GAO-18-509, IMPROVISED THREATS: Warfighter Support .
United States Government Accountability OfficeReport to Congressional CommitteesJuly 2018IMPROVISEDTHREATSWarfighter SupportMaintained, butClearerResponsibilities andImproved InformationSharing NeededGAO-18-509
July 2018IMPROVISED THREATSHighlights of GAO-18-509, a report tocongressional committeesWarfighter Support Maintained, but ClearerResponsibilities and Improved Information SharingNeededWhy GAO Did This StudyWhat GAO FoundIEDs are one of the most lethalweapons available to terrorists andenemy combatants. DOD reported thatbetween January 2007 and February2018, approximately 9,000 IEDincidents were targeted against U.S.and allied military forces in Iraq andAfghanistan resulting in about 23,000casualties.The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Joint Improvised ExplosiveDevice Defeat Organization in 2006 to lead and coordinate the department’scounter-improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. In response to acongressional mandate, DOD renamed this entity the Joint Improvised-ThreatDefeat Organization (JIDO) and placed it under the Defense Threat ReductionAgency (DTRA) in 2016. Since that point, JIDO has transferred personnel andpay systems, funding, and staff functions to DTRA, and identified additional,longer-term transition activities that will take several years to complete, such asworkforce colocation. Plans for these transition activities reflect all nine keypractices GAO identified for implementing mergers and organizationaltransformations, such as setting goals and timelines. JIDO also identifiedefficiencies achieved through the transition in areas such as research andtraining.The House Armed Services Committeeincluded a provision in a committeereport for GAO to assess JIDO’stransition under DTRA. This report: (1)assesses the status of JIDO’stransition under DTRA; (2) describeshow, if at all, the transition has affectedJIDO’s warfighter support; and (3)identifies what, if any, challenges couldaffect JIDO’s continued efficiency andeffectiveness. GAO examined DODdocumentation including directives andplans, and met with DOD officials.JIDO maintained warfighter support during its transition under DTRA. Officialsfrom across DOD stated that they were satisfied with JIDO’s level of supportduring the transition and that JIDO continued to provide a range of warfightersupport such as personnel and rapidly fielded materiel.Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization Developed CapabilitiesWhat GAO RecommendsGAO is making four recommendationsincluding that DOD clarify thecategories of threats JIDO isresponsible for countering and JIDO’scorresponding authorities, as well asestablish processes for obtainingpermission to share research projectinformation and submitting it to DOD’sinformation sharing repository. DODconcurred with all of therecommendations and cited actions itplans to take to address them.However, GAO identified two challenges to JIDO’s efficiency and effectiveness: View GAO-18-509. For more information,contact Jason Bair at (202) 512-6881 orbairj@gao.gov.Unclear responsibilities. DOD has not clarified which categories of threatsJIDO is responsible for countering and what authorities JIDO has forcountering them. According to DTRA and JIDO officials, clarifying theseissues would help JIDO plan, program, and coordinate its responsibilities.Incomplete information sharing. JIDO lacks processes to ensure itroutinely obtains permission to share research project information andsubmits it to DOD’s designated information sharing repository, as required.As a result, information on less than one-third of JIDO’s research projects isincluded, according to DOD. This limits the ability of other researchorganizations to leverage JIDO’s expertise and increases the risk ofredundant or fragmented research.United States Government Accountability Office
ContentsLetter1BackgroundJIDO Completed Initial Transition Activities, Developed LongerTerm Transition Plans That Reflect Key Practices, andIdentified EfficienciesJIDO Maintained Warfighter Support during the TransitionUnclear Responsibilities and Incomplete Information SharingChallenge JIDO’s Continued Efficiency and EffectivenessConclusionsRecommendations for Executive ActionAgency Comments and Our Evaluation315192021Appendix IObjectives, Scope, and Methodology23Appendix IIComments from the Department of Defense28Appendix IIIGAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments30711TablesTable 1: Key Practices for Mergers and OrganizationalTransformations Reflected in Joint Improvised-ThreatDefeat Organization (JIDO) Transition PlansTable 2: Actual or Anticipated Efficiencies from the JointImprovised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Transition,According to the Department of DefenseTable 3: Warfighter Support the Combatant Commands ReportedReceiving from the Joint Improvised-Threat DefeatOrganization (JIDO) Before and During the TransitionTable 4: Department of Defense (DOD) Organizations Contactedby GAO10111226FiguresFigure 1: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)Timeline of Significant EventsFigure 2: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)Enacted Funding LevelsPage i56GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Figure 3: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO)Staffing LevelsFigure 4: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)Organizational Structure as of May 2018Figure 5: Examples of Materiel Capabilities the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Undertook during theTransitionFigure 6: Number of Unique Users