62 AIR FORCE Magazine - U.S. Department Of Defense
GHQ Air ForceThis strangearrangement in1935 split the AirCorps into twocamps—but it ledthe way to anindependent AirForce.IBy John T. Correlln the years following WorldWar I, the Army had a hard timekeeping a lid on its rambunctiousair arm. The aviators, convincedthat airpower had revolutionized warfare, rallied to the call of the firebrandBrig. Gen. Billy Mitchell for a separateaeronautical department, co-equal withthe Army and the Navy.They were further inspired by theexample of the Royal Air Force, formedin 1918, by the merger of the RoyalFlying Corps and the Royal NavalAir Service. Britain had establishedthe world’s first independent air forceafter experiencing the bombardmentof London during the war by Germanzeppelins and airplanes.US airmen were impatient with theirrole and status, but independence for62AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2008
them was not to be. The Army Air Service—part of the Signal Corps until May1918—gave a good account of itself inthe war, but it was in combat for onlynine months. Its contributions were notcentral to the outcome.Aviation was popular with the publicand Congress, and between 1916 and1920, eight separate bills seeking to create a separate air service were introduced.That made little impression on the WarDepartment, which regarded airpower,at best, as a supporting capability forthe ground forces.Demobilization of the Army beganwithin hours of the Armistice in 1918,and the air arm took its share of the reductions. The Air Service was cut back95 percent from its wartime strengthand all but 22 of its 185 aero squadronswere disbanded. A spirit of isolation-That did not mean that the branchesof the Army were equal. The Infantrywas first in the pecking order. The AirService was last, and by a wide margin.Many of the airmen were young andbrash, which did not help their casewith the Army elders.The Chief of the Air Service wasa major general in charge of schools,depots, and acquisition of airplanes andother equipment. Tactical aeronauticalunits—like infantry, cavalry, and artillery units—were parceled out to the nineArmy corps area commanders.With the drastic drawdown in effect,most of the Army’s infrastructure existedonly on paper or in skeleton form. Plansfor fleshing out the force in wartime wereextensive and complicated.When Ulysses S. Grant had becomehead of the Union Army during the CivilAn early B-17C in flight. Whether to develop the B-17 was the biggest issue between Andrews and the Army.ism dominated US political opinionand defense policy. It was a poor timefor the newest part of the Army to belooking to expand.The War Department understood thataviation had introduced something newinto warfare. The Army ReorganizationAct of 1920 recognized the Air Serviceas a combatant branch of the Army, onan organizational par with the Infantry,the Artillery, and the QuartermasterCorps.Opposite top: B-17s in formation flight.Left: Lt. Gen. Frank Andrews in thecockpit of a Flying Fortress. Andrewswas a leading advocate of the development of a long-range bomber.AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2008War, he left a subordinate in charge ofaffairs in Washington and made hisheadquarters with the Army of thePotomac in the field, chasing Robert E.Lee back toward Richmond. The Army’swar mobilization plan in the 1920s wasbased on a similar idea.The concept of a “General Headquarters” had its specific origins withGen. John J. Pershing, who establishedsuch an organization for his AmericanExpeditionary Force in France in WorldWar I. The Army mobilization plan inthe 1920s assumed that the Chief ofStaff, like Grant in the Civil War, wouldleave Washington and take commandof a Pershing-style GHQ in the field.All land and air combat forces wouldreport to the GHQ, which would thenlead them in battle. In 1924, the Armyspecifically authorized a GHQ Air Forceto be headed by an air officer and to bethe air component of the GHQ.The Army continued to insist that theAir Service had no mission other thansupport of the ground forces, despitegrowing evidence of other kinds ofcapabilities. Mitchell’s airmen sank abattleship in 1921, and Army aviatorsflew around the world in 1924. Agitationfor a separate air service continued. In1925, the Army court-martialed Mitchellfor his criticism of the War Departmentand the armed forces, but it failed tosilence him.Standby ModeThe Air Corps Act of 