Root Cause Analysis (RCA)

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EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015BSI Standards PublicationRoot cause analysis (RCA)

EngPedia.irBRITISH STANDARDBS EN 62740:2015National forewordThis British Standard is the UK implementation of EN 62740:2015. It isidentical to IEC 62740:2015.The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to TechnicalCommittee DS/1, Dependability.A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained onrequest to its secretary.This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions ofa contract. Users are responsible for its correct application. The British Standards Institution 2015.Published by BSI Standards Limited 2015ISBN 978 0 580 79741 5ICS 03.120.01Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity fromlegal obligations.This British Standard was published under the authority of theStandards Policy and Strategy Committee on 30 April 2015.Amendments/corrigenda issued since publicationDateText affected

EngPedia.irEUROPEAN STANDARDEN 62740NORME EUROPÉENNEEUROPÄISCHE NORMApril 2015ICS 03.120.01English VersionRoot cause analysis (RCA)(IEC 62740:2015)Analyse de cause initiale (RCA)(IEC 62740:2015)Ursachenanalyse(IEC 62740:2015)This European Standard was approved by CENELEC on 2015-03-20. CENELEC members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELECInternal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration.Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELECManagement Centre or to any CENELEC member.This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translationunder the responsibility of a CENELEC member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has thesame status as the official versions.CENELEC members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,Turkey and the United Kingdom.European Committee for Electrotechnical StandardizationComité Européen de Normalisation ElectrotechniqueEuropäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische NormungCEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2015 CENELEC All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CENELEC Members.Ref. No. EN 62740:2015 E

EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015EN 62740:2015-2-ForewordThe text of document 56/1590/FDIS, future edition 1 of IEC 62740, prepared by IEC/TC 56"Dependability" was submitted to the IEC-CENELEC parallel vote and approved by CENELEC asEN 62740:2015.The following dates are fixed: latest date by which the document has to beimplemented at national level bypublication of an identical nationalstandard or by endorsement(dop)2015-12-20 latest date by which the nationalstandards conflicting with thedocument have to be withdrawn(dow)2018-03-20Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject ofpatent rights. CENELEC [and/or CEN] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all suchpatent rights.Endorsement noticeThe text of the International Standard IEC 62740:2015 was approved by CENELEC as a EuropeanStandard without any modification.In the official version, for Bibliography, the following notes have to be added for the standardsindicated:IEC 60300-1NOTEHarmonized as EN 60300-1.IEC 61025NOTEHarmonized as EN 61025.IEC 61649NOTEHarmonized as EN 61649.IEC 61163-1NOTEHarmonized as EN 61163-1.IEC 62508:2010NOTEHarmonized as EN 62508:2010 (not modified).ISO/IEC 31010:2009NOTEHarmonized as EN 31010:2010 (not modified).

EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015EN 62740:2015-3-Annex ZA(normative)Normative references to international publicationswith their corresponding European publicationsThe following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and areindispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undatedreferences, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.NOTE 1 When an International Publication has been modified by common modifications, indicated by (mod), the relevantEN/HD applies.NOTE 2 Up-to-date information on the latest versions of the European Standards listed in this annex is available here:www.cenelec.eu.PublicationIEC 60050 SeriesYear-TitleInternational Electrotechnical Vocabulary(IEV)EN/HD-Year-

