Mr. President: How Judgments Of Eisenhower In The White .
Mr. PresidentHOW JUDGMENTS of EISENHOWERIn the WHITE HOUSE HAVE CHANGEDBy IRWIN F. GELLMAN
The following excerpts are from The President and theApprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952–1961, by Irwin F.Gellman, published this summer by Yale University Press.Ever since the 1952 presidential election, authors who opposedDwight Eisenhower on philosophical and political grounds havedominated the discussion of his White House years. At the sametime, a number of misconceptions about those years have gone unexam ined. For too long, the fable that Eisenhower spent more time playinggolf than governing was accepted as fact. It was said that Secretary ofState John Foster Dulles, for example, shaped American diplomacy andWhite House chief of staff Sherman Adams took on such an outsizedmanagement role that he earned the title assistant president. In reality,Eisenhower formulated foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration;Secretary Dulles dutifully carried out Ike’s directives. Eisenhower was askillful, hands-on President (he had, after all, overseen the invasions ofNorth Africa, Italy, and France during World War II) who set his ownagenda. Adams managed the President’s schedule and protected him fromunwarranted intrusions, but did not act for him or enforce his decisions.Opposite: President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The secretary providedvaluable advice on foreign affairs, but the President formulated foreign policy. Below: Dwight Eisen hower served as president of Columbia University in the late 1940s amid complaints that he governedonly part-time due to failing health and extensive travel.
Historical consensus has been especiallyunkind to Richard Nixon, who is thoughtto have played a minimal role as VicePresident, in an administration that accom plished so little that there was not much fora Vice President to do. Besides, the Presidentneither depended on nor liked Nixon. Thereality is that the President and his appren tice respected and trusted each other. Nixonwas deeply involved in many far-reachinginitiatives and emerged as one of the mostimportant presidential advisers.The negative portrayals of Eisenhower be gan before he became President and changedslowly after his death. After World War II,both major political parties tried to drafthim as their presidential nominee. He re fused and in 1948 accepted the presidencyof Columbia University. Many faculty mem bers, especially those in the social sciencesand the humanities, considered a militaryman unsuitable to lead the university, andthroughout his tenure the complaints, rang ing from petty to serious, grew more vocaland intense. Historian Travis Jacobs, in hisbook Eisenhower at Columbia, wrote: “Somefaculty members criticized Eisenhower be cause he did not seem interested in theacademic needs of the university, but theirmajor complaint was that he never was afull-time President due to his failing healthand extensive travel schedule.” Neitherposed any threat to his tenure. During the 1952 presidential campaign,the faculty and staff split into warringcamps: those who supported the Democraticcandidate, Adlai Stevenson, and others whobacked Eisenhower. According to reports inthe New York Times, some grew so hostilethat they refused to talk to colleagues on theother side. After Ike’s convincing triumph,some Stevenson loyalists refused to acceptdefeat and used undergraduate lectures,graduate seminars, and writings to trivializethe winner.28 PrologueRecent studies of the Eisenhower presidency have reversed the general image that the President spent moretime playing golf than governing.They remained unconvinced afterEisenhower defeated Stevenson again in 1956.Columbia historian Richard Hofstadter, inAnti-Intellectualism in American Life, de scribed Ike as having a “conventional” mindand “fumbling inarticulateness.” WilliamLeuchtenburg’s 1993 book In the Shadow ofFDR (written after he had decamped fromColumbia for North Carolina) provided anegative assessment of Eisenhower’s presiden cy, stating that he left the Oval Office with“an accumulation of unsolved social prob lems that would overwhelm his successors inthe 1960s.”Up at Harvard, historian Arthur Schlesinger,Jr., who worked on Stevenson’s staff dur ing the 1952 and ’56 campaigns and wouldlater be a special assistant to President JohnKennedy, charged that Eisenhower had ac cepted McCarthyism “with evident content ment.” Throughout his career, Schlesingerregularly belittled Eisenhower. As late as 1983he described the former President as “a genial,indolent man of pied syntax and platitudi nous conviction, fleeing from public policy tobridge, golf and westerns.”In his prestigious Oxford History of theAmerican People, published in 1965, SamuelEliot Morison used his chapter on theEisenhower years to highlight the President’sfailures: “Peace and order were not restoredabroad; violence and faction were notquenched at home.” The former Presidentreceived a copy of the book and scribbled onthe dedication page: “the author is not a