Utilizing Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Organization’s (JIDO’s) VoltronImprovised-threat Intelligence-related OJIEDDODepartment of DefenseDefense Technical Information CenterDefense Threat Reduction AgencyImprovised Explosive DeviceJoint Improvised-Threat Defeat AgencyJoint Improvised-Threat Defeat OrganizationJoint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat OrganizationThis is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in theUnited States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entiretywithout further permission from GAO. However, because this work may containcopyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may benecessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.Page iiGAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Letter441 G St. N.W.Washington, DC 20548July 24, 2018Congressional CommitteesAs we previously reported, improvised explosive devices (IED) are one ofthe most accessible and lethal weapons available to terrorists and enemycombatants and have been used extensively against U.S. and alliedmilitary forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 1 Between January 2007 andFebruary 2018, approximately 9,000 IED incidents were targeted againstU.S. and allied military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan resulting in about23,000 casualties, according to the Department of Defense (DOD). 2 Toaddress this persistent and evolving threat, DOD established the JointImprovised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead andcoordinate the department’s counter-IED efforts.In 2015, DOD established JIEDDO as an independent combat supportagency to preserve its counter-IED capabilities and support counterterrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related operational areas.However, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016directed DOD to transition the organization under the authority, direction,and control of an existing military department or defense agency. 3 In2016, DOD renamed this entity the Joint Improvised-Threat DefeatOrganization (JIDO) and placed it under the authority, direction, andcontrol of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). 41GAO, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices: Improved Planning Could EnhanceFederal Coordination Efforts, GAO-16-581SU (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2016). DODdefines an improvised explosive device as a weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in anunconventional manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, orincendiary chemicals designed to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, ordistract.2In this report, annual dates are calendar years unless otherwise specified.3Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015).4In this report, unless the distinction is relevant, we refer to the Joint Improvised ExplosiveDevice Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA),and the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) as JIDO.Page 1GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
House Report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the National DefenseAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, included a provision for us toassess JIDO’s transition under DTRA. 5 This report:(1) assesses the status of JIDO’s transition under DTRA, whethertransition plans reflect key practices on mergers and organizationaltransformations, and what, if any, efficiencies have been identified;(2) describes how, if at all, the transition has affected JIDO’s warfightersupport, and what types of warfighter support JIDO provided duringthe transition; and(3) identifies what, if any, challenges could affect JIDO’s continuedefficiency and effectiveness.To assess the status of JIDO’s transition under DTRA, we analyzed JIDOtransition planning documents and met with DTRA and JIDO officials todiscuss the status of the transition and identify achieved efficiencies. 6 Wecompared JIDO transition plans to key practices we identified in priorwork on mergers and organizational transformations to determine if thekey practices were reflected. 7 GAO’s prior work found that implementinglarge-scale organizational change requires the concentrated efforts ofboth leadership and employees, and that it can take several years tocomplete. Therefore, we included both initial and longer-term transitionactivities within the scope of our review.To describe how, if at all, the transition affected JIDO’s warfightersupport, and what types of warfighter support JIDO provided during thetransition, we reviewed relevant DOD plans and strategies and obtainedthe perspectives of combatant command and military service planning,operations, intelligence, training, and logistics officials. We also5H.R. Rep. No. 115-200 (2017).6For the purposes of this report, we define “efficiencies” as maintaining federalgovernment services or outcomes using fewer resources (such as time and money), orimproving or increasing the quality or quantity of services or outcomes while maintaining(or reducing) resources. See GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from SelectEfficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared Governmentwide, GAO-11-908 (Washington, D.C.:Sept. 30, 2011).7GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers andOrganizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). GAOconvened a forum in September 2002 to identify useful practices and lessons learnedfrom major private and public sector mergers, acquisitions, and organizationaltransformations. This was done to help federal agencies implement successfultransformations of their cultures.Page 2GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
