Validation Of Machines Under Consideration Of The New EN .
Validation of machines under consideration ofthe new EN ISO 13849-2Dipl.-Ing. BeckerDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Verification and validationVerification and validation are intended to assure conformity of the design ofthe SRP/CS with the Machinery Directive.These activities should begin as early as possible during the development, inorder to detect and eliminate faults in time. If possible, the test should beperformed by persons not involved in the process of designing the safetyrelated parts, (i.e. who are independent of the design and developmentprocess).Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
To redesign and againPL evaluationFrom realisation and PL evaluationnoVerification: PL PLr?For eachSafety functionYesValidation:requirements met?noYesnoAll SF analyzed?To risk analysis(DIN EN ISO 12100)YesDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationIteration:More SF
EN ISO 13849-2: ValidationSTARTDesign ocumentsAnalysiscriteria for faultfaults-listsexclusionsnoIs analysissufficientyesSafety functionsnoPerformance Level (PL)-Category-MTTFd-CCF-Systematic faults-Softwaretestingyesis the testingcomplete?category 2,3,4yesnomodificationTest of SF under fault considerValidation recordCombination/Integrationall parts successfully validated?noyesendDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation05/28/13Seite 4
Verification and Validation plan Identification of the SRP/CS products to be tested Identification of the safety function with their assignment to the SRP/CS involved Reference to documents with requirements/specifications (e.g. SRS/safety requirementsspecifications) Test principles (standards) and internal company requirements (e.g. company standards,design rules and programming guidelines) to be applied Analyses and tests (methods) to be performed, including identification of the dedicated testsspecification documents Fault lists to be employed Personnel responsible for the analyses and tests (testers, department or body) Specified results documentation (test reports/records to be generated)Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Validation of the safety functions Has the safety function been defined properly and completely? Has the correct safety function been implemented? Are the provisions for the safety function appropriate for the design? Have all necessary operating modes been considered? Have the operating characteristics of the machine been considered (includingreasonably foreseeable misuse)?Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Validation of the safety functions Have response actions to the emergencies been considered? Are all safety-related input signals processed properly and with the correct logicto safety-oriented output signals? Have the results of the risk assessment for each specific hazard or hazardoussituations been incorporated into the definition of the safety function?Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Validation of the category Specifications of the SRP/CP Design descriptions Block diagrams/description of the structure Circuit diagrams Fault lists Tests of the fault-mode behavior of the SRP/CS,with failure mode and effects testing and testing byfault injectionDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Validation of the DC values Comprehensible reasoning must be provided fordiagnostic coverage assigned to the blocks on thebasis of test measures. The information on origin ofthe values is typically examined here, e.g. whetherthe values obtained are credible or questionable. Tests of fault mode behaviour of the SRP/CS (failuremode and effects testing/testing by fault injection) areto show that proper fault detection is assured by thediagnostic functions.Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Validation of the measures against CCF Besides attainment of total number of points,the method examines whether the selectedmeasures are adequately described in theassociated documentation. Analyses and/or tests must demonstrate thatthe measures have actually beenimplemented.Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationStartSystem gesign:Category, MTTFd, DC, CCFCheck of realisedePLPkt. 65stop
