Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
Joint Military OperationsHistorical Collection15 July 1997
Knowing the past and being ableto use its lessons are majorresponsibilities of all militaryprofessionals. The Joint MilitaryOperations Historical Collection(JMOHC) presents historical events thatillustrate Joint Doctrine principles inJoint Force Employment. The selectedUS joint military operations includehistorical and modern operations thatteach us universal lessons directlyapplicable to Joint Force Employment.I want all leaders, action officers,planners, and commanders in the ArmedForces of the United States to know JointDoctrine and be able to plan and executeoperations based on its principles. Byknowing how combat and other operations shaped our doctrine, military professionalsand students will be able to judge new situations and take proper actions in accordancewith Joint Doctrine. I hope that the JMOHC will inspire further study of the evolutionof Joint Doctrine.The military actions covered in the JMOHC helped shape our current JointDoctrine. By studying, understanding, and practicing this doctrine, we will enhancejoint warfighting throughout the Armed Forces of the United States.JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILIChairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PREFACE1. ScopeThe Joint Military Operations HistoricalCollection (JMOHC) complements jointdoctrine by providing historical militaryoperations that illustrate fundamentalprinciples of joint operations. Thesehistorical joint operations teach primarylessons in planning, deploying, andemploying joint forces.c. Military personnel should take the timeto read, study, and reflect upon thousands ofyears of recorded military history.Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Napoleon, and othershave much to offer today’s leaders. Whilehistorical case studies can extend theexperience base of today's commanders andsenior staff officers they should not, however,be viewed as a checklist for future operations.The purpose of the historical study is tostimulate thought, not rote imitation.2. PurposeThe JMOHC has been developed to helpmilitary students, action officers, andplanners understand key principles of JointForce Employment. Joint doctrine is largelydeveloped from the lessons of past operations.The JMOHC distills seven case histories fortheir relevance to Joint Force Employmentand fundamental principles of joint doctrine.3. Applicationd. Joint doctrine consists of manyprinciples and guidelines. Do they work onpaper? Probably. Do they work in actual militarysituations? By studying actual joint operationsof the past the answers may be determined.While not an absolute guide to present decisionmaking, history frequently suggests the rightquestions for action officers, planners, andcommanders to consider.e. In using these case histories, several pointsshould be considered using personal judgement.What decisions could have been different?Could the outcome have been better or worse?Imagine a complicating factor — weather orsystem breakdown — What would havehappened? Finally, how does this relate to thepresent situation?a. This document examines generalprinciples of Joint Force Employment to linkrelevant historical lessons to current planningand joint operations. Each of the historicaloperations illustrates how fundamental jointdoctrine principles were applied in specificcircumstances. Military students andf. The JMOHC will aid action officers,practitioners are invited to compare the casehistories in this book to today’s joint operations planners, and commanders in understandingand principles to stimulate original thought and and using the lessons of joint doctrine andeffective responses to future military challenges. force employment in real world situations.Knowledge is essential to convert today’sb. Great leaders have always studied military students into the leaders of futurehistory. In their study they hope to see not joint operations. When the warning orderonly what happened but why. What were comes it is too late to start thinking aboutthe processes that led to a certain action? how to respond. It takes a robust system ofWhy was one action successful and another education, teaching, and critical examinationa failure? How can these lessons learned be to prepare leaders. The JMOHC should serveas a primary reference for today's leaders.used to help US forces fight as a team?i
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TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGEEXECUTIVE SUMMARY . vMILITARY INCIDENT #1: THE IMPORTANCE OF TACTICSMILITARY INCIDENT #2: BUILDING ON EXPERIENCECHAPTER IVICKSBURG . I-1MILITARY INCIDENT #3: THE PRICE OF POOR PLANNINGCHAPTER IIOPERATION CHROMITE . II-1MILITARY INCIDENT #4: THE PRICE OF INFLEXIBILITYCHAPTER IIIOPERATION URGENT FURY . III-1MILITARY INCIDENT #5: UNITY OF COMMANDCHAPTER IVOPERATION JUST CAUSE . IV-1MILITARY INCIDENT #6: FORCE WITHOUT CONCEPTCHAPTER VOPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM . V-1MILITARY INCIDENT #7: FACING THE UNEXPECTED AND UNTHINKABLECHAPTER VIOPERATIONS IN SOMALIA . VI-1MILITARY INCIDENT #8: NEW MISSIONS, EARLY STRATEGIESCHAPTER VIIOPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY . VII-1iii
