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Chapter 2MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERSChapter 2.— MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERSPagePageOverview33Theory of Multiple Protective Shelters,Preservation of Location Uncertainty,SizingtheMPSSystemWeapon Characteristics for MPS .,34354044Some Previous MX/MPS Basing Modes. 97The Road able Transporter-ErectorLauncher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mpacts73Regional Energy Development . . 81SystemSchedule.82SystemCost84Cost and Schedule of Expanding 92923949496Minuteman MPS and Northern PlainsBasing,,.MissileModificationsCost and Schedule ,.101101102Civilian Fatalities From a CounterforceMPSStrike.103LIST OF TABLESTable No2.3.4,5.6.7.8.9.10.11.Physic Signatures of MissileMPS Example . . . . . .Monitoring TimelinePrincipal Exclusion/Avoidance CriteriaUsed During Screening.CandidateAreas.WaterRequiredforMX.Water Uses. . . . . . . . .Cost Overruns in Large-Scale ProjectsEstimated and Actual ConstructionWork Forces for Coal-FiredP o w e r p l a n t s. . .SystemTimeSchedulePage36425959616868777883

PageTable No.Force Baseline Estimate 4,600Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Comparison of Air Force and OTA CostEstimates . . . . . . . . . 86Land Use Requirements . . . . . . . . . 87FuIl-ScaIe Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 88Lifecycle Cost of 4,600, 8,250, and12,500 Shelters to the Year 2005 . . . . . . 88Air Force Estimates of Additional SplitBasingCosts.90Lifecycle Costs for Horizontal andVertical Shelters Deployed inNevada-Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Minuteman MPS Costs. . . . . . . . . . .10212. Air13.14.15,16.17.18,19.LIST OF FIGURESFigure No.Page9. Multiple Protective Shelters. . . 3310. Preservation of Location UncertaintyandSystemDesign.3911. Peak Overpressure From l-MT Burst . . 4012. Surviving Missiles v. Threat Growthfor MPS Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4213. MPS Shelter Requirement forProjected Soviet Force Levels . . 4414.SystemDescription.4615.Launcher.4716. Missile Launch Sequence. . . . . . . rSite4919. MX Protective Shelter . . . . . . . 5020. Transporter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5021. Missile Launcher and Simulator—Transfer Operations. . . . . . . 5122. Mass Simulator and LauncherExchanges . . . . . . . . . 5123. Mass Simulator . . . . . . . . . 5224. Cluster Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5225. Shelter and Road Layout . . . . . . . . . . . 5326. Command, Control, andCommunications System . . . . . . . . . . 5427. Electrical Power Distribution. . . . 5528. MX-Cannister/Missile Launch Sequence 5629. Transporter Rapid Relocation Timeline 5730. Dash Timeline . . . . . . . 5831. Geotechnically Suitable Lands. . . . . . . 6032, Road Construction Profiles . . . . . . . . 6233, Area Security . . . . . . . . . 6334,PointSecurity.6335. Hypothetical MPS Clusters inCandidate Area . . . . . . . 6536. Potential Vegetative Impact Zone. . . . 71Figure No.Page37. Construction Work Force, OperatingPersonnel, and Secondary Populations. 7538. Baseline Work Force Estimates 7639. Comparison of Onsite and TotalConstruction Work Force. . . . . . 7740. Construction Work Force: High-RangeProjection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7841. Range of Secondary PopulationGrowth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7942. Range of Potential PopulationGrowth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8043. Cumulative Energy ActivityintheWest.8244. proposed Split Basing DeploymentAreas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8945. Summary Comparison of Long-TermImpact Significance Between theProposed Action and Split Basing . . 9146.VerticalShelter.9247. Transporter for Vertical Shelter . 9448. Remove/Install Timelines forHorizontal and Vertical Shelters . 9549. Dash Timeline for Horizontal Shelter. . 9650. Readable Transporter-ErectorLauncher.9851. Trench Layout . . . . . . . . 9952. MX Trench Concepts . .10053. Minuteman/MPS Schedule. . . .10254A. Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 500 rim). . .10354B. Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 1,000 nm) . .10454C. Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 1,500 nm) . .10454D. Population Subject to Fallout V .Wind Direction (Range: 2,000 nm) . .10455. Downwind Distance v, Total Dose . .10556. Crosswind Distance v. Total Dose . .10557A. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 500 rim). . .10657B. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range: 1,000 nm) . .10657C. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range 1,500 nm). . 10657D. MX in Texas and New Mexico:Population Subject to Fallout v.Wind Direction (Range 2,000 nm). . 