1926 changedthe name of the air arm, making it soundmore important but leaving its role andstatus unchanged. By the 1930s, theArmy had largely overcome its earlyprejudice that aviation had little or nomilitary value. Even so, the Air Corpswas regarded as no more than a branchof the Army, like the artillery and thecavalry, and was expected to behaveas such. The mission was to supportthe ground forces. Maj. Gen. Hugh A.Drum, the deputy chief of staff andsecond ranking officer in the Army,declared that there was no requirementfor airplanes to fly farther than threedays’ march ahead of the infantry.A provisional GHQ Air Force wasformed for Army maneuvers in 1933.With a wary eye on the revolution andcontinuing unrest in Cuba, the Armykept the headquarters element of theGHQ Air Force in a standby mode afterthe maneuvers.To the chagrin of the old guard, theprospects for airpower kept expanding.For example, bigger and better Armybombers challenged the Navy for thecoastal defense mission. Proposals keptbubbling up for a separate service. InFebruary 1934, two bills introduced inCongress proposed a separate promotion list and budget for the Air Corps,along with increases in personnel andaircraft.Between 1919 and 1934, no fewerthan 15 special boards, commissions,and committees had pondered the question of what to do about Army aviation.The most significant of these was theBaker Board of 1934, chaired by formerSecretary of War Newton D. Baker. Itsuggested setting up a GHQ Air Forcefor regular peacetime operations. Sucha measure would not only head off63
In 1935 (l-r), Maj. Jimmy Doolittle (Air Corps Reserves), Brig. Gen. Hap Arnold, andBrig. Gen. Oscar Westover stand next to the Mackay Trophy that Arnold received fora record-setting flight. Arnold was at this time GHQ Air Force’s 1st Wing commander. Westover became Chief of the Air Corps later that year.the demand for a separate air servicebut would also provide a way to takeadvantage of the growing capabilitiesof airpower.With great fanfare, the GHQ AirForce was set up March 1, 1935, withheadquarters at Langley Field, Va.The Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen.Benjamin D. Foulois, wanted command of GHQ Air Force for himself,but the Army leaders did not wanthim to have any more power than healready did.The commander chosen was FrankM. Andrews—described by Timemagazine as “a hitherto obscure fieldofficer”—who was jumped in gradefrom lieutenant colonel to temporarybrigadier general. Andrews was a seasoned airman who had begun his Armycareer in the horse cavalry. No US airman had held such a command sincethe days of Billy Mitchell in France.No overall General Headquarters hadbeen mobilized, so Andrews reporteddirectly to the Chief of Staff, Gen.Douglas MacArthur, through the ArmyGeneral Staff.Air Corps tactical units were takenaway from individual field commandsand assigned to GHQ Air Force. Thatmeant about 40 percent of the Air Corpswas now in GHQ Air Force. Fouloisheld control of the rest for training,procurement, supply, and other functions. Foulois reported to MacArthur,just as Andrews did.Thus, the air arm was split into twocamps. Organizational competitivenesswas inevitable and grew sharper when64Andrews was within the year promotedto temporary major general.Intramural ArgumentsAir Corps cohesion weakened temporarily, but the real significance ofthe GHQ Air Force was not yet fullyapparent. It was a unique force, likenothing else in the Army, with all of thefield units of a combat branch assignedto one organization and commandedby an officer of that branch. It was theclosest thing so far to an independentair force.GHQ Air Force had three wings,encompassing 30 tactical squadrons.These squadrons comprised 12 bom-bardment, 10 pursuit, six attack, andtwo reconnaissance units. The 1st Wingat March Field, Calif., was commandedby Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, promotedto brigadier general in his new assignment. Brig. Gen. Henry Conger Prattcommanded the 2nd Wing at Langley,and Col. Gerald C. Brant had the 3rdWing at Barksdale Field, La.Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, who succeeded Foulois as Chief of the Air Corps,in December 1935, clashed regularlywith Andrews. Westover wanted GHQAir Force transferred to his control.Andrews opposed this. More fundamentally, Westover was not a boat rockerwhereas Andrews flung one challengeafter another at the Army.Westover brought Arnold to Washington as his assistant. Arnold did notwant the job, but he got along well witheverybody and he was a stabilizing influence. In his memoirs, Arnold said he hadpreviously sided with GHQ Air Forcein the “intramural argument” dividingthe air arm but that he soon developed“a new kind of sympathy” for Air Corpsheadquarters.In 1936, Arnold and Maj. Ira C.Eaker published the first edition oftheir book, The Flying Game, in whichthey described GHQ Air Force as “thefirst recognition in the United Statesof the need for an air force designed,equipped, and trained to operate beyondthe sphere of influence of either armiesor navies.”The biggest issue in the runningbattle between Andrews and the Armywas the B-17 bomber. MacArthur, whohad chosen Andrews to command GHQMaj. Gen. Malin Craig (l) becameArmy Chief of Staff in 1935. Arnold(r) was appointed assistant chief ofthe Air Corps in 1936.AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2008
Air Force, backed development of anexperimental long-range bomber. WhenGHQ Air Force was activated in 1935,several prototype bombers were flying,among them the four-engine BoeingXB-17, forerunner of the B-17 Flying Fortress. Andrews was the leadingadvocate of the B-17 and wanted itdesignated as the standard bomber forthe Air Corps.However, Gen. Malin Craig, whoreplaced MacArthur as Chief of Staff inOctober 1935, was ill-disposed towardsuch bombers or airpower in general.Speaking for the General Staff, Craig’sdeputy, Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embrick,said that “the military superiority of .a B-17 over two or three smaller planesthat could be procured with the samefunds remains to be established.”Andrews had an extra burden in making the case for the B-17. The publicwas staunchly isolationist, and strategicbombardment was not an approved AirCorps mission. Thus the purpose of theheavy bomber was initially pitched ascoastal defense. As a demonstrationof capability, GHQ Air Force B-17sintercepted the Italian ocean liner Rex725 miles east of New York in 1938. TheNavy was outraged and so was Craig.Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring,a strong isolationist, shared Craig’slack of enthusiasm for the B-17. TheArmy bought only a few B-17s, insteadbuying cheaper, two-engine bombers.Westover was killed in an airplanecrash in September 1938. Craig offeredto nominate Andrews to be Chief of theAir Corps on condition that Andrews stoppushing the B-17. Andrews declined andArnold was chosen instead. In January1939, Andrews further antagonized theWar Department with a speech to theNational Aeronautic Association. In it,he said the US was a sixth-rate airpower.That contradicted Woodring, who wasassuring the public of the nation’s airstrength.Retribution came swiftly when Andrews’ tour at GHQ Air Force ended inMarch 1939. He reverted from majorgeneral to his permanent grade of coloneland was assigned as air officer for theVIII Corps Area in San Antonio—thesame backwater to which Mitchell hadbeen exiled in 1925 for similar outspokenness.The logjam finally was broken by theactive intervention in military affairsof President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Inprevious times, he had been assistantsecretary of the Navy and as offendedas anyone by Billy Mitchell. As war66Shifting Lines of AuthorityOld Army, 1926. Chief of Air Corps reports to Army General Staff, as dochiefs of Infantry, Artillery, Quartermaster Corps, etc. Flying units in the fieldcontrolled by individual corps area commanders.GHQ Air Force, 1935. Flying units taken away from corps commanders, putinto single organization headed by an airman and reporting to the GeneralStaff. Leadership of air arm divided, with Chief of Air Corps also reportingto General Staff but having no control of GHQ Air Force.Air Corps Control, 1939. Chief of Air Corps—rather than General Staff—designated to “supervise” GHQ Air Force. Nominal change, as General Staffcontinued to exercise control.GHQ Army Activation, 1940. All Army field units, including aviation units inGHQ Air Force, assigned to the newly activated GHQ Army.Army Air Forces, 1941. Both the Chief of the Air Corps and the commanderof Air Force Combat Command (formerly GHQ Air Force) report to the Chiefof the new Army Air Forces. However, various organizational issues cloudthe lines of control.The Army Triad, 1942. Army divided into three autonomous commands:Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces (replacing GHQ Army), and ArmyService Forces. Office of Chief of Air Corps and Air Force Combat Command dissolved.clouds gathered in Europe and Asia,though, Roosevelt became a supporterof airpower.Alarmed by German militarism andthe growing capability of the Luftwaffe,President Roosevelt launched a rearmament program. At a White House meeting in November 1938, he called for anArmy air force of 20,000 airplanes. Hesaid he did not want to talk about groundforces, that “a new barracks at some postin Wyoming” would not “scare Hitlerone goddamned bit.” That put aircraftproduction, including production of theB-17 bomber, on a faster track.Nothing More ImportantAt the end of 1938, the Air Corps hadonly 13 B-17s. When the US enteredthe war in December 1941, the newlynamed Army Air Forces had 198, withthousands more on the way. “No singleitem of our defense today is more important than a large four-engine bombercapacity,” Roosevelt said as he crankedup production.Meanwhile, a number of other important changes took place. Maj. Gen.George C. Marshall replaced Embrickas deputy chief of staff of the Armyin 1938. He was a strong supporterof airpower, and he thought highly ofAndrews. In July 1939, Craig was onfinal leave prior to retirement and Marshall, chosen to replace him, was actingChief of Staff. Risking the displeasureof Craig and Woodring, Marshall re-called Andrews—in his fourth month ofexile in San Antonio—to Washington,promoted him to brigadier general,and made him assistant chief of stafffor operations.(In 1943, Andrews was killed in an aircrash. He had advanced to the grade oflieutenant general and was commanderof all US forces in the European Theater.It was widely believed that had he lived,he, rather than Dwight D. Eisenhower,would have been the Allied commanderfor the D-Day invasion.)Roosevelt had never agreed withthe isolationist views of Woodring butdid not dismiss him because he coulddeliver votes at election time. Finally,in July 1940, Woodring was replacedwith Henry L. Stimson, a fire-breathinginterventionist.With the departure of Andrews fromGHQ Air Force in 1939, the Army entered a zigzag series of adjustments andredrew the organizational chart severaltimes before hitting on a solution thatworked.In March 1939, Delos C. Emmonswas promoted to major general and sentto GHQ Air Force to replace Andrews.Concurrently, the Army made anotherone of its cosmetic changes, switchingcontrol of GHQ Air Force—on paper,at least—from the General Staff to theChief of the Air Corps. This gave theappearance that Hap Arnold, six monthsinto his tour, had gained the controldenied to Westover but in reality, EmAIR FORCE Magazine / September 2008
Andrews (front) and staff view an aerial demonstration at the new GHQ Air Force atLangley Field, Va.mons continued to get his orders fromthe General Staff.The Air Corps split widened thefollowing year. With war approachingand mobilization looking more likely,the Army finally activated Army GHQin July 1940, five years after GHQ AirForce had been activated. Its first taskwas to train tactical units for four fieldarmies set up in a 1932 mobilizationplan. In November 1940, GHQ AirForce assumed its wartime role andwas assigned to Army GHQ. The threeoriginal wings of GHQ Air Force weresoon reorganized as four air forces.Airmen braced themselves, expectingto hear that the four air forces had beenplaced under the four field armies, butthat did not happen.What did happen was Emmons waspromoted to lieutenant general in November 1940, the first airman to achievethat grade. That put him on a par withthe commanders of the field armies,who were three-star generals, but itmade Emmons senior to Arnold, whowas still a two-star. Arnold was deputychief of staff for air as well as Chief ofthe Air Corps. This gave him a certainadvantage in the decision-making process but, as Arnold said later, it was an“awkward situation.”