OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME I
GLOBALCOMPETITIONENFORCEMENTUPDATE2015 - 2019OECD COMPETITIONTRENDS 2021, VOLUME I
Please cite this publication as:OECD (2021), OECD Competition Trends 2021, Volume I:Global Competition Enforcement Update etition-trends.htmThis report is published under the responsility of the SecretaryGeneral of the OECD. The opinions expressed and argumentsemployed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views ofthe OECD member countries.This report, as well as any data and map included herein,are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over anyterritory, to the delimitation of international frontiers andboundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under theresponsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use ofsuch data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of theGolan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in theWest Bank under the terms of international law.The use of this work, whether digital or print, isgoverned by the Terms and Conditions to be found athttp://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.Graphic design by Poeli Bojorquez.
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME IForewordStarting in 2018, the OECD, under the guidanceof the Bureau of the Competition Committee, haslaunched an initiative to develop a database ofgeneral statistics relating to competition agencies,including data on enforcement and information onadvocacy initiatives. The database currently coversthe period 2015-2019 and will be collected on anannual basis in the future.OECD Competition Trends presents unique insightsinto global competition trends based on analysisof data from more than 50 OECD and non-OECDjurisdictions. First launched in 2020, this secondedition is presented in two volumes. Volume Iprovides an update on the competition enforcementtrends between 2015 and 2019 for the competitionauthorities of the 56 jurisdictions in the OECDCompStats database.This is complemented by “Volume II: Global MergerControl” which provides an overview of trends inglobal merger control. It describes a selection ofthe different choices made by jurisdictions whendesigning legal regimes, global merger controlactivity, and trends in merger control enforcement.This publication supports informed policymakingand contributes to improving competition law andpolicy around the world by providing multi-year dataon a large number of economic and legal indicators.The OECD Competition Committee, which includesrepresentatives of the world’s major competitionauthorities, is the premier source of policy analysisand advice to governments on how best to harnessmarket forces in the interests of greater globaleconomic efficiency and prosperity. For almost 60years the OECD and its Competition Committeehave taken a leading role in shaping the frameworkfor international co-operation among competitionagencies. The resulting recommendations, bestpractices and policy roundtables serve both asmodels and inspiration for national initiatives and astools for sharing global best practices on competitionlaw and policy. Competition officials from developedand emerging economies are offered a uniqueplatform from which to monitor developments incompetition policy and enforcement, and to discussnew solutions for increasing effectiveness.This work benefits from the support of the OECDSecretariat, in particular the Competition Division,and from the organisation’s whole-of-governmentapproach, taking advantage of expertise in otherOECD committees and experience in internationalco-operation. As the role and scope of competitionlaw and policy continue to evolve, the tools ofcompetition authorities must constantly developand incorporate lessons learned from others. Thispublication contributes to helping policy makersand competition enforcers to stay up to date withthe different ways in which competition law andpolicy is applied throughout the world.data of a certain number of individual jurisdictions.The aggregate-level data includes an analysis (i) forall participating jurisdictions (“All jurisdictions”),(ii) comparing OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions,and (iii) per geographical region (Americas, AsiaPacific, Europe and Other (i.e. countries that donot qualify for the first three regions, but for whomnot enough countries in their region participate toremain anonymous)).The publication was prepared under the supervisionof Antonio Capobianco, Acting Head of Division; byWouter Meester, project leader; Carlotta Moiso;Menna Mahmoud; Niyati Asthana; and Pedro Caro deSousa; all of the OECD Competition Division. CristinaVolpin, Federica Maiorano, Isolde Lueckenhausen,James Mancini, Paulo Burnier, Ruben Maximianoand Sabine Zigelski, all of the OECD CompetitionDivision, provided comments and suggestions onearlier drafts.We want to thank the individual competitionauthorities in the participating jurisdictions whogenerously provided the information on which muchof this publication is based.Data in OECD Competition Trends 2021 is mainlypresented on an aggregate level, combining theGLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-20193
4GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-2019
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME ITable of ContentsAcknowledgements1. Key figures2. Resources2.1 Competition budgets2.2 Competition staffList of Figures468893. Competition enforcement activities103.1 Enforcement and detection activities3.2 CartelsDecisionsLeniencySettlements3.3 Abuse of dominanceDecisionsInvestigationsCommitment procedures3.4 MergersMerger decisions and notificationsMerger clearancesProhibitions and withdrawalsRemedies10121212131414161617171818194. Fines4.1 Total fines4.2 Fines imposed for cartel cases4.3 Fines imposed for abuse of dominance casesAnnex A. Source of data: CompStatsJurisdictionsPeriodDataAnnex B. Competition Authoritesin the CompStats DatabaseAnnex C. Methodology20202224262626272830Figure 1 Coverage of the OECD CompStats Database, 2019Figure 2 Key facts about the OECD CompStats DatabaseFigure 3 Evolution of competition law and merger regimes,1910-2019Figure 4 General overview of competition resourcesand enforcement activity, 2019Figure 5 Total budget by region, 2015-2019Figure 6 Average budget per agency, 2015-2019Figure 7 Average competition budget per EUR 1 million GDP,2015-2019Figure 8 Average budget per competition staff memberper agency, 2015-2019Figure 9 Total number of competition staff, 2015-2019Figure 10 Average number of competition staff per agency,2015-2019Figure 11 Competition staff per 1 million inhabitants, 2019Figure 12 Change in enforcement activity by jurisdiction,2015-2019Figure 13 Change in detection activity and ex-officioinvestigations by jurisdiction, 2015-2019Figure 14 Total number of dawn raids, 2015-2019Figure 15 Average number of dawn raids per agency,2015-2019Figure 16 Total number of market studies, 2015-2019Figure 17 Average number of market studies per agency,2015-2019Figure 18 Total number of cartel decisions, 2015-2019Figure 19 Average number of cartel decisions, 2015-2019Figure 20 Total number of leniency applications, 2015-2019Figure 21 Average number of leniency applicationsper agency, 2015-2019Figure 22 Total of cartel decisions and the percentageof cases with settlements, 2015-2019Figure 23 Total number of abuse of dominance decisions,2015-2019Figure 24 Average number of abuse of dominance decisions,per agency, 2015-201966678888999101011111111121212121314Figure 25 Total number of abuse of dominance decisionsby jurisdiction, 2015-2019Figure 26 Total number of investigations launched foralleged abuse of dominant position, 2015-2019Figure 27 Total number of commitment procedures,negotiated or consensual procedures used in abuseof dominance cases, 2015-2019Figure 28 Number of merger decisions and notifications,2015-2019Figure 29 Types of merger decisions, 2019Figure 30 Types of merger decisions, 2015-2019Figure 31 Number of prohibition decisions and withdrawnmerger notifications, 2015-2019Figure 32 Number of prohibition decisions, 2015-2019Figure 33 Number of withdrawn notifications, 2015-2019Figure 34 Total decisions with remedies and percentageof remedy decisions over total number of decisionsFigure 35 Total of fines imposed (abuse of dominanceand cartel cases), 2015-2019Figure 36 Total of fines imposed by type of infringement,2015-2019Figure 37 Fine-to-budget ratio (abuse of dominance andcartel cases), 2015-2019Figure 38 Total of cartel fines imposed, 2015-2019Figure 39 Average cartel fines imposed, 2015-2019Figure 40 Average cartel fines imposed per cartel decision,2015-2019Figure 41 Average number of companies fined per carteldecision, 2015-2019Figure 42 Total of abuse of dominance fines imposed,2015-2019Figure 43 Average abuse of dominance fines imposed,2015-2019Figure 44 Average fines imposed per abuse of dominancedecision, 2015-201915GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201951616171818181919192020212222232324242514
1. Key figuresFigure 1 Coverage of the OECD CompStats Database, 2019Figure 2 Key facts about the OECD CompStats DatabaseNON-OECD19Chart TitleOTHER7OECD37*ILKZRUUA AR BRZA TRCACLCO1148%CREG68%YEARSOF DATA5SVCHMXSEFigure 3 Evolution of competition law and merger regimes, 1910-2019PEESUS56SISKEUROPE ROPTPLNOAUTWINASIA-PACIFIC7Competition LawNumber of jurisdictions60Merger Regime50IDJP40KRNLNZMT30ATLUBE20BGLVHRITIEISHU GREUDE FR FIEEDKCZ* Includes the 36 OECD countries and the European Union. Colombia, although having become a member in 2020, has been treated a non-member,as the data pertained to the years before Colombia’s accession.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 1998200220062010201420182019LT6% OF WORLDGDPECGB31% OF WORLDPOPULATIONAMERICASNote: Data based on the 56 jurisdictions in the CompStats databaseSource: OECD CompStats Database.