Table of ContentsAPPENDIX AREFERENCES . . A-1APPENDIX BRECENT JOINT HISTORY OFFICE PUBLICATIONS . . B-1GLOSSARYPART I - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . . GL-1PART II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. . 1V-1ivJoint Campaigning in the American Civil War 1862-1864 . I-3Grant's Approach to Vicksburg . I-7Joint Campaigning in Korea 1950 . II-2The Pusan Perimeter, September 1950 . II-6The Inchon Landing . II-7Inchon Challenges . II-9Grenada . III-2Invasion Organization . III-4Grenada: US D-Day Plan . III-7Map of Panama . IV-4Ground War: Situation 24 February 1991 . V-11Joint Military Operations Historical Collection
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW Discusses the Uses of Historical Study to Understand andIlluminate the Principles of Joint Doctrine Outlines the Key Employment Principles Demonstrated bySeven Historical Joint Operations Illustrates the Key Aspects of Joint Operations throughthese Selected Joint Case Histories Emphasizes the Importance of Joint Doctrine in EffectiveDecision Making at All Levels of Conflict Synthesizes Common Threads in Historical JointOperations and Current RequirementsThe Role of History in Joint Doctrine“War is a matter of vital importance to the state, the province of life or death, theroad to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.”Sun TzuThe Art of War, 400-320 B.C.The challenges inherentin coordinating differentmilitary forces arosesoon after militaryforces specialized inground or navalcombat.Joint doctrine’s roots reach back to the commanders who firstdealt with the timeless problems of coordinating militaryoperations among land, sea and, later, air forces. Thechallenges inherent in coordinating different military forceshave existed since armies became distinct from navies. Thenation-states of ancient Greece that maintained both armiesand navies faced the same challenges of joint coordinationthat General Grant and Admiral Porter addressed at the battleof Vicksburg.“It is now accepted with naval and military men who study their profession, thathistory supplies the raw material from which they are to draw their lessons, andreach their working conclusions. Its teachings are not, indeed, pedantic precedents;but they are the illustrations of living principles.”Rear Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahanv
Executive SummaryAdding air power to thejoint coordinationequation made multiService coordinationmore complex.As technological developments added air power to the jointcoordination equation, multi-Service coordination becameeven more complex. The nature of multi-Service coordinationseen in World War II convinced Congress in 1947 that apermanent institution was required to control its complexities.The result was legislation that created the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. Establishing a permanent structure to coordinate USland, sea, and air forces recognized that multiplying forceeffectiveness through joint action was critical to militarysuccess.Nations successfullycoordinate land, air, sea,and space forces tomultiply combateffectiveness; those thatdo not, lose.Throughout history, nations that successfully coordinatedsimultaneous land and sea actions won their battles. Thosethat did not, lost. Although the ancients coordinated forceson land and sea, modern military planners must also dealwith air and space. These new media change the situationquantitatively, not qualitatively. Multi-Service coordinationstill seeks to solve problems revealed when Pericles balancedhis naval and land forces to defend Athens.“A single unwise tactical move by a soldier on patrol can instantly change thecharacter of an operation and when broadcast by the ever present media pool,can also affect strategic considerations.”Kenneth AllardSomalia Operations: Lessons LearnedModern weapons andcommunicationsdemand rapid andeffective decisionmaking.Since Athens fought Sparta, technological advances havegreatly reduced the time available for military decision making.In the age of sail, governments had months to decide how tocoordinate land and sea responses to military threats. Withmodern weapons and communications, the luxury of timehas virtually disappeared. The pace of events requires rapidand more effective decision making. Lacking time and facingcritical decisions, military planners who know their historycan base their choices on useful knowledge.“It is too late to learn the technique of warfare when military operations are alreadyin progress, especially when the enemy is an expert at it.”General Aleksei A. BrusilovviJoint Military Operations Historical Collection
Executive SummaryThe Value of Studying HistoryThe Joint MilitaryOperations HistoricalCollection exists to allowhistorical militaryknowledge to supportcurrent decisions.History relates militaryevents to fundamentalprinciples.While history can not guarantee valid answers to everymilitary question, past events frequently can illuminatepresent problems. Even though technology has changedthe pace and increased the violence of war, many of theproblems leaders and planners face today are similar tochallenges met in earlier days. Learning the facts of militaryhistory, analyzing them in light of enduring principles,and applying them within the context of current militarytechnologies and techniques is critical to success. Thefighters who learn, interpret, and correctly apply the lessonsof earlier conflicts are known as “victors.” The Joint MilitaryOperations Historical Collection presents historical casestudies to allow leaders, joint planners, and action officers toplan and fight by using the experience of historical plannersand leaders who faced similar problems and solved them.The value of studying history derives from putting militaryevents in the context of fundamental principles. The sevenhistorical joint operations illustrate specific universallessons. Each case study demonstrates several general jointemployment principles.“Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldierwill fight in the future.”Ardant du PicqHistorical Joint Military OperationsCalculated risks,deception, and expandedoperational reachenabled surprise.The Federal campaign against Vicksburg, as executed byGeneral Ulysses S. Grant and Admiral David D. Porter,showed how joint doctrine principles applied even before thedevelopment of modern communications and the internalcombustion engine. The Union Army and naval forces jointlyused unity of effort, mass, leverage, and seizing theinitiative. Headquarters had given General Grant no orders,but he independently recognized that he had to take theoffensive and concentrate his forces to preserve his army anduse speed to achieve Union strategic goals. He understoodthe importance of Vicksburg as a major center of gravity. Infact, after the battle of Vicksburg the Confederacy lost themilitary benefit of its entire western sector. To bring thisabout Grant took calculated risks and used deceptionvii
Executive Summaryeffectively. By boldly casting aside the traditional relianceon lines of communications, he demonstrated his agility,mobility, and flexibility in order to expand operational reach.The opposing forces were unable to react to this operationalsurprise. However, the key to Grant’s maneuvers and successwere consciously coordinated efforts of land and naval forcesin a classic joint operation.“There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war which could not bedeviated from without danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, hasbeen in almost all time crowned with success.”Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri, Baron de JominiThe Early Joint Chiefs of Staff EraAt Inchon UN forcesseized the initiative.At Inchon, General Douglas MacArthur seized the initiative.The landing amidst the communist lines of supply allowedasymmetric action through synchronized application of sea,land, and air power. General MacArthur outlined simpleobjectives and applied unity of effort to achieve them. Atthe time of the operation, UN forces were desperatelydefending at the Pusan perimeter; MacArthur's bold strokecompletely reversed this tenuous situation through a rapidtransition from defense to offense. He forced a favorableoverall combat ratio by taking a calculated risk thatprotected a friendly center of gravity while striking directlyat an enemy center of gravity. His classic example of the jointapproach to modern warfare was the first major jointoperation after Congress established the Joint Chiefs of Staff.“A great captain can only be formed by long experience and intense study.”Archduke Charles of AustriaJoint Operations Before Goldwater-NicholsGrenada required a“coup de main,” asudden and decisiveattack, in whichOperations Security(OPSEC) was critical.Operation URGENT FURY, the restoration of democracy inGrenada, was an overall success as a military operation andpointed the way for continued improvements in the USapproach to joint military operations. As a coup de main,Grenada demonstrated how to apply simultaneous air-landsea action to eliminate an untenable political situation. Theoperation required a forcible entry to rescue the Americanmedical students. As in all forcible entries, operationsviiiJoint Military Operations Historical Collection
Executive Summarysecurity (OPSEC) was a prime concern. Although Cubahad strategic warning, OPSEC and US speed of executionlimited Cuban ability to take advantage of foreknowledge.From the beginning of the operation, clear objectives werestated and followed. The US forces knew that their job wasto rescue the students, drive out the New Jewel Movementgovernment, and restore the legitimate governor. To do this,Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the US andCaribbean nations' forces, used operational surprise to forceasymmetric domination of the battlespace. As a result ofthe operation, the US medical students were released,democracy was restored, and a powerful strategic messagewas sent. However, this short conflict revealed the need forimprovement in both joint doctrine and joint organization.The Goldwater-Nichols act, passed in 1986, rationalized jointorganization and paved the way for additional military successby supporting unity of command.“Nothing is more important. than unity of command.”NapoleonThe Goldwater-Nichols EraThe Goldwater-Nicholslegislation contributed tosuccess in OperationJUST CAUSE.Coordinated land, sea,and air action achievedclear objectives.US forces set clearconflict terminationcriteria.Economy of forcesupported mass.Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama, tookadvantage of the organizational changes wrought by theGoldwater-Nichols legislation and doctrinal lessons fromOperation URGENT FURY. In a forcible entry thatdemanded a long operational reach, the commander, GeneralMaxwell Thurman, coordinated air, sea, and land action toachieve clearly stated, rational objectives. General Thurmanplanned and executed attacks on centers of gravity. Amongthese centers of gravity was the person of the Panamaniandictator. Making President Manuel Noriega an objective putthe dictator on the run, kept him from coordinating his defense,and established a clearly recognizable criterion for conflicttermination. United States Southern Command operationstook the offensive throughout the Panamanian area, shockedthe Panamanian forces, and reduced their effectiveness. Withthe multiple US bases on Panamanian territory requiringdefense while Thurman’s forces attacked Noriega’s centersof gravity, economy of force allowed sufficient mass to prevailquickly through coordinated maneuver. General Thurmanrelied on security, surprise, simplicity, and strengthenedunity of command ensured by the Goldwater-Nichols act.ix
