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G R O U PO FT W E N T YG-20 MUUTTUUAALL ASSSSEESSSSMNTT PRROMEENOCCEESSSS:11FRROOMO CAANH TTOGHURRGM PIITTTTSSBBUNEESS—IMF UMORRTTNNMBBRREELLLLAA REEPPOPrepared by Staff of theI N T E R N A T I O N A LM O N E T A R YF U N D1Report 1 of 10. At the request of the G-20, IMF staff has provided analyses and assessments of member’s economies and policies in a set ofreports for the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP). These reports serve as inputs for the Action Plan agreed by G-20 Leaders at the CannesSummit. The 2011 Staff Reports for the 20 MAP consist of the following: (i) an Umbrella Report that provides an integrated summary of thecomponent reports and an upside scenario for G-20 collective action; (ii) an Accountability Report that summarizes members’ progress towardpolicy commitments since the Seoul Summit in 2010; (iii) a MAP Report providing analysis of members’ medium-term macroeconomicand policy frameworks; and (iv) Sustainability Reports for seven members (China, France, Germany, India, Japan, United Kingdom,and United States)—indentified by G-20 indicative guidelines—to assess the root causes and policy implications of key imbalances.
2I.INTRODUCTION11.At the 2009 G-20 Summit tainable,andbalancedgrowth—creatinganewFramework that has evolved over time tosupport these objectives. An embodimentof that collective commitment in Pittsburghwas the launch of the Mutual AssessmentProcess (MAP) to evaluate the consistency ofG-20 policies and frameworks withmembers’ shared growth objectives. Sincethen, the Framework has been augmentedto enhance its effectiveness. At the 2010Summit in Seoul, members advanced theprocess by “outlining an action-orientedplan with each member’s concrete policycommitments” with the aim of delivering ontheir growth objectives and to assessmembers’ progress. Leaders also committedto enhancing the MAP to promote externalsustainability. It was agreed that “persistentlylarge external imbalances, assessed againstindicative guidelines warrant an assessmentof their nature and the root causes ofimpediments to adjustment as part of theMutual Assessment Process ” These threekey pillars—the MAP analysis, policy progressaccountability, and sustainability assessmentsof imbalances—form a basis to help informthe 2011 Action Plan aimed at achieving thegrowth objectives, to be discussed byLeaders at the Cannes Summit.1Prepared by Krishna Srinivasan and Hamid Faruqee,with input from Derek Anderson, Michal Andrle, MikaKortelainen, Dirk Muir, Susanna Mursula, StephenSnudden and the support of Eric Bang,David Reichsfeld, and Anne Lalramnghakhleli Moses.2.The MAP is a medium-termexercise, but is very much relevant for thecurrent conjuncture. It was clear at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh that resolving thefinancial crisis, sustaining a durable recoveryand anchoring strong, sustainable andbalanced growth requires “two rebalancingacts”—one internal, involving a hand-offfrom public to private demand led growth;one global, involving rebalancing demand incountries with large current account deficitstoward external demand and in countrieswith large current account surpluses towardinternal demand. The “dual rebalancing” acts, however, arestuck in midstream, because of whichglobal activity has weakened and becomemore uneven, while financial stabilityrisks have risen sharply. Indeed, fiscalconsolidation has gained traction, butprivate demand has not picked up theslack, owing both to unresolved crisisrelated fragilities and a barrage of newshocks, including the devastatingearthquake and tsunami in Japan andmajor financial turmoil in the euro area.In the context of lower growth, adversefeedback loops between the realeconomy, fiscal tensions and thefinancial sector have strengthened,posing risks to financial stability. At thesame time, global demand rebalancinghas stalled, as domestic demand in keysurplus countries has not acceleratedbecause underlying impediments remainunaddressed.