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME IFigure 4 General overview of competition resources and enforcement activity, 2019COMPETITION BUDGET (EUR)COMPETITION STAFFTOTAL DECISIONSTotal 1.155 BillionAverage 23.57 MillionMedian 10.19 MillionTotal 10 768Average 207Median 100Abuse of dominance 212Cartel decisions 449Mergers 8 636GROWTH RATE 2018-2019OECD 5.5 %NON-OECD 3.1GROWTH RATE 2018-2019OECD 2.4 %NON-OECD 1.8%GROWTH RATE 2018-2019%AMERICAS400.8 MAVG 40 MAMERICASEUROPE399.6 M2 3913 122AVG 1041.155 bnAVG 23.57 MEUROPE3 934AVG 1312 068ASIAPACIFICTOTAL3 241AVG 324ASIAPACIFICAVG 14 M%AMERICASEUROPEAVG 239OECD -0.5 %NON-OECD -4.0ASIAPACIFICAVG 295228.7 M1 625AVG 38 MAVG 232OTHER126 MTOTAL10 768AVG 207OTHER3 187AVG 637AVG 25 MTOTAL9 297OTHER497AVG 99Note: Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the CompStats database for which complete data has been received. Budget data includes 49 jurisdictions that provided budgetdata for solely competition activities for all five years. OECD vs non-OECD logos show the average annual growth rate from 2015 to 2019. Budget number is in 2019 EUR.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-20197
2. Resources2.1 Competition budgets2015Figure 5 Total budget, 2015-2019020020164006008001 0000All igure 7 Average competition budget per EUR 1 million GDP, 2015-201901020204060All uropeOtherNote (for all graphs): Data based on the 49 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided budget data for solely competition activities for all five years. Budget figures are in 2015 EUR (non-eurocurrencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting budget changes. Competition staff are staff working only on competition(excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority, such as consumer protection, public procurement, sector regulation).Source: OECD CompStats Database.82019RegionsGLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201930EUR million5040Figure 8 Average budget per competition staff member per agency, 2015-2019EUR35All jurisdictions2018Figure 6 Average budget per agency, 2015-2019EUR million1 200All jurisdictions0201780100120140160EUR thousand180200
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME I2.2 Competition staff20152016201720182019RegionsFigure 9 Total number of competition staff, 2015-201902 0004 0006 0008 00010 00012 0008%All jurisdictionsNon-OECDincreasein competition staffbetween 2015-2019OECDAmericasAsia-PacificEuropeOtherFigure 11 Competition staff per 1 million inhabitants, 2019Figure 10 Average number of competition staff per agency, ECD/ Non-OECDAll 3.1All eOther* Two jurisdictions in the group “Other” are responsible for the high values because of regional offices.Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Total number of staff working only on competition (excluding administrative staff or staffinvolved in other functions of the authority, such as consumer protection, public procurement, and sector regulation).Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-20199
3. Competition enforcement activities3.1 Enforcement and detection activitiesFigure 12 Change in enforcement activity by jurisdiction, 2015-2019Percentage of ersCartelsIncreaseAbuse ofdominanceCartelsMergersNote (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Each ‘wedge of three/four rectangles represents the development ofthe respective indicators in one of the jurisdictions. The development was calculated by using the average annual growth rate (AAGR) by jurisdiction. (“increase” indicates an AAGRincrease of 5% or more, “stable” indicates an AAGR-change between -5% and 5%, “decrease” indicates a AAGR-decrease of 5% or more, “low activity” indicates insufficient activity tocalculate a meaningful change, and “No data/N.A.” indicates that no data is available or that this indicator is not applicable for the particular jurisdiction.).Source: OECD CompStats DatabaseGLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-2019Low ActivityLeniencyEach wedgerepresents oneand the samejurisdictionEach wedgerepresents oneand the samejurisdiction10DecreaseNo Data / N.A.Figure 13 Change in detection activity and ex-officio investigations by jurisdiction,2015-2019Percentage of e of Cartel ex-officio Dawn RaidsdominaceinvestigationsinvestigationsAbuse ofdominanceStableLeniencyDawn raidsCartel ex-officioinvestigationsAbuse of dominanceinvestigations
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME I2015201620172018Figure 14 Total number of dawn raids, 2015-2019Figure 15 Average number of dawn raids per agency, All eOther0All eFigure 16 Total number of market studies, 2015-2019Figure 17 Average number of market studies per agency, ions3030002019All eOther0All eOther*Other* Two jurisdictions in the group “Other” and one jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific region are responsible for the high values in 2018.Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201911