Executive SummaryMajor Campaigns at Extreme Operational ReachSpeed and operationalreach deterred SaddamHussein from attackingSaudi Arabia.OPSEC, speed, anddeception dislocatedIraqi forces.Economy of force wasthe key to massingagainst centers ofgravity.Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated virtually everyprinciple of war and element of joint doctrine in action. Atthe beginning of the crisis, when it appeared that SaddamHussein might try to push into Saudi Arabia, speed combinedwith operational reach to stabilize the US base of operations.Throughout the deployment and employment phases,flexibility and timing were applied with skill to allowmaneuver to leverage and multiply mass. By combiningOPSEC and deception under unity of command, GeneralH. Norman Schwarzkopf was able to maneuver coalition forcesto surprise, shock, and dislocate Iraqi forces. GeneralSchwarzkopf’s hint of an amphibious landing drew criticalIraqi forces away from the real coalition plan. WhenSchwarzkopf topped this deception with an attack at blindingspeed, Saddam’s battered forces could not react. The coalitionused mass to smash Iraqi centers of gravity before the landwar began. This mass resulted from reliance on economy offorce defense to free selected air and sea assets for massedattacks on priority targets. The principle of objective washonored by coalition forces, who understood what needed tobe done and went after it without distraction. The swiftconclusion of the land war resulted from superb coo
History relates military events to fundamental principles. Calculated risks, deception, and expanded operational reach enabled surprise. While history can not guarantee valid answers to every military question, past events frequently can illuminate present problems. Even though technology has changed the pace and increased the violence of war .
Navy This branch of our nation’s armed services conducts military operations at sea, world-wide. According to the Department of Defense, its focus is “maintaining the freedom of the seas, deterring aggression, and achieving victory at war.” Like the Air Force, the Navy has many aircraft to assist with protecting the seas.File Size: 959KBPage Count: 12Explore furtherUnderstanding the 5 Branches of US Military - US Militaryusmilitary.comBasic Branches of the United States Armylibarts.hamptonu.eduU.S. National Military Chain-of-Commanddde.carlisle.army.milArmy Branches Military Science - SOU Homeinside.sou.eduWhat Are the Branches of the US Military? Military.comwww.military.comRecommended to you b
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series and is a companion to joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint military operations.
Supersedes: AFI36-2608, 26 October 2015 Certified by: SAF/MR (Mr. John A. Fedrigo) Pages: 140 This instruction implements Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1336.08, Military Human Resource Records Life Cycle Management, and is consistent with DAFPD 36-25, Military Promotion and Demotion. It applies to all military and civilian members of .File Size: 1MBPage Count: 176Explore furtherAFI 36-2608 Military Personnel Records System Air Force .www.airforcecounseling.comAFI 36-2608 Military Personnel Records System Air Force .www.airforcecounseling.comAFI 36-2608 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS SYSTEMS .standards.globalspec.comAIR FORCE - AFI 36-2608 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS .standards.globalspec.comAIR FORCE - AFI 36-2608 - MILITARY PERSONNEL RECORDS .standards.globalspec.comRecommended to you based on what's popular Feedback
historical collection. o Establishes new controls on historical artifacts loaned to Army museums. o Establishes the Army Museum Information System as the central historical artifact accounting program for the Army. o Establishes a Central Control Number for each artifact in the Army Historical Collection.
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52 Loll Furniture 54 Technical Info 14 TimberTech AZEK Decking 15 Vintage Collection 16 Arbor Collection 17 Harvest Collection 18 Multi-Width Decking 19 Porch Collection 20 TimberTech PRO Decking 21 Legacy Collection 22 Reserve Collection 23 Terrain Collection 24 TimberTech EDGE Decking 25 Premier Collection 26 Prime Collection 27 .
MILITARY LAW REVIEW Articles THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGS JUDGMEKTS . Uniform Code of Military Justice . and Practice Richard S. Schubert . 81 Foreign Military Law Notes: A Review of Dutch Military Law Danish Military Jurisdiction Swedish Military Jurisdiction Major Jozef Schuurmans . 101 Soren B. Nyholm .
