DETERRENCE STABILITY ESCALATION CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA
ANDDETERRENCE STABILITYESCALATION CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIAEdited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson
2013 The Stimson CenterAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproducedor transmitted in any form or by any means without prior writtenconsent from the Stimson Center.ISBN: 978-1-939240-06-4Stimson1111 19 Street, NW, 12th FloorWashington, DC 20036Tel: 202.223.5956 Fax: 202.238.9604www.stimson.orgth
ContentsPreface 5Key Terms and Acronyms 7Introduction 9Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, Stimson CenterThe Non-unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia 21George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International PeacePakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability 41Michael Krepon, Stimson CenterThe US Experience With Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia 65David O. Smith, independent consultantDoctrine, Capabilities, and (In)Stability in South Asia 93Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyProspects for Limited War and Nuclear Use in South Asia 107Neil Joeck, University of California, BerkeleyMissile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia 123Dinshaw Mistry, University of Cincinnati, OhioDeterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia 135Christopher Clary, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyStrategic Restraint Regime 2.0 161Feroz Hassan Khan, Naval Postgraduate School, MontereyThe Yin and Yang of Strategic Transparency:Tools to Improve Nuclear Stability and Deterrence in South Asia 175Zachary S. Davis, Lawrence Livermore National LaboratoryBeyond Incrementalism: RethinkingApproaches to CBMs and Stability in South Asia 187Toby Dalton, Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceContributors 209
Preface 5PrefaceI am pleased to present the latest publication of the Stimson Center’s South Asia program: Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, edited by MichaelKrepon and Julia Thompson. Since 1991, the Stimson Center has examined the threatof conflict in South Asia, ways to seek normal relations between India and Pakistan,and means to reduce nuclear risks. Stimson’s South Asia program includes prescriptiveanalysis, fieldwork, outreach to decision-makers and civil society, Washington meetings, workshops within the region cosponsored by local partners, Visiting Fellowships,and initiatives geared to a rising generation of strategic analysts in India and Pakistan.This fall, Stimson launched a new website — South Asian Voices: Generation Why(www.southasianvoices.org) to empower a rising generation of strategic analysts andto facilitate cross-border dialogue, which has been hindered by the denial of visas.During the past year, Stimson has convened workshops where the authors in thisvolume have presented their work in progress. Feedback from these workshops andfrom project advisors is reflected in this collection. Stimson plans an additional volume with essays from new workshops and authors a year from now.I wish to express gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the JohnD. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the National Nuclear SecurityAdministration for their support of Stimson’s programming on nuclear issues inSouth Asia. The editors also wish to thank Stimson’s Communications team — DavidEgner, Rich Robinson and Lita Ledesma — copy editor Karla Daly, and intern DylanRebstock for their production support.Sincerely,Ellen LaipsonPresident and CEO, Stimson Center
Key Terms and Acronyms 7Key Terms and AcronymsATGMAnti-tank guided missileCBMConfidence-Building MeasureCENTCOMCentral CommandCIACentral Intelligence AgencyDCMDeputy Chief of MissionDGMODirector General of Military OperationsDODDepartment of DefenseDRDODefense Research and Development OrganizationFATAFederally Administered Tribal AreasIMIndian MujahideenISIInter-Services IntelligenceJeMJaish-e-MohammadJTEsJoint transparency exercisesLeTLashkar-e-TaibaLoCLine of ControlMADMutually Assured DestructionMoUMemorandum of UnderstandingNCTCNational Center for CounterterrorismNGONon-governmental organizationNPTNonproliferation TreatyNRRMNuclear Risk Reduction MeasureNSCNational Security CouncilRSORegional Security OfficeSAARCSouth Asian Association for Regional CooperationSPDStrategic Plans Division (Pakistan)SRBMShort-range ballistic missileTTPTehrik-i-Taliban PakistanUAVUnmanned Aerial VehicleUNSCUnited Nations Security Council
Introduction 9IntroductionMichael Krepon and Julia ThompsonWhen India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, their governments offered assurances that they would seek minimum, credible nuclear deterrents. With the passageof time, their definitions of “minimum” have evolved. Powerful domestic constituencies and institutions in Pakistan and India have developed, tested and inducted moretypes of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles than are now possessed by the United States.There is no evidence, as yet, that this competition is slackening.Even though the nuclear competition on the Subcontinent pales by comparison tothe superpower competition, it is nonetheless dangerous. The primary dangers do notrelate to a lack of professionalism on the part of those responsible for nuclear stewardship. Instead, escalatory dangers are rooted in the absence of normal relations betweennuclear-armed neighbors, the presence of spoilers who seek to disrupt more normalrelations, and the potential for incidents that could lead to renewed conflict. TheUnited States and the Soviet Union did not have to concern themselves with domesticand cross-border threats to deterrence stability. Pakistan and India do.New challenges to stability are rising. Governance in Pakistan continues to be indecline. Water is becoming an increasingly scarce, and perhaps contested, commodity.Crises