O'CONNOR v. DONALDSONSyllabusO'CONNOR v. DONALDSONCERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE FIFTH CIRCUITNo. 74-8. Argued January 15, 1975--Decided June 26, 1975Respondent, who was confined almost 15 years "for care, maintenance, and treatment" as a mental patient in a Florida statehospital, brought this action for damages under 42 U. S. C.§ 1983 against petitioner. the hospital's superintendent, and otherstaff members, alleging that they had intentionally and maliciouslydeprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. The evidenceshowed that respondent, whose frequent requests for release hadbeen rejected by petitioner notwithstanding undertakings by responsible persons to care for him if necessary, was dangerousneither to himself nor others, and, if mentally ill, had not receivedtreatment. Petitioner's principal defense was that he had actedin good faith, since state law, which he believed valid, hadauthorized indefinite custodial confinement of the "sick," even ifthey were not treated and their release would not be harmful,and that petitioner was therefore immune from any liability formonetary damages. The jury found for respondent and awardedcompensatory and punitive damages against petitioner and acodefendant. The Court of Appeals, on broad Fourteenth Amendment grounds, affirmed the District Court's ensuing judgmententered on the verdict. Held:1. A State cannot constitutionally confine, without more, a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedomby himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends, and since the jury found, upon ample evidence,that petitioner did so confine respondent, it properly concludedthat petitioner had violated respondent's right to liberty. Pp.573-576.2. Since the Court of Appeals did not consider whether thetrial judge erred in refusing to give an instruction requested bypetitioner concerning his claimed reliance on state law as authorization for respondent's continued confinement, and since neithercourt below had the benefit of this Court's decision in Wood v.Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, on the scope of a state official's qualifiedimmunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, the case is vacated and
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.remanded for consideration of petitioner's liability vel non formonetary damages for violating respondent's constitutional right.Pp. 576-577.493 F. 2d 507, vacated and remanded.STEWART, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.GER,BUR-C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 578.Raymond W. Gearey, Assistant Attorney General ofFlorida, argued the cause for petitioner pro hac vice.With him on the briefs were Robert L. Shevin, AttorneyGeneral, and Daniel S. Dearing, Special Assistant Attorney General.Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause for respondent.With him on the brief was Morton Birnbaum.*MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of theCourt.The respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed to confinement as a mental patient in the FloridaState Hospital at Chattahoochee in January 1957.He was kept in custody there against his will for nearly15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O'Connor, was thehospital's superintendent during most of this period.*William F. Hyland, Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph T. Maloney, Deputy AttorneyGeneral, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as amicus curiaeurging reversal.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by E. BarrettPrettyman, Jr., for the American Psychiatric Assn.; by Francis M.Shea, Ralph J. Moore, Jr., John Townsend Rich, James F. Fitzpatrick, Kurt W. Melchior, Harry J. Rubin, Sheridan L. Neimark,and A. L. Zwerdling for the American Association on Mental Deficiency; and by June Resnick German and Alfred Berman for theCommittee on Mental Hygiene of the New York State Bar Assn.William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ruzicho andBarbara J. Rouse, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for theState of Ohio as amicus curiae.
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the CourtThroughout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly, butunsuccessfully, demanded his release, claiming that hewas dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill,and that, at any rate, the hospital was not providingtreatment for his supposed illness. Finally, in February1971, Donaldson brought this lawsuit under 42 U. S. C.§ 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O'Connor, and othermembers of the hospital staff named as defendants, hadintentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty.' After a four-day trial, thejury returned a verdict assessing both compensatory andpunitive damages against O'Connor and a codefendant.The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed thejudgment, 493 F. 2d 507. We granted O'Connor's petition for certiorari, 419 U. S. 894, because of the important constitutional questions seemingly presented.IDonaldson's commitment was initiated by his father,who thought that his son was suffering from "delusions."After hearings before a county judge of Pinellas County,Fla., Donaldson was found to be suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia" and was committed for "care, main'Donaldson's original complaint was filed as a class action on be-half of himself and all of his fellow patients in an entire departmentof the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. In addition to adamages claim, Donaldson's complaint also asked for habeas corpusrelief ordering his release, as well as the release of all members of theclass. Donaldson further sought declaratory and injunctive reliefrequiring the hospital to provide adequate psychiatric treatment.After Donaldson's release and after the District Court dismissedthe action as a class suit, Donaldson filed an amended complaint,repeating his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Although the amended complaint retained the prayer for declaratoryand injunctive relief, that request was eliminated from the caseprior to trial. See 493 F. 2d 507, 512-513.
