China And India In The Global Economy

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China and India in the GlobalEconomyDevelopment Strategies, Economic Reforms and Responses to theGlobal Economic Crisis and RecessionT.N. SrinivasanSamuel C. Park Jr. Professor of Economics, Yale Universityand Visiting Professor, Stanford Center of InternationalDevelopment, Stanford UniversityConference on Institutions and Economic Development, ChinaCenter for Economic Studies, Fudan University, Economic GrowthCenter, Yale University 11-12, August 2009, Shanghai, China

Overview Introduction Development Strategies: China (1949-1978), India (1947 –mid 1980’s) Reform era: China (1978 on), India (Mid 80’s on) Economic Performance, Pre and Post Reform Global Economic Crisis: Impact on and Responses of Chinaand India Future Prospects Conclusions2

Introduction In 2007 China and India accounted for 20% and 17% of the World’s Populationrespectively and 10.9%(5.9%) and 4.7%(2%) of the World’s Gross National income inpurchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates (market exchange rates).A historical perspective on their growth – Table 1Nobel Laureate Robert Fogel of Chicago forecasts that the two would increase theirshare of world income (PPP) to 40% and 12% respectively by 2040.In comparison Maddison’s forecasts for China for 2030 appears more conservative.Table 1 shows that during 1870-1913,the hey days of first wave of globalization,India’s income grew while China’s stagnated. During 1913-50 China’s incomedeclined absolutely and relative to India’s. In 1950 India’s per capita income washigher than China’s by 38%. In the entire Mao era (1949-76) China’s income grewmarginally more rapidly than India’s eventually catching up by the time Deng tookover in 1978.The expected global economic dominance of the two by 2050 inevitably would leadto a restructuring of global political and economic order3

1. Introduction: Cont’d. Mao’s rule (1949-76) was characterized by the disasters of the GreatLeap Forward, an avoidable famine with an excess mortality of 30 millionor more, and the Cultural Revolution. No remotely comparable disastersoccurred in India, except that India lost a border conflict with China in1962 and engaged in three limited wars with Pakistan.Only with Deng’s opening of China’s economy in 1978 and initiation ofreforms China grew rapidly and relative to India.With reforms and global integration since mid eighties, India is catchingup on growthThe global crisis has tempered the optimism about sustaining the rapidgrowth of the two in the long term.4

2. Development Strategies:China (1949 – 1978) - India (1947 – mid 1980’s) At Communist take-over in China in 1949 and at India’s Independencefrom Great Britain in 1947, both had very low incomes, large andoverwhelmingly poor populations living in rural areas and heavilydependent on agriculture Both adopted a Soviet Style Centrally Planned Development Strategies,focused on industrialization, with emphasis on capital intensive heavyindustry Analytical foundation for India’s strategy in Mahalanobis (1956) –Feldman (1928) Two-Sector Growth Model.5

2. Development Strategies:Contd. Both insulated their economies from the world economy – India’s bychoice and China’s by refusal with others to trade with her China collectivized its agriculture while in India it was entirely private,dominated by very small holdings. China's economy was almost entirely state-owned and state-controlled. India’s economy was state-controlled and directed, but mostly privatelyowned except in industry, finance, transport and communication wherethere was significant public ownership, in some cases a public monopoly.6

2. Development Strategies:Contd. China was (and is still to a large extent) a single-party controlled statewith no de-jure autonomy for provinces. De facto they have hadconsiderable discretion despite central direction. India is formally a federal state with a constitutionally set assignment ofpowers and responsibilities between the Central and state governments.However, even the constitutional assignment and more so subsequentpractice have led India to become de facto more of a unitary state withthe Central government dominant in economic matters.7

2. Development Strategies:Contd. India is a parliamentary democracy with a free press and media, andChina undoubtedly is not.Did the substantial political differences between the two affect economicpolicies and performance ?Policy formulation and implementation are time consuming and electoralcompetition pushes them towards myopia and populism in a democracyOne party rule makes both easier, less time consuming and less myopicHowever contents and quality of policies could be good or bad foreconomic performance under democracy and one party rule so that theinstrumental role of democracy and autocracy for economic performancecould be benign or malignIndian democracy and Chinese authoritarian rule have not undergoneany fundamental change since 1950. Yet both countries performed poorlyin the economic arena before reforms and much better afterDemocracy is an intrinsic desideratum regardless of its instrumental rolein helping or hurting economic performance. Exclusive focus on itsinstrumental role is utterly silly.8

