A Social Dimension For Transatlantic Economic Relations
Cornell University ILR SchoolDigitalCommons@ILRResearch Studies and ReportsILR Collection2010A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic RelationsLance A. CompaCornell University, lac24@cornell.eduHenning MeyerLondon Metropolitan UniversityFollow this and additional works at: k you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.Support this valuable resource today!This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Research Studies and Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR.For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu.If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in analternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance.
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic RelationsAbstractTransatlantic Economic Relations (TER) was neglected by politi cians for much of the twentieth centuryas international security issues took priority. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and as economicissues have come to prominence TER has assumed increasing importance and yet is largely overlookedin academic discussion. This report places TER in its historical context and demonstrates how thepolitical agenda and institutional setup are both largely dysfunctional. Viewed through the prism ofindustrial relations and drawing on some real life examples from both sides of the Atlantic, it argues thatthe social dimension is a challenge central to the future development of the relationship and proposesinstitutional innovations which could also be replicated in other areas: for instance in support ofenvironmental concerns. Presenting some guiding principles for transatlantic trade, this paperrecommends the creation of a new secretariat to act as a permanent contact point and providing a varietyof practical functions essential to making TER work.KeywordsTransatlantic Economic Relations, TER, industrial relations, tradeCommentsSuggested CitationCompa, L. & Meyer, H. (2010). A social dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relations [Electronicversion]. London: The Global Policy Institute.Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations /35/Required Publisher StatementReprinted with permission of the Global Policy Institute.The Global Policy Institute was created in August 2006 as a Research Institute of London MetropolitanUniversity. It brings together academics from the social sciences and business disciplines to analyse thedynamics of globalization and formulate policy solutions. The Institute’s research and consultancy will beof direct practical use to decisionmakers, policy formation, business users and civil society groups, and itwill offer partnerships within and beyond the academic community.This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/35
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic RelationsPolicy ReportLead InvestigatorsProfessorLance CompaSchool of Industrial andLabor Relations (ILR),Cornell UniversityDr Henning MeyerGlobal Policy Institute,London MetropolitanUniversityFebruary 2010A Social Dimension forTransatlantic EconomicRelationsCo-InvestigatorsDr Stephen BarberLondon South BankUniversityProfessorMichele FaioliUniversity of Rome‘Tor Vergata’Dr Rebecca GivanCornell UniversityDr Klaus MehrensThe Global Policy InstituteResearch AssistantChris LuenenThe Global Policy InstituteAbstractTransatlantic Economic Relations (TER) was neglected by politicians for much of the twentieth century as international securityissues took priority. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and aseconomic issues have come to prominence TER has assumed increasingimportance and yet is largely overlooked in academic discussion. Thisreport places TER in its historical context and demonstrates how thepolitical agenda and institutional setup are both largely dysfunctional.Viewed through the prism of industrial relations and drawing on somereal life examples from both sides of the Atlantic, it argues that thesocial dimension is a challenge central to the future development of therelationship and proposes institutional innovations which could alsobe replicated in other areas: for instance in support of environmentalconcerns. Presenting some guiding principles for transatlantic trade,this paper recommends the creation of a new secretariat to act as apermanent contact point and providing a variety of practical functionsessential to making TER work.Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract 15880301