goodhistorian. . . . in those events with which I ampersonally familiar he is grossly inaccurate.”Morison co-wrote with Leuchtenburg andHenry Steele Commager (also a Columbiaprofessor until 1956) a widely assigned col lege textbook, The Growth of the AmericanRepublic, in which the authors downgradedthe Eisenhower presidency with a backhand ed compliment: “Eisenhower had made animportant contribution toward unifyingthe nation, but not a few asked whether theprice that had been paid was too high.”The academic criticism was not limitedto Cambridge and New York. Before Ike’sfirst term was finished, Norman Graebner,a diplomatic historian at the University ofVirginia, argued that the President wasreturning the United States to a “NewIsolationism.” Several months before Ikeleft office, Graebner concluded that thePresident’s advocates had “measured his suc cess by popularity, not achievements.” Twoyears later, in the preface to an edited vol ume of chapters by well-known authors, his torian Dean Albertson wrote that “informedreaction to the Eisenhower administrationwas unfavorable.” Fall 2015
Many journalists criticized Eisenhowerfor his lack of leadership. Marquis Childs,a syndicated columnist, enumerated hissubject’s weaknesses in his 1958 bookEisenhower: Captive Hero. New York Timesreporter James Reston found in Ike a sym bol of the times: “Optimistic, prosperous,escapist, pragmatic, friendly, attentive inmoments of crisis and comparatively in attentive the rest of the time.” ColumnistRichard Rovere summarized Ike’s lacklusterachievements: “The good that Eisenhowerdid—largely by doing so little—was accom plished . . . in his first term.”Political scientists painted their own un flattering portraits. James Barber, who ana lyzed presidential performance according toa four-part matrix—active/positive, active/negative, passive/positive, and passive/nega tive—put Ike in the last box and assertedthat he left “vacant the energizing, initiat ing, stimulating possibilities” of his office. Acounselor to John Kennedy during his con gressional years, Harvard professor RichardNeustadt, used 160 pages of his 1960 bookon presidential power to enumerate howpoorly Eisenhower had governed.In the 1960s, Eisenhower responded tohis detractors with two volumes of memoirs,The White House Years, in which he defendedhis record on such controversial subjects asWisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy andhis refusal to aid Britain and France duringthe 1956 Suez invasion. Those recollectionsand later books by close associates—suchas Sherman Adams’s Firsthand Report andEzra Taft Benson’s Cross Fire—emphasizedthe administration’s achievements. AttorneyGeneral Herbert Brownell, Jr., years later,commented in his memoirs: “There wasnever any doubt in the Eisenhower admin istration about who was in charge and whomade the decisions. The President did.”Such testimonials did little to overcomethe consensus on Ike’s mediocrity. The fic tion that Eisenhower had governed incom petently, and that he had failed to use theMr. Presidentbully pulpit effectively, continued to be ac cepted without careful analysis. This impres sion still lingers. Cracks in the concrete began to appearwhen the well-respected journalist MurrayKempton wrote in the late 1960s thatpundits had underestimated Eisenhower’sacumen. After the Dwight EisenhowerPresidential Library opened in the springof 1962 and the National Archives startedto release thousands upon thousands of ad ministration documents, Herbert Parmetbecame one of the first historians to exam-Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., whoworked on the Adlai Stevenson campaigns, wasone of the harshest critics of Eisenhower, describ ing him as “a genial, indolent man . . . fleeing frompublic policy to bridge, golf and westerns.”ine them and was surprised by what he un covered. His Eisenhower and the AmericanCrusades, published in 1972, representedthe first time a serious scholar suggested thatEisenhower had accomplished far more thanprevious writers had allowed.Others followed. In the early 1980s, po litical scientist Fred Greenstein examinedthe recently opened files of Ann Whitman,the President’s private secretary, and deter mined that Ike had employed a “hiddenhand” to manage the federal bureaucracy. InThe Hidden-Hand Presidency and PresidentialDifference, Greenstein elaborated on thistheme: the President, he wrote, “was once as sumed to have been a well-intentioned politi cal innocent, but he emerges from the histori cal record as a self-consciously oblique politicalsophisticate with a highly distinctive leadershipstyle.” Though this interpretation gained pop ularity, the book outraged Arthur Schlesinger,who wrote in his journal on February 12,1981, that Greenstein was “a nice fellow—buthis thesis these days—Eisenhower the ActivistPresident—is a lot of bullshit.”Despite Schlesinger’s objections, docu mentation of the efficacy of Eisenhower’smanagement inaugurated a trend towarda more positive view of his presidency. InStephen Ambrose’s 1984 book Eisenhower:The President, Ike emerges as a brilliant lead er. Ambrose