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)3.2 ure 18 Total number of cartel decisions, 2015-201902016100200300Figure 20 Total number of leniency applications, 2015-2019400500600All Pacific200Europe100Other0Figure 19 Average number of cartel decisions per agency, 2015-20190510152025All eOtherFigure 21 Average number of leniency applications per agency, 2015-201930All ficEurope3530252015105Other** In 2018, one jurisdiction is mainly responsible for the spike in the number of cartel decisions in Asia-Pacific in 2018.Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.Source: OECD CompStats Database.12GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-20190All eOther
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME ISettlementsFigure 22 Total of cartel decisions and the percentage of cases with settlements, 2015-2019Total number of cartel decisions (left axis)250100%Percentage of cartelin whichsettlements,plea bargain,anyoftypecases casesin whichsettlements,plea bargain,any typeproceduresoffor settlingcases(rightofaxis)forproceduressettling caseswere 370%16515014715515615114355%55%49% 0182019OtherNote: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201913
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)3.3 Abuse of dominance2015DecisionsFigure 23 Total number of abuse of dominance decisions, 2015-2019050100150200250All eOtherFigure 24 Average number of abuse of dominance decisions per agency, 2015-20190246810All eOtherNote (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.Source: OECD CompStats Database.14GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-2019121416182016201720182019Regions
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME IFigure 25 Total number of abuse of dominance decisions by jurisdiction, 2015-201967%share of top5 jurisdictionsin total abuse ofdominance casesNote: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Each number represents one jurisdiction.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201915
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)3.3 Abuse of ent proceduresFigure 26 Total number of investigations launched for alleged abuse of dominantposition, 2015-2019Figure 27 Total number of commitment procedures, negotiated or consensualprocedures used in abuse of dominance cases, 2015-20190100200300400500600All icas30Asia-Pacific20Europe10Other0Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.Source: OECD CompStats Database.16GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-2019All eOther
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME I3.4 MergersMerger decisions and notificationsFigure 28 Number of merger decisions and notifications, 2015-2019AmericasAsia-PacificEuropeOtherTotal Notifications100009 15590008 04980003178 2848 5664294499 27241240015%increasein merger notificationsbetween 2015-2019700060003 2823 4991 4671 3962 6712 759201520163 6053 8283 682500040001 4611 5033 0693 1743 0392017201820191 3603000200010000Note: Data based on the 48 jurisdictions in the CompStats Database that have a merger regime and for which data is available for all years and is comparable.Decisions include cases in which the waiting period had expired.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201917
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)3.4 MergersMerger clearancesProhibitions and withdrawalsFigure 29 Types of merger decisions, 2019Figure 31 Number of prohibition decisions and withdrawn merger notifications,2015-2019Phase I clearanceswithout remedy95.7%Phase II clearanceswith remedy1.0%Prohibitions0.4%Other4.3%Phase I clearanceswith remedy0.7%Phase II clearanceswithout remedy2.2%Total number of prohibitionsTotal number of withdrawn 70201520182019Note: The figures slightly overestimate the number of blocked or withdrawn transactions as they include prohibitions decisions andwithdrawals of the same transaction by different agencies.Figure 30 Types of merger decisions, 2015-2019100%99%98%95%97%96%95%Phase II prohibitions94%Phase II clearances with remedy93%Phase II clearances without remedy92%Phase I clearances with remedy91%90%0%Phase I clearances without remedy20152016201720182019Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 48 jurisdictions in the CompStats Database that have a merger regime and for which data is available for all years and is comparable.Phase I clearances without rememdy, Phase I clearances with remedy, and Phase II prohibitions include Single Phase decisions.Phase I and Phase II clearances include cases of expiration of waiting period.Source: OECD CompStats Database.18GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-2019share of mergerscleared without remedyin Phase I