3. Reform EraChina (1978 on). India (Mid 1980s on) China was ripe for reform in 1978 when Deng Xiao Ping took over afterthe overthrow of the gang of four. Chinese population was exhausted by dislocation and disruption of thecultural revolution. The economy had been shattered and was in dire straits India – no pressure for systemic reform during 1950-80 – no disasters asin China. 1966 Macroeconomic Crisis and assistance from IMF and World Bankwith conditionality of liberalization A brief flirtation with liberalization was reversed within two years due todomestic political reasons and by the reneging of the World Bank on itspromised assistance due to US pressure9

3. Reform EraCont’d. Content of reforms and their time sequence differed substantially betweenthe two countries China began with reform of its most distorted agricultural sector byintroducing the household responsibility systems and gradually reducingcompulsory deliveries to the state – thus yielding quick, spectacular andwell-distributed gains. Foreign sector reforms followed with the opening China to foreign tradeand investment and the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)at Shenzhen and Xiamen and a few others. SEZs were free of restrictions on enterprises in the rest of China: 100%foreign ownership was allowed with freedom to hire and fire workers;access to efficient and high quality infrastructure including power, waterand telecommunications; and the size of each SEZ was sufficiently largefor exploitation of economies of scale. Encouragement of FDI in general and in export oriented labour intensivemanufacturing in particular.10

3. Reform Era:Cont’d. SEZs were later expanded to coastal economic zones after Deng’sSouthern Tour One crucial area that was not (and is yet to be fully) reformed is theHukou system of registration that handicapped labour movement awayfrom rural areas and discriminated against migrant workers’ access toeducation and health services. India began with piecemeal and hesitant reforms in the mid-1980’s thatrelaxed the rigors of its mindless import and investment licensing systemand also allowed the real effective exchange rate to depreciate. Theeconomy responded well to these change A very severe macroeconomic and balance of payments crisis hit in 1991following the first Gulf War11

3. Reform Era:Cont’d. India’s credit rating plummeted, foreign exchange reserves fell to lessthan two weeks’ worth of imports and gold reserves had to be pledged toavoid default on external debt and India had to go to the World Bank andthe IMF for assistance that came with conditionality.The rupee was devalued and tariff barriers were brought down fromdizzy heights, but quantitative restrictions on imports remained untilIndia was forced in 2001to remove them by an adverse ruling of theWTO.Collapse of India’s model for central planning, the Soviet Union collapsedin 1991. India’s rival China had grown rapidly since its external openingand market oriented reforms in 1978. The two events made a return tothe status quo ante before the crisis no longer desirableSystemic and comprehensive reforms followed12

3. Reform Era:Concluded. Reforms have progressed and performed well on foreign trade, foreigninvestment, telecommunications, and financial sector, but have far to goor have lagged or not untouched in others. These include financialsector, labour and land markets, electricity and infrastructure.13

4. Economic Performance:Before and After Reforms Importance of Total Factor Productivity growth forsustainability.Herd and Dougherty (2007) – Table 2TFP growth in both countries went up after reforms.Until reforms the Stalinist Development Strategy of botheconomies emphasized capital intensive industry, hadinsulated the economy from world markets and virtuallyeliminated domestic and external competition.Growth until reforms was modest and accelerated onlythereafter in both countries – Table 3The same is true of poverty reduction – Table 414

4. Economic Performance:Before and After Reforms. Cont’d. Economic performance of the two economies differedsignificantly not only in growth but equally importantly in thefinancing of growth (mostly domestic in both) extent of globalintegration. structure of output, demand – Tables 5 - 7Several conclusions emerge from these Tables: China and India depended almost entirely on domestic savings tofinance investment with India catching up with China in both. Table 5China increased its share of world merchandise trade far more thanIndia. The China-India gap in shares in world exports of commercialservices is much narrower. Table 6: I15

4. Economic Performance: Beforeand After Reforms. Cont’d. Several conclusions emerge from these Tables , contd. China is integrated with global markets to a much greater extent thanIndia both in markets for goods and services and financial markets(except on capital account). Table 6: II China continues to attract FDI flows to a much greater extent andportfolio flows to a lesser extent than India. Table 6:III India continues to have much higher applied MFN tariff barriers thanChina and its bound rates exceed its applied rates by a substantialmargin. Table 6:IV China’s structure of output is heavily tilted towards industry, particularlymanufacturing. Table 716