administered a questionnaire and analyzed responses from the 6geographic combatant commands and Special Operations Command. 8To identify any challenges affecting JIDO’s continued efficiency andeffectiveness, we analyzed DOD doctrine and guidance on JIDO’smission and authorities, and met with DTRA, JIDO, Joint Staff, militaryservice, and combatant command officials. We then comparedinformation on potential challenges we identified to relevant joint doctrineand DOD directives and instructions to determine their relevance. Moredetailed information on our objectives, scope, and methodology can befound in appendix I of this report.We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to July 2018 inaccordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtainsufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for ourfindings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe thatthe evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings andconclusions based on our audit objectives.BackgroundJIDO’s Counter-IED Rolesand ResponsibilitiesDOD created the Army IED Task Force in 2003—which DOD elevatedinto the Joint IED Defeat Task Force in 2005—in response to theincreased IED threat to U.S. forces operating in Iraq. Theaccomplishments of the Army task force led to a recommendation that alarger organization be created. In 2006, JIEDDO was established toprovide timelier, integrated counter-IED solutions and was placed underthe authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 9JIEDDO’s mission was to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DODactions to defeat IEDs.In September 2013, as a result of the drawdown of operations in Iraq andAfghanistan, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued guidance directing8DOD operates 6 geographic combatant commands to manage the department’s militaryoperations: Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, NorthernCommand, Pacific Command, and Southern Command.9DOD Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization(JIEDDO) (Feb. 14, 2006) (Rescinded 2016).Page 3GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
JIEDDO to continue its counter-IED mission and maintain essentialcapabilities commensurate with the reduction of supported U.S. militaryforces. Two months later, in November 2013, the Deputy Secretary ofDefense directed JIEDDO to develop a concept of operations plan toarticulate its enduring mission. In March 2015, after considering a rangeof options, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated JIEDDO acombat support agency focused on counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and other related operational areas, including counter-IED. InApril 2015, JIEDDO’s name was changed to JIDA to reflect this expandedmission.The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 directedDOD to provide a plan and timeline for the full and complete transition ofthe activities, functions, and resources of JIDA to an office under theauthority, direction, and control of an existing military department ordefense agency. 10 In February 2016 DOD renamed JIDA to JIDO andplaced it under the authority of the Director, DTRA, effective October 1,2016. In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act, inAugust 2016, the department submitted a plan to Congress fortransitioning JIDO under DTRA. 11 Figure 1 shows significant events inJIDO’s organizational history.10Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015).11DOD, Report to Congress Plan for Full and Complete Transition of the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Agency Under the Authority, Direction, and Control of the Defense ThreatReduction Agency (August 2016).Page 4GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Figure 1: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Timeline of Significant EventsaEstimate as of May 2018, according to DTRA officials.JIDO Funding and StaffingCongress has appropriated overseas contingency operations funds forJIDO operations. 12 JIDO can use these funds across multipleappropriations accounts to investigate, develop, and provide counterimprovised threat equipment, supplies, services, training, facilities, andpersonnel. Figure 2 shows JIDO’s enacted funding levels for fiscal years2013 to 2018.12Since fiscal year 2010, DOD has requested, and Congress has authorized andappropriated, separate amounts for both operation and maintenance base requirementsand operation and maintenance overseas contingency operation requirements as part ofthe annual budget cycle. DOD defines “contingency operations” as small, medium, orlarge-scale military operations, including peacekeeping operations, major humanitarianassisted efforts, noncombatant evacuation operations, and international disaster reliefefforts. Base requirements are those costs that would be incurred whether or not acontingency operation took place. Operation and maintenance base requirementsencompass continuing annual costs of DOD’s routine operations, including operatingsupport for installations, training and education, civilian personnel, maintenance,contracted services, and defense health.Page 5GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Figure 2: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Enacted FundingLevelsWhen JIDO was established in 2006, it was led by a retired four-stargeneral, and each subsequent director has been a three-star general.Figure 3 shows JIDO’s staffing levels including for military, civilian, andcontractor personnel for fiscal years 2013 to 2018.Page 6GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Figure 3: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Staffing LevelsJIDO CompletedInitial TransitionActivities, DevelopedLonger-TermTransition Plans ThatReflect Key Practices,and IdentifiedEfficienciesJIDO Completed InitialTransition Activities andDeveloped Longer-TermTransition PlansJIDO completed initial transition activities in key areas such asorganizational alignment, personnel and pay systems, and missionfunding, according to DOD documents and officials. Consistent with ourprior work on mergers and organizational transformations, DTRA andPage 7GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
