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AD-A253 444L,.Peelingthe Onion:The Iraqi Center of Gravity in Desert StormA4-j 'MonographbyAUG3Major Colin A. AgeeMilitaryIntelligenceSchool of Advanced Militar StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSecond Term AY 9 70392 '11.I1111111111111111llil
Form ApprovecdREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEq dW,.hsdai.sl wq1 nevded. aw co4metancafelu of Infaw.40.uo. wa.Igdlng t ruesfor Mo,nenenIa9h1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)4. TITLE AND SUETITLIPEELING THE ONION:IN DESERT STORM (U)i. AUTHyCOLLIN A. AGEE,OMANo.nT ,n of'a n,,NW(4eiPnlnhSba1n GNe. a'" nas1I0""ea o t geSMina O ,nswtle. &nd0149crt. t3l JaISmo"nsgo- an:4n.q, N*.dewanflm SO-.ca.Wa0704-01,. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEREDT.REYb7b 2THE IRAQI CENTER OF GRAVITY.MOORPFUNDING NUMBERSUSA1. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER7. PERFORM0IG ORGANIZAiION NAME(S) AMU AOORESSUIS)SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESATTN: ATZL-SWVFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900AUTOVON 552-3437COM (913) 684-343710. SPONSORING/ MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER3. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND AOORESSIS)11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES12s. OISTRISU lION/IAVAILABI LY STATEMENT12b. DISTRIBUTIONAP PROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTIONUNLIMITED.ICODE1J.ABSTRACT (Maximcjm 200 wosJjSEE ATTACHED.FORTLEAVNWORH,KNSAS6602-690" . SUBgFMiFGRAVITYCLAUSEWITZDESERT STORMREPUBLICAN GUARD11.r.OPERATIONAL DESIGNCAMPAIGN PLANNING19.SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONSECURITY CLASSIFICATION 14.SECURITY CLASSIFICA11TOF REPORTOF THIS PAGEOF ABSTRACTUNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIEDNSN ISAO0-.60-5500NUM%6.OF PAGES16. PRICE CODE20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACTUNLIMITEDStan'dard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)PATcN AbZ AL-SWlid.IWV1
ABSTRACTPEELING THE ONION: THE IRAQI CENTER OF GRAVITY IN DESERT STORMby MAJ Collin A. Agee, USA, 60 pages.This monograph examines the concept "center of gravity" asapplied by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Centerof gravity is an integral part of operational art and figures prominently in current U.S. doctrine.It begins by tracing the concept's inception in Clausewitz'sOn War, finding several competing definitions in various sectionsof that landmark work. Current U.S. doctrine reveals that time hasdone little to alleviate the confusion. The U.S. Army definitionof center of gravity as a strength is significantly and irreconcilably different from the Marine Corps' treatment as a weakness. TheAir Force offers yet another slant.Given those inconsistent definitions, it is little wonder thatvarious participants and analysts suggest differing centers ofgravity during Desert Storm. From various sources, the monographcompiles a list of a dozen contenders for the title "Iraqi Centerof Gravity." It next examines coalition planning and actual combataction in search of a de facto center of gravity, concluding thatthe Republican Guard was the true Iraqi center.The monograph then suggests The Onion Model as a unifying representation of the concept. Adding the terms Protectors, Connectors and Sustainers to the Center of Gravity, it graphically portrays the relationship of the other eleven contenders to the truecenter of gravity.The study concludes that the center of gravity remains a valuable, if misused, concept. In Desert Storm, this misapplication ofdoctrine was overcome by an abundance of combat power; the centerwas hit because everything was attacked. In the future, U.S.forces may not enjoy the same luxury of time and resources. A future doctrine based on overwhelming force must be tempered by theLaw of War's requirements for military necessity, proportionality,and avoidance of unnecessary suffering. These principles, as wellas military efficiency, will be well served by a concept of centerof gravity used consistently by all services--made understandableby the Onion Model.
