Transit Security - A Description Of Problems And .

UMTA Office of Technical Assistance, Safety and Security Staff,has sponsored this assessment of transit security problems andsolutions. Building on past research in this area, this reportreflects the changing nature of transit security problems andthe continuing development of new security programs andequipment.To gain an overview on transit security issues, site visitswere made to 13 U.S. transit systems. Systems were selected torepresent a variety of sizes, geographical locations, and modes(bus/light rail/heavy rail). Contacts also were made withnontransit organizations, including government agencies and amajor department store, to learn from their experiences andexpertise in the security area. In addition, a literature searchwas undertaken to draw on existing knowledge in the area oftransit security.The first section of this executive summary describes theprincipal study findings regarding security problems encounteredby the transit systems visited. Patron security, employeesecurity, revenue security, and property security are the majorareas addressesd. The second section of the summary describesthe ways in which the systems visited attempt to deal withsecurity problems, including policing activities, the use ofsecurity-related hardware, and programmatic attempts to copewith transit crime. The concluding section contains generalstudy findings and recommendations for future UMTA/TSCactivities to improve transit security.x

A.SECURITY PROBLEMS1.Patron Security Although all the transit systems consider patronsecurity to be a matter of primary concern, theextent to which it is a day-to-day problem variesconsiderably among systems. Crime against patrons isa daily occurrence on some systems; on othersystems, it is infrequent. Larger urban transit systems operating in high-crimeinner-city areas generally experience more crimeagainst patrons than smaller systems or thosesystems operating commuter-oriented service insuburban areas. In general, subways experience more problems withcrime against patrons than bus systems. Some suburban, commuter-oriented systems have asignificant problem with parking lot crime. Typical crimes against patrons on large urbansystems include robberies and assaults; less commonare more serious crimes, such as murder and rape.2.Employee Security Crime against employees is a problem of varyingmagnitude on transit systems. It can be frequent onlarge urban systems, but is often rare on smallersystems. Nonetheless, the impacts of such crime,including lost time on the job, the need forxi

compensation payments, and low employee morale, makeit a concern for all systems. Transit employees, such as bus drivers and stationbooth attendants, who work in isolated positions areparticularly vulnerable to violent acts. Theseemployees are additionally vulnerable because theyare the guardians of revenue and because they arethe visible enforcers of various transit systemregulations, such as payment of fare. Although exactchange policies have partially eliminated robbery asa motive for attacks, driver assault is still aserious problem.3.Revenue Security Transit revenue collection is typically a diverseprocess with many types of fare media and manypoints at which revenue is collected. Consequently,precise accounting is difficult and losses may goundetected.a. External Theft of Revenues Forcible theft of revenues is not a frequentproblem on transit systems, but is a concern dueto both the potential for physical violence andthe fact that many transit systems are notinsured against such losses. Robberies and burglaries occur at various pointsin the revenue collection process. On oldersystems, change booth robberies are a problem; onxii

newer systems, automatic fare collectionequipment has been a target for burglars. Robberies of revenue trucks during the transportof revenue from stations or bus garages to thecounting room are relatively infrequent, but theyare an intermittent problem on some systems. Suchrobberies are of concern because of the largeamounts of money lost.b. Internal Theft of Revenues Theft of revenue by employees is a common problemon all transit systems regardless of size ortype. Many transit employees who are involved inhandling revenue have the opportunity to pilfer,including bus drivers, change booth attendants,station attendants, fare collection equipmentmaintenance workers, vault or cash box pullers,revenue truck personnel, and counting roomemployees. Examples of revenue theft by workersin each of these categories were discoveredduring the site visits. Internal theft, particularly small-scalepilfering, may go undetected for long periods oftime because of its covert nature and the generallack of precise accounting. Consequently,internal theft is often overlooked by management.Although amounts pilfered on a day-to-day basisare small, cumulative losses may be large.xiii