10758A. Downwind Distance v. Total Dose —500 KT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10758B. Downwind Distance v. Total Dose—250 KT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Chapter 2MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERSOVERVIEWThe multiple protective shelter (MPS) concept seeks to maintain the capabilities of afixed land-based ICBM force, while protectingthe force from Soviet attack, by hiding the m issiles among a much larger number of missileshelters (see fig. 9). If the attacker does notknow which shelters contain the missiles, allthe shelters must be attacked to ensure thedestruction of the entire missile force Thus,the logic of MPS is to build more shelters thanthe enemy can successfully attack, or at leastto make such an attack unattractive by requiring the attacker to devote a large number ofweapons to attack a relatively smalIer force.In this chapter, the theory, design requirements, and some of the outstanding issues ofMPS are addressed I n particular, the technicaland operational requirements of hiding themissiIes among the shelters, forma I I y known aspreservation of location uncertainty (PLU), areexamined This wouId be a new task for missiIeland basing, and it is now appreciated as oneof the more challenging aspects of MPS. ThecompatibiIity of the missiIes’ location uncertainty with arms control monitoring is also discussedFigure 9.— Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS)SOURCE Off Ice of Technology AssessmentInherent in the strategy of MPS is that thenumber of shelters constructed be keyed to thesize of the Soviet threat. Growth i n the numberof accurate Soviet warheads wouId require alarger deployment of missile shelters to maintain the same expected survival rate for U.SmissiIes. The sensitivity of missiIe survival andshelter number to the size of the Soviet threatis discussed by performing severaI MPS calculations related to possible Soviet growthThe consequences of an “undersized” MPS area I so exam i ned, and shelter number requirements are calcuIated.These issues, keeping the missiles successfuIIy hidden and determining the propersize of the MPS, are common to any MPSbasing mode, and are analyzed in detail in thesection on the theory of MPS.Much of this chapter is devoted to specificdesigns for an MPS, with a great deal of attention devoted to the Air Force’s baseline system. This system has been in full-scale engineering development since September 1979,and was modified in the spring of 1980 to incIude a horizontaI loading dock configurationfor the missile shelter. As proposed, thebaseline system consists of 200 MX missilesamong 4,600 concrete shelters, with each m issile deployed in a closed cluster of 23 shelters.These shelters would be spaced about 1 mileapart and arranged in a linear grid pattern.Each shelter would resemble a garage, orloading dock, into which a missile could be inserted horizontally. Missile location uncertainty would rely on the use of specially designedmissile decoys of similar, though not identical,physical characteristics to the real missile, andthe employment of operational proceduresthat would treat missile and decoy alike. Largetransport trucks could shuffle missiles anddecoys among the shelters in order to keep theprecise location of the missiles unknown tooutside observers. Descriptions are providedof the Iayout and operation of this basing, m is33

34 MX Missile Basingsile mobility and the “dash” option, command,control, and communications (C3), and estimates for system cost and schedule Air Forcecriteria used for siting the MX, and its regionalimpacts are also addressed.In the discussion of regional impacts, emphasis has been on two particular issues. Because the A i r Force has aIready completed extensive studies and has published almost sovolumes of materiaIs (MX: Milestone II, FinalEnvironmental impact Statement; DeploymentArea Selection and Land Withdrawal A cquisition, Draft Environmentl Impact ting to the environmental impacts of MX/MPS basing, no attempt has been made tocatalog the potential environmental impacts,to evaluate independently all of those impactsidentified by the Air Force, or to critique theAir Force environmental impact statements(EISs), Instead, those documents have beenused as resources, and attempts have beenmade to draw attention to those issues that arebelieved to be of most importance to the congressional decision making process, For moredetailed information on particular impactsassociated with MPS, reference should bemade to the Air Force E I S documents and comments by the States of Nevada and Utah.A variation of the proposed system would besplit basing, where the system would be deployed in two noncontiguous regions of thecountry: the Great Basin area of Utah andNevada, and the border region between Texasand New Mexico, This basing scheme wouldmitigate the regional impacts, at some addition to system cost.In addition to discussions of the Air Forcebaseline system and split basing, several alternative MPS designs are examined. All of thesehave been studied in the past, but rejected bythe Air Force for various reasons. These designs incIude housing the MX missiIe in conventional Minuteman- like vertical shelters,rather than the horizontaI shelters of the A i rForce basel inc. Greater hardness against nuclear attack could be achieved with verticalshelters; however, missile mobility would besomewhat simpler with horizontal shelters.Two previous baseline modes for the MX arealso) discussed: the “trench” design, where themissile wouId reside in a long concrete-hardened tunnel several feet underground, and theso-called “ r o a d a b l e T E l , ” t h e i m m e d i a t epredecessor of the present baseline, where themissile and