Validation of the PL and SRP/CS review of the determination of the obtained PL taken to accountCategory, DCavg and MTTFd in accordance with EN ISO13849-1, 4.5.4 and Annex K evidence that the obtained PL meets the PLrPL PLrWhen not using simplified calculation method, the followingparameters has to be considered: MTTFd- Value for each Part the DC the CCF the structure review of the documentation, use and calculationDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Validation of the combination and intergration of SRP/CSRequired Validation steps: Inspection of the design documents which together describe thesafety function Comparison of the characteristic data for the interfaces betweenthe SRP/CS (e.g. Voltages, currents, pressures, informationdata) FMEA of combination/integration Function test/Black test Extended functional test Checking of the simplified determination of the overall PL fromthe PLs of the individual SRP/CSi nΣ PFH PFHi 1Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationi1 . PFH n
Example mounting stationScrew fixing stationCylinderWork pieceBall insertionstationRotary tablePulse sensorDrive beltLoading stationGearElectric motorRotation sensorDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Safeguardingwith interlockingguardDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
EN ISO 13849-1:2006Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Logical Block diagram ‟Stop function”B1PLCAB2PLCBSRP/CS InputDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationT1aK1SRP/CS Logic/OutputT1b
Determination of PL: Category Requirement of category B is met A fault does not lead to loss of SF Fault detection realised- category 3 is metDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Redundant control system with fault detectionCanal 1:B1PLCAInverter T1aCanal 2:B2PLCBB1PLCAT1aB2PLCBK1relay K1Inverter T1bFault detection through: e.g feedback G1, G2 and K1Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationdop: 240hop: 24tcycle: 3600T1B
Calculation of MTTFd for canal 1 PLCA: MTTFd 25 years (data from producer) Inverter T1a 30 years (data from producer) B1 570 yearscanal 1: MTTFd 13,64 yB1PLCAT1aB2PLCBK1Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationT1B
dop: 240hop: 24tcycle: 3600Calculation of MTTFd for canal 2 B2: PLCA: MTTFd 25 years (data from producer) Relay K1: MTTFd 570 years Inverter T1b :MTTFd 570 yearsB1PLCAT1aB2PLCBK1Kanal 2: MTTFd 22,99 yearsDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationT1B
Determination of MTTFd for redundant according to annex D :MTTFd 18,07aDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
SRP/CSDC(%)AssessmentB199Due to normally open and normally closed mechanical linked contactsB299Due to normally open and normally linked contactsK199Due to normally open and normally closed mechanical linked contactsPLCA90Checking the monitoring device reaction capability (e.g., watchdog) by the main channel at start-up orwhenever the safety function is demanded or whenever an external signal demands it, through aninput facility.PLCB90Checking the monitoring device reaction capability (e.g., watchdog) by the main channel at start-up orwhenever the safety function is demanded or whenever an external signal demands it, through aninput facility.Inverter T1a90Fault is recognized by PLC B through reading of G2 when the safety function is demanded.Fault is recognized also by PLC A through reading of G1 at an operational stop of the electric motorM1 or when the safety function is demanded.Inverter T1b99Indirect monitoring (monitoring of relay K1)Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
MTTFd [a]Kat.3DCavg mittelMTTFd 570aDC 99%MTTFd 25aDC 90%B1PLCAMTTFd 25aDC 90%MTTFd 570aDC 99%PLCBK1121,04 10-6c139,2110-7d157,44 10-7d166,76 10-7d185,67 10-7dMTTFd 570aDC 99%204,85 10-7dB2224,21 10-7d243,70 10-7d273,10 10-7d302,65 10-7d332,30 10-7d362,01 10-7d391,78 10-7dDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationMTTFd 30aDC 90%T1aMTTFd 570aDC 99%T1bSRP/CS input/logic/OutputMTTFdgesamt 18,07aDcgesamt 90,52%PFH 5,42 10-7 (Berechnung mit Systema)
CCF: Common Cause FaultFor redundant control systems (Cat. 2, 3 and 4) the probabilityof common cause failure of a SRP/CS shall be taken into account,(IEC 61508-6, Annex D of Beta-Factor from 2%)StartSystem formation:Category, MTTFd, DC, CCFor be less:recalculationachieved PLpoint system minimum 65 points Physical separation between channels Diversity Design (e.g. Protection against overload, over current) Well tried components FMEA Competence/Training of designer Environmental - EMC Other influences, e.g. temperature, shock, etc.15 points20 points15 points5 points5 points5 points25 points10 pointsgoal: minimum 65 pointsDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationyesPkt. 65Endno
Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Stop function initiated by opening the interlocked guardComponent/unitPotential faultFault detectionEffect/reactionContact does not open when the guard isopened (mechanical faults).aFault is recognized independently by PLC A andPLC B through signal change in B2 when thesafety function is demanded (opening of thesafety guard, plausibility check).Electric motor M1 isApply a static high level at thestopped via T1a by therelevant input of both PLCsPLC A and via K1 and T1b before the guard is opened.by the PLC B and re-startis prevented.Interlocking switch B2Contact does not open when the guard isopened (electrical or mechanical faults)Fault is recognized independently by PLC A andPLC B through signal change in B1 when thesafety function is demanded (opening of thesafety guard, plausibility check).Electric motor M1 isApply a static high level at thestopped via T1a by therelevant input of both PLCsPLC A and via K1 and T1b before the guard is opened.by the PLC B and re-startis prevented.Interlocking switch B2Spontaneous contact closure while theguard is open (mechanical faults).Fault is recognized independently andimmediately by PLC A and PLC B as a result ofthere being no corresponding signal change inB1.Electric motor M1 isApply a static high level at thestopped via T1a by therelevant input of both PLCsPLC A and via K1 and T1b while the guard is open.by the PLC B and re-startis prevented.Interlocking switch B1A plausibility check of B1 and B2 by PLC A and PLC B gives a DC of 99 % for B1 (see ISO 13849-1:2006, Table E.1).Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationTest for conformation
Fault detectionEffect/reactionStuck-at fault at the input/ outputcards, or stuck-at or wrongcoding or no execution in theCPU, which prevents PLC A fromsending a stop command to T1abefore or when the guard isopened.Fault is recognized by PLC B through reading of G2 tocompare its time-related signal with the expected changein the number of revolutions.Some faults (e.g. output cards) are recognized by PLC Athrough reading of G1 at an operational stop of the electricmotor M1 or when the safety function is demanded.Other faults can be detected early by the internalwatchdog (WDa) function of PLC A.Electric motor M1 is stopped by PLC B via K1 and T1bApply a static high level at the stopafter a time delay when the guard is opened, and re-start output of PLC A before the guard isis prevented.open.In the case of faults detected by PLC A through readingof G1 during the operational stop, PLC A informs PLC B.As a result of reporting PLC B, the electric motor M1 isstopped and re-start is prevented by PLC B.In the case of faults detected by WD, PLC A tries to stopelectric motor M1 and prevent the re-start via T1a beforethe safety function is demanded or before electricalmotor M1 comes to an operational stop, and then toinform PLC B.Stuck-at fault at the input/outputcards, or stuck-at or wrongcoding or no execution in theCPU, which removes the PLC Astop command from T1a whilethe guard is open.Faults cannot be recognized by PLC B through reading ofG2 because the motor M1 remains stopped by PLC B viaK1 and T1b while the guard is open.Some faults (e.g. output cards) are recognized by PLC Athrough reading of G1 on closing the guard.The above and additional faults are detected by operatorthrough process observation on closing the guard, or byPLC B when the safety function is next demanded(opening of the guard).Other faults can be detected early by WDa function ofPLC A.Electric motor M1 remains stopped by PLC B via K1 andT1b while the guard is open.In the case of faults detected by PLC A through readingof G1 on closing the guard, PLC A informs PLC B. As aresult of reporting PLC B, the unintended start-up ofelectric motor M1 is prevented by PLC B.In the case of faults detected by WD, PLC A tries to keepelectric motor M1 stopped, to prevent the re-start viaT1a, and to inform PLC B.Component/unit Potential faultPLCAFailure of the PLCADipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationTest for conformationElectric motor M1 remains stopped byPLC B via K1 and T1b while the guardis open.In the case of faults detected byPLC A through reading of G1 onclosing the guard, PLC A informsPLC B. As a result of reporting PLC B,the unintended start-up of electricmotor M1 is prevented by PLC B.In the case of faults detected by WD,PLC A tries to keep electric motor M1stopped, to prevent the re-start viaT1a, and to inform PLC B.