(It was the last promotion for Emmons,who would finish World War II as commander of the Alaskan Department. Bythat time, Arnold was a five-star generalcommanding the Army Air Forces.)The lashed-up organization withArmy GHQ in charge of operationalair and ground forces did not last long.It was becoming obvious that a two68ocean war would be too complicatedto run from a Pershing-style GHQ inthe field. Marshall also saw for himselfthat the General Staff responded withparticular slowness on matters affectingthe air forces.A reorganization in June 1941 createdthe Army Air Forces. It took GHQ AirForce away from Army GHQ, renamedit “Air Force Combat Command,” andassigned it to the AAF. Arnold’s newtitle was Chief of the Army Air Forcesand he controlled both the Air Corps andAir Force Combat Command.Spaatz ReturnsEmmons once again reported to Arnold, who was junior to him by one star.Arnold was finally promoted to lieutenant general in December 1941. Later thatmonth, Emmons was sent to commandthe Army’s Hawaiian Department, replacing Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, whowas relieved following Japan’s attackon US bases in Hawaii.Air Force Combat Command had onlya few months to go before its demisein the next round of reorganizing, butArnold took the opportunity to bringin Carl A. Spaatz as commander andpromote him to major general.In February 1942, Time magazinepredicted that, unless the Air Force gotmore autonomy, “the hue and cry fora separate air arm . will go up again,louder and clearer than before.”Soon, the Army adopted its fourthorganizational scheme since 1939 andthe configuration that would carry itthrough the war. In March 1942, WarDepartment Circular 59 divided theArmy into three autonomous commands—Army Air Forces, Army GroundForces, and Services of Supply (laterArmy Service Forces).Arnold’s title was changed to Commanding General, Army Air Forces.The Office of the Chief of the Air Corpsand Air Force Combat Command wereabolished and their functions taken overby AAF headquarters. (The Air Corpsformally existed until 1947.)Army GHQ was dissolved and itstraining functions taken over by ArmyGround Forces. That was the end of thelast vestige of the 1920s mobilizationplan. The GHQ concept had probablybeen obsolete even back then, but its continuation in the interwar years permittedthe air arm to grow and develop.Circular 59 contained one catch: It wasto expire six months after the end of thewar. Potentially, the AAF could revertto being no more than a component ofthe Army. As a practical matter, that wasnot going to happen. What had begunwith the GHQ Air Force in 1935 mightbe slowed but not stopped.Arnold suppressed the clamor forAir Force independence until the warwas over. From February 1942 on, hewas a member of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, alongside Marshall and the Chiefof Naval Operations, Adm. Ernest J.King.The 1930s had begun with a smallAir Corps flying open-cockpit biplanesas both bombers and pursuit aircraft. Itwas the most junior branch of the Army,popular with the public but lacking realinfluence inside the Army. The 1930s sawa great leap in aeronautical technology,and the aircraft of 1940 looked different,were different, and represented a newera. The B-17 bomber was operationaland the P-38 fighter was in early stagesof production.Airpower was almost universally recognized as a likely significant force in thecoming war. There was no longer any realquestion about the imperatives of strategicbombardment and other missions independent of the ground forces. During theformative years of GHQ Air Force, theair arm had developed a conceptual andoperational cohesion. It had become anair force rather than an air corps. John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is nowa contributing editor. His most recent article, “How the Luftwaffe Lost the Battle ofBritain,” appeared in the August issue.AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2008
Mar 14, 2016 · Arnold did not want the job, but he got along well with everybody and he was a stabilizing influ-ence. In his memoirs, Arnold said he had previously sided with GHQ Air Force in the “intramural argument” dividing the air arm but that he soon developed “a new kind of sympathy” for Air Corps headq
58 AIR FORCE Magazine / May 2016 Acronyms & Abbreviations AABactivated 1935. Named for Lt. Col. Frederick I. Eglin, Army Air Base AAFRG (ANG), RPA operations; 309th Aerospace Army Airfield AB Air Base ABG Air Base Group ABW Air Base Wing ACC Air Combat Command ACG Air Control Group ACS Air Control Squadron ACTS Air Combat Training Squadron ACWHistory: Air Control Wing
Exercise Center Break Areas with Vending Machines 4. USNTPS Indian Navy/Air Force French Navy/Air Force Royal Navy Royal Australian Navy Canadian Forces Japanese Forces Royal Air Force Royal Swedish Air Force Royal Australian Air Force . Israeli Air Force Swiss Air Force German Air F
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