3 Recovery remains in low gear in majoradvanced economies with elevated risk offalling back into recession. Policyparalysisandincoherencehavecontributed to exacerbating uncertainty,a loss of confidence, and heightenedfinancial market stress—all of which areinimical to demand rebalancing andglobal growth prospects.Thus, understanding large imbalanceswithin and across countries has taken onrenewed importance. Policy makers needto move with a greater sense of urgencyon reaching an agreement on policiesthat will reduce imbalances and lay thefoundation for restoring the globaleconomy to health.3.The IMF—working with otherIFIs—was asked by the G-20 to provide aseries of assessments on these issues foran enhanced MAP, to assist themembership in pursuit of its goals.2 Themain component reports from IMF staffconsist of the following: An Accountability Report to take stockof progress made in delivering uponpolicy commitments made in the Seoul(and Toronto) Action Plan; A MAP Report, consisting of anupdatedassessmentofG-20macroeconomic frameworks to developa forward-looking analysis of whetherpolicies pursued by individual membersare collectively consistent with thegrowth objectives; and A Sustainability Report to undertakean in-depth assessment of the nature oflarge imbalances, root causes, andimpediments to adjustment that mayundermine growth. The first step of anintegrated two-step process—based onG-20 indicative guidelines—identifiedkey imbalances in seven members forfurther analysis.34.This report provides an integratedsummary of the analysis and assessmentin IMF staff’s component reports for theG-20 MAP—toward informing a desirableaction plan. Section II provides a summaryof members’ progress with regard to policycommitments made in Seoul and Toronto,and identifies gaps that need to be bridged.Section III discusses how the globaleconomy might evolve as envisaged by therevised G-20 projections taken collectively.Section IV provides a summary assessmentof the root causes and policy implications ofimbalances in the seven members identifiedby G-20 indicative guidelines. Integratingthese various assessments, Section Vexamines upside potential of G-20 policiesfrom strengthened collaborative action. Thedetails of the underlying analyses andassessments are presented in threecomponent reports accompanying thisumbrella report.2Work on the set of MAP reports was undertaken inclose partnership with the OECD, World Bank, ILO andUNCTAD.3The seven countries are China, France, Germany,India, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.
4II. DELIVERING ON POLICY COMMITMENTSG-20 economies have been making progress toward the policy commitments made at theToronto and Seoul Summits. At the same time, however, the global environment has becomemuch more challenging, as growth in advanced countries has slowed sharply and financialstress has increased. As a result, swift and decisive action is now needed to secure the agreedobjectives. Major advanced economies urgently need to articulate credible medium-term fiscalplans and further financial sector reforms to resolve underlying problems and weaknesses thatled to the crisis; key emerging surplus economies need to address impediments to rebalancingand allow greater exchange rate appreciation; and all need to focus on structural reform,including in the financial sector, aimed at alleviating key impediments to higher growth.5.Deflation has been avoided andprice stability has been maintained inadvanced economies, but inflationarypressures remain high in someemerging economies. The major advanced G-20 economieshave kept policy rates exceptionallyand appropriately low, given thatunderlying inflation remains subduedin environments of weak demand andhigh unemployment. The EuropeanCentral Bank has raised policy rates,but they remain at low levels, andmonetary policy rates remain close tothe zero bound in the United Kingdom,United States, and Japan. The majoradvanced economies have also usedunconventionalmonetarypolicymeasures to stimulate the economy.Policy rates have been raised in othereconomies but may yet need to risefurther,especiallyinemergingeconomies where inflation remainsstubbornly high (and growth remainsrobust). In India, Korea, and Russia,nominal policy rates have been raised,but real rates remain very low or evennegative. In Brazil, policy rates havebeen raised substantially and macroprudential measures deployed, butfurther rate action may be needed, aslong as growth prospects remainbuoyant. In China, strong policymeasures have slowed credit growth,but inflation has not yet decelerated.In Turkey, policy rates have beenlowered, but credit growth isnonetheless moderating, partly due todeterioratingexternalfinancingconditions and a tightening ofmacroprudential measures.6.On the fiscal side, slow policyprogress and weaker global recoveryhave placed the Summit commitmentsin jeopardy. In particular, there is nowconsiderable uncertainty about how fiscalsustainability will be achieved in theUnited States, Japan, and some euro areaeconomies. To reduce this uncertainty,these economies need to move quickly toput in place credible medium-termconsolidation plans, which will helppreserve room for adequate short-termfiscal support to the recovery. Indeed,given the still-fragile nature of the