transporter were structuralIy integrated, and therefore had greatly enhancedmolbiI it y.Another possibility would be the deployment of Minuteman /// missiIes in an MPSmode, by constructin g a large number of add itional vertical shelters in the present Minuteman missiIe fields. Proponents of thissystem claim it would provide an acceleratedscheduIe for a survivabIe land-based missiIeforce, since Minuteman missiles, support infrastructure, and most roads are already available. Mod if i cations to the Minuteman misslIewouId be required to deploy it in a mobiIemode, and many additional shelters and missile transporters would need to be built. Theextent of these and other modifications is addressed, as is system cost and schedule forcompletion.Finally, several calculations of civilianfatalities resulting from a Soviet attack on MXdeployment in multiple protective shelterfields are presented. These calculations helpaddress the question of the extent to which aSoviet strike against an MPS deployment couldindeed be regarded as “ Iimited, ”THEORY OF MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS (MPS)A land-based missile force in MPS relies forits survivability on the assumption that the attacker, in order to destroy the adversary’s mis-site force with confidence, will be forced totarget al I or most of the shelters if it is notknown which of these shelters contains the

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective Sheltersmissiles. MPS thus tries to draw a distinctionbetween missile and target, by “immersing”the missiIe force in a “sea” of shelters.MPS can also be regarded as “anti-MIRV”basing Just as MIRV (multiple independentlytar-gettable reentry vehicle) technology allowsone to attack many targets with one miss i Ie,MPS forces the attacker to devote many warheads to destroy one real target.For this strategy to work, the tasks of“hiding” the missiles among the shelters andproperly sizing the MPS system for a givenlevel of survivability involve two key requirements Since the nature of these two tasks issimilar for all MPS basing modes, their detailsand impIications are discussed in this sectionof the chapter.Preservation of Location Uncertainty(PLU)Inherent in the strategy of MPS is that allshelters appear to the attacker as equally IikeIy to contain a missile This assumption is important, since if the attacker were to find outthe location of alI the missiIes, it wouId defeatthe design of the system For the planned 200MX missile deployment, for example, it couldmean targetting as few as 200 reentry vehicles(RVS), one RV per MX missile, which is a smallportion of the Soviet Union’s arsenal. The taskof PLU — or keeping the missile locationsecret — is essential to successful MPS deployment. With increased study of this issue overthe last few years, the defense community hascome to realize the magnitude of the PLU task.What makes PLU so challenging is that It is amany faceted problem, dealing with a varietyof missile details Moreover, PLU must bemade an integral part of the design process atevery level. Furthermore, the present expectation is that the design process for PLU will beongoing throughout deployment, with continuous efforts at enforcing and improving missilelocation uncertainty through improved PLUcountermeasures and operations,To accomplish this task of missile concealment, it is necessary to eliminate all indica-35tions, or signatures, that could give away thelocation of the missile One such set is the setof alI physical signatures of the missiIe andassociated missile equipment. This set includesweight, center of gravity, magnetic field, andmany others By utiIizing these physical signatures, missile location might be inferred bymaking measurements outside the shelter ormissile transporter, looking for those signatures that could distinguish location of themissile. Such signatures span the spectrum ofphysical phenomena, many with a range of detectability of hundreds of miles, if not adequately countermeasure.A second set of missile signatures to beeliminated are operational signatures The taskhere is to eliminate all operating proceduresthat could distinguish the missile and therebybetray its location. Otherwise, missile placement might be inferred by observing personneloperations.Internal information is a third set of signatures. This set includes the piecing togetherof many observations to arrive at a pattern recogn it ion of data from which one can infermissile location.Soviet espionage efforts aimed at breakingPLU wilI also be likely, and counterintelligenceefforts may be necessary.SignaturesPHYSICAL SIGNATURESThe physical signatures of the missile runinto the scores, with the magnitude and rangeof each dependent on design detaiIs and material construction of the missile, shelter, andtransporter. Against each of these signaturesthat might compromise missile location it isconsidered desirable to design and install a setof specific countermeasures. These counter-measures include simulating missile signatureswith decoys, masking or reducing the magnitude and range of the signatures, and confusing an outside observer by engineering a set ofsignatures that vary randomly from decoy todecoy in order to make it more difficult todetermine which shelters contain the missiles.