4. Economic Performance:Before and After Reforms. Cont’d. Several conclusions emerge from these Tables, contd. India’s export demand as a share of domestic expenditure at 17% ismuch less than China’s 32% - Table 7 Age structure of population – India’s population is younger with 33%below the age of 15 as compared to China’s 21.6% in 2005, adifference that will narrow but not be eliminated by 2050. China’s population is not only older but also aging faster because itsrate of growth of population is and will remain considerably slower.However, China’s working population is better educated and healthierthan India’s. India thus has a potential advantage both for reasons of itsdemography, and also because with a higher share of labour force inagriculture and other low productivity primary activities has a greaterpotential to accelerate its growth by shifting labour to higherproductivity activities.17

4. Economic Performance:Before and After Reforms. Concluded.Several conclusions emerge from these Tables, concluded. Success in realizing the potential depends heavily in completingreforms in health and education and eliminating constraints on labourallocation. India has a considerable edge over China according to Huang (MIT)and Khanna (Harvard) for the following reasons: India depends to a much greater extent its efficient the privatesector for entrepreneurship and on markets for allocation ofcapital India’s financial sector including banks, equity and public debtmarkets more efficient—China’s banks were technically insolventuntil recently India’s better governance in the private corporate sector with itsentrepreneurial and innovation capabilities reduces the need forseek FDI to substitute for weak domestic markets andentrepreneurship as in China18

5. Impact of Global EconomicCrisis and Response Impact of crisis on India Perception in mid 2008-Speech of the then RBI Governor Reddy:The impact was expected to be modestPossible spread of crisis to India through the financial and real channelsSpread through financial channel not expected because:Credit derivatives market was embryonicRBI restriction on investment by residents on derivatives issued abroadPrudential policies have ensured a sound financial system, particularlybanksReddy did not mention spread through the real channelThe perception changed by October 2008Speech of Rao, Reddy’s successor19

5. Impact of Global EconomicCrisis and Response: Cont’d. Debunked ―De-coupling‖ fadReiterated Reddy’s main claim on the soundness of India’s financial system andbanksReduction of portfolio flows affect equity markets and are affected by volatility inequity returnsReduction of foreign credit to domestic corporations increases domestic creditdemand and affects exchange ratesImpact on GDP growth from reduction in export growth relevant but expected tobe quantitatively small because of relatively low share (less than 25 percent) ofexports of goods and services in GDPHowever the share of exports in manufacturing is much higher and thus fall inexport growth affects growth of manufacturing significantlyFinancial channel became more significant because of India’s faster integration inglobal financial, compared to real markets-- in 2007-08, credit plus debit on trade ingoods and services was 45%, on current account 53%, on capital account 64%and on overall balance 117%20

5. Impact of Global EconomicCrisis and Response: Cont’d. Impacts and Response Indian GDP growth in each quarter compared the corresponding quarter inthe year before declined from 9.3% (Q3) of 2007-08 to 5.8% (Q4) of 200809.Export Growth declined from a healthy 28.9% in 2007-08 to 17.5% duringApril-December 2008 and to 12.8% for 2008-09 as a whole.Growth of manufacturing declined even more rapidly than GDP during thesame period, from 8.6% to a negative 1.4% for reasons mentioned earlier.This decline is similar to that experienced by China, Japan and East Asiawith their much higher shares of exports in GDPFiscal deficit grew to 6.1% in 2008-09 compared to 2.7% in 2007-08 and isprojected at 6.8% for 2009-10. It is likely to be much higherRelatively small stimulus package properly measuredRBI measures including cuts in policy rates and expansion of liquidity.Share of consumption and investment demand in expenditure is high(exceeding 75%), thus limiting the scope domestic demand stimulus tosubstitute for falling export growth. However corporate investment isdeclining due to fall in profits21

