China S Position On Korean Unification And ROK-PRC Relations

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China’s Position on Korean Unification andROK-PRC RelationsKim, Heung-Kyu(Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy at Sungshin Women’s University)Ⅰ. IntroductionⅡ. China’s Geopolitical Interests on the Korean PeninsulaⅢ. ROK Unification Policy That’s Compatible for BeijingⅣ. A Unified Korea and Chinese Political, Economic, and Socio-CulturalInterestsⅤ. Positions of Chinese Opinion Leaders on Korean UnificationⅥ. ROK-PRC Relations and Maintaining Peace on the Korean PeninsulaⅠ. IntroductionThe established assumption is that the People’s Republic of China (eitherPRC or China) has consistently supported North Korea’s position on Koreanunification since the Cold War-era. Officially, China has voiced support forpeaceful Korean unification achieved through peaceful means and not bymilitary means; and this principle also applies to North Korea. The generalperception, however, is that China’s policy in practice has adhered to astrategy of deferring or deterring South Korea-led unification. Thisperception originates from the dichotomous thinking that is the legacy ofthe Cold War-era, but also reflects accumulated experience with China andreflects the current strategic situation of China.

228The 2ndKRIS-Brookings Joint ConferenceDespite their various sorts of rhetoric, both South and North Korea’sperspectives on unification during the Cold War were based on the premiseof unification by absorption; and both Koreas did not rule out the will toachieve this end by military means. South Korea envisioned achievingunification by advancing into North Korea with the support of the ROK-USalliance, while China sought to deter, overpower, or at least offset theROK-US alliance to prevent South Korea from achieving this end. Even intoday’s post-Cold War context, these perceptions still strongly resonate inSouth Korean society and among ROK policy makers.The question is whether these Cold War-era perceptions and policies onKorean unification will provide the most realistic and desirable options toaddress new external/internal developments that have emerged in thepost-Cold War-era. That is, we need to take into account the followingfactors that have newly emerged in addressing the issue of Koreanunification.First, North Korea faces chronic economic difficulties that originate fromits socialist system, while internal political instability is increasing withthe recent series of political purges in an attempt to consolidate the powerof the Kim Jong-un regime. North Korea has sought to overcome thesechallenges to its regime security and post-Cold War security challenges byarming itself with nuclear weapons. As long as North Korea maintains theperception that its nuclear weapons programs are a strategic asset, andthus insist on keeping its nuclear weapons, its isolation from theinternational community will intensify, and make it more difficult for it toadopt economic opening and reform measures that are necessary for itsregime security. If North Korea continues to maintain these policies, itwould also be difficult to rule out the scenario of a North Koreanimplosion, and the potential for a military conflict on the Korean

China’s Position on Korean Unification and ROK-PRC Relations 229peninsula.Second, PRC-DPRK relations are in the process of shifting from the ColdWar-era traditional “special” alliance relationship to a normal “state tostate” relationship. This signifies that bilateral relations are no longerbeing defined by ideological affinities, but are shifting towards a morecomplex relationship that is prescribed by strategic, diplomatic, securityand economic interests. At the same time, we can observe thediversification of views on North Korea within the Chinese policy makingcircle, as well as the growing dilemma among Chinese academics and policymakers with regards to the strategic value of North Korea.Third, US-PRC relations have evolved since the 1970s from aconfrontational relationship to a more complex relationship that ischaracterized by competition and cooperation defined by strategic interests.For the time being, US-PRC relations are likely to be characterized by thecoexistence of cooperation and conflict, but both countries appear toperceive that in the mid- to long-term the bilateral relationship willinevitably evolve towards a strategic consortium or “US-China Concert”system. In particular, the G-2 system has already become more or lesstrends, it has become difficult for one country to unilaterally coerce theother. Under the current situation, both the US and China appear to prefera status-quo policy over a revisionist policy in light of their strategicinterests on the Korean peninsula.In light of the above factors, the post-Cold War situation cannot benecessarily seen as being more favorable for South Korea in achieving itsgoal of unification. South Korea remains the only country in the regionthat seeks unification or a revisionist policy on the Korean peninsula,which is contrary to the will of neighboring powers. Following the death ofKim Heung-Kyuestablished in the Northeast Asia region, and regardless of power transition

230The 2ndKRIS-Brookings Joint ConferenceNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-il, China continues to have suspicions thatSouth Korea may attempt to change the status quo and has attempted tocheck such efforts. This means that it is highly unlikely that a NorthKorean contingency scenario will naturally lead to Korean unification. Atthe same time, South Korea faces the growing potential for conflict on theKorean peninsula.In light of these situational developments, it is important to note China’sposition and role on Korean unification. China is in the process ofundergoing meaningful change, including China’s relations with NorthKorea, the United States and South Korea. China is considered as aconstant, rather than a variable, in Korean unification, and this is likely tobe the case in the future. This is due to the strategic importance of theKorean peninsula to China; and Beijing has the will and capacity tointervene in whatever way in Korean peninsula affairs. Therefore, it isimperative to understand the implications of these changes for Koreanunification, and will be an integral part of solving the most difficult andkey puzzle to Korean unification.Ⅱ. China’s Geopolitical Interests on the Korean Peninsula1. China’s Position on Korean Unification: Historical OriginsChinese leader Mao Zedong decided in 1950 to enter the Korean War basedon the strategic judgment that the future of China would be directly linkedto whether US-ROK joint forces succeed in winning the war. It isinteresting to note, however, that the Chinese military opposed to Mao’sdecision to enter the war, which forced Mao to defer his decision in orderto persuade the military. China’s entry into the Korean War eventuallyresulted in the division of the Korean peninsula, and also forced China to