Component/unit Potential faultFault detectionEffect/reactionT1AStuck-at fault and other complex internalfaults in control and power electronics ofthe inverter, which prevent T1a fromstopping the motor before or when theguard is opened.Fault is recognized by PLC B throughreading of G2 when the safety function isdemanded.Fault is recognized also by PLC A throughreading of G1 at an operational stop ofthe electric motor M1 or when the safetyfunction is demanded.Electric motor M1 is stopped by PLC B via Set the stop-input of theK1 and T1b after a time delay when theinverter to high before orguard is opened, and re-start is prevented. when the guard is opened.PLC A informs PLC B when a fault isrecognized during the operational stop. As aresult of reporting PLC B, the electric motorM1 is stopped and re-start is prevented byPLC B.Stuck-at fault and other complex internalfaults in control and power electronics ofthe inverter, which provides gate signalsto power semiconductors of T1a, whilethe guard is open.Fault cannot be recognized by PLC Bthrough reading of G2 because the motorM1 remains stopped by PLC B via K1 andT1b while the guard is open.Fault will be detected by operator throughprocess observation on closing of theguard.Fault is also recognized by PLC A throughreading of G1 on closing the guard.Electric motor M1 remains stopped byTransfer the start signal toPLC B via K1 and T1b while the guard isthe inverter while the guardopen.is open.On closing the guard an un-intended start-upof the motor occurs (non-hazardous).PLC A informs PLC B when a fault isrecognized. As a result of reporting PLC B,the unintended start-up of electric motor M1is prevented and re-start is prevented byPLC B.T1ADipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationTest for conformation
Component/unitPLCBPLCBPotential faultFault detectionEffect/reactionStuck-at fault at the input/output cards, or stuckat or wrong coding or no execution in the CPU,which prevents PLC B from switching off K1before or when the guard is opened.Fault is recognized by PLC A monitoring of K1mechanically-linked feedback contact when thesafety function is demanded.Some faults can be detected early by the WDafunction of PLC B.Electric motor M1 isKeep K1 in the energizedimmediately stopped by PLC A position when the guard isvia T1a when the guard isopenedopened and re-start isprevented.In the case of faults detectedby WD, PLC B tries to informPLC A and then to stop theelectric motor M1 and preventthe re-start via T1b before thesafety function is demanded.Stuck-at fault at the input/output cards, or stuckat or wrong coding or no execution in the CPU,which removes the PLC B stop command fromK1 while the guard is open.Fault is immediately recognized by PLC Amonitoring of K1 mechanically-linked feedbackcontact.Some faults can be detected early by the WDafunction of PLC B.Electric motor M1 is keptstopped by PLC A via T1awhile the guard is open, andre-start is prevented.In the case of faults detectedby WD, PLC B tries to keepstopped the electric motor M1and prevent the re-start viaT1b, and to inform PLC A.Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationTest for conformationSwitch K1 to its energizedposition while the guard isopen
Component/unitPotential faultFault detectionThe contact does not open when the guard isopened (electrical fault, e.g. welded contacts).Fault is recognized by PLC A monitoring of K1 Electric motor M1 isKeep K1 contact in the ONmechanically-linked feedback contact when the immediately stopped by PLC A position when the guard issafety function is demanded.via T1a when the guard isopened.opened and re-start isprevented.Non-opening of internal relay contact when theguard is opened.Fault is recognized by PLC A monitoring ofmechanically-linked feedback contact for T1binternal relay when the safety function isdemanded.K1Inverter T1bDipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validationEffect/reactionElectric motor M1 isimmediately stopped by PLC Avia T1a when the guard isopened and re-start isprevented.Test for conformationKeep the input of the coilof blocking relay in T1b tohigh level when the guardis opened.
Thank you very much for your attention !!!Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation
Dipl.-Ing. Becker EN ISO 13849-1 validation EN ISO 13849-2: Validation START Design consideration validation-plan validation-principles documents criteria for fault exclusions faults-lists testing is the testing complete? Validation record end 05/28/13 Seite 4 Analysis category 2,3,4 all
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