5recovery, fragility of demand in keyadvanced economies, more emphasisshould be given to the medium-term andless to front-loaded cuts. In the United States, the August fiscalpackage represents an important stepforward. But much more progressneeds to be made to elaborate acredible medium-term consolidationplan that commands broad ections.Theprojected improvement of fiscalbalances in Japan falls short of what isneeded to put the debt to GDP ratioon a downward path before 2020.Fiscal consolidation plans that meetthe Toronto criteria have beenoutlined in the euro area. Germany iswell on track to meeting the Torontotargets. France, Italy, and Spain arepursuing ambitious plans and haverecentlyannouncedadditionalconsolidation measures, but actualconsolidation could prove to be lessthan projected, because growthprojections remain overly optimistic;revenue and spending measures lackspecificity; and funding costs are likelyto be greater-than-projected. Moregenerally, the euro area needs aconsistent, coherent, and cooperativeapproach to crisis resolution, includingswift enactment of the measuresagreed at the July EU summit.While the Toronto commitments donot encompass emerging marketeconomies, fiscal consolidation is stillwarrantedinmanyoftheseeconomies, including Brazil, India, andTurkey, to help moderate demandpressures.7.G-20 members have generallypursuedexchangeratepoliciesconsistent with greater flexibility, butmore appreciation is needed in majoremerging surplus economies. Key advanced G-20 economies withexternal deficits (such as the UnitedStates) have seen their currenciesweaken, while those with strongerexternal positions (euro area andJapan) have appreciated. Advancedeconomies have largely avoidedintervening in currency markets,although the G7 made a coordinatedintervention in March after Japan’searthquake and tsunami led to anunusually sharp appreciation of theyen. Some emerging economies (e.g.,India) have abstained from interveningin foreign exchange markets, whileothers (e.g., Brazil) have experiencedsubstantialexchangerateappreciations while intervening anddeploying capital flow measures tomanage the pressure of strong capitalinflows.Meanwhile, some majorsurplus emerging economies (notablyChina) have intervened extensively tolimit appreciation—in China, theexchange rate has depreciated in realterms.
68.G-20economieshaveannounced structural reforms, butmuch more needs to be done in keyareas. Structural reforms are crucial forachieving the growth objectives, ensuringfiscal sustainability, and rebalancingeconomies. Yet many of the announcedplans are not well aligned with the criticalpriorities identified by the OECD, whileothers are only at early stages ofdiscussion and planning.4 In particular,measures are needed to increase laborparticipation; boost competition; increaseflexibility of product, service and labormarkets; bolster training and education;and improve the business climate. Also, insome cases, implementation of keystructural reforms needs to be speeded up(e.g., the EU Services Directive in Franceand Italy).9.Significant agreements havebeen reached on reforms to financialsupervision and regulation, but somedifficult issues remain. As a result of theimportant work by the FSB and itsmembers, a number of initiatives toreform the financial sector are beingadvanced. Capital and liquidity standardswill be increased under Basel III. Theregulatory/supervisory framework for4See the OECD’s assessment in “Pursuing Strong,Sustainable, and Balanced Growth: A Note on theImplementationofStructuralReformCommitments,” July 2011, and “Pursuing Strong,Sustainable, and Balanced Growth: Taking Stock ofthe Seoul Action Plan’s Structural ReformCommitments,” June 2011.SystemicallyImportantFinancialInstitutions (SIFIs) is being augmented,particularly in the United Kingdom, UnitedStates, and euro area. But to safeguardfinancial stability more work is needed.Moreover, these international initiativesneed to be translated into robust andconsistent implementation at the nationallevel. Further progress on internationalcoordination is also needed, inter alia toavoid regulatory arbitrage. And mosturgently (though this is beyond Summitcriteria), financial institutions should beforced to rebuild capital, and thoseinstitutions that are deemed not viableand not able to access private funds needtoberesolvedsmoothlyandexpeditiously.