EngPedia.ir–2–BS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015CONTENTSINTRODUCTION . 81Scope . 92Normative references . 93Terms, definitions and abbreviations . 93.1Terms and definitions . 93.2Abbreviations . 124RCA – Overview . 125The RCA process . 135.1Overview. 135.2Initiation . 145.3Establishing facts . 155.4Analysis . 175.4.1Description . 175.4.2The analysis team . 185.5Validation . 195.6Presentation of results . 196Selection of techniques for analysing causes . 206.16.26.3Annex AGeneral . 20Selection of analysis techniques . 20Useful tools to assist RCA. 21(informative) Summary and criteria of commonly used RCA techniques . 22A.1A.2A.3Annex BGeneral . 22RCA techniques . 22Criteria . 23(informative) RCA models . 26B.1General . 26B.2Barrier analysis . 26B.2.1Overview . 26B.2.2Strengths and limitations . 27B.3Reason’s model (Swiss cheese model) . 27B.3.1Overview . 27B.3.2Strengths and limitations . 28B.4Systems models . 28B.5Systems theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP) . 29B.5.1Overview . 29B.5.2Strengths and limitations . 29Annex C (informative) Detailed description of RCA techniques . 30C.1General . 30C.2Events and causal factors (ECF) charting . 30C.2.1Overview . 30C.2.2Process . 31C.2.3Strengths and limitations . 31C.3Multilinear events sequencing (MES) and sequentially timed events plotting(STEP) . 32

EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015–3–C.3.1Overview . 32C.3.2Process . 32C.3.3Strengths and limitations . 33C.4The ‘why’ method . 35C.4.1Overview . 35C.4.2Process . 36C.4.3Strengths and limitations . 36C.5Causes tree method (CTM) . 36C.5.1Overview . 36C.5.2Process . 39C.5.3Strengths and limitations . 39C.6Why-because analysis (WBA) . 39C.6.1Overview . 39C.6.2Process . 42C.6.3Strengths and limitations . 42C.7Fault tree and success tree method . 42C.7.1Overview . 42C.7.2Process . 43C.7.3Strengths and limitations . 44C.8Fishbone or Ishikawa diagram . 44C.8.1Overview . 44C.8.2Process . 45C.8.3Strengths and limitations . 46C.9Safety through organizational learning (SOL) . 46C.9.1Overview . 46C.9.2Process . 46C.9.3Strengths and limitations . 47C.10 Management oversight and risk tree (MORT) . 48C.10.1Overview . 48C.10.2Process . 48C.10.3Strengths and limitations . 48C.11 AcciMaps . 49C.11.1Overview . 49C.11.2Process . 49C.11.3Strengths and limitations . 51C.12 Tripod Beta . 51C.12.1Overview . 51C.12.2Process . 52C.12.3Strengths and limitations . 52C.13 Causal analysis using STAMP (CAST) . 53C.13.1Overview . 53C.13.2Process . 56C.13.3Strengths and limitations . 57Annex D (informative) Useful tools to assist root cause analysis (RCA) . 58D.1General . 58D.2Data mining and clustering techniques . 58D.2.1Overview . 58D.2.2Example 1 . 58D.2.3Example 2 . 58

EngPedia.ir–4–BS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015D.2.4Example 3 . 59Annex E (informative) Analysis of human performance . 60E.1E.2E.3General . 60Analysis of human failure . 60Technique for retrospective and predictive analysis of cognitive errors(TRACEr) . 61E.3.1Overview . 61E.3.2Process . 62E.4Human factors analysis and classification scheme (HFACS) . 63E.4.1Overview . 63E.4.2Process . 63Bibliography . 66Figure 1 – RCA process . 14Figure B.1 – Broken, ineffective and missing barriers causing the focus event . 26Figure C.1 – Example of an ECF chart . 31Figure C.2 – Data in an event building block . 32Figure C.3 – Example of a time-actor matrix . 34Figure C.4 – Example of a why tree . 35Figure C.5 – Symbols and links used in CTM . 37Figure C.6 – Example of a cause tree . 38Figure C.7 – Example of a WBG . 41Figure C.8 – Example of a fault tree during the analysis . 43Figure C.9 – Example of a Fishbone diagram . 45Figure C.10 – Example of a MORT diagram . 48Figure C.11 – Example of an AcciMap . 50Figure C.12 – Example of a Tripod Beta tree diagram . 52Figure C.13 – Control structure for the water supply in a small town in Canada . 55Figure C.14 – Example CAST causal analysis for the local Department of health . 56Figure C.15 – Example CAST causal analysis for the local public utility operationsmanagement . 56Figure E.1 – Example of an TRACEr model [25] . 61Figure E.2 – Generation of internal error modes . 62Figure E.3 – Level 1: Unsafe acts . 64Figure E.4 – Level 2: Preconditions . 64Figure E.5 – Level 3: Supervision Issues . 65Figure E.6 – Level 4: Organizational Issues . 65Table 1 – Steps to RCA . 13Table A.1 – Brief description of RCA techniques . 22Table A.2 – Summary of RCA technique criteria . 23Table A.3 – Attributes of the generic RCA techniques . 25Table B.1 – Examples of barriers . 27Table B.2 – Example of the barrier analysis worksheet . 27Table C.1 – Direct and indirect causal factors . 47

EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015–5–Table E.1 – External error modes. 63Table E.2 – Psychological error mechanisms . 63

EngPedia.ir–8–BS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015INTRODUCTIONRoot cause analysis (RCA) refers to any systematic process that identifies factors thatcontributed to a particular event of interest (focus event). RCA is performed with theunderstanding that events are addressed by understanding the root causes, rather than theimmediately obvious symptoms. RCA aims to reveal root causes so that either the likelihoodof them occurring, or their impact if they do occur, can be changed.An important distinction to make is that RCA is used to analyse a focus event that hasoccurred and therefore analyses the past (a posteriori). However, knowledge of the rootcauses of past events can lead to actions that generate improvements in the future.This International Standard is intended to reflect current good practices in the conduct ofRCA. This standard is general in nature, so that it may give guidance across many industriesand situations. There may be industry specific standards in existence that establish preferredmethodologies for particular applications. If these standards are in harmony with thispublication, the industry standards will generally be sufficient.This standard is a generic standard and does not explicitly address safety or accidentinvestigation although the methods described in this standard may be used for this purpose.

EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015–9–ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS (RCA)1ScopeThis International Standard describes the basic principles of root cause analysis (RCA) andspecifies the steps that a process for RCA should include.This standard identifies a number of attributes for RCA techniques which assist with theselection of an appropriate technique. It describes each RCA technique and its relativestrengths and weaknesses.RCA is used to analyse the root causes of focus events with both positive and negativeoutcomes, but it is most commonly used for the analysis of failures and incidents. Causes forsuch events can be varied in nature, including design processes and techniques,organizational characteristics, human aspects and external events. RCA can be used forinvestigating the causes of non-conformances in quality (and other) management systems aswell as for failure analysis, for example in maintenance or equipment testing.RCA is used to analyse focus events that have occurred, therefore this standard only covers aposteriori analyses. It is recognized that some of the RCA techniques with adaptation can beused proactively in the design and development of items and for causal analysis during riskassessment; however, this standard focuses on the analysis of events which have occurred.The intent of this standard is to describe a process for performing RCA and to explain thetechniques for identifying root causes. These techniques are not designed to assignresponsibility or liability, which is outside the scope of this standard.2Normative referencesThe following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document andare indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. Forundated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including anyamendments) applies.IEC 60050 (all parts), International Electrotechnical Vocabulary3Terms, definitions and abbreviationsFor the purposes of this document, the definitions given in IEC 60050-192, as well as thefollowing, apply.3.1Terms and definitions3.1.1causecircumstance or set of circumstances that leads to failure or successNote 1 to entry:maintenance.A cause may originate during specification, design, manufacture, installation, operation or[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2014, 192-03-11 modified – addition of the words “circumstanceor” and "or success" in the term]