36 MX Missle BasingTable 2 is a generic list of associated missilesignatures present for any MPS system. A briefdiscussion of them is included here along withsome possible countermeasures. A more detailed list and analysis is included in the classified annex.1, Seismic/ground tilt results from the forceof missile weight on the ground, both as seismic waves set up by the motion of the missilein transit, and static measures of its mass, suchas the tilt of the ground in the missile’s proximity, The seismic signature is particularlysignificant while the missiIe is in transport between shelters, since seismic waves can propagate for miles, with a falloff in wave amplitude that varies inversely with distance.Ground tilt caused by depression of the groundunder the missile-laden transporter falls offsomewhat faster with an inverse square law,and a maximum ground depression of theorder of thousandths of an inch. The resultingground tilts are measurable at a distance, Acountermeasure for this signature may includea mass decoy.2. Thermal sources arise from heat generated by electrical equipment associated withthe missile, such as fans, heaters, and other environmental control systems. A measure of thisheat is the power consumed by each shelter,typically 10 to 20 kilowatts (kW) at full operating power, Countermeasures for this signature might use thermal insulation and dummy powerloads at the unoccupied shelters.3. Acoustic sources are due to such items ascooling fans and missile transfer operations atthe shelter site. This signature might be countermeasure by simulation, such as suitablyemplaced recording and playback devices.Table 2.—Physical Signatures of Missile Seismic/ground tiltThermal Nuclear Radar AcousticOptical Chemical SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment GravityMagneticElectromagnetic4. Optical signatures are significant primarily while the missiIe is in transport. Assumingthat the transporter is covered, so that themissile is not directly visible, concern must beshown for the modal oscillations of the missiletransporter in a loaded v. unloaded condition,tire deformation, exhaust smoke, and vehiclesway angle around corners. Sensors that mightpick up this distinction range from sophisticated optics aboard a high flying plane toground-based lasers or even observation withbinoculars at a distance. A possible countermeasure for this signature is a massive decoyof the same weight and simiIar vibrationalcharacteristics to the missile.5 Chemical signatures are due to the routinevolatiIe chemical release from the missile,such as propel I ant, coolant, plasticizers, andozone. The missile transporter exhaust maya Isc) differ for a loaded v. unloaded case.Chemical concentrations are expected to be ashigh as 1 part per million (ppm), and methodsof detection include laser scattering infraredabsorption, Raman spectroscopy, and takingonsllte samples for later analysis, Countermeasures may include simuIated effIuents anda massive decoy load for the missiIe transporter,6. The nuclear warhead on the missile has itsown signature characterized by a set of gamma ray spectral lines particular to the plutonium isotopes contained in it. The warheadmaterial also emits neutrons. UsefuI countermeasures incIude radioactive shielding,7. Radar is a potential signature due to thelarge radar cross section of metal objects associated with the missiIe, such as launch equipment. I n addition, distinguishing the modaloscillations of the transporter due to differentIoacls may be radar detectable from a distanceof severaI hundred miIes. Countermeasures forradar include a massive missile decoy, and reliance on the metal rebar and a steel Iine forthe shelter as well as earth overburden toradar-shield its contents,8. Gravity field and field gradient measurements should be able to detect the mass of themissiIe at a range of several hundred feet.