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME I20152016201720182019RemediesRegionsFigure 32 Number of prohibition decisions, 2015-2019Figure 34 Total decisions with remedies and percentage of remedy decisions overtotal number of decisions30Number of decisions with remedies (left 2%8%7%6%5.9%10059%Percentage of decisions with remedies over total number of decisions (right axis)5%5.0%804%603%402%45201%4000All eOtherFigure 33 Number of withdrawn notifications, 2015-20190%2015352016201720182019302520151050All eOtherNote (for all graphs): Data based on the 48 jurisdictions in the CompStats Database that have a merger regime and for which data is available for all years and is comparable.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201919
4. Fines4.1 Total finesFigure 35 Total of fines imposed (abuse of dominance and cartel cases), 2015-20192015201602017201822019Regions468EUR billion1210All jurisdictionstotal finesimposed in ure 36 Total of fines imposed by type of infringement, by year, 2015-2019Abuse of dominanceCartelsEUR 2016201720182019Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.Source: OECD CompStats Database.209.3 bnGLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-2019
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME IFigure 37 Fines-to-budget ratio (abuse of dominance and cartel cases), 8average numberof timesthat fines exceededagencies’ budgetsin 2019403010282016.614.91011.5107.97.714.78.56.4 6.54.55.747.37.24.910.28.38.24.64.454.42.30All jurisdictionsNon-OECDOECDAmericas6.4 5.71.5 1.8Asia-Pacific0.2Europe1.2 1.3OtherNote: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided budget for solely competition activities and fines data for five years. Budget and fines figures are in2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates (on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting budget and fines changes.One jurisdiction in the “Other” group was responsible for the spike of fines in 2018 and 2019.Source : OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201921
4. Fines (continued)4.2 Fines imposed for cartel cases2015Figure 38 Total of cartel fines imposed, 2015-201901234567EUR billion8All eOtherFigure 39 Average cartel fines imposed, 2015-2019050100150200250300EUR million350All eOther** In 2017, Two jurisdiction in Americas were responsible for the spike of cartel fines. One jurisdiction in the “Other” group was responsible for the spike in 2018.Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.Source : OECD CompStats Database.22GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-20192016201720182019Regions
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME IFigure 40 Average cartel fines imposed per cartel decision, 2015-2019Average fine per cartel decision (EUR m)5-year averageEUR million25 20162017201820191510Million averagecartel finein 201950Figure 41 Average number of companies fined per cartel decision, Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201923
4. Fines (continued)4.3 Fines imposed for abuse of dominance cases2015Figure 42 Total of abuse of dominance fines imposed, 2015-20190123456EUR billion7All eOther** One jurisdiction in Europe was responsible for the spike of abuse of dominance fines in 2018.Figure 43 Average abuse of dominance fines imposed, 2015-2019050100150200EUR million250All eOther** One jurisdiction in Europe and one jurisdiction in Asia-Pacific were responsible for the spike of abuse of dominance fines in 2018.Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines figures are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are convertedusing 2015 official exchange rates) (on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.Source: OECD CompStats Database.24GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-20192016201720182019Regions
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME IFigure 44 Average fines imposed per abuse of dominance decision, 2015-2019Average fine per abuse of dominance decision5-year averageEUR million 182019Millionaverage abuseof dominance finein 201920103.97.0020152016Note: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines figures are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015official exchange rates) (on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.Source: OECD CompStats Database.GLOBAL COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT UPDATE 2015-201925