later called him “the Americanof the twentieth century. Of all the men I’vestudied and written about he is the brightestand the best.”Unfortunately, this assessment is taintedby scandal. While some Eisenhower schol ars questioned Ambrose’s research after thebook’s publication, the enormity of his fal sifications was not revealed until after hisdeath. Ambrose lied about his relationship toEisenhower. He claimed that Ike was so im pressed with his book on Civil War GeneralHenry Halleck that he called Ambrose outof the blue and asked him to write his biog raphy. Two Ambrose letters contradict thisaccount. On September 10, 1964, the his torian wrote to Ike that he was thrilled to beappointed associate editor of the Eisenhowerpapers and thought “it only fair that youhave an opportunity to see some of my writ ing.” One sample was the Halleck book. OnOctober 15, Ambrose informed the formerPresident that he was editing World WarII documents and wanted “to begin a fullscale, scholarly account of your military ca reer.” He was not considering “a completebiography, as I know little about politics andhave even less interest in them.” Prologue 29
Historians have been divided on President Eisenhower’s leadership on civil rights. He met with civil rights leaders on June 23, 1958. Left to Right: Lester Granger, Dr.Martin Luther King, Jr., E. Frederic Morrow, the President, A. Philip Randolph,William Rogers, Rocco Siciliano, and Roy Wilkins.Ambrose also claimed that he had talkedwith Ike alone for “hundreds and hundredsof hours” over five years; his footnotes recordnine separate interviews. But Ike’s daily logsshow that the historian met with the formerPresident only three times, for a total of lessthan five hours. They never met privately; oneof Eisenhower’s aides was always present.The most damaging charge to result fromthese phantom sessions concerns the issueAmbrose singled out as the major failureof Eisenhower’s presidency: civil rights. Hequotes Ike as saying he regretted “the ap pointment of that dumb son of a bitch EarlWarren.” He also writes that Eisenhower“personally wished that the Court had upheldPlessy v. Ferguson, and said so on a number ofoccasions (but only in private).” For the re mark on the chief justice, Ambrose cited anundated interview with the former President;for the opinion on Plessy, he did not provide a30 Prologuesource. No one has supplied any documenta tion that confirms either statement. Ambrosedeclared, also without any documentation,that “Eisenhower had no Negro friends, noteven more than one or two acquaintances. . . He was uncomfortable with . . . Negroes,so much so that he did not want to hear theirside.” These assertions, which have no foun dation in fact, lead to the expected conclu sion: Ike “ignored the Negro community.” . . .Ambrose’s fabrications received wide spread coverage, but little changed.Eisenhower: The President has not beenpulled from library shelves, and its publish er, Simon and Schuster, still sells it in printand as an eBook, touting it as an outstand ing reference work with “numerous inter views with Eisenhower himself.” Even theEisenhower Library bookstore sells it. By the first decade of the 21st century,most authors had rejected the notion ofEisenhower as ineffective. David Nichols,in A Matter of Justice, has shown howEisenhower advanced the cause of civilrights, and in Eisenhower 1956 how he skill fully managed the Suez crisis. JournalistJim Newton’s Eisenhower concentrated onhow well the President managed the WhiteHouse, and historian Jean Edward Smithfollowed with Eisenhower in War and Peace.In this massive, full-length biography, aquarter of which is devoted to the presiden cy, Smith concludes that next to FranklinD. Roosevelt, Ike “was the most successfulPresident of the twentieth century.”While the narrative on the Eisenhowerpresidency has shifted dramatically, fromthe story of an inept leader to that of a neargreat one, most accounts of the actual eventsduring his administration have remainedFall 2015
The President with five of his advisers on January 13, 1956, to discuss his Atoms for Peace program. Left toright: Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, the President, Secretary of State Dulles, National SecurityAdviser Dillon Anderson, Secretary of Commerce Lewis Strauss, and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson.Initiatives and policies were Eisenhower’s, even when others appeared to be the prime movers.unchanged. (One recent exception was EvanThomas’s Ike’s Bluff, which describes how thePresident thought about nuclear weaponsfrom a strategic vantage point and analyzeshow Ike combined his generalship and hiscivilian authority to maintain a fragile peaceduring the height of the Cold War.) If weno longer see Eisenhower as the golf-playinginnocent happily ignoring the nation’s prob lems, we do not yet have an unclouded pic ture of how the man actually governed. Themythology still obscures our vision.President Eisenhower’s organization re volved around the team concept. To Ike, amilitary professional who became the civiliancommander-in-chief, the use of the team ap proach emerged logically from his West Pointexperience. The picture that will emerge inthis book is of a military man at the top ofthe pyramid; his subordinates worked in lay ers below him and provided information. Helistened well and assimilated a wide variety ofmaterial before arriving at a decision.Eisenhower took charge of the budget ary, civil rights, legal, defense and diplomaticissues that he thought needed his personalattention. To reach the best solutions tocomplicated problems, he designated othersinside his administration to carry out specificassignments. Secretary Dulles, for instance,provided valuable advice on foreign affairs.Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson managedMr. Presidenthis department’s sprawling bureaucracy whilethe President shaped military policy. In eco nomic matters, the President depended onSecretary of the Treasury George Humphreyand other advisers to help formulate fiscalpolicy. Although Ike admired and respectedAttorney General Brownell, the Presidentnevertheless played a major role in the JusticeDepartment’s direction. He valued these indi viduals but kept them in their place, emphasiz ing whenever necessary that he was in charge.In many important aspects of his administra tion, including critical areas where historianshave depicted him as passive or disengaged, theinitiatives and policies were Eisenhower’s, evenwhen others appeared to be the prime movers. Depictions of Eisenhower’s connectionto Nixon have followed a particularly darkpath. The relationship between the two menis variously described as ambivalent, loath some, or hateful. In the spring of 1960,columnist and commentator Joseph Kraftwrote in an article in Esquire entitled “IKEvs. NIXON” that “it is remarkable thatanyone could even suppose a close rap port between the President and Nixon.”The two men’s linkage puzzled Ambrose,who described them as at best ambivalenttoward one another. More recently, in his2011 book American Caesars, British authorNigel Hamilton states: “Eisenhower hadnever liked or trusted Nixon, nor did he feelconfident about Nixon holding the reinsof America’s imperial power.” Hamiltonclaimed that Ike censored Nixon’s speeches,rarely allowed him to enter the Oval Office,and prevented him from participating in“Cabinet and senior government meetings,save as an observer.” These statements donot deviate at all from the mainstream viewamong historians; none of them are accurate.A former presidential speechwriter, EmmetJohn Hughes, in The Ordeal of Power, releasedin 1963, claimed: “The relationship betweenEisenhower and Nixon, at its warmest over theyears, could never be described as confidentand comradely.” A pre-publication excerpt thatappeared in Look magazine in November 1962alleges that Eisenhower told Hughes beforethe 1956 Republican national convention thatNixon “was not presidential timber.” Reportersasked the former President to comment, andhe denied ever making that statement. No onehas acknowledged Ike’s disclaimer, and the de rogatory characterization is regularly used todescribe the two men’s relationship.Partisan biographers like Earl Mazo andBela Kornitzer published sympathetic ac counts about Nixon during his vice presi dency, and after leaving office, Nixon de fended himself in Six Crises. Many authorscast these works aside in favor of less compli mentary depictions. The New Republic serial ized a book by William Costello, The FactsAbout Nixon, just before the 1960 presiden tial election. Costello declared that Nixonhad failed to assist GOP candidates in the1954 elections and that the Vice Presidentwas “was widely blamed for the Republicanparty’s reckless flirtation with the treason is sue.” These accusations were without merit.Most Republicans applauded Nixon for aid ing the party’s candidates, and they support ed him in his efforts to remove subversivesfrom the federal bureaucracy. Prologue 31
Anthony Summers, in his 2000 bestsell er The Arrogance of Power, garnered head lines by claiming that Nixon went intopsychotherapy sessions with Dr. ArnoldHutschnecker, who, according to Summers,gave the impression that he was a practicingpsychiatrist. The New York Times, a decadelater, blithely embraced Summers’ allega tions in Hutschnecker’s obituary. The news paper did not mention that the doctor wasnot a board-certified psychiatrist and neverclaimed to be one, or that he testified un der oath at Senate and House hearings inNovember 1973 that he had never treatedNixon for psychological or psychiatricreasons. Hutschnecker’s records of his ap pointments with Nixon reveal that the doc tor met with the Vice President for severalannual checkups and on a few other occa sions for stress-related illness.Time magazine editors Nancy Gibbs andMichael Duffy, in The Presidents Club, lookedat the relationships among the Presidentssince Harry Truman. They include chapterson Eisenhower’s association with Truman,Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, as well asNixon’s association with Johnson, GeraldFord, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, andGeorge W. Bush. Although Ike