7III. GLOBAL OUTLOOK THROUGH THE EYES OF THE G-20Against the backdrop of weakening global activity and rising downside risks, G-20 growthprojections (admittedly based on submissions made in May, when the global outlook lookedbetter than it is currently) appear overly optimistic relative to both the WEO and comparedwith experiences following past financial crises. This, in turn, implies that projected markedimprovements in fiscal positions may not be realized if growth rates are lower than expected.Progress towards rebalancing global demand remains modest.10.G-20 macroeconomic frameworksproject strong growth over the mediumterm, but risk being optimistic whencompared with previous recoveries.Projected growth is above both the precrisis trend and potential, and isaccompanied by a rapid decline inunemployment. Growth is projected to bebroadly sustainable and balanced, in thesense that it is increasingly underpinned byprivate demand and is broad-based acrossthe G-20. However, in the context of recentdevelopments and when assessed againstrecoveries from previous crises and theWEO projections, growth projections appeartoo sanguine, particularly for advanceddeficit countries (notably, the UnitedStates)—in the current context of continuingweak private sector spending and activity,owing in part to insufficient repair ofhousehold and bank balance sheets. Thus,the projected hand-off from public toprivate demand is rather optimistic.5G-20 MAP: Real GDP Growth 1/(percent, yoy)MAP change (RHS) 4/WEO 1/Potential 3/6MAPAverage 9101112131415Sources: G-20 authorities and IMF staff estimates.1/ 2005 - 2009 reflects historical data; 2010 - 2015 reflectsprojections.2/ PPP weighted average annual growth for 1998 - 2007.3/ G-20 authorities and IMF staff estimates.4/ June 2011 vs. October 2010 MAP projections; 2010-2014.G-20 MAP: Unemployment Rates 1/(percent)G-20G-20 Adv.G-20 Emg. 3/10G-20 Oct. 2/G-20 Adv. Oct. 2/G-20 Emg. Oct. 2/ 3/98765405060708091011121314Sources: G-20 authorities and IMF staff estimates.1/ 2005-2009 reflects WEO data; 2010-2015reflectsMAP projections.2/ Reflects October 2010 MAP projections.3/ Excludes India due to data unavailability.5Comparative perspectives are based on the October2011 WEO.15
811.Projected fiscal balances arebroadly consistent with the Torontocommitment of halving the 2010 deficitby 2013 and stabilizing debt by 2016,but in many cases are predicated onoptimistic assumptions and not wellidentified measures. The projectionsforesee a narrowing of fiscal deficits byaround 4 percentage points of GDP over2010–15, and a reduction in public debtratios by almost 4 percentage points.G-20 plans, however, continue to rest onmoreoptimisticmacroeconomicassumptions than WEO projections,particularly for advanced economies. Amore favorable path for public debt in theMAP projections partly reflects a lowerinitial value for 2010 (due to vintageissues).6 6Advanced economies are projectinga much larger improvement in fiscalbalances over the medium-termthan emerging economies, reflectingdifferent starting positions. Whilefiscal projections in advancedcountries are consistent with theToronto commitments, Fund staffprojections indicate that these maybe difficult to achieve for some(including France and the UnitedUsing comparable vintages, earlier estimates forpublic debt in the June 2011 WEO quarterly updatewould be very close to the MAP figures shownbelow. However, WEO estimates for debt levelshave subsequently been revised up.States), because of both optimisticgrowth projections and sinceconsolidation measures are not wellidentified.12.Anticipated progress towardrebalancing global demand—essentialfor ensuring sustainability of globalgrowth going forward—is limited.Global imbalances narrowed during therecession, but are projected (according toG-20 policy frameworks) to stay large overthe medium term. This may partly reflectthat members’ projections do not fullyinternalize the effects of others’ plannedpoliciesorperhapsdoubttheireffectiveness. Projected changes in current accountbalances over 2010–15 reveal slow andlimited progress toward rebalancingglobal demand. Current accountdeficits of emerging deficit economiesare projected to widen, while deficitsof advanced deficit economies areprojected to narrow somewhat. At thesametime,emergingsurpluseconomies project their surpluses toexpand, while both advanced surpluseconomies and large oil exportersexpect a reduction in their surpluses.
9G-20 MAP Framework and WEO Projections of Overall Balances andGross Public Debt-8(percent of GDP; group averages computed using PPP weights)Gross Public DebtFiscal Balance80G-20 (WEO)-7G-20 (MAP)76G-20 Toronto 1/-6G-20 (WEO)78G-20 12131415Sources: G-20 authorities and IMF staff estimates.1/ Toronto Declaration of at least halving the 2010 deficit by 2013; based on June 2011 MAP projected estimate of2010 deficit.2010 - 2015 Projected Change in Current Account Balances 1/(percent of World GDP)ROW DeficitG-20 Deficit EmgG-20 Deficit AdvG-20 Large Oil ExportersROW SurplusG-20 Surplus EmgG-20 Surplus AdvWEOG-20MAPWORLD SUM-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.60.8Sources: G-20 authorities and IMF staff estimates.1/ Percentage points.Current Account Balances 1/(percent of World GDP)G-20 Large Oil ExportersG-20 Deficit EmgG-20 Surplus AdvROW DeficitG-20 Deficit AdvWORLD SUMROW SurplusG-20 Surplus ources: G-20 authorities and IMF staff estimates.1/ 2000-2009 reflects WEO data; 2010-2015 reflects MAP estimates and projections for G-20 countries and WEO projectionsfor ROW.
