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No. 12-873IN THESupreme Court of the United StatesLEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC.,Petitioner,v.STATIC CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC.,Respondent.ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THEUNITED STATES COURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUITBRIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAEIN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTETHAN HORWITZKING & SPALDING LLP1185 Avenue of the AmericasNew York, New York 10036(212) 556-2100VIJAY TOKEHIARING SMITH, LLP101 Lucas Valley Road,Suite 300San Rafael, California 94903(415) 457-2040A NTHONY J. DREYERCounsel of RecordJORDAN A. FEIRMANSKADDEN, A RPS, SLATE,MEAGHER, & FLOM LLPFour Times SquareNew York, New York 10036(212) 735-3000anthony.dreyer@skadden.comCounsel for Amicus CuriaeThe International Trademark AssociationOctober 17, 2013249809A(800) 274-3321 (800) 359-6859

iTABLE OF CONTENTSPageTABLE OF CONTENTS.CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iTABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiiINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.3LEGAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.8A. Prudential Standing Under the LanhamAct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8B. Three-Way Circuit Split for Lanham Act“Prudential Standing” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101.Categorical Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .102. AGC Factors Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113. “Reasonable Interests” Test. . . . . . . . .13ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14I.T H E CAT EG OR ICA L T E S T I SU N DU LY NA R R OW A N D D OE SNOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT THEI N T ER E S T S OF T R A DEM A R KOWNERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

iiTable of ContentsPageA. Circuits Adopting the CategoricalTest Dev iat e f rom P recedenta nd R ely S olely on a n Undu lyNarrow Reading of the LanhamAct’s General Statement of Purpose . . . . .14B. The Categor ical Test Has BeenHeavily Criticized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18C. T h i s C a s e D e m o n s t r a t e s t h eShortcomings of the CategoricalTest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19II. A DOPTION OF THE A NTITRUSTBASED AGC FACTORS TEST HASSUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS IN THECONTEXT OF THE LANHAM ACT. . . . . . . .20A. B y E m p h a s i z i n g I n j u r y t oCompetition and Monetary Damages,the AGC Factors Do Not Comportwith the Lanham Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20B. T h i s C a s e D e m o n s t r a t e s t h eShortcomings of the AGC FactorsTest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24III. THE “REASONABLE INTERESTS”TEST IS CONSISTENT WITH THELA NH A M ACT A ND SHOULD BEADOPTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

iiiTABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIESPageCASESAllen v. Wright,468 U.S. 737 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 9Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2American Association of Orthodontists v.Yellow Book USA, Inc.,434 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Associated General Contractors of California,Inc. v. California State Councilof Carpenters,459 U.S. 519 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passimBanjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky,399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,370 U.S. 294 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20Camel Hair & Cashmere Institute of America,Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.,799 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,479 U.S. 104 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

ivCited AuthoritiesPageCentury 21 Real Estate LLC v.All Professional Realty, Inc.,No. CIV. 2:10-2751, 2011 WL 221651(E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Christian Louboutin S.A. v.Yves Saint Laurent America Holding, Inc.,696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc.,690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd.,442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4, 9Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v.Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc.,165 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passimDastar Corp. v.Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,539 U.S. 23 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Avenue Photo Inc.,624 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passimFerring Pharm. Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc.,Case No. 13-2290 (3d. Cir.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

vCited AuthoritiesPageFlorida Prepaid Postsecondary EducationExpense Board v. College Savings Bank527 U.S. 627 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc.,812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . 10, 14, 15, 18Jack Russell Terrier Network of NorthernCalifornia. v. American Kennel Club, Inc.,407 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,486 U.S. 281 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.Lasting Impression I, Inc.,543 U.S. 111 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v.AT&T Information Systems, Inc.,9 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14Made in the USA Foundation v.Phillips Foods, Inc.,365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,537 U.S. 418 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. v.Cosprophar, Inc.,32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

viCited AuthoritiesPagePhoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,489 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 23, 24Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp.,242 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,514 U.S. 159 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc.,676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.,886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,86 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9Smith v. Montoro,648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc.,52 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14Static Control Components, Inc. v.Lexmark International, Inc.,697 F.3d 387 (6th Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passimStatic Control Components, Inc. v.Lexmark International, Inc.,No. 02-571, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73845(E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2006), rev’d, 697 F.3d387 (6th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

viiCited AuthoritiesPageTambrands, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co.,673 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Test Masters Educational Services, Inc.v. Singh,428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc.,653 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19, 21, 28TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,532 U.S. 23 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,505 U.S. 763 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co.,661 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 16Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,529 U.S. 205 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Warth v. Seldin,422 U.S. 490 (1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

viiiCited AuthoritiesPageSTATUTES AND REGULATIONS15 U.S.C. § 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 1115 U.S.C. § 1116(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7, 2215 U.S.C. § 1117(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2315 U.S.C. § 1125(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim15 U.S.C. § 1127 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 9, 10, 14OTHER AUTHORITIES1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 1:8 (4th ed. 2013) . . . . . . .154 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 24:14 (4th ed. 2013) . . . . .185 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 27:9 (4th ed. 2013) . . . . . . 17