Ch. 2—Multiple Protective SheltersM a s s simulation is the most direct countermeasure to this threat9. Magnetic field anomalies due to the largeamounts of metal i n the missiIe-launchingequipment, if unshielded, can be detected by amagnetometer. Such detection techniques areanalogous to magnetic anomaly detection ofsubmarines, and simiIar countermeasures canbe utilized. A missile decoy containing anappropriate quantity and distribution of highpermeability (magnetic) metal might be usedto help prevent an observer from distinguishing it from the missile.10. Electromagnetic emissions generated bymissile equipment during normal operationsare another potential signature. I n addition,radio frequency communication involving themissile could lead to missile location determination by radio direction-finding techniques Electrical transients may also be detectable Countermeasures to these signaturesmight consist of simulatin g p o w e r l i n e c o n sumption by installing dummy loads inside theshelter, and communicating with the missileduring normal operation over secure buriedcable, rather than radioThe task for a potential attacker to defeatMPS by utilizing these signatures depends onthe range of the signature to be exploited, thecovertness needed to COIIect and transmit thedata, and the degree of security provided forthe MPS deployment area Presently plannedsecurity arrangements for the shelters are commonIy reterred to as point security, Pointsecurity allows public access to all but a smallrestricted area around the shelter, and therefore allows access relatively close to the missile shelter Area security, on the other hand,would restrict access to most of the deployment areaDesigning PLU for short-range observation,which is anticipated for point security, is moredemanding than for long-range surveillance,since most, though not a 11, of the missile si natures are signiticantly stronger at closerange For example, magnetic anomaly detection, which relies on measurement of magnetictield gradients, falls off as the inverse cube of 37the distance from the source. This means thatthe strength of this signature at 100 ft is morethan 1 million times as intense as this signaturewould be at some 2 miIes away. Since close-inthe magnetic details of the source becomemore important, the distribution of magneticmaterial in the decoy is more critical for adequate deception than it would be for distantobservation.I n addition to the short-range signatures,there are also long-range signatures, such asdetailed motions of the missile transporter andseismic waves, that are measurable at manym i Ies.The range of missile signatures stronglydetermines the degree of covertness that anagent must employ to collect missile locationinformation. A signature that is visible at longranges might require Iittle or no cover toobserve. I n particuIar, long-range signatureswouId be particuIarly threatening if observable by satellite, since security wouId have Iittle effect; and the impact on PLU would becatastrophic if such signatures could not besuccessfuIly countermeasure. Similarly, signatures that are measurable at several miles ortens of miles are also particularly threatening,since security sweeps would be impracticalover so large an area, even if possible. I n thecase of long-range surveillance, the number ofsensors needed would be small compared tothe number of shelters, with the precise number dependent on signature range. It is notclear whether covert operation of sensorswould pose a problem to the Soviets if theyfound a signature that was observable at suchranges On the other hand, short-range signatures wouId require some degree of covertness, perhaps by an implanted sensor, a roadside van, or “missile sensing” done under theguise of another activity, such as mining. OncemissiIe location is determined there are anumber of ways to transmit the informationcovert I y.gFor short-range shelter surveillance, manyemplaced sensors, on the order of thousands,would be necessary to seriously degrade PLU,since a large portion of the shelter deployment

38 MX Missile Basingwould require independent observation. Thistask could pose a severe problem for theenemy agent. I n addition, the areas proximateto the shelter would quite likely be subjectedto frequent sweeps by security forces. On theother hand, covert sensors that could detectmissile presence in the transporter, while themissile is in transport, could be much moreserious. Since point security wouId not securethe roads, implants in the roads must beprevented from determining the contents ofthe transporter. In a Iinear cluster arrangement, for example, if PLU on the transporterwere to fail, then one missile-sensing deviceplanted in the middle of the cluster would beable to determine which half of the clustercontained the missiIe, thereby effectively reducing the number of shelters in half, Therefore, PLU is particularly important for thetransporter, and it must be constantly supplemented by security sweeps of the road network.The Air Force program for deal ing with physical missiIe signatures consists of several approaches, the first of which is to eliminate