China’s Position on Korean Unification and ROK-PRC Relations 231forgo its opportunity to unify with Taiwan. That is, China’s intervention inthe Korean War came at the price of failing to unify with Taiwan. Thismeans that China’s loss of Taiwan, as well as China’s defeat in theSino-Japanese war in the late 19th century, were both related to China’smilitary intervention in the Korean peninsula.The Chinese military’s opposition to entering the Korean War was basedon the historical lesson of not repeating the same mistake, while having tosuffer immense losses by fighting the more technologically superior USforces. China’s losses during the Korean War provided the historical basisfor China’s efforts to evade a direct military confrontation with the UnitedStates during the Vietnam War.The tragic experience and lesson stemming from China’s participation inthe Korean War is reflected in the 1961 PRC-DPRK Treaty of Friendship,Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Article 2 of the treaty commits bothparties to come to the aid of the other if attacked and is often cited as thegrounds for the PRC-DPRK military alliance. Article 6 of this treaty,however, strongly reflects China’s position on Korean unification. That is,the article stipulates that “the unification of Korea must be realizedmust be recognized as corresponding to the national interests of the Koreanpeople and the aim of preserving peace in the Far East.”China’s emphasis on Korean peninsula peace in the article could havebeen a defensive response to situational developments on the Koreanpeninsula at the time, including US nuclear armament on the Koreanpeninsula and the anti-Communist policies of the new Park Chung-heemilitary government and Kennedy administration. At the same time, thearticle reflects Chinese concerns of being forced to get militarily involvedin Korean peninsula affairs by North Korea; the article thus provided aKim Heung-Kyuthrough peaceful and democratic foundations,” and that “such a resolution

232The 2ndKRIS-Brookings Joint Conferencesafety mechanism for China by stating that Korean unification must berealized through peaceful and democratic means.Beijing’s position on Korean unification is also reflected in the secretcable (dated March 28, 1973) drafted by the East German Embassy inPyongyang, and states the following: “Though it appears that Chinesepropaganda outlets support North Korea’s position on Korean unification,the USSR judges that China is not interested in Korean unification. Chinawill support Korean unification only when it is confident that a unifiedKorea will be pro-Chinese.” The cable goes on to state that “China was alsoconcerned that a unified Korea made up of over 50 million Koreans willbecome more politically important and independent, and that a leader withpolitical ambitions extending beyond the Korean peninsula will appear.”This position is also reflected during Henry Kissinger’s secret talks withthe Chinese during the 1970s. At the time, instead of expressing supportfor North Korea’s position on Korean unification, China expressed that theKorean peninsula issue should be resolved by the four parties or the US,China and the two Koreas. This position also reflects China’s approach tomaintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula by jointly managingKorean peninsula affairs with the United States. Even when US-PRC talkswere suspended in the mid-1970s and it became inevitable for the US topull out of Southeast Asia, China consistently expressed opposition tothen-North Korean leader Kim Il-sung’s intention to use military means tounify the two Koreas. Furthermore, China clearly conveyed to North Koreathat it would not accept any attempts by Pyongyang to change the statusquo on the Korean peninsula by military means, and drew the line thatBeijing supports “North Korea’s independent peaceful unification policy.”Since then, China has consistently maintained the status quo and peacefulunification principle, which is based on its historical lesson from the

China’s Position on Korean Unification and ROK-PRC Relations 233Korean War and pragmatic judgment.2. Possibility of Change in China’s Status Quo PolicyWe do not need to presume that China will always adopt a negativeposition on Korean unification. First, we should note the high likelihoodthat the territory of North Korea is not included in what China defines asits “core interest.” At the inaugural Strategic and Economic Dialogue(S&ED) talks in 2009, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo articulatedChina’s three “core interests” as maintaining the governance capacity of theChinese Communist Party, issues related to sovereignty and territory, andsustainable economic development and social stability. In light of thisposition, in contrast to the issue of Taiwan, China does not consider NorthKorea to be directly linked to its sovereignty or territory. At the sametime, there is still the possibility that the North Korea issue could belinked to China’s “core interests” if it has implications for China’sgovernance capacity. For example, a situation where the United Statesunilaterally occupies the territory of North Korea without the consent ofBeijing could have implications for the legitimacy of the Chinese Communistthat a North Korea collapse scenario would have for China’s social stabilityand economic development.In general, North Korea still has strategic importance to China, but ithas a secondary impact to China’s core national interests. From ageo-economic perspective, North Korea could rather be considered ashaving a negative impact on China’s sustainable economic development. Inparticular, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs could pose a potentialthreat to China by increasing the possibility of a military conflict with theUS and South Korea, having negative implications for the economicKim Heung-KyuParty. Also, China would have concerns regarding the negative implications

234ndThe 2KRIS-Brookings Joint Conferencedevelopment and social stability of China’s northeast regions, strengtheningNorth Korea’s independent diplomatic/military policy line, and increasingthe potential for nuclear technology and materials to fall in the hands ofseparatists in China. Ironically, North Korea is important to China notbecause it is a strategic asset, but because of the large strategic cost andburden that North Korea could incur on China. In fact, the current debatebetween traditionalists and strategists in China on North Korea’s strategicvalue is related to these concerns.Since the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership, China’s policy towards theKorean peninsula and North Korea is in the process of evolving. It is stillunclear what the ultimate result will be, and this process will be influencedby many factors. But it seems to be clear that the evolving policy will beclearly different from China’s former policy towards North Korea, and insome respects be well pointed out by Peking University Professor Niu Jun’sanalysis that Chinese policy towards North Korea is moving along a criticaljuncture. China’s traditional policy towards the

the Cold War-era, but also reflects accumulated experience with China and reflects the current strategic situation of China. 228 nd The 2 KRIS-Brookings Joint Conference

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