4iPeeling the Onion:The Iraqi Center of Gravity in Desert StormAMonographbyMajor Colin A. AgeeMilitaryIntelligenceVICOIf' CLAWtS School of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasSecond Term AY 9.1-92AppwiedforPublicRaleueDisuibuaaisUnlimited
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVALMajor Collin A. AgeeTitle of Monograph:Peeling the Onion:The Iraci Center of Gravityin Desert StormApproved by:Monograph DirectorRobert M. Epstein,Director, School ofJames R. McDonough, MyAdvanced MilitaryStudies9KdiLoI"Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.-Director, GraduateDegree ProgramDTIC; QDALI.For" : ";:,J/-t r 1 bit Ior:Av ilatiity CodesAccepted thisday ofiLfJ-1992.DiztAiland/orA.iSpecial
ABSTRACTPEELING THE ONION: THE IRAQI CENTER OF GRAVITY IN DESERT STORMby MAJ Collin A. Agee, USA, 60 pages.This monograph examines the concept "center of gravity" asapplied by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. Centerof gravity is an integral part of operational art and figures prominently in current U.S. doctrine.It begins by tracing the concept's inception in Clausewitz'sOn War, finding several competing definitions in various sectionsof that landmark work. Current U.S. doctrine reveals that time hasdone little to alleviate the confusion. The U.S. Army definitionof center of gravity as a strength is significantly and irreconcilably different from the Marine Corps' treatment as a weakness. TheAir Force offers yet another slant.Given those inconsistent definitions, it is little wonder thatvarious participants and analysts suggest differing centers ofgravity during Desert Storm. From various sources, the monographcompiles a list of a dozen contenders for the title "Iraqi Centerof Gravity." It next examines coalition planning and actual combataction in search of a de facto center of gravity, concluding thatthe Republican Guard was the true Iraqi center.The monograph then suggests The Onion Model as a unifying representation of the concept. Adding the terms Protectors, Connectors and Sustainers to the Center of Gravity, it graphically portrays the relationship of the other eleven contenders to the truecenter of gravity.The study concludes that the center of gravity remains a valuable, if misused, concept. In Desert Storm, this misapplication ofdoctrine was overcome by an abundance of combat power; the centerwas hit because everything was attacked. In the future, U.S.forces may not enjoy the same luxury of time and resources. A future doctrine based on overwhelming force must be tempered by theLaw of War's requirements for military necessity, proportionality,and avoidance of unnecessary suffering. These principles, as wellas military efficiency, will be well served by a concept of centerof gravity used consistently by all services--made understandableby the Onion Model.
Table of ContentsPageI.Introduction .II.Clausewitz's Center of Gravity .III.Doctrine .IV.Iraqi Center(s) of Gravity .V.Coalition Actions .VI.A Proposed Model:VII.Conclusions and Implications .147.15. . 22The Onion .35.38.41Appendices:A. Jomini's Decisive Points .B. War College Study .C. Initial Target List .42. .43D. How to Defeat Saddam Hussein .44E. Campaign Plan, 10 October 1990 .F. The Onion Model .G. The Iraqi Onion .Endnotes .Bibliography . 45.46. . 47. .4855
I. INTRODUCTIONDesert Storm drew rave reviews from a spell-bound Americanpublic, military experts world-wide, and even the U.S. press.TimeMagazine coined the campaign, "the apotheosis of warmaking as abrilliant American craft:a dazzling, compacted product, like somenew concentrate of invention--Fast!Improved! Effective!"'ArmyTimes declared it impossible to find fault with the American-ledattack or detect a single element of AirLand Battle that was neglected. 2 The war seemed the epitome of military efficiency.Amidst the praise, however, could be heard criticism, including this icathing assessment written during the air campaign:It is a party--a drunken one turning sadistic. Relentless aerial bombardment--lately about as surgical as operating on a cornea with machetes--is a systematic destroying of Iraq's electricity, water, and sewage facilities. That, plus blowing up bridges and obliteratingneighborhoods, is called "softening up the enemy. '3Other editorials equated massive air strikes to terrorism inflictedon an innocent populace to turn them against their leader. 4 An officer from the Air University, obviously impressed by the air campaign, impugned the Army's doctrine and performance, contending theground war was merely a "sucker punch" thrown at an already defeated enemy. 5If the detractors are right, the indiscriminate application offorce against militarily insignificant targets implies that the coalition did not focus their efforts--they failed to identify a center of gravity--or hit it only because they hit everything.Clausewitz explained why we should scrutinize campaigns suchas Desert Storm:experience is more valuable than abstract truths;history provides the test of theory. 6 He also explained his self1