10IV. REDUCING IMBALANCES—LESSONS FROM THESUSTAINABILITY REPORTSeven systemic members were identified as having “moderate” or “large” imbalances thatwarranted more in-depth analysis. Sustainability assessments indicate that global imbalanceshave been driven primarily by saving imbalances—generally too low in advanced deficiteconomies and too high in emerging surplus economies—owing to a combination ofequilibrium factors (demographic patterns), structural weaknesses and domestic distortions.Corrective steps, including through collaborative action, aimed at addressing structuralimpediments and underlying distortions, will be needed to better support G-20 growthobjectives.A.Imbalances—Conceptual Issues13.There is agreement in the G-20that securing strong, sustainable andbalanced growth will require a reductionof excessive imbalances. If largeimbalances—internal or external—persistfor an extended period, they could posesystemic problems, including the risk ofdisruptive adjustments. For this reason,there is already market pressure on someG-20 countries to address their mediumterm fiscal imbalances, notwithstanding theneed to provide short-term fiscal supportto recovery. Alleviating external imbalancesis also a pressing need in the currentconjuncture, where large external surplusesin emerging economies combined with aliquidity trap in major advanced deficiteconomies (facing rising demands for fiscalconsolidation) underpin low output anddeflation risk in the latter and slowergrowth for the world, more memberswereidentified as having “moderate” or“large” imbalances (external or internal)thatwarrantedmorein-depthassessment of their root causes,implications for growth, and possibleneed for corrective action (see Box 1).The discussion further below summarizesthe sustainability assessment, evaluated inthe context of fiscal, monetary, financialsector, exchange rate and other policies.7Some conceptual issues are as follows: 7The discussion of internal imbalanceswill focus primarily on public finances—cyclically-adjusted primary balances(CAPB) and public debt—since largefiscal imbalances are likely to bear uponexternal imbalances, can stifle growth,and heighten vulnerability to marketfinancing pressures.For details on the root causes of imbalances in theseven G-20 members, please see the SustainabilityReports.
11 Thediscussionofexternalimbalances focuses primarily on thecurrent account—a core componentof the balance of payments whichprovides a concise summary of acountry’s net external position. Internal and external imbalances areinterlinked. The current accountreflects the excess or shortfall ofnational saving over investment, and,thus, connects external and internalimbalances.Moreover,viewingcurrent accounts through the prismofsaving-investmentbalancesprovides a good sense of variousinter-linkages and the levers foradjustment.15.Imbalances are not prima facie“bad”, and warrant remedial actiononly to the extent that they smayreflectdifferences in saving and investmentpatterns and portfolio choices acrosscountries, owing to differences in levelsof development, demographic patterns,andotherunderlyingeconomicfundamentals. If so, such imbalances arenot a reason for concern. At the sametime, however, imbalances may alsoreflect policy distortions, market failures,and externalities at the level of individualeconomies or at a global level. If so, theyare a cause of concern, since they couldinter alia undermine the strength andsustainability of growth. In particular, thefollowing typology is useful: Imbalances can be beneficial if theyreflect the optimal allocation ofcapital across time and space. Forinstance, to meet its life-cycle needs,a country with an aging populationrelative to its trading partner maychoose to save and run currentaccount surpluses in anticipation ofthe dissaving that will occur whenthe workforce shrinks. Similarly, acountry with attractive investmentopportunities may wish to financepart of its investment through foreignsaving, and thus run a currentaccount deficit. Imbalances can be detrimental if theyreflect structural shortcomings, policydistortions or market failures. Forinstance, large current accountsurpluses may reflect high nationalsaving unrelated to the life-cycleneeds of a country but instead tostructural shortcomings, such as alack of social insurance or poorgovernance of firms that allowsthem to retain excessive earnings.Similarly, countries could be runninglarge current account deficitsbecause of low private saving, owingto asset-price booms that are beingfueled or accommodated by policydistortions in the financial systemthatimpedemarketsfromequilibrating. Imbalances could alsoreflect systemic distortions, reflected,forinstance,intherapidaccumulation of reserves by somecountriestomaintainanundervalued exchange rate.