Large-scale internal theft does occuroccasionally.c. Fare Evasion Fare evasion is a pervasive problem on transitsystems regardless of size or type. The extent ofthe problem is difficult to determine, althoughsome officials report having sizeable problems. Methods of fare evasion include outright refusalto pay, paying less than full fare,counterfeiting fare media, and misuse of existingmedia. Newer systems, using automatic fare collectionequipment, are not immune from fare evasionproblems; patrons have devised many ingeniousways to circumvent these fare collection systems. Fare evasion, like employee theft, can easily beignored by management because of its covertnature.4.Property Security Vandalism and graffiti are problems on transitsystems of all sizes. The extent of vandalism andgraffiti seems to be as much a function of thesystem's efforts to control it than the size or typeof system. Some systems have the resources andmotivation to keep vandalism largely under control;others appear to be fighting a losing battle.xiv

There is some evidence that vandalized propertyinvites more vandalism and that, conversely, keepingvehicles and facilities in good repair serves as apreventive measure. Theft of transit property by employees is a problemof unknown dimensions. A number of systemsacknowledge incidents of such theft and some haveinitiated countermeasures, but overall this securityarea is not given high priority. Lack of goodinventory control at many systems contributes to theproblem. Theft of property by persons outside the transitsystem does occur, but seems to be a relativelyminor problem and is more easily controlled thaninternal theft.B.SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES AND PROGRAMS1.Policing Activities All transit systems need to rely upon sworn policeofficers for situations in which arrest power isnecessary. Large urban systems tend to have theirown transit police forces or use of special transitunits within municipal police departments. Smallersystems often have no security personnel of theirown but rely on local police when dealing withsituations requiring arrest powers. Other systemshire off-duty municipal officers or private securityforces.xv

The use of police officers, however, is usuallyconfined to the protection of patrons and employees.Protection of property and revenues often is theresponsibility of security guards or other transitsystem employees. Most transit police forces are guided by standardoperating procedures, but the existence of longrange security plans and emergency procedures aremore the exception than the rule. Although most transit police departments maintaingood records of criminal incidents, only a few ofthe systems visited use crime statistics to deploypolice officers and to guide security planning.2.Security Equipment and Technology Closed circuit television (CCTV) is used by manytransit systems to protect patrons, property, andrevenues. The extent of its use and opinionsregarding its effectiveness vary widely. Areas whereits use appears to have a discernibly positiveimpact include surveillance of revenue countingactivities and station security, at least asperceived by transit patrons. Two-way radios are in use at all systems visited. Inaddition to their use by patrol officers, theseradios are used by bus and train operators tocommunicate with a control center. Although theirmain function in this case is to monitor systemoperations, they also serve an important securityxvi

function by allowing vehicle operators to call forassistance. Two-way radios represent a fundamentaladvance in improving transit security byfacilitating communication within the system. Silent alarms, which are standard equipment on busesat many systems visited, allow the drivers to signaltrouble on a bus without alerting those on board.The simplest alarms activate flashing lights on thebus exterior. More complex alarms transmit a signalto the dispatcher indicating a problem on a specificbus. The operational efficiency of silent alarms,particularly the issuance of false alarms, is amajor problem limiting their usefulness. Use of computerized management information systems(MIS) to compile transit security data is limited atpresent, but appears to be expanding rapidly. Thisexpansion is related to the increasing general useof computers by transit systems. For example, a fewlarger systems use computerized crime statistics todeploy security forces. Some bus systems withelectronic registering fareboxes use computerizedMIS systems to establish an audit trail of revenuesfrom farebox to bank. Other security-related uses ofMIS include inventory control and cost accountingfor vandalism and graffiti losses. A number of security measures that relatespecifically to the protection of revenues wereencountered during the study. Electronic registeringfareboxes on buses help reduce fare evasion and canbe used to establish an audit trail of revenues.xvii