may be prompted by disaffected Indian Muslims who seek to settle domesticscores by violent means, actions that may be hard to distinguish from Pakistan-basedspoilers. The introduction of short-range delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, theutility of which depends on their proximity to battlefields, leaves much to chance.Some pathways to conflict, such as premeditated, large-scale conventional warfare,as might have been contemplated in 1987, and as was the case in 1965 and 1971, nowseem unlikely because of offsetting nuclear capabilities. Fears of preemptive nuclearstrikes, like those plaguing Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, seem evenmore improbable on the Subcontinent. Instead, the most likely scenario for conflict inthis region continues to arise from escalation sparked by spectacular acts of violenceon Indian soil by individuals trained and based in Pakistan.This scenario has confronted decision-makers on two prior occasions — the “TwinPeaks” crisis sparked by an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 followed by an attack on the dependents of troops deployed on the front lines in 2002, and after multiple attacks on iconic targets in Mumbai in 2008. On these occasions, spectacular actsof terrorism did not lead inexorably to war. Neither did a limited war, fought in theheights above Kargil in 1999, lead to uncontrolled escalation. In these three instances, national leaders acted responsibly, outsiders played constructive roles to defusetensions, and escalatory pressures were deflated. This may hold true in the future, aswell. But there can be no assurance of the absence of another triggering event. Nor canthere be assurance that Indian and Pakistani leaders will react in the same way in thefuture as in the past. Indeed, there is good reason to assume that there will be anothercrisis-triggering event, whether relations between Pakistan and India remain poor or,perhaps more likely, if national leaders seek improved ties.
10 Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South AsiaA great many in Pakistan see the wisdom of avoiding a repeat of the Twin Peakscrisis and the Mumbai attacks. After these crises subsided, India rebounded, whilePakistan’s image and economy suffered deeply, and foreign direct investment driedup. It is, nonetheless, hard to translate this recognition into concerted actions againstextremist groups. Pakistan’s army is heavily engaged in fighting some of these groupsalong the Afghan border. Pakistan already suffers more internal violence than anyother state not in the throes of a civil war, with the sole exception of Iraq. To takeon extremist groups that carry out attacks against India would entail even tougherchallenges for Pakistan’s security forces and much higher potential casualties — noton the periphery of the state, but in its heartland. Pakistan’s national leaders hope thatextremist groups will turn away from violence and be reintegrated within their society.But hope is not a game plan for dealing with the perpetrators of violence directedagainst India — or, indeed, against Pakistan itself. As long as Pakistan’s decision-makers are unable or unwilling to move against extremist groups, the potential for anothercrisis remains, along with the potential for uncontrolled escalation.To complicate matters further, India’s national leaders do not appear to have a gameplan for trying to improve relations with Pakistan. If they do, very little effort is beingexpended toward this goal. Ambition has been displaced by ennui. Indian leaders havehad good reason to conclude that Pakistan’s political leaders do not have the power orinclination to make deals over Kashmir that reflect ground realities — a considerabledistance away from campaign boilerplate. The Pakistan file in South Block is gathering dust — until it will be shaken off by a new Indian government or by foreseen butnonetheless jarring events.Deterrence stability is not a given and does not automatically result from acquiring offsetting nuclear capabilities. Even when the United States and the Soviet Unionacquired a triad of basing modes for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on land, at seaand with aircraft, and even after Washington and Moscow each acquired and deployed more than 10,000 nuclear weapons, deterrence stability proved elusive. To thecontrary, both superpowers felt more insecure as the other’s capabilities and stockpilesgrew. The more each adversary increased its nuclear-weapon-related capabilities, theless its force structure appeared to be for deterrence purposes and the more it appeared to be seeking advantage in nuclear war-fighting scenarios.India and Pakistan are slowly climbing this familiar path, adding perhaps 10 warheads per year as they add delivery vehicles for their use, if deterrence fails.1 Indiaand Pakistan appear on course to each have a triad, large families of ballistic andcruise missiles, and, in the case of Pakistan (with perhaps India to follow), a declaredrequirement for short-range nuclear weapons for use at the forward edge of futurebattlefields. There were no official statements hinting at nuclear forces of current sizes,no mention of requirements for “tactical” nuclear weapons, no mention of expandedinfrastructure to produce fissile material, and no hint of vetoing fissile material cutoffnegotiations in the years immediately following the 1998 tests.Some — but not all — of these developments might well have been anticipated, butothers appear to have been generated by unforeseen developments, including the USIndia civil nuclear agreement, changes in military doctrine following the Kargil war,particularly the Indian military’s planning for shorter timelines to respond in limitedways to grievous injury, and the readjustment of requirements in an unfolding competition marked, as might be expected, by conservative estimates of adversarial intentions and production capabilities.