proclaimed role as a kritik (critical analyst): to recognize thetruth, rather than to judge. 7Therefore, without intent to tarnishthe luster of the campaign, this study examines an aspect of ourdoctrine--and its application.Success is dangerous because it breeds complacency.In Novem-ber 1991, General Powell signed Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of theUS Armed Forces.In describing the fundamentals of joint warfareand guidelines for the conduct of campaigns, the manual repeatedlycites Desert Storm as the "school solution."In particular, itvalidates the center of gravity as a key component of US doctrine,asserting that,The concept of centers of gravity established a clear focus for operations and intelligence requirements. Atboth the strategic and operational levels, enemy centersof gravity were identified, analyzed, and confirmed andserved as the basis for devising both the national military and theater strategies. 8It was not that simple.In fact, the muddled use of the termduring Desert Storm makes the swift success all the more amazing.The confusion is not surprising, given the foggy elucidation inClausewitz's On War.Nearly two centuries and several wars later,"center of gravity" continues to defy concise definition.AlthoughUS joint doctrine increasingly emphasizes the importance of identifying the center of gravity, each service has its own definition.The descriptions in Army and Marine Corps doctrine are diametrically opposite of one another.The Air Force adds yet another slant.Within Army doctrine, there are omissions and contradictions;other elements of operational design are not well integrated intothe doctrine.In an extreme example, decisive points, a Jominianconcept, are confused with centers of gravity in the Army's key2
stone warfighting manual.Despite this lack of consensus or definition, the Iraqi threatin the fall of 1990 suggests several potential centers of gravity.Similarly, coalition actions provide insight into target prioritiesand the campaign planners' perception of the threat.The fruit ofthis analysis (or in this case, the vegetable) is the Onion Model,which graphically depicts the relationship of components of military power to the center of gravity.Hopefully, Desert Storm canspur refinement of theory and emerging operational doctrine.I come not to bury the center of gravity, though I place it inan onion.I find fault with the contemporary interpretation andapplication of Clausewitz, but enduring value in the theory, ifapplied correctly.Clausewitz intended his ideas to be enduring.He wrote, "It was my ambition to write a book that would not beforgotten after two or three years, and that might be picked upmore than once by those who are interested in the subject." 9 Idoubt he would object to refinement of the unfinished On War.More notable Clausewitz adherents have found flaws.GeneralHuba Wass de Czege, largely responsible for introducing operationalart in Clausewitzian terms to Army doctrine, commented in a 1988article that On War needed editing; it was difficult to distinguishabsolute models from real empirical phenomenon.10 Michael Howard,in his introduction to On War, noted that Clausewitz feared his admirers more than his critics, because his disciples would misinterpret incomplete ideas and erroneously apply them to contemporarycircumstances. 11 The US military is guilty of that error, but theconcept--center of gravity--merits salvation.3
II. CLAUSEWITZ'S CENTER OF GRAVITYThe idea of a military center of gravity originated in Clausewitz's On War.Book VI, Chapter 27's definition appears simple andunderstandable:The center of gravity is always found where the mass isconcentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blowis that struck by the center of gravity. . . Thefighting forces of each belligerent .have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. Where there iscohesion, the analogy of the center of gravity can beapplied. Thus, these forces will possess certain centers of gravity, which by their movement and dire-tion,govern the rest, and those centers of gravity wili befound wherever the forces are most concentrated.12With that definition in hand, identification of a center ofgravity seems a mechanical task:simply locate the greatest mass,the greatest concentration of forces.He further prescribed:One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all powerand movement, on which everything depends. That is thepoint against which all energies should be directed.13He elaborated that all efforts must focus on destruction of enemyforces.He disdained the "easy way," imploring that an enemy can-not be truly defeated unless his center is sought.In contrast tocontemporary approaches to warfare, he contended, "We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed." 14Clausewitz considered fighting the essence of war; in fact, heconsidered battle the true center of gravity of war (thisintroduces the confusion created by multiple definitions of theterm).' 5He defined major battle as the collision between centersof gravity and criticized the lesser use of force toward objectivesthat did not lead to victory.164