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.tenance, and treatment" pursuant to Florida statutoryprovisions that have since been repealed.2 The state lawwas less than clear in specifying the grounds necessaryThe judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to § 394.22(11) of the State Public Health Code, which provided:"Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent requires confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury orviolence to others, the said judge shall direct that such person beforthwith delivered to a superintendent of a Florida state hospital,for the mentally ill, after admission has been authorized under regulations approved by the board of commissioners of state institutions,for care, maintenance, and treatment, as provided in sections 394.09,394.24, 394.25, 394.26 and 394.27, or make such other dispositionof him as he may be permitted by law ." Fla. Laws 19551956 Extra. Sess., c. 31403, § 1, p. 62.Donaldson had been adjudged "incompetent" several days earlierunder § 394.22 (1), which provided for such a finding as to anyperson who was"incompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness, drunkenness,excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other mental or physical condition, so that he is incapable of caring for himself or managing hisproperty, or is likely to dissipate or lose his property or becomethe victim of designing persons, or inflict harm on himself orothers . . ." Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 831.It would appear that § 394.22 (11) (a) contemplated that involuntary commitment would be imposed only on those "incompetent"persons who "require[d] confinement or restraint to prevent selfinjury or violence to others." But this is not certain, for § 394.22(11) (c) provided that the judge could adjudicate the person a"harmless incompetent" and release him to a guardian upon a finding that he did "not require confinement or restraint to prevent selfinjury or violence to others and that treatment in the Florida StateHospital is unnecessary or would be without benefit to such person . . . ." Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 835 (emphasisadded). In this regard, it is noteworthy that Donaldson's "Orderfor Delivery of Mentally Incompetent" to the Florida State Hospitalprovided that he required "confinement or restraint to prevent selfinjury or violence to others, or to insure proper treatment." (Emphasis added.) At any rate, the Florida commitment statute provided no judicial procedure whereby one still incompetent could2
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the Courtfor commitment, and the record is scanty as to Donaldson's condition at the time of the judicial hearing.These matters are, however, irrelevant, for this case involves no challenge to the initial commitment, but isfocused, instead, upon the nearly 15 years of confinementthat followed.The evidence at the trial showed that the hospitalstaff had the power to release a patient, not dangerousto himself or others, even if he remained mentally illand had been lawfully committed.' Despite many requests, O'Connor refused to allow that power to besecure his release on the ground that he was no longer dangerousto himself or others.Whether the Florida statute provided a "right to treatment" forinvoluntarily committed patients is also open to dispute. Under§ 394.22 (11) (a), commitment "to prevent self-injury or violence toothers" was "for care, maintenance, and treatment." RecentlyFlorida has totally revamped its civil commitment law and nowprovides a statutory right to receive individual medical treatment.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.459 (1973).3 The sole statutory procedure for release required a judicial reinstatement of a patient's "mental competency." Public Health Code§§ 394.22 (15) and (16), Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, pp. 838841. But this procedure could be initiated by the hospital staff.Indeed, it was at the staff's initiative that Donaldson was finallyrestored to competency, and liberty, almost immediately afterO'Connor retired from the superintendency.In addition, witnesses testified that the hospital had always had itsown procedure for releasing patients-for "trial visits," "homevisits," "furloughs," or "out of state discharges"---even though thepatients had not been judicially restored to competency. Thoseconditional releases often became permanent, and the hospital merelyclosed its books on the patient. O'Connor did not deny at trialthat he had the power to release patients; he conceded that it washis "duty" as superintendent of the hospital "to determine whetherthat patient having once reached the hospital was in such condition as to request that he be considered for release from thehospital."