JIDO officials stated that it will take several years to fully transition JIDOunder DTRA. 13 Completed transition activities include: Organizational alignment: As shown in figure 4, DTRA aligned JIDOas a directorate-level organization.Figure 4: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Organizational Structure as of May 2018Note: This figure excludes some offices such as General Counsel and Inspector General. Personnel and pay: JIDO transitioned 263 civilian and 110 militaryauthorized positions to DTRA. JIDO also transferred personnel paysystems from the Army to DTRA to ensure its workforce was paidwithout disruption. Funds: DTRA coordinated the transfer of previously appropriatedJIDO funds from Army to DTRA accounts to ensure missioncontinuity. Budget request: Prior to its transition under DTRA, JIDO reliedexclusively on overseas contingency operations funding and did notreceive base funding through DOD’s annual budgeting process.Following the transition, DTRA requested funds through DOD’s basebudget to cover a portion of JIDO’s enduring and predictable functions(e.g., information technology support, personnel salaries, andinfrastructure costs).13GAO-03-669.Page 8GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats
Staff integration: JIDO integrated several of its support functions intoexisting and complementary DTRA functions, including legal, financialmanagement, human resources, equal opportunity and diversity,inspector general, and security. In November 2017, DTRA released a plan that assigned responsibilitiesand milestones for the remaining longer-term transition activities such asconsolidating information technology and acquisition managementfunctions, and workforce colocation. 14 DTRA officials noted theimportance of pursuing military construction options to co-locate JIDOand DTRA personnel at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to enhance missioneffectiveness and collaborative planning, increase force protection, andreduce leased space costs. Further, DTRA continues to evaluate the sizeand composition of JIDO’s workforce, including its leadership, military,civilian, and contractor positions, according to DTRA officials.Transition Plans ReflectKey Practices for Mergersand OrganizationalTransformationsJIDO transition plans reflect key practices we identified for implementingmergers and organizational transformations. 15 Our prior work indicatesthat the likelihood of an efficient and effective transition is increased byfollowing these key practices. According to our analysis, JIDO transitionplans and supporting documentation include language reflecting all ninekey practices, as shown in table 1.14Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization(JIDO) Integration Plan (Nov. 15, 2017).15GAO-03
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to lead and coordinate the department’s counter-IED efforts. In 2015, DOD established JIEDDO as an independent combat support agency to preserve its counter-IED capabilities and support counter - terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other related operational areas.
Page 1 GAO-18-509 Improvised Threats . 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 . Letter . July 24, 2018 Congressional Committees As we previously reported, improvised explosive devices (IED) are one of the most accessible and lethal weapons available to terrorists and enemy combatants and have been used extensively against U.S. and allied
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IMPROVISED MUNITIONS HANDBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page I. EXPLOSIVES AND PROPELLANTS 7 (Including Igniters) 1 Plastic Explosive Filler 7 2 Potassium Nitrate 8 3 Improvised Black Powder 11 4 Nitric Acid 14 5 Initiator for Dust Explosions 17 6 Fertilizer Explosive 19 7 Ca
Improvised weapons offer the potential to modify and combine conventional and WMD capabilities through nonmilitary means of delivery using readily available and self-manufactured materials and technology, making the use of improvised weapons widespread in irregular warfare. In fact, the use of improvised weap-
main advantage of such improvised chemical bomb is the availability of the propane cylinders and the main drawback is low accuracy. The third type of improvised chemical bomb is more sophisticated and falls in the category of binary chemical weapons. Those type of ordnance uses two or more chemical substances that combined form
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business seeking funds from a venture capitalist might be affected by this perception of risk. The answer to this question in turn will expose the reader to more questions about whether venture capital in the future will be provided by diversified funds and what a specialized venture capitalist (who invests in one sector alone) might need to do to survive in such an environment. This will .