spent moretime with Nixon than with the other threePresidents combined, there is no chapter onEisenhower and Nixon. Instead, the authorsrepeat the misinformation that “Eisenhower. . . never felt much warmth toward his VicePresident.” They also state that the Ike hadNixon fire cabinet members, even though henever had that authority.Jeffrey Frank’s 2013 book Ike and Dickmagnifies the factual and interpretative er rors. Frank is a well-respected journalist andnovelist but untrained as a historian, and hisbook shows evidence of insufficient research.The small number and limited range of writ ten sources cited suggest that he may havespent a month in the Eisenhower and NixonPresident Eisenhower delivering his Atoms for Peace speech before the U.N. General Assembly on December 8, 1953.32 PrologueFall 2015
President Eisenhower campaigning for reelection in 1956. Eisenhower had offered Nixon a cabinet post, but Nixon chose to run for a second term as Vice President.presidential libraries; each contains millionsof documents that would take years to ex amine properly. In addition, Frank did notcite any of the thousands upon thousands ofdocuments readily available on microfilm, in cluding Eisenhower’s diaries, legislative con ferences, and cabinet meetings. On the basisof the tiny sample he cites, Frank advancedthe proposition that the President could becold blooded or worse and that Nixon reactedas well as he could without losing his integ rity. The relationship that emerges is that ofa son trying to win the affection of a distant,bullying father. Ike’s opinion of Nixon, ac cording to Frank, changed over time “fromthe mild disdain that he felt for most politi cians to hesitant respect.”Authors have routinely failed to under stand that the relationship between thePresident and Vice President matured overeight years. At first they did not know eachother’s strengths and weaknesses. As Nixonbecame familiar with how Ike governed, hewas better able to adapt the President’s ideasto practical proposals and make himself atrusted part of the administration. This evolv ing relationship is almost completely absentfrom most accounts. Instead, incorrect infor mation has been repeated for so long that ithas been converted into fact.To learn more about Eisenhower’s health during the 1960 election, to go www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2012/fall/. The “thaw” bet ween Ike and Harr y Truman after both left the presidency, go to /fall-winter/. Historians’ evolving view of Franklin Roosevelt, go to /fdr-emerges.html.Mr. PresidentPrologue 33
Eisenhower grew to have great confidence in his Vice President, and allowed him to gradually assume a morediverse set of duties than anyone else in the administration. Earlier authors have relied on three inci dents to demonstrate Eisenhower’s low regardfor Nixon. The first starts with the 1952 fundcrisis; the second is the unsuccessful “dumpNixon” drive spearheaded by White Housedisarmament adviser Harold Stassen a monthbefore the 1956 Republican convention;the third came on August 24, 1960, whenEisenhower answered a reporter’s questionconcerning what contribution Nixon madeto the administration by saying “If you giveme a week, I might think of one.” The com ment made front-page headlines.Written records of the time show clearlythat the general did not try to oust Nixonfrom the 1952 ticket, and the stubborn factthat he was not removed should give pause tothose who stress a theme of discord betweenthe two men. This is an example of the inco herence that bits of lingering mythology giveto the standard picture of Eisenhower: he isnow seen as a strong leader—yet too haplessto influence the selection of his own running34 Prologuemate. In the second case, Ike suggested toNixon months before the 1956 Republicanconvention that he take a cabinet post to gainexperience managing a large bureaucracy. ThePresident did not demand that Nixon leavethe vice presidency but told him to make thedecision he thought best. If Ike had wanted adifferent running mate for his second term, hecertainly had the popularity to choose some one else. He did not approve and certainlynever championed Stassen’s initiative. Nixonsaw a cabinet post as a demotion that woulddamage his political future, and he chose torun for reelection. Lastly, the accounts of theAugust 1960 press conference did not men tion that the President was leaving the po dium because that was his final question. Hestated that he would respond the followingweek; he did not disclose that he was feel ing poorly. No press conference was held thenext week, and at the one that followed, noreporter asked the President to comment onthe Vice President’s value. After Ike made hisintemperate remark, he apologized to Nixon.Authors have omitted that fact.Such regularly repeated anecdotes affirmthe unsubstantiated argument that Ike andNixon were at odds. In reality, the two menworked well together. Ike grew to have greatconfidence in his Vice President and hadNixon express opinions during crucial meet ings and summarize those of others. Nixondepended on the President to provide