2Report1. The Context ofTransatlantic EconomicRelations1While transatlantic relations haveformed an important part of academic study, Transatlantic EconomicRelations (TER) are often overlooked.Indeed, the attention on respective responses to the ‘Global Waron Terror’ has diverted attentionfrom other policy fields in whichthe European Union (EU) and theUnited States (US) have commonconcerns and interests. Transatlanticeconomic cooperation is one of them.The US and the EU started aformal process in the early 1990sculminating in the ‘Framework forAdvancing Transatlantic EconomicIntegration’ (FATEI) in April 2007.But this phenomenon has passed bylargely unnoticed. By way of a background and introduction to the maintheme of this paper, which addressesthe lack of and need for a robustsocial dimension in TER, this sectionseeks to place the transatlantic economic relationship in its economic,historical and political context.Although the political dynamics ofTER are closely linked to the generalpolitical climate, the core economics of the partnership are not. AsAndrews et. al. have argued, thereis no evidence that political frictionsin the fields of security and foreignpolicy have had any significantimpact on the volume of transatlantic trade and investment.2 Perhapsthis economic stability is due to thecharacteristics and sheer size of thetransatlantic marketplace. After all,the transatlantic economic partnership is the biggest and possibly themost important one in the world.Comprising roughly 800 millionpeople, the US and the EU accountedfor 56.2 per cent of world GDP, 32.2per cent of global trade in goods and43.7 per cent of trade of services in2007 (excluding intra EU 27 trade).3Another important economicfactor is consumption. Although consumption is likely to grow faster inthe emerging economies in Asia andelsewhere, the combined consumerdemand of the EU and the US willremain crucial for the world economyin the foreseeable future as manyemerging economies pursue theirdevelopment with strategies basedon strong exports into the NorthAmerican and European markets.It is this overall imbalance that USPresident Barack Obama sought toaddress during the G20 meetingin Pittsburgh encouraging greaterconsumption and lower trade surpluses in the exporting nations of theworld, led by China (but includingthe likes of Germany), while simultaneously promoting more saving andreduced deficits in the United States.The broad economic indicatorspresented here show the importanceof the transatlantic marketplace. Aresearch report written for the USCongress summarized its externaleffects with the conclusion thatthe ‘combined weight of these twoeconomic superpowers means thathow the US and EU manage theirrelationship and the difficult issuesinvolving domestic regulations,competition policy, and foreigninvestment could well help determine how the rest of the worlddeals with similar issues’.4 In otherwords, within a weak framework ofglobal governance institutions, withWorld Trade Organization (WTO)Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract 1588030
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relationstalks often unsuccessful or deadlocked, the transatlantic relationshiphas the potential to set the rulesfor international economic activities using the two blocs’ combinedpowers as biggest producers andconsumers of goods and services inthe world. Therefore the way thisbilateral economic relationship isconstructed is of crucial importance.2. From Security toEconomic Cooperationand Institutionalization:The Historical ContextTER also has an important historicaldimension. While the roots of transatlantic cooperation can be tracedback to the early 20th century, it wasfirst put into the political spotlightwith John F. Kennedy’s ‘Declarationof Interdependence’ in the 1960s.In a speech in Philadelphia on 4thJuly 1962, the President stated ‘thatthe United States will be ready fora Declaration of Interdependence,[and] that [the US] will be preparedto discuss with a united Europethe ways and means of forminga concrete Atlantic partnership, amutually beneficial partnershipbetween the new union now emerging in Europe and the old AmericanUnion founded 175 years ago.’5The transatlantic partnershipbefore 1990 was predominatelymotivated by the Cold War and theshared security interests of the USand Western Europe. When the SovietEmpire collapsed, the cohesive forceof the common enemy subsided. Atthis point, the relationship previouslydominated by security issues shiftedincreasingly into the economic field.3The ‘Transatlantic Declaration’(TD) of 1990 was the first officialagreement in the new era of transatlantic relations after the Cold War.It was largely a statement of sharedvalues, emphasizing that the US andthe EU are ‘mindful of their commonheritage and of their close historical,political, economic and cultural ties’and ‘recogniz[e] that the transatlanticsolidarity has been essential for thepreservation of peace and freedomand for the development of free andprosperous economies as well as for‘When the Soviet Empirecollapsed, the cohesive force ofthe common enemy subsided’the recent developments which haverestored unity in Europe’.6 The TDalso laid the foundation for the institutionalization of the transatlanticpartnership. It created intergovernmental institutions by establishing: bi-annual consultations to bearranged in the United Statesand in Europe between, onthe one side, the Presidentof the European Council andPresident of the EU Commission, and on the other side, thePresident of the United States; bi-annual consultationsbetween the European UnionForeign Ministers, with the