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.exercised in Donaldson's case. At the trial, O'Connorindicated that he had believed that Donaldson wouldhave been unable to make a "successful adjustment outside the institution," but could not recall the basis forthat conclusion. O'Connor retired as superintendentshortly before this suit was filed. A few months thereafter, and before the trial, Donaldson secured his releaseand a judicial restoration of competency, with the support of the hospital staff.The testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, that Donaldson had posed no danger to othersduring his long confinement, or indeed at any point inhis life. O'Connor himself conceded that he had no personal or secondhand knowledge that Donaldson had evercommitted a dangerous act. There was no evidence thatDonaldson had ever been suicidal or been thought likelyto inflict injury upon himself. One of O'Connor's codefendants acknowledged that Donaldson could have earnedhis own living outside the hospital. He had done so forsome 14 years before his commitment, and immediatelyupon his release he secured a responsible job in hoteladministration.Furthermore, Donaldson's frequent requests for releasehad been supported by responsible persons willing toprovide him any care he might need on release. In 1963,for example, a representative of Helping Hands, Inc., ahalfway house for mental patients, wrote O'Connor asking him to release Donaldson to its care. The requestwas accompanied by a supporting letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, which acodefendant conceded was a "good clinic." O'Connorrejected the offer, replying that Donaldson could be released only to his parents. That rule was apparently ofO'Connor's own making. At the time, Donaldson was55 years old, and, as O'Connor knew, Donaldson's parents
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the Courtwere too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him.Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with Donaldson's parents, O'Connor never informed them of theHelping Hands offer. In addition, on four separateoccasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembeke, a college classmate of Donaldson's and a longtime familyfriend, asked O'Connor to release Donaldson to his care.On each occasion O'Connor refused. The record showsthat Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, whowas willing and able to assume responsibility for Donaldson's welfare.The evidence showed that Donaldson's confinementwas a simple regime of enforced custodial care, not aprogram designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness. Numerous witnesses, including one of O'Connor'scodefendants, testified that Donaldson had received nothing but custodial care while at the hospital. O'Connordescribed Donaldson's treatment as "milieu therapy."But witnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in thecontext of this case, "milieu therapy" was a euphemismfor confinement in the "milieu" of a mental hospital.4For substantial periods, Donaldson was simply kept in alarge room that housed 60 patients, many of whom wereunder criminal commitment. Donaldson's requests forground privileges, occupational training, and an opportunity to discuss his case with O'Connor or other staffmembers were repeatedly denied.At the trial, O'Connor's principal defense was that hehad acted in good faith and was therefore immune fromany liability for monetary damages. His position, inshort, was that state law, which he had believed valid,4There was some evidence that Donaldson, who is a ChristianScientist, on occasion refused to take medication. The trial judgeinstructed the jury not to award damages for any period of confinement during which Donaldson had declined treatment.
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.had authorized indefinite custodial confinement of the"sick," even if they were not given treatment and theirrelease could harm no one.'The trial judge instructed the members of the jurythat they should find that O'Connor had violated Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty if they found thathe had"confined [Donaldson] against his will, knowing thathe was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing thatif mentally ill he was not receiving treatment forhis alleged mental illness."Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalizationis treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others.Without such treatment there is no justification froma constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that [Donaldson]was dangerous to either himself or others." 65At the close of Donaldson's case in chief, O'Connor moved fora directed verdict on the ground that state law at the time ofDonaldson's confinement authorized institutionalization of the mentally ill even if they posed no danger to themselves or others.This motion was denied. At the close of all the evidence, O'Connorasked that the jury be instructed that "if defendants acted pursuant to a statute which was not declared unconstitutional at thetime, they cannot be held accountable for such action." The District Court declined to give this requested instruction.6 The District Court defined treatment as follows:"You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to becured or to improve his mental condition." (Emphasis added.)O'Connor argues that this statement suggests that a mental patienthas a right to treatment even if confined by reason of dangerousnessto himself or others. But this is to take the above paragraph outof context, for it is bracketed by paragraphs making clear the trial
