledgers.As an alternative, policy makers will oftenuse audience information, especially ratings data, as a surrogatefor industry revenues.17
17One of the most straight forward uses of the commodity modelcan be found in the workings of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal(CRT).Under compulsory licensing arrangements, cable systemsmust pay for the right to carry certain broadcast signals.Eachyear, this creates a fund worth hundreds of millions of dollars.The CRT's job is to determine how that fund should be dividedamong various claimants.Chief among the claimants is the MotionPicture Association of America (MPAA), which has argued thatcopyright owners should receive roylaties in direct proportion tohow much their programs were actually viewed.To make the case that it deserves the largest piece of thepie, MPAA annually commissions a special study from A.C. Nielsen,based on market-by-market ratings data.Nielsen provides MPAAwith a list of every qualifying program, the number of quarterhours it was broadcast, and the number of cable households thatviewed each quarter hour via retransmissions of "distant" signals(Motion Picture Association of America, 1988).While the CRT isfree to allocate funds in whatever manner it chooses, MPAA'sapproach has become the method of choice.In this application,audience size becomes a kind of weight that determines thedistribution of revenues, as is the case in more direct exchangesbetween buyers and sellers.A fascinating, if somewhat more convoluted, example of howthe goverment has used the commodity model of the audience,emerges in the cases of "economic injury."Here, the questionbefore policy makers is whether competition for a broadcaster's18
18audience can be so damaging as to require that the licensee beprotected from harm.While the courts initially ruled this wasnone of the government's concern (FCC V. Sanders Brothers RadioStation, 1940), by the 1950's the Court of Appeals had qualifiedthat hands off policy.The court reasoned that:To license two stations where there is revenue only for onemay result in no good service at all.So economic injury toan existing station, while not in and of itself a matter ofmoment, becomes important when on the facts it spellsdimunution or destruction of service.At that point theelement of injury ceases to be a matter of purely privateconcern. (Carroll Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 1958, p. 443)While the court's motivation was to protect the public from being"victimized" by ruinous competition, it did so by recognizing thecommodity value of the audience, and preserving that commodityfor the exclusive use of an incumbent licensee.In practice, the commission made little use of this doctrinein granting or denying broadcast licenses.However, as soon asit seemed cable television might "divert" audiences from localbroadcasters, the FCC applied the logic of economic injury witha vengeance.Through the 1960's and early 1970's it implementeda number of measures that diminshed cable's ability to competefor the broadcaster's audience (see LeDuc, 1973).These actionswere largely pre-emptive, and often taken in explicit recognitionthat some members of the public might be worse off as a result.As the commission noted in one of its early decisions denying a19
19cable system the means to import a distant signal:True, a grant of the instant application would permit therendition of better service by the CATV, but at the expenseof destroying the local station and its rural coverage.TheCATV would permit the urban areas a choice of coverage, butthe local station.serves a wider area. (FederalCommunications Commission, 1962, p. 464)Through such rulings, the commission extended the use of thecommodity model.Not only could audiences be quarantined fortheir own good, some members of the audience could be deniedfreer choice so their commodity value could subsidize service torural areas.More recently, the FCC has handled claims of audiencediversion in the context of its rules on syndicated exclusivity.These rules, which went into effect in 1972, were intended toensure that broadcasters who bought the exclusive rights tosyndicated programming would not have that privilege underminedby a cable system that imported a distant signal with the sameprogram.The import, it was assumed, would divert some audiencethat rightly belonged to the local station.While the commissionlater dropped the rule, in 1988 it decided to reimpose syndicatedexclusivity.During that proceeding, the parties at interest allsubmitted analysis of ratings data purporting to show thataudience losses did or did not occur in the absence of the rule.In reimposing the rule, the commission reasoned,.the ability to limit diversion means broadcasters will be20
20able to attract larger audiences, making them moreattractive to advertisers, thereby enabling them to obtainmore and better programming for their viewers. ("The whysand wherefore's of syndexII," 1988, pp. 58-59)The commodity model of the audience has a chameleon-likequality.It is a suitable companion to either the effects modelor the marketplace model, which are themselves profoundly atodds.One may argue that audience choices are dangerous in theirconsequences, or that they are an appropriate expression ofrational preferences and still recognize that, in the aggregate,those choices create a commodity.One may also dispense with thefirst two models altogether and deal with the commodity value ofth
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 339 045 CS 507 529 AUTHOR Webster, James G. TITLE Audience Models in Communications Policy. PUB DATE May 91 NOTE 29p.; Paper presented at tne Annual Meeting of the. International Communication Association (41st, Chicago, IL, May 23-27, 1991). PUB TYPE. Speeches/Conference
London: Chambers Harrap. Merriam-Webster’s ollegiate Dictionary. (112003). Edited by Frederick C. Mish. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged. (1990). Edited by Philip Babcock Gove and the Merriam Webster
sam.jones@webster.edu I 314-246-6982 Objective: dedicated, organized and self-directed first-year student seeking a Federal Work-Study position at Webster University, St. Louis. Webster University, St. L
Lesson 3 - James 1:13-18 15 Lesson 10 - James 5:1-12 61 Lesson 4 - James 1:19-27 21 Lesson 11 - James 5:13-20 67 Lesson 5 - James 2:1-13 27 Lesson 12 - James Synthesis 73 Lesson 6 - James 2:14-26 35 Appendix - Bible Study Skills 79 Lesson 7 - James 3:1-12 42 Introduction “The book of James is the voice of a great Christian leader whose grasp .
Webster Financial (WBS) is a mid-sized regional bank holding an undiscovered multi-billion-dollar asset. On the surface, Webster is just another depository, albeit one with leading market share in Connecticut and surrounding
Webster, Sterling, and certain of their respective directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from the stockholders of Webster and Sterling in connection
Sexual Offense Advocate (main campus) 314-649-8474 (24 hours a day) The Department of Public Safety and Sexual Offense Advocate are located on the main campus in Webster Groves, Missouri; however, staff members can assist callers remotely or make appropriate referrals to local resources. Webster Alert System
This etext was prepared by Gary R. Young. The Duchess of Malfi by John Webster Introductory Note Of John Webster's life almost nothing is known. The dates 1580-1625 given for his birth and death are conjectural inferences, about which the best that can be said is that no known facts contradict them.
Provide laminates for the bearings that comply with ASTM A 36, AASHTO M 270 (ASTM A 709) Grade 36, ASTM A 1011 SS Grade 36 or A 1008 SS Grade 40, unless otherwise specified in the Contract Documents. d. PTFE/Elastomeric Sliding Bearings. Provide an elastomeric portion satisfying subsection 1701.2(c).