4ReportCommission, and the US Secretary of State, alternately oneither side of the Atlantic; ad hoc consultations betweenthe Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika7 and theUS Secretary of State; bi-annual consultations betweenthe Commission and the USGovernment at Cabinet level; briefings, as currently exist, bythe Presidency to US Representatives on European PoliticalCooperation (EPC) meetingsat the Ministerial level.8The beginning of a formal institutionalization of the relationshipwas also necessary as the shift intransatlantic relations from securityto economic issues was not withoutproblems. As Barry Eichengreen ofthe University of California at Berkeley observed in 1998: ‘Economicglobalization in the aftermath ofthe cold war may be causing tariffs,capital controls, and transport coststo decline, but it is also putting firmsin the United States and Europeinto closer competition.’9 He concluded that ‘policies on one side ofthe Atlantic – be they central bankdecisions over the interest rate,congressional and parliamentarydecisions about the budget, or government decisions about competitionand regulatory policy – are havingstrong repercussions on the other.The scope for conflict in such anenvironment is considerable.’10The shift from security to economic cooperation thus made thetransatlantic partnership morecomplicated. Not only did the basicrationale of the partnership shiftto a new policy field, but the newfield was also much more conflictladen than the shared securityinterests during the Cold War. Thenew framework not only broughtdown economic barriers but alsohighlighted differences in regulatoryregimes and political preferences.The year 1995 brought a majorevolution of TER and the institutionalization of the bilateralpartnership with the agreementof the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’(NTA). By signing the NTA, USPresident Bill Clinton, EU Commission President Jacques Santer and EUCouncil President Felipe Gonzálescommitted to organized cooperation in four key strategic areas: Promoting peace and stability,democracy and developmentaround the world Responding to global challenges Contributing to the expansion of world trade andcloser economic relations Building bridges acrossthe Atlantic.11In order to address these priorityareas effectively, a series of institutional innovations were createdin the wake of the NTA. As MarkPollack commented, the ‘establishment of a new and novel institutionalarchitecture linking Washingtonand Brussels across a wide range ofissue-areas, represent[ed] the mostsystematic effort at genuine bilateralgovernance in the history of thetransatlantic partnership.’12 The NTAcomplemented the intergovernmentalinstitutionalization of the TD withtransgovernmental and transnationalinstitutions by creating a variety ofcivil society dialogues to strengthen
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relationsbridge-building across the Atlanticand more structured networks oflower-level officials. After the NTA,the three level structure of transatlantic governance looked as follows:13commitments. Its main aim is toenhance the level of discoursebetween members of the EuropeanParliament and the US Congress.153. Structural Dysfunctionality: Regular summit meetings between The Political ContextIntergovernmental Level:the US President and a delegation of EU officials (mostly theEU Commission President andthe rotating Presidency of theCouncil of Ministers plus the HighRepresentative for the CommonForeign and Security Policy)Transgovernmental Level: Transatlantic networks oflower-level US and EU officialsworking on foreign policy andespecially economic issues.These networks work largelyunaffected by the dynamics oftransatlantic high politicsTransnational Level: Transatlantic Business Dialogue(TABD) – consisting of Europeanand American CEOs lobbying for the liberalization of thetransatlantic marketplace Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue(TACD) – network of EU andUS consumer organizations Transatlantic Labor Dialogue(TALD) – Dialogue of trade unions(had only a handful of meetings buthas not been formally abolished) Transatlantic EnvironmentalDialogue (TAED) – Dialogueof environmental stakeholders – (ceased to exist in 2001)14 Transatlantic Legislator’s Dialogue(TLD) – created in 1999 as a formalresponse of the European Parliament and US Congress to the NTAInstitutional structures are important, but it is the political agendawhich is vital for successful transatlantic relations. And in terms ofmission, the main purpose of TERhas been a narrow focus on tradeliberalization and de-regulation:to bring down tariff and non-tariffbarriers to trade and investment.This