5. Impact of Global EconomicCrisis and Response: Cont’d. Impacts of Crisis on China In China also GDP growth declined - from 13% in 2007, to 9 percent in 2008and even further to a projected 7.2% in 2009 according to World Bank.Latest official data (7/16/2009) show a 7.1% increase in the first half of 2009.Real export growth declined from 23.3% in 2006, to 8.8% in 2008. In 2009,the growth projected at a negative 10.1%. Latest official data show a declineof 21.8% in the first half of 2009Fiscal balance worsened from 0.7 of GDP in 2007 to a projected -4.9% in2009With domestic demand at 68% of gross domestic expenditure, much lowerthan India’s 83%, the scope for domestic demand expansion throughstimulus packages is much greater in China. China’s stimulus packageshave in fact been far larger in magnitude (second only to the U.S) as aproportion of GDP than India’s (a total of 4.4% for three years 2008-10versus 0.5%). Although the packages have pushed China’ fiscal budget froma surplus of 0.6% on GDP in 2007, to a deficit of 0.4% in 2008 and aprojected 4.9% in 2009, these deficits are far lower than India’s likely deficitof 10% or more in 2009-10, thus allowing China more fiscal room for furtherstimulus if needed (most unlikely)22

5. Impact of Global EconomicCrisis and Response: Cont’d. Impacts of Crisis on China, Continued: However, with Chinese investment being comparatively inefficient, it wouldbe better to focus on expanding household’s consumption demand, which isonly 25% as compared to India’s 44% of domestic expenditure.Unfortunately the investment component of the stimulus package hassucceeded in boosting inefficient government-influenced investment and notso much the more efficient market based investmentChina runs a substantial current account surplus- 11.3% of GDP in 2007,9.8% in 2008 and a projected 8.0% in 2009 and its foreign currency reservesof 1.95 trillion in 2008 is projected at 2.17 trillion in 2009, already reachedat the end of June. With most of reserves invested in U.S. Treasury bills andsecurities and doubts being raised about the credit rating of U.S.government debt, China is understandably concerned about the security andvalue of the reserves.The governor of the Peoples’ Bank of China has defended China’s highdomestic savings rates and expressed his support for a move away from theU.S. dollar as the major international reserve currency.23

5. Impact of Global EconomicCrisis and Response: Concluded. Impacts of Crisis on China, Concluded: On balance, given China’s extremely modest fiscal deficit, large scope forexpanding domestic consumption and the availability of sizeable resources,China can comfortably adjust to the crisis and resume growth in the nearfuture. China has liberalized trade far more than India India – still one of the most protected countries in the developing world bysome measures China’s embrace of openness and its purposive use in accelerating domesticreform process have been important as compared to continuing skepticismabout the benefits of openness in India.24

6. Future Prospects India’s potential future prospects once the global crisis ends and growth resumesare bright. Realizing the potential requires that the following reform tasks arecompleted. A credible commitment to complete the reform agenda is needed urgently. Forexample, India could announce its willingness to consider much more liberalcommitment to reduce barriers to agricultural and nonagricultural trade in theDoha negotiations; the budget presented on July 6 unfortunately did notannounce reductions in non-merit subsidies and handouts, revive and go furtheron labour law reform. Constraints of infrastructure – physical and human to be addressed. Reform of labour laws – their dysfunctionality and growth and equity costs hasbeen known for a long time Reform of bankruptcy laws – took a decade on average to close a business inJune 2008 Rethinking SEZs along the lines of Chinese SEZs25

6. Future Prospects: Cont’d. Making India a true Common Market Agricultural reforms Addressing high costs of doing business – e.g. it took nearly 4 years and46 procedures to enforce a contract in 2008 Pushing ahead with integrating India with the global economy—thecurrent crisis is NOT an argument for retreat China’s potential future prospects are also bright – the needed economicreform tasks to realize the potential are easier to accomplish then neededpolitical reforms to be discussed in the concluding section. The economic reforms tasks including unifying the labour market byabolishing the Hukou system and other restrictions26

6. Future Prospects: Cont’d. China’s investment at over 50% of GDP is inefficient – need to reduce theshare of investment and making it more efficient Financial system is still inefficient and needs to be reformed. The problems of rising dependence ratios and falling share of thepopulation in the working age group

India’s export demand as a share of domestic expenditure at 17% is much less than China’s 32% - Table 7 Age structure of population –India’s population is younger with 33% below the age of 15 as compared to China’s 21.6% in 2005, a difference that will narrow but not be eliminated by 2050.

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