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the CourtThe trial judge further instructed the jury that O'Connor was immune from damages if he"reasonably believed in good faith that detention ofjudge's theory that treatment is constitutionally required only ifmental illness alone, rather than danger to self or others, is thereason for confinement. If O'Connor had thought the instructionsambiguous on this point, he could have objected to them and requested a clarification. He did not do so. We accordingly have nooccasion here to decide whether persons committed on grounds ofdangerousness enjoy a "right to treatment."In pertinent part, the instructions read as follows:"The Plaintiff clahns in brief that throughout the period of hishospitalization he was not mentally ill or dangerous to himself orothers, and claims further that if he was mentally ill, or if Defendantsbelieved he was mentally ill, Defendants withheld from him the treatment necessary to improve his mental condition."The Defendants claim, in brief, that Plaintiff's detention waslegal and proper, or if his detention was not legal and proper, itwas the result of mistake, without malicious intent."In order to prove his claim under the Civil Rights Act, theburden is upon the Plaintiff in this case to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in this case the following facts:"That the Defendants confined Plaintiff against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that ifmentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mentalillness."[T]hat the Defendants' acts and conduct deprived the Plaintiff ofhis Federal Constitutional right not to be denied or deprived of hisliberty without due process of law as that phrase is defined andexplained in these instructions . ."You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civillycommitted to a mental hospital does have a constitutional rightto receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunityto be cured or to improve his mental condition."Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment andnot mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a dangerto himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justifica-
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.[Donaldson] was proper for the length of time hewas so confined ."However, mere good intentions which do not giverise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfullyrequired cannot justify [Donaldson's] confinementin the Florida State Hospital."The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson againstO'Connor and a codefendant, and awarded damages of 38,500, including 10,000 in punitive damages.'The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of theDistrict Court in a broad opinion dealing with "the farreaching question whether the Fourteenth Amendmentguarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarilycivilly committed to state mental hospitals." 493 F. 2d,at 509. The appellate court held that when, as in Donaldson's case, the rationale for confinement is that thepatient is in need of treatment, the Constitution requiresthat minimally adequate treatment in fact be provided.Id., at 521. The court further expressed the view that,regardless of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against his will at a state mentalinstitution has "a constitutional right to receive suchindividual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition."Id., at 520.Conversely, the court's opinionimplied that it is constitutionally permissible for a Stateto confine a mentally ill person against his will in orderto treat his illness, regardless of whether his illness rention from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinementunless you should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous eitherto himself or others."7 The trial judge had instructed that punitivedamages shouldbe awarded only if "the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants which proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff wasmaliciously or wantonly or oppressively done."
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the Courtders him dangerous to himself or others.522-527.IISee id., atWe have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by the Court of Appeals arenot presented by this case in its present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others havea right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by theState, or whether the State may compulsorily confine anondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose oftreatment. As we view it, this case raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man's constitutional right to liberty.The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerousto himself nor dangerous to others, and also found that,if mentally ill, Donaldson had not received treatment.8That verdict, based on abundant evidence, makes theissue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decidewhether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally illperson may be confined by the State on any of thegrounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement ofsuch a person-to prevent injury to the public, to ensure8 Given the jury instructions, see n. 6 supra, it is possible that thejury went so far as to find that O'Connor knew not only that Don-aldson was harmless to himself and others but also that he wasnot mentally ill at all. If it so found, the jury was permitted by theinstructions to rule against O'Connor regardless of the nature ofthe "treatment" provided. If we were to construe the jury's verdictin that fashion, there would remain no substantial issue in this case:That a wholly sane and innocent person has a constitutional rightnot to be physically confined by the State when his freedom willpose a danger neither to himself nor to others cannot be seriouslydoubted.