12Box 1. G-20 Indicative Guidelines for Identifying Large ImbalancesTo take forward the G-20’s commitment in Seoul to promote external sustainability, indicative guidelineswere developed to help identify persistently large imbalances among members that warranted deeperanalysis. This two-step process identified seven members for in-depth assessments (i.e., sustainabilityreports) in the second stage, using the following approach: A set of key indicators were agreed upon by the G-20 to evaluate key imbalances. These indicatorswere: (i) public debt and fiscal deficits; (ii) private saving and private debt; and (iii) the externalposition—composed of the trade balance and net investment income flows and transfers. Indicative guidelines consisted of comparing indicators to reference values to determine if deviationswere significant based on four different approaches. While not policy targets, reference values werederived based on: (1) a structural approach based on economic frameworks to derive suitable“norms”; (2) a time series approach to provide historical trends; (3) a cross-section approach toprovide benchmarks based on group averages for countries at similar stages of development; and(4) quartile analysis to provide median values based on the full G-20 distribution. Values of theindicators were based on staff WEO projections for 2013–15. Members were selected if imbalances significantly exceeded their reference values in at least two ofthe approaches. “Large” imbalances were identified as such if two or more of the methods founddeviations from indicative guidelines to be significant in two of the three sectors (external, fiscal,and private sector). Systemic countries (who account for 5 percent or more of G-20 GDP) wereevaluated on stricter criteria (requiring only moderate-sized imbalances), recognizing thatimbalances in systemic members are more likely to affect others. On this basis, seven member countries were selected for sustainability assessments of imbalances(see figure). The countries and imbalances chosen were as follows: China (high private saving andexternal surplus); France (high external deficit and public debt); Germany (high public debt andexternal surplus); India (high private saving and fiscal deficits); Japan (high public debt and privatesaving); United States (large fiscal and external deficits); and United Kingdom (low private savingand high public debt).G-20 Indicative Guidelines: Comparison of Approaches(Systemic rule; at market exchange rates)Structural NormsCross SectionFranceGermanyU.K.ChinaJapanU.S.Time SeriesQuartile AnalysisEuro areaTurkeySources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and staff estimates.IndiaItaly
13B.Explaining Imbalances16.Thesourcesofexternalimbalances in the run-up to the crisisvary widely across the seven economies,largely reflecting factors that have leddomestic saving behavior to differwidely. Current account deficits before thecrisis have reflected low public and privatesaving (United Kingdom and United States);or low public saving, which has been partlyoffset by high private saving (France andIndia). Surpluses, on the other hand, havereflected high national saving, owing, inparticular, to exceptionally high privatesavingthatexceedshighprivateinvestment (China); or positive privatesaving-investment balances, owing to highsaving and low investment (Germany andJapan), which has offset high (modest)public dissaving in the case of Japan(Germany).Private (S-I)Private (S-I)SurplusDeficitPublic Saving ( )ChinaPublic Dissaving (-)IndiaJapanFranceGermanyUnited StatesUnited KingdomSource: IMF staff estimates.Note: Countries circled in red denote those with current account deficits.17.Abstracting from the financialcrisis—which adversely affected budgetbalances in all countries, a variety ofstructural and equilibrium factors,reflecting country circumstances, havedriven public saving behavior. These willneed to be addressed to reduce externalimbalances and bolster public finances. Inparticular, factors underpinning fiscaldeficits include: Persistently low growth (making itdifficult to balance the budget),reflecting a decline in productivity, ashrinking labor force, and lowinvestment, as well as the needs of arapidly aging population (Japan); Structural imbalances between taxrevenues and spending commitmentspre-crisis, underfunded entitlementobligations, the lack of agreement onfiscal adjustment priorities, and thelack of fiscal rules and strictenforcement mechanisms to imposesufficient budgetary discipline (France,United Kingdom and United States); Politicaleconomyconsiderationsexerting strong pressure on spendingand resistance to raising taxes (India,Japan, and United States), a weakrevenuesystem,andfinancialrepression (India).
1418.At the same time, domesticpolicy distortions (defined broadly asfactors that impede a market fromequilibrating) have also played animportant role in driving imbalances. Distortions in financial systems havefueled low private saving and largecurrent account deficits. Weak privatesaving-investment imbalances beforethecrisis,reflectingunderlyingproblems in financial sectors, haveplayed a role in fueling currentaccount deficits in major advancedeconomies, notably the United Statesand United Kingdom. In particular,distortions in the financial system,pertainingtoregulatoryandsupervisory frameworks, were partlyresponsibleforafundamentalbreakdown in market discipline andmispricing of risk (reflected in creditand housing booms) and contributedto a widening of external imbalances.In the United Kingdom, constraints onthe supply of housing precluded aconstruction
Process (MAP) to evaluate the consistency of G-20 policies and frameworks with members’ shared growth objectives. Since then, the Framework has been augmented to enhance its effectiveness. At the 2010 Summit in Seoul, members advanced the process by “outlining an action-oriented plan with each member’s concrete policy
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