thesignatures, if possible, by system design. Forexample, if one construction material has asmaller signature than another, using the firstmaterial might be preferable, An example ofthis might be the use of nonferromagnetic material, if practical, rather than iron, in order toreduce or eliminate the magnetic signature.These technical design requirements due toPLU have been established for the launcher,the mass simulator, the protective shelter, andthe transporter. The Iist of these requirementsneeded to countermeasure the missile/launcher signatures, some of which were Iisted in theprevious section, and the many others that aresystem- particular, is a very long Iist, that is discussed more fuIIy in the classified annex to thissect ionThe second approach to countermeasurephysical signatures after attempting to designthem away could be to attenuate the signatureby shielding. For example, heavy materialshields gamma radiation. Thermal insulationmight be used for heat signatures, and so forth.A signature that cannot be designed away orattenuated might conceivably be masked orjammed, For example, a real signature that ismeasurable might be masked by an additionallarge, possibly random signal, thereby makingit more difficuIt to extract the real missiIesignature from ,the “noise. ”If these approaches were not feasible, an attempt to simulate the signature by the use of adecoy might be employed. This simulation isone of the purposes of the MX mass simulator,which will be placed in all of the unoccupiedshelters, and in the transporter when simulating missile transport, Since the simulator isdesigned to weigh the same as the missile/launcher, it automatically countermeasuresthose signatures that arise from total weight.A S discussed in the classified annex to this s ec tion, additional simulations wiII be required.Finally, there can be physical security forthe deployment area that would consist ofmonitoring the area and sweeps for sensorsthat might compromise missiIe locationOPERATIONAL SIGNATURESIn addition to physical missile signatures, itis necessary that routine procedures of missiIetransport and maintenance do not expose thelocation of the missile, This considerationmeans that when carrying out missile-relatedand mass-simulator-related operations, personnel must do the same things, in the same timeinterval , with the same equipment at al I sites.For example, when it becomes necessary toreturn the missiIe from maintenance to theshelter, the transporter must visit all of theshelters and either deposit or simulate depositof the missile. I f the operator knows in whichshelter he is depositin g the missile, care mustbe taken that any actions on his part, such asoutward behavior or conversation with colleagues, do not give clues to missile location.INTERNAL INFORMATIONThis category includes piecing togethermany observations to arrive at any patternrecognition of data from which one may infermissiIe location, To deal with this considera-

Ch 2—A4u/t/p/e Protective She/tefs . 391 1 thr ljgh the prtng of 1982, with fllll- c 1 ’testing in the latter- part of 1982 through 1‘)8 3These testj wi I I be crit [( a I in the des Ign of th tran 5porter J ncj ma i m u I ator, as vel I d \ forthe entire P1 U taskAssessment of PLUAssessing the feasibll ity of the Pi-U effort isa d i f f i c u I t task [- i rs t, I t Is E n u i n e I v n wproblem, a n d not a s] m p I e extra po I a t i o n ofpast e n g i n e e r i n g effort SI nce m issi Ie signa tu re and their cou n t lrmea u res sens I t ive I vde )end o n the det a i I ed d e ign ot t h( tem, i ti \ d i f f i c u I t and c a n be m Is I e ad i ng to m a k e genera I statenlent about PLUponents is underway now Small sca I c testingfor signatures will be done in the latter halt ofFigure 10. —Preservation of Location Uncertaintyand System Designf1CharacterizeslgnatIture, - .SystemDeterminediscriminatesbasellne 1vrEvolvedbaseIlnefTest Characterizethreat &SOURCE U S AIr Force? Selectcounter.measures1?bConsidercountermeasures Afo physical ana I ysIs IS known that can arguet h a t PLU is a phyfic l l} ir-npossible ta k I t sa n a I yses and countermeasures rest on WC I 1u nderftood physic a I pr i n c i p] t’ U nt I I re( ent I y,however, there has been no research and dt velopment program on P 1- U, nor have therebeen fu Ii-scale field tests to val Idate many ofthe conjectures (ind ana Iyt lcal tools needed todesign the sy tenl I n terms of PLU scopc , it deta i 1- i ntens ive c h ara cter, and 5 i m pl y as a newtechn ica I problem, comparable previous experience or data are not ava i Idbie to LI Ide Injudging its fea ibi I ity I t IS true that there IJ orne a na I ogy with submarine detect Ion andl o c a t i o n I ndeecj, some PL LJ signatur( t mostnotably magnetic, are corm mon with iu bmar i nes. St i I I, there are two i m port a n t d I \t i n

ventional Minuteman- like vertical shelters, rather than the horizontaI shelters of the A i r Force basel inc. Greater hardness against nu-clear attack could be achieved with vertical shelters; however, missile mobility would be somewhat simpler with horizo

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