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.his own survival or safety,' or to alleviate or cure hisillness. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 736-737;Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 509. For the juryfound that none of the above grounds for continued confinement was present in Donaldson's case. 10Given the jury's findings, what was left as justificationfor keeping Donaldson in continued confinement? Thefact that state law may have authorized confinement ofthe harmless mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. SeeJackson v. Indiana, supra, at 720-723; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 248-250. Noris it enough that Donaldson's original confinement wasgThe judge's instructions used the phrase "dangerous to himself."Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury orsuicide, a person is literally "dangerous to himself" if for physical orother reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom eitherthrough his own efforts or with the aid of willing family members orfriends. While it might be argued that the judge's instructionscould have been more detailed on this point, O'Connor raised noobjection to them, presumably because the evidence clearly showedthat Donaldson was not "dangerous to himself" however broadlythat phrase might be defined.'o O'Connor argues that, despite the jury's verdict, the Courtmust assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient tojustify his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a"nonjusticiable" question that must be left to the discretion of thepsychiatric profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where"treatment" is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person ofliberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts arepowerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present. SeeJackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715.Neither party objected to thejury instruction defining treatment. There is, accordingly, no occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment,standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much or what kind of treatment would sufficefor that purpose. In its present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply involuntary custodial confinement.
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the Courtfounded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if infact it was, because even if his involuntary confinementwas initially permissible, it could not constitutionallycontinue after that basis no longer existed. Jackson v.Indiana, supra, at 738; McNeil v. Director, PatuxentInstitution, supra.A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify aState's locking a person up against his will and keepinghim indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term uan be given a reasonably precisecontent and that the "mentally ill" can be identified withreasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basisfor confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom.May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoyin the private community? That the State has a properinterest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presenceof mental illness does not disqualify a person frompreferring his home to the comforts of an institution.Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a personto save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever anecessary condition for raising the living standards ofthose capable of surviving safely in freedom, on theirown or with the help of family or friends. See Sheltonv. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488-490.May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solelyto save its citizens from exposure to those whose waysare different? One might as well ask if the State, toavoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justifythe deprivation of a person's physical liberty. See, e. g.,Cohen v. California,403 U. S. 15, 24-26; Coates v. City of
OCTOBER TERM, 1974Opinion of the Court422 U. S.Cincinnati,402 U. S. 611, 615; Street v. New York, 394U. S. 576, 592; cf. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,413 U. S. 528, 534.In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable ofsurviving safely in freedom by himself or with the helpof willing and responsible family members or friends.Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O'Connor, as an agent of the State, knowingly did so confineDonaldson, it properly concluded -that O'Connor violatedDonaldson's constitutional right to freedom.IIIO'Connor contends that in any event he should not beheld personally liable for monetary damages becausehis decisions were made in "good faith." Specifically,O'Connor argues that he was acting pursuant to statelaw which, he believed, authorized confinement of thementally ill even when their release would not compromise their safety or constitute a danger to others,and that he could not reasonably have been expected toknow that the state law as he understood it was constitutionally invalid. A proposed instruction to this effectwas rejected by the District Court."The District Court did instruct the jury, without objection, that monetary damages could not be assessedagainst O'Connor if he had believed reasonably and ingood faith that Donaldson's continued confinement was11See n. 5, supra. During his years of confinement, Donaldsonunsuccessfully petitioned the state and federal courts for releasefrom the Florida State Hospital on a number of occasions. Noneof these claims was ever resolved on its merits, and no evidentiaryhearings were ever held. O'Connor has not contended that herelied on these unsuccessful court actions as an independent intervening reason for continuing Donaldson's confinement, and noinstructions on this score were requested.
O'CONNOR v. DONALDSON563Opinion of the Court"proper," and that punitive damages could be awardedonly if O'Connor had acted "maliciously or wantonly oroppressively." The Court of Appeals approved thoseinstructions. But that court did not consider whetherit was error for the trial judge to refuse the additionalinstruction concerning O'Connor's claimed reliance onstate law as authorization for Donaldson's continued confinement. Further, neither the District Court nor theCourt of Appeals acted with the benefit of this Court'smost recent decision on the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308.Under that decision, the relevant question for the juryis whether O'Connor "knew or reasonably should haveknown that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rightsof [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutionalrights or other injury to [Donaldson]." Id., at 322. Seealso Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248; Wood v.Strickland, supra, at 330 (opinion of POWELL, J.). Forpurposes of this question, an official has, of course, noduty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional
15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O'Connor, was the hospital's superintendent during most of this period. *William F. Hyland, Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assist-ant Attorney General, and Joseph T. Maloney, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for
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