Annex A. Source of data: CompStatsStarting in 2018, the OECD, under the guidance of the Bureau Jurisdictionsof the Competition Committee, has launched an initiative todevelop a database of general statistics relating to competition Currently, the CompStats database covers data from competition agencies in 56 jurisdictions,agencies, including data on enforcement and information on of which 37 jurisdictions are OECD countries (including the European Commission); 15jurisdictions are participants in the OECD Competition Committee; 2 jurisdictions areadvocacy initiatives.associates to the OECD Competition Committee; and 1 jurisdiction is neither an OECD countrySome statistics related to competition authorities’ activities are nor an associate or participant in the OECD Competition Committee. Colombia, althoughalready publicly available. However, this information is often having become a member in 2020, has been treated as a non-member, as the data in thisdispersed, lacks consistency across time and jurisdictions, and is report pertains to the years before Colombia’s accession.currently not used systematically to identify overall trends fromAmericaswhich to draw policy lessons. This initiative fills this gap.Argentina, Brazil, Canada*, Chile*, Colombia1, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico*,The OECD collects data annually from:Peru, United States*1. competition authorities in OECD countries;Asia-Pacific2. authorities in non-OECD jurisdictions that are ParticipantsAustralia*, Chinese Taipei, India, Indonesia, Japan*, Korea*, New Zealand*or Associates in the OECD Competition Committee; andEurope3. agencies in jurisdictions that are neither OECD countriesAustria*, Belgium*, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic*, Denmark*, Estonia*, Europeannor a participant or associate in the OECD CompetitionUnion2, Finland*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary*, Iceland*, Ireland*, Italy*, Latvia*,Committee but have expressed interest in joiningLithuania*, Luxembourg*, Malta, Netherlands*, Norway*, Poland*, Portugal*, Romania,the database.Slovak Republic*, Slovenia*, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, United Kingdom*The currency of the data in CompStats is Euros.OtherEgypt, Israel
Graphic design by Poeli Bojorquez. Please cite this publication as: OECD (2021), OECD Competition Trends 2021, Volume I: . models and inspiration for national initiatives and as tools for sharing global best practices on competition . Chart Title 56 ASIA-PACIFIC7 AMERICAS 11 OTHER 7 EUROPE 31 OECD 37* NON-OECD 19 % OF WORLD POPULATION % OF .
RIGHTS@oecd.org, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France . Belge, aslen OECD tarafından İngilizce olarak aşağıdaki başlık altında yayınlanmıştır: OECD (2016), OECD Position Paper Regarding the Relationship between the OECD Principles of GLP and ISO/IEC 17025, Series on
OECD and non-OECD net electricity generation Trillion kilowatt-hours World electricity use by sector Quadrillion Btu Net electricity generation in non-OECD countries increases twice as fast as in the OECD with building use being a major contributor to growth in the EIA Reference Case 0 5 10 15 20 25 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 non-OECD OECD 0 .
OECD/IEA - OECD/NEA 2010 OECD/IEA - OECD/NEA 2015 Jaejoo HA, Head, Nuclear Development Division, OECD/NEA Email: jaejoo.ha@oecd.org NI2050 - 7 July 2015
Find the volume of each cone. Round the answer to nearest tenth. ( use 3.14 ) M 10) A conical ask has a diameter of 20 feet and a height of 18 feet. Find the volume of air it can occupy. Volume 1) Volume 2) Volume 3) Volume 4) Volume 5) Volume 6) Volume 7) Volume 8) Volume 9) Volume 44 in 51 in 24 ft 43 ft 40 ft 37 ft 27 .
user-friendly format. 2003: Launch of OECD Health Care Quality Indicators (HCQI) project to develop a set of indicators measuring and comparing quality of care across countries. 2004: First OECD Health Ministerial Meeting in Paris to discuss the main findings from the OECD Health Project. Release of publication Towards High-Performing Health .
OECD PRINCIPLES ON WATER GOVERNANCE . Head of the OECD Water Governance Programme OCSE Economic & Environmental Forum, Prague - 14 September 2015 OECD Projections : A Gloomy Picture Global water demand: Baseline scenario, 2000 and 2050 Water stress by river basin: Baseline, 2050 Source: OECD Environmental Outlook Baseline (2012) 23rd OSCE .
This Overview is based on the June 2015 OECD Economic Outlook and is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of OECD member countries. The country notes for Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico are reproduced from the OECD Economic Outlook.
Introduction to Magnetic Fields 8.1 Introduction We have seen that a charged object produces an electric field E G at all points in space. In a similar manner, a bar magnet is a source of a magnetic field B G. This can be readily demonstrated by moving a compass near the magnet. The compass needle will line up