Clausewitz borrowed "center of gravity" from physical sciencealong with friction, polarity, inertia and mass.The term isderived from the German word schwerpunkt: schwer meaning heavy andpunkt meaning point or spot. 17 Napoleon's campaigns greatly influenced Clausewitz's theories.Witness Napoleon's assertionthat, "There are in Europe mazy good generals, but they see toomany things at once.main body.I see only one thing, namely the enemy'sI try to crush it, confident that secondary matterswill settle themselves." 18Clausewitz did not clearly specify single or multiple centersof gravity.At one point, he declared, "The ultimate substance ofenemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources,and ideally to one alone."He further prescribed, "The first task,then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers ofgravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one." 19Atthe strategic level, he identified five centers of gravity:*the opposing nation's army*the capital*the army of a nation's protector*a key ally*public opinion 2 0In planning a campaign, Clausewitz emphasized accurate identification of the enemy center of gravity.If numerical superiorityis not enjoyed, the skill of the commander results in relative superiority at the decisive point.The result is destruction of theenemy's armed forces. 21In various locations in On War, Clausewitz referred to the5
center of gravity as a blow, a concentration of force, cohesion anda battle. 22 It is not even clear whether he considered the centerof gravity a physical entity, a state of morale, or an activity.James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo, in their aptly titled,Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity, contend that Clausewitzwent too far by suggesting personalities and public opinion as cen23ters of gravity.Recalling that On War was a set of incomplete notes at thetime of his death, we can conjecture that he would have resolvedthese competing definitions and ambiguities.But the document pub-lished after his death remains the best summary of Clausewitz'stheories, with all its imperfections.Even his most ardent admir-ers, such as Michael Howard, concede, "It is not easy.to givea fair and comprehensive summary of Clausewitz's strategic doctrine, since it is presented with infuriating incoherence." 24Jomini's decisive points complement centers of gravity, sharing the emphasis on identifying the most important aspect or element of the hostile force. 25Jomini identified several variants ofthe decisive point in The Art of War (Appendix A).The descrip-tions reflect Jomini's emphasis on terrain, versus Clausewitz's focus on forces.Several recent monographs explored the relationshipof decisive points to the center of gravity. One coined the decisive point the "gateway" to the center of gravity. 26 Another summarized, "The seizure or retention of an objective point places theholder in a position of advantage relative to the enemy's center ofgravity." 27 It offered the following hierarchy of decisive points:*strategic points:have military significance6
*decisive points: a subset of strategic points; those whichhave a marked influence on a campaign*objective points: those decisive points against which thecommander commits forces 28As we examine current doctrine and Desert Storm, it becomes evidentthat the relationship between centers of gravity and decisivepoints is not universally understood.In fact, they are often con-fused with one another.iII.DOCTRINEThe center of gravity holds a central position in current USdoctrine.Perhaps the best example is the recently published JointPublication 1: Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, which containsGeneral Colin Powell's guidelines for joint warfare.It alsoserves as an after-action report, from the perspective of theChairman, for Desert Storm; the Gulf operation is frequently citedto illustrate characteristics of joint warfighting.In straightforward terms, the pamphlet states, "The joint campaign is oriented on the enemy's strategic and operational centersof gravity" and "direct attack of the enemy's strategic centers ofgravity .is closely linked to the joint theater campaign."29Joint Pub 1 also cites center of gravity as the concept that integrates intelligence and operations.3 0The Marines fight in accordance with Fleet Marine Force Manual1:Warfighting.The Marine definition of center of gravity tendstoward Clausewitz's treatment of cohesion, rather than the destruction of forces.FMFM 1 prescribes that "the object of maneuver isnot so much to destroy physically as it is to shatter the enemy'scohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance." 31 Di-7
verging from the Clausewitzian definition, the manual erroneouslyequates centers of gravity with enemy weaknesses.This is not tosay that attacking vulnerabilities is ill-advised; however, thismanual further blurs an already fuzzy definition. A footnoteleaves no doubt as to the USMC interpretation of center of gravity:Applying the term [center of gravity] to modern warfare, we must make it clear that by the enemy's centerof gravity we do not mean a source of strength, butrather a critical vulnerability. 32FMFM 1 states that maneuver warfare relies on speed and surprise to overwhelm the enemy and destroy his cohesion.To "shapethe battle," the emphasis is not on identifying sources ofstrength, but on isolating critical ene
Desert Storm drew rave reviews from a spell-bound American public, military experts world-wide, and even the U.S. press. Time Magazine coined the campaign, "the apotheosis of warmaking as a brilliant American craft: a dazzling, compacted product, like some new concentrate of invention--Fast! Improved! Effective!"' Army
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