theseopportunities and put forward his best ef fort to become the versatile utility player onIke’s team. More than anyone else in the ad ministration, he understood the President’sintentions on many different fronts and be came an articulate spokesman for his poli cies. Because of Nixon’s desire to advance thePresident’s initiatives and because Eisenhowerrecognized his Vice President’s talents, Nixongradually assumed a more diverse set of dutiesthan anyone else in the administration.The President considered Nixon knowl edgeable in political matters. He providedvaluable advice regarding interaction betweenthe executive and Congress, and during thetwo campaigns. Nixon initially tried to curbMcCarthy’s excesses, and when McCarthyangered the President by attacking the Army,Nixon assisted in the White House’s quietbut effective campaign against the senator.The Vice President became the administra tion’s leading spokesman on the civil rights.He chaired the President’s Committee onGovernment Contracts, advancing minorityemployment and education. He also regularlyspoke out for equal rights and helped push theCivil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate.While in Congress, Nixon had been a com mitted internationalist. As Vice Presidenthe traveled to Asia, Latin America, Europe,and Africa, became one of Ike’s most trustedforward observers and matured into an ex pert on world affairs. The President briefedhim before he left and debriefed him uponhis return. Nixon relayed both his findingsand his discussions with Ike to the NationalSecurity Council and relevant cabinet mem bers. He learned a great deal in his travelsand met many world leaders, with whom heFall 2015
remained in contact. He and Dulles becameintimate friends and shared ideas on the dip lomatic initiatives.The President’s heart attack in 1955 hasreceived a great deal of attention. During hisrecovery that fall and winter, Nixon assumedadded responsibilities. Already overworked,he grew weary and suffered from insomnia;physicians prescribed barbiturates to relievehis symptoms. No one knew how inca pacitated both the President and the VicePresident were during this period.Even in this troubling situation, Ikeand Nixon worked well together. The VicePresident’s two military advisers were amongthe many who refuted the allegations of dis cord between the leaders. Robert Cushman,who handled national security matters forthe Vice President, recalled that he neverheard Nixon say anything critical of thePresident. Nixon’s appointment secretary,Donald Hughes, reported that no animosityexisted between the leaders. Three months after leaving office, Nixoncommented in a letter to a constituent, Mrs.Barbara Berghoefer, that while he did notknow how history would view Ike, “for de votion to duty, for unshakeable dedicationto high moral principle, for a determinationalways to serve what he regarded as the bestinterests of all Americans—on each of thesescores, Mr. Eisenhower ranks with the great est leaders our nation has ever had.” He wasprivileged to have worked with Ike and tohave learned “that real leadership is not amatter of florid words or action for its ownsake. It is, rather, the undeviating applica tion of the basic principles to the shiftingdetails of day-to-day problems.”Sitting in the Oval Office on July 21,1971, more than two years after Eisenhower’sdeath, President Nixon reflected on his rolein that earlier administration. He believedhe had made a substantial contribution tosolving a wide range of problems. DuringMr. Presidentthe second term, he recalled, the Presidenthad him substitute for him at cabinet andNSC meetings as well as participate in manycritical decisions. Ike, Nixon concluded, hadtreated him “extremely well.” Due to linger ing partisan bitterness and the Watergatescandal, Nixon remains an easy target. Thefable that Ike limited Nixon’s role in the ad ministration and that the two were antago nistic toward each other has permitted theselective rehabilitation of Ike’s reputationwithout requiring a similar reexamination ofNixon’s, and this selectivity blocks an accu rate understanding of the Eisenhower presi dency. The enormous weight of the evidencepoints to a fundamentally different relation ship. Ike entered the presidency ready tolead. Nixon was eager to follow. P 2015 by Irwin F. GellmanAuthorIrwin F. Gellman has taught atseveral American universities and isnow an independent scholar living inthe Philadelphia suburb
White House chief of staf Sherman Adams took on such an outsized management role that he earned the title assistant president. In reality, Eisenhower formulated foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration; Secretary Dulles
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THE MEANING OF ETHICS Ethics, also known as moral philosophy, is a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of questions of right and wrong and how we ought to live. Ethics involves making moral judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad. Right and wrong are qualities or moral judgments we assign to actions and conduct. Within the .