Introduction 11Leaders in both countries provide assurance that deterrence is becoming strongerand that they will be sensible stewards of their nuclear arsenals. They take strongexception to worst-case analyses by outsiders who have rarely set foot in South Asia(and by those who have visited frequently). These sensitivities are understandable,as those ringing alarm bells typically come from countries guilty of extreme nuclearexcess. But behind prideful rebuttals lies reasonable doubt — doubt that all is not assafe and sound as advertised at home and abroad, that no system of nuclear deterrenceis foolproof, and that much could go haywire on the Subcontinent.As with the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan and India will encounterdifficulty in finding deterrence stability — even at their current, modest level of ongoing competition. They could still, however, brake their nuclear competition in waysthat eluded the United States and the Soviet Union. It is still possible, for example, forNew Delhi and Rawalpindi to avoid placing multiple warheads atop their missiles. Itis still possible to avoid missile defense deployments that will be militarily ineffectiveyet will ratchet up the adversary’s targeting requirements. It is still possible to avoidthe pursuit of greater accuracies to open the Pandora’s box of counterforce targetingrequirements for their medium- and intermediate-range missiles. And it is not too lateto rethink the wisdom of requirements for tactical nuclear weapons.Deterrence stability is far from assured on the Subcontinent and is likely to deteriorate if current trend lines continue. One reason is due to the triangular nature ofthe nuclear competition in which India and Pakistan are embedded with China. NewDelhi wishes to focus on deterring China and does not wish to be linked to Pakistanin a nuclear competition. These distinctions have been blurred in the past becausePakistan has received nuclear-weapons-related assistance from China. It is extremely hard to establish deterrence stability — let alone maintain it — when states withunequal capabilities are enmeshed in a strategic competition, and when two of thesestates are strategic partners. The geometry of this nuclear triangle provides no soundbasis for constructing deterrence stability.Strategic stability is also hard to establish and maintain when bilateral diplomacy between India and Pakistan and between India and China has been moribund,marked by periodic high-level engagement without appreciable result. New Delhiwould welcome nuclear risk-reduction accords with Beijing, but Chinese leaders haveso far shown little enthusiasm to do so. Indian and Pakistani attempts to reach nuclearrisk-reduction accords in the context of a composite dialogue process have been stymied by acts of violence that can be traced back to Pakistan. Neither country appearsto view Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures as worthwhile in their own right; instead,they have been viewed as useful to deflect external pressures after serious crises or asbargaining levers for more important objectives in the absence of crises.A common conceit, regardless of nationality, is that deterrence becomes strongeras nuclear capabilities grow. In reality, deterrence becomes less stable when nuclearweapons substitute for diplomacy. There is no basis for deterrence stability when diplomacy and nuclear risk reduction is moribund while nuclear capabilities are growingand military doctrines are evolving. Negotiating bilateral nuclear risk-reduction accords are hard enough; reaching triangular accords among states with differing powerpotential and military requirements is much harder. Bilateral nuclear risk-reductionaccords between India and Pakistan have been infrequent. The last one — relatingto notifications of nuclear accidents — was reached in 2007. Nothing tangible in this
12 Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asiarealm has been accomplished since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. There have been nobilateral nuclear accords between Beijing and New Delhi.Nuclear capabilities are growing at a steady pace while becoming more diversifiedby all three of the triangular competitors. All three have adopted changes in militarydoctrines to increase agility. India’s military services seek to be able to respond morepromptly to severe provocations that can be traced back to Pakistan. Pakistan’s armyalso seeks to shorten its ability to move troops and equipment into blocking positions.And Chinese military forces seek to strengthen their abilities to deny access to offshorechallengers. Nuclear dangers can only grow in South Asia when capabilities outpacedoctrine, and when both capabilities and doctrine outpace diplomacy.New Delhi and Islamabad have made many modest overtures signaling an interestin improving bilateral relations, such as the release of fishermen captured in contestedwaters, but little has come of them. Military-related Confidence-Building Measures(CBMs) and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRMs) have been few and far between over the past 15 years. The governments of India and Pakistan assert that theyhave been responsible stewards of their nuclear arsenals, and they have taken steps toincrease the security and command and control arrangements for their nuclear deterrents. However, their definition of responsible nuclear stewardship does not appear toinclude sustained, productive diplomatic engagement to reduce nuclear risks.In contrast to their relaxed approach to NRRMs, Pakistan and India have togetherintroduced 17 new nuclear-weapon-capable delivery systems since 1998 — or slightlymore than one system per year. New families of cruise missiles are being readied foroperational deployment, along with expanded families of ballistic missiles. Nuclearweapon delivery systems are moving out to sea. Differing cycles of missile development and flight-testing add to difficulties in stabilizing nuclear competition on theSubcontinent. 