EngPedia.ir– 10 –BS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 20153.1.2causal factorcondition, action, event or state that was necessary or contributed to the occurrence of thefocus event3.1.3contributory factorcondition, action, event or state regarded as secondary, according to the occurrence of thefocus event3.1.4eventoccurrence or change of a particular set of circumstancesNote 1 to entry:An event can be one or more occurrences, and can have several causes.Note 2 to entry:An event can consist of something not happening.Note 3 to entry:An event can sometimes be referred to as an “incident” or “accident”.[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, 3.5.1.3, modified – Deletion of Note 4 [1]] 13.1.5failure of an item loss of ability to perform as requiredNote 1 to entry:A failure of an item is an event that results in a fault of that item.Note 2 to entry: Qualifiers, such as catastrophic, critical, major, minor, marginal and insignificant, may be used tocategorize failures according to the severity of consequences, the choice and definitions of severity criteriadepending upon the field of application.Note 3 to entry: Qualifiers, such as misuse, mishandling and weakness, may be used to categorize failuresaccording to the cause of failure.Note 4 to entry:This is failure of an item, not more generally of behaviour.[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2014, 192-03-01, modified – Introduction of new Note 4]3.1.6failure mechanismprocess that leads to failureNote 1 to entry:The process may be physical, chemical, logical, psychological or a combination thereof.[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2014, 192-03-12, modified – the word "psychological" has beenadded]3.1.7focus eventevent which is intended to be explained causally3.1.8immediate causal factorcondition, action, event or state where there is no other causal factor between this causalfactor and the focus event1Numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.

EngPedia.irBS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 2015Note 1 to entry:– 11 –There may be more than one immediate causal factor.3.1.9necessary causal factor of an event or state condition, action, event or state, that resulted in the given event or state, without which thegiven event or state would not have occurred3.1.10human errordiscrepancy between the human action taken or omitted, and that intended or requiredNote 1 to entry: The first edition of IEC 60050-191:1990 identified “mistake” as a synonym for "human error", buta mistake is a type of human error.Note 2 to entry: The term human error applies to any situation where the outcome is not as intended whether theintent of the person was correct or not.[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192: 2014 192-03-14, modified – Omission of the example, addition ofNote 1 and 2]3.1.11itemsubject being consideredNote 1 to entry:system.The item may be an individual part, component, device, functional unit, equipment, subsystem, orNote 2 to entry:The item may consist of hardware, software, people or any combination thereof.Note 3 to entry:The item is often comprised of elements that may each be individually considered.[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192: 2014, 192-01-01, modified – omission of internal references andNotes 4 and 5]3.1.12root causecausal factor with no predecessor that is relevant for the purpose of the analysisNote 1 to entry:A focus event normally has more than one root cause.Note 2 to entry: In some languages, the term root cause refers to the combination of causal factors which have nocausal predecessor (a cut set of causal factors).3.1.13root cause analysisRCAsystematic process to identify the causes of a focus eventNote 1 to entry: IEC 60050-192:2014, definition 192-12-05 provides the following more restrictive definition“systematic process to identify the cause of a fault, failure or undesired event, so that it can be removed by design,process or procedure changes”. This standard uses an extended definition to allow a wider applicability of theprocess.Note 2 to entry:This note applies to the French language only.3.1.14stakeholderperson or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affectedby a decision or activity[SOURCE: IEC 60300-1:2014, 3.1.15] [2]

EngPedia.ir– 12 –BS EN 62740:2015IEC 62740:2015 IEC 20153.1.15stopping rulereasoned and explicit means of determining when a causal factor is defined as being a rootcause3.2AbbreviationsBGABall grid arrayCASTCausal analysis using STAMPCCTCausal completeness testCTCounterfactual testCTMCauses tree methodECFEvents and causal factorsEEMExternal error modeFTAFault tree analysisGEMSGeneric error modelling systemHFACSHuman factor analysis and classification schemeIEMInternal error modeMESMultilinear events sequencingMORTManagement oversight and risk treePEMPsychological error mechanismPSFPerformance shaping factorsRCARoot cause analysisSOLSafety through organizational learningSTAMPSystems theoretic accident model and processesSTEPSequentially timed events p

EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME EUROPÉENNE EUROPÄISCHE NORM EN 62740 April 2015 ICS 03.120.01 English Version Root cause analysis (RCA) (IEC

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