Turkey's Refugee Crisis: The Politics Of Permanence

Turkey’s Refugee Crisis:The Politics of PermanenceEurope Report N 241 30 November 2016HeadquartersInternational Crisis GroupAvenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, BelgiumTel: 32 2 502 90 38 Fax: 32 2 502 50 38brussels@crisisgroup.org

Table of ContentsExecutive Summary.iI.Introduction .1II.Navigating Displacement: Turkey’s Response and Refugee Perspectives .3A. The Bureaucratic Scramble.3B. Incentive and Opportunities to Integrate .1. Education and the risk of a lost generation .2. Challenges entering the labour market .3. Experience of political upheaval .4579III. Beyond Guests: Are Syrians Welcome?. 11A. The Growing Anti-refugee Sentiment. 121. Refugees as an economic burden . 122. Refugees as a security risk . 14B. Identity and Demographic Balance Concerns . 151. Sectarian cleavages . 152. Kurds, Liberals and Secularists . 18IV.Political Polarisation and Opposition Conundrums . 20V.Protection, Integration versus Citizenship. 23VI.Conclusion . 26APPENDICESA.Map of Turkey . 27B.Number of Registered Syrians in Turkey (2012-2016) . 28C.Top Ten Provinces with Highest Number of Syrians in Turkey . 29D.Glossary of Terms . 30E.About the International Crisis Group . 31F.Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Europe and Central Asia since 2013 . 32G.Crisis Group Board of Trustees . 34

International Crisis GroupEurope Report N 24130 November 2016Executive SummaryTurkey’s response to the influx of Syrians is a source of national pride. The massivenumbers pose significant absorptive and financial challenges and compound problems stemming from complex demographics, deep political polarisation and risingsecurity threats. The uncertainties with regard to the Syria war delayed long-termplanning by both authorities and Syrians in Turkey. Ankara now needs to assume thepermanence of the refugees in order to craft an integration strategy to mitigate thelong-term risk for the nation’s stability. Replacing top down, erratic policymakingwith a national plan alongside efforts to build consensus among constituencies isnecessary both for Syrians to have clarity about their future in Turkey and to ensurethat their hosts do not see them as an economic burden, security threat or instrumentfor redesigning national identity.The scale is staggering. 2.75 million Syrians are registered in Turkey, around 3.5per cent of the population. When the influx began in 2011, Ankara assumed a smaller number and shorter timeframe, but with the war showing no signs of abating andEurope’s migration policies in disarray, it is a reality that looks set to stay or expand.Emergency responses have meant fitful policies and convoluted rhetoric. For therefugees, challenges include learning the language, finding meaningful jobs, housingand education, vulnerability to exploitation and navigating an unfamiliar, complicated bureaucracy. Acknowledgement of likely permanence has begun in 2016 to showup in policies for integration in education and employment. Implementation of thenew progressive integration policies, however, needs tighter coordination betweenpublic institutions, which should be aligned around a holistic, coherent strategy.Moreover, the year’s dramatic political upheavals, peaking with the July coup attemptand its aftermath, have deepened the general sense of an unpredictable and precarious future that dominates the refugee experience.Host communities complain about the impact of dense refugee concentrations onthe labour force, social benefits refugees receive and potential for increased crime andterror. Violence against refugees is isolated and downplayed, though the occasionalflare-ups on social media and alarming coverage after the president said citizenshipwould be granted suggest the potential for friction. Squaring state capacities withrefugee expectations and host grievances is complicated. Integration policies need toconsider host community concerns of a zero sum equation between their and Syrians’interests and be coupled with communication strategies alongside other efforts tofoster dialogue between refugees and hosts.The refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni Arabs, adding an ethnic-sectarian dimension to the issue. The common European assumption that Turkey is a natural environment for Syrians tends to neglect the complexities of its society. Much as in Europe,absorption involves not merely administrative and financial matters, but also culturaland political values. Sensitivities of minority communities are based on collectivememories of persecution, recent political marginalisation and mistrust of the president and government. Alevis, Kurdish nationalists, liberals, secularists and someTurkish nationalists worry that political leaders are using refugees to transformnational identity, consolidate power and reframe Turkey’s role in the Middle East asmore Arab, Sunni and hegemonic. The perception that refugees are a demographic

Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of PermanenceCrisis Group Europe Report N 241, 30 November 2016Page iithreat and pawns used by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) dampensprospects for a dispassionate, constructive debate about their presence and future.Suspicion of AKP’s refugee agenda is also fuelled by lack of clarity about, for example, locations for new refugee housing and camps and possible citizenship prospects.An inclusive national dialogue is needed to distinguish unfounded speculation fromlegitimate concerns, but the polarised environment hinders an integration debate.Opposition parties complain the president decides on refugees without consulting andwants to use them to achieve absolute power. Because society’s cultural, ethnic andsectarian fault lines correspond to party constituencies, they manifest themselves inpolitical confrontation at the centre.Ideally, Ankara would, in line with international precedents and human rightsstandards, lift the geographical limitation it applies to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and give Syrians formal refugee status, but this is currently unlikely. A long-termcitizenship prospect would provide Syrians with an incentive to integrate but posesrisks if offered without building consensus and setting clearly defined, fair conditions.Regardless of citizenship, targeted integration policies with clearly-defined legalsteps incentivising transition from temporary to permanent legal status are needed.This requires decision-making and engagement by political leaders that is inclusive,not imposed. More comprehensive debate on a new constitution and amendment ofArticle 66 on the definition of citizenship could provide a positive framework if government and opposition engage constructively.While Europe is most concerned about preventing more Syrians from seeking refuge in its countries, a more nuanced focus needs to be on how the refugees integratein Turkey over the long term. However, the low numbers the European Union (EU)is willing to accept make Turkish authorities unwilling to engage on refugee rightsand give Ankara a sense of occupying the moral high ground in face of EU requestson issues such as the rule of law agenda. It is a dynamic from which all stand to lose.Ankara/Brussels, 30 November 2016

International Crisis GroupEurope Report N 24130 November 2016Turkey’s Refugee Crisis:The Politics of PermanenceI.IntroductionThe politics of Syrians’ integration into Turkish society is complex on many levels.Domestic upheaval has increased political polarisation and further eroded confidence between Turkey and the European Union (EU). That polarisation and the tensions with the EU render management of the crisis more difficult at the same time asthe consequences of not integrating the refugees are becoming more dangerous.AKP has pursued unprecedented consolidation of power after losing its thirteenyear parliamentary majority in June 2015, then restoring single-party rule in theNovember 2015 election. Since disintegration of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)conflict ceasefire in July 2015, dramatic escalation in the mainly Kurdish-inhabitedsouth east has cost over 2,300 lives, with no end in sight. Seven attacks attributed tothe Islamic State (IS) in the same period have killed more than 250. This instabilitywas compounded by the 15 July 2016 coup attempt led by what the state calls theFethullahist Terrorist Organisation/Parallel State Structure (FETÖ/PDY).The failed coup created grounds for emergency rule, which has dramatically increased presidential power. It has also resulted in dismissal of some 125,000 civilservants and arrests of many, straining bureaucratic capacity in areas ranging fromthe judiciary to law enforcement and education, all of which are relevant to refugeeabsorption capacity. Moreover, with the focus on PKK- and FETÖ-related developments, refugee integration challenges are not getting the attention they need.The expedited pace of concentrating power in the presidency and the top-downyet haphazard nature of decision-making render establishing constructive dialoguewith the opposition and building national consensus on Syrians’ integration evermore unlikely. Sensitive issues such as the prospect of granting citizenship are perceived by government critics as ploys to strengthen AKP’s electoral base. Though therefugee crisis was not of Ankara’s making, and the open door policy toward refugeeshas been widely commended, the way dynamics have evolved leaves refugees feelinginstrumentalised in both Turkey’s domestic politics and its EU relations.The EU-Turkey refugee deal plays into this picture in complex ways. In the lasttwo years, the refugee issue has alternately reinvigorated and strained ties. The dealhas delivered mutual benefits: the flow of irregular migrants to the EU has beencurbed, and European funding and programming have had visible positive impact onSyrians’ opportunities in Turkey, which is also in the country’s long-term interests.The promise to curb the flow to Europe has likewise increased Ankara’s leverage andarguably rendered EU counterparts less vocal about human rights and rule-of-lawissues. Achievement of visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, however, hinges on compliance with EU conditions relating to anti-terrorism laws, among others, which isunlikely in the post-coup environment.Anti-EU rhetoric is high in Turkey, while the appetite in the European Counciland European Parliament to support visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens is low.Ankara is floating the prospect of reintroducing the death penalty, and the EuropeanParliament adopted on 24 November a non-binding resolution proposing a freeze on