2 From 1998 to 2005, India added three new nuclear weapon deliverysystems, while Pakistan tested six for the first time. Since 2006, India has introducednew missile systems at a more rapid pace than Pakistan: India has flight-tested six newnuclear-capable missile systems since 2006, 3 while Pakistan has flight-tested two —the Nasr and the Raad cruise missile. The most notable missile developments of latehave been New Delhi’s flight testing of an extended-range ballistic missile to deterChina and Pakistan’s stated requirement for short-range nuclear weapon delivery systems to deter India.4 Pakistan’s embrace of short-range nuclear weapon requirements isbeing pursued under the rubric of “full spectrum deterrence.”5Concurrently, military doctrines have evolved significantly. Since the 1999 Kargil War,Indian military exercises have focused on faster and more flexible force deployments forlimited war without triggering the use of nuclear weapons. The Shoor Veer exercises inRajasthan in April and May 2011 involved more than 300 combat vehicles and roughly60,000 troops to practice an “integrated theatre battle concept.”6 Pakistan’s military exercises, such as the Azm-e-Nau series, seek shorter timelines for blocking action.Ineffectual diplomacy, coupled with rapid technological and doctrinal developments,has shortened the fuse for the possible use of nuclear weapons on the Subcontinent.Since 1998, potentially meaningful CBMs and NRRMs with a direct bearing onreducing the risk of military confrontations have been few and far between: the 1999Lahore Memorandum of Understanding, the 2005 Agreement on Pre-Notification ofFlight Testing of Ballistic Missiles, and the 2007 Agreement to Reduce Nuclear Risks— renewed in 2012 for a five-year term.
Introduction 13Before going public with their nuclear-weapon capabilities, India and Pakistannegotiated several important measures: a hotline between the prime ministers, usedepisodically and reaffirmed in May 1997; a hotline between the Directors Generalof Military Operations (DGMOs), first established following the 1971 War, re-established in December 1990, and reaffirmed in the 1999 Lahore Memorandumof Understanding; the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises,Manoeuvres and troop movements; and t
Prospects for Limited War and Nuclear Use in South Asia 107 Neil Joeck, University of California, Berkeley Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia 123 Dinshaw Mistry, University of Cincinnati, Ohio Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia 135
Escalation level 2 (EL2) Supplier Management ZF Group ZF Escalation Model Supplier / Purchased parts 13 If the exit criteria are sustainably reached, the escalation leader de-escalates the supplier to a lower level or ends the escalation. The maximum period for a supplier to remain on EL2 is 3 months, if no different decision is taken.
SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Cyber Deterrence The final report of the DSB Task Force on Cyber Deterrence is attached. The Cyber Deterrence Task Force was asked to consider the requirements for deterrence of the full range of potential cyber attacks against the United States and U.S. allies/partners, and to identify critical capabilities (cyber and non .
mix of passive and active actions is the key to building a successful strategy. Passive cyber deterrence (deterrence by denial) alone will not inflict the necessary fear in an adversary to prevent attacks. There must be a credible threat to impose an undesirable set of penalty measures (active deterrence) to have a successful and effective strategy
6 conventional deterrence of north korea conventional deterrence of north korea 7 below the nuclear level.3 As with Russia and China, the central challenge for U.S. de- terrence posture is the risk that North Korea could attempt to impose a fait accompli,
4 Deterrence and compellance can be difficult to distinguish. Broadly, deterrence seeks to mobilize threats of punishment to induce an adversary to forego aggression or, if conflict has already begun, to forego escalation. Deterrence essentially seeks to preserve a status quo. Compellence seeks to motivate an actor
Nuclear deterrence is an elusive quarry. The absence of a superpower war since the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, fortunately, makes it impossible to test directly the theory of deterrence. Still, it does not follow that the stability of the post-war era can be attributed to the ability of each superpower to obliterate the other. Though .
Russian thinking on escalation management, though some judge them insufficient for deterrence of regional conflict. In Russian military writings, the role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is not only enduring, but remains prominent in regional contingencies. . Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts ó provides a .
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