Vacuum systems remove revenue from bus fareboxeswithout the intervention of human hands. Pocketlessuniforms worn by counting room employees make itmore difficult to conceal money. Surveillancecameras in counting rooms increase revenue securityby deterring and detecting revenue theft. A number of more mundane security measures, such asimproved fencing, lighting, and locks, are beingimplemented at many of the systems visited. Althoughless expensive, these measures may be as costeffective as the more sophisticated countermeasures.3.Security Outreach Programs Outreach programs that involve the public in transitcrime prevention have been instituted at transitsystems. Many systems have school programs thatteach children to ride the system safely and explainwhy vandalism is expensive and dangerous. Otheroutreach efforts mentioned include communityprograms to make the public more conscious oftransit crime and how to avoid it, to involve thepublic in reporting transit crime, and to reducefare evasion. Efforts to communicate with and involverepresentatives of the legal system are an importantpart of transit crime deterrence. Unless offendersare prosecuted, an air of permissiveness willdevelop, which encourages further criminal activity.Judges typically do not give transit crime a highpriority because of their heavy case load and thexviii

serious nature of many nontransit crimes before thecourt.Some transit systems have made efforts tocommunicate to judges the cumulative effect oftransit crime and the consequent need for stricterenforcement. There also has been discussion ofestablishing special courts to deal exclusively withtransit crime. Careful record keeping to identifyrepeat offenders is also useful in obtainingprosecution through the courts.CONCLUSIONS There is substantial evidence that transit securityrepresents a large, multi-dimensional problem whichseriously detracts from the continued viability of publictransportation. The financial and social costs of transit securityviolations are borne by transit riders as well as by thepublic at large. Lack of quantification is a problem which pervades thearea of transit security. Most transit systems recordindividual crime incidents, but few compile aggregatecrime statistics. Few systems maintain statistics onlosses from fare evasion, revenue theft, property theft,or vandalism. Better quantification would make transit officials moreaware of existing problems and would allow them to makemore rational decisions regarding the implementation ofnew procedures, programs and technologies. In addition,xix

it would allow more precise estimation of the dimensionsof the transit security problem on a national level. Most transit security activity is reactive, responding toa particular problem. Programs that deal systematicallywith problems and solutions are more the exception thanthe rule. Although some information sharing does occur, manysystems implement security countermeasures withoutinteraction with others in the transit industry. Moreinformation sharing among transit officials would help todisseminate innovative security ideas and techniques. Significant improvements in transit security could beobtained by fuller utilization of those countermeasuresalready developed and available to transit systems.RECOMMENDATIONS UMTA should promote greater quantification of transitsecurity information by encouraging systems to maintaincomprehensive automated records and by encouraging someform of national reporting system for transit crimestatistics. UMTA should conduct further studies to (1) quantify thefinancial and social costs of transit crime, (2) identifycountermeasures to address transit crime, and (3)establish the impact of particular securitycountermeasures on transit crime. UMTA should undertake cost/benefit studies to determinethe relative value of various security countermeasuresxx

thereby assisting transit systems in deciding whichmeasures to implement in "real world" situations. UMTA should act to enhance the exchange of information ontransit security problems and countermeasures within thetransit industry.xxi

1. INTRODUCTIONThis report, prepared for the Urban Mass TransportationAdministration's (UMTA) Office of Technical Assistance, Safetyand Security Staff, provides a broad perspective on transitsecurity. It describes the wide range of security problemsencountered by transit systems and discusses some of the methodsand technologies used to address these security problems. Aprimary focus of the report is transit crime that is highlypublicized and apparent to passengers and consequently has adetrimental effect on transit ridership. In addition to coveringsecurity topics that are "visible" to patrons, the report alsoaddresses internal security subjects such as facility protectionand the integrity of the revenue system. Finally, the process ofchange is discussed to establish a framework for encouragingimprovements in transit security.A common theme discussed throughout the report is thesystems approach to transit security. The basis of the systemsapproach is that all elements of a unit are integrated. Withinthe context of transit security, adherence to a systems approachwould necessitate careful consideration of the total impact of asecurity or non-security process or technology change on theoverall security of the transit system.This study is an initial effort to identify securityproblems and available countermeasures. Findings andrecommendations will provide a basis for the establishment of asecurity program to systematically address transit securityneeds.1

1.1BACKGROUNDSecurity is the condition that exists when the laws ofsociety regarding the protection of people and property areobserved. For the purposes of this report, transit security isdefined as the freedom from injury, loss, or damage due to adeliberate act of violence, theft, or vandalism within

The transit security countermeasures described in the report include: transit security personnel organizations and activities, security management activities, transit policing activities, and products, equipment and technologies used to provide transit security.