limited political agendahad severe consequences for thetransnational level of the transatlantic institutional structure. TheTransatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD)folded after just a few meetingsbecause there was simply nothing togain or achieve for the labor movement in the framework of a purelyfree-market political agenda.16 TheTransatlantic Environmental Dialogue (TAED) suffered a similarfate. Even the Transatlantic BusinessDialogue (TABD), the NTA dialoguewith the arguably biggest interestoverlap with the agenda, nearly ‘ranaground’ when it seemed increasingly difficult to deliver progress inthe business community’s interest.17Most of the progress in the 1990swas made in the area of MutualRecognition Agreements (MRAs).But as Mark Pollack and Gregory C.Schaffer made clear: ‘In the view ofmany participants, the “low-hangingfruit” for economic cooperationhad been picked. Governmentson both sides now found it dif-5
6Reportficult to move beyond symbolicagreements and rearguard effortsat conflict resolution. Enhancedcooperation among regulatorshad not prevented new and bittertrade disputes from arising.’18The very limited effectiveness oftransatlantic economic cooperationled to the EU Commission’s 2004report Review of the Framework forRelations between the European Unionand the United States. The reporthighlighted further agenda-setting‘Although the internalproblems in the partnershipremain, the changing externalframework might well drivetransatlantic economiccooperation forward’problems, criticizing the tendency ofTER to become overloaded with toomany issues in very specific economicsectors and as a result failing in prioritizing issues of strategic importance.The lack of political ownership wasanother problem that was detected bythe Commission. Without renewedpolitical commitment at the highestlevel, the authors of the report fearedthat crucial strategic agenda-settingwould be impossible.19 Some of thereport’s recommendations weretaken on board in the most recenttransatlantic economic agreement: the‘Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration’ (FATEI),adopted in April 2007. The FATEIbrought major novelties on the political as well as the institutional level.On the political level, the FATEIrepresented an important shift ofrationale, stressing the potentialexternal effects of the transatlanticpartnership. It stated that deepertransatlantic economic integration‘will encourage other countries toadopt the transatlantic economicmodel of respect for property rights,openness to investment, transparency and predictability in regulation,and the value of free markets’.20This new awareness of thepotential external impact of the transatlantic economic partnership can beinterpreted as somewhat defensivein view of rising economic competition, especially from China. As areport of the Congressional ResearchService (CRS) made clear: ‘Givenquite similar interests in bolsteringthe multilateral trading system, manyanalysts say that both sides couldcooperate more in addressing therising challenge posed by China.’21The Congressional researchers madea fundamentally important point: inview of rising economic challenges,the economic interests (especiallyexternal ones) of the EU and US areseemingly converging. Although theinternal problems in the partnershipremain, the changing external framework might well drive transatlanticeconomic cooperation forward.The continuing institutionalization of the partnership is a furtherdriver for closer integration. In thisarea, the FATEI created the most
A Social Dimension for Transatlantic Economic Relationshigh profile transatlantic institutionto date: the Transatlantic EconomicCouncil (TEC), representing newpolitical ownership at the highestlevel. Permanent TEC members arecurrently the European Commissioners for External Relations, Trade aswell as Internal Market and Services.The US side is represented by theUS Secretaries of the Treasury andCommerce as well as the US TradeRepresentative.22 The TEC focuses onregulatory cooperation in additionto deeper integration in the areas ofintellectual property rights, trade,financial markets, innovation andtechnology as well as investment.23Accepting that ‘the low-hangingfruits have been picked’, deeper regulatory cooperation has the potentialto lift the transatlantic economicpartnership onto a qualitatively newlevel. Similar to what was calledfor in the 2004 Commission report,a ‘High Level EU-US RegulatoryCooperation Forum’ was establishedto ‘facilitate early warning aboutdiverging regulatory approaches’.24Policy-makers on both sides of theAtlantic are also looking into howtheir impact assessment mechanismscan be used to identify potential regulatory conflicts at an early stage.254. The Challenge of aSocial DimensionThis report has so far analyzed theeconomic, historic and politicalsignificance of TER and set out itspotential to become a kind of
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