ixCited AuthoritiesPage5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 27:31 (4th ed. 2013) . . . . .225 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 27:32 (4th ed.2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 185 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarksand Unfair Competition § 30:47 (4th ed. 2013) . . . . .22Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 1 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 2 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 3 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition§ 37 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16S. Rep. No. 100-515 (1988), reprinted in 1988U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 18T r a d e m a rk L a w R e v i s ion A c t of 19 8 8 ,Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

xCited AuthoritiesPageRebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut From A to B:Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law,159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1305 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23The United States Trademark AssociationTrademark Review CommissionReport and Recommendations to USTAPresident and Board of Directors,77 Trademark Rep. 375 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3James S. Wrona, False Advertising and ConsumerStanding Under Section 43(a) of the LanhamAct: Broad Consumer Protection Legislationor a Narrow Pro-Competitive Measure?,47 Rutgers L. Rev. 1085 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

1INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1Founded in 1878, amicus curiae The InternationalTrademark Association (“INTA”) is a not-for-profitorganization dedicated to the support and advancementof trademarks and related intellectual property conceptsas essential elements of trade and commerce. INTA hasmore than 6,000 members in more than 190 countries. Itsmembers include trademark and brand owners, as wellas law fi rms and other professionals who regularly assistbrand owners in the creation, registration, protection,and enforcement of their trademarks. All INTA membersshare the goal of promoting an understanding of theessential role that trademarks and goodwill play infostering effective commerce, fair competition, andinformed decision-making by consumers.INTA was founded in part to encourage the enactmentof federal trademark legislation after invalidationon constitutional grounds of the United States’ firsttrademark act. Since then, INTA has been instrumentalin making recommendations and providing assistance tolegislators in connection with major trademark and relatedlegislation. INTA members are frequent participants inLanham Act–related litigation as both plaintiffs and1. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amicuscuriae states that this brief was authored solely by INTA andits counsel, and no part of this brief was authored by counselto a party. No party or counsel for a party made a monetarycontribution intended to fund the preparation or submission ofthis brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, andits counsel made such a monetary contribution to its preparationor submission. Letters from both parties consenting to the fi lingof this brief have been fi led with the Clerk of the Court.

2defendants. INTA has also participated as amicus curiaein numerous cases involving significant Lanham Act issuesin this Court and others. 2INTA and its members have a particular interestin this case, which concerns prudential standingrequirements for false advertising claims broughtpursuant to Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Resolution of the current threeway circuit split on this issue would greatly benefittrademark owners by creating a uniform standard andreducing forum shopping. In addition, it is important toINTA that the standard adopted by the Court sufficientlyprotect trademark owners’ ability to pursue recourseunder the Lanham Act when their commercial interests2. Cases in which INTA has fi led amicus briefs with thisCourt include without limitation: Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,133 S. Ct. 721 (2013); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. LastingImpression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004); Dastar Corp. v. TwentiethCentury Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); Moseley v. V SecretCatalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. SamaraBros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Qualitex Co.v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. TacoCabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); and K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). Recent cases in which INTA has fi ledamicus briefs with the United States Courts of Appeals for thevarious circuits include without limitation: Ferring Pharm. Inc. v.Watson Pharm., Inc., Case No. 13-2290 (3d. Cir.) (amicus brief filedSept. 20, 2013); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint LaurentAm. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012); Rosetta Stone Ltd.v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012); Fleischer Studios, Inc.v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); and Test MastersEduc. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005).

3are adversely affected by false advertising. As set forthherein, while INTA takes no position with respect to theplausibility of respondent’s allegations or the merits of itssubstantive claims, INTA and its members are concernedthat the prudential standing tests proposed by petitionerare not only inconsistent with the text and purpose ofthe Lanham Act, but also would prevent the Courts fromhearing legitimate grievances concerning deceptivemarketing that Congress intended to be actionable underthe Lanham Act. 3SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTAt the heart of prudential standing is the questionof “whether the constitutional or statutory provisionon which the claim rests properly can be understoodas granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right tojudicial relief.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).Put differently, a plaintiff’s complaint must “fall withinthe zone of interests protected by the law invoked,” inorder for prudential standing to lie. Allen v. Wright, 468U.S. 737, 751 (1984).3. This brief is not the fi rst time that INTA has providedguidance with respect to prudential standing requirements forSection 43(a) false advertising claims. INTA’s predecessor, theU.S. Trademark Association (“USTA”), addressed this issueprior to passage of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988.See The United States Trademark Association TrademarkReview Commission Report and Recommendations to USTAPresident and Board of Directors, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 42728 (1987); S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 2-3 (1988), reprinted in 1988U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5578-79 (noting that the USTA Report andRecommendations “served as the basis for the introduction” ofthe bill that became the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988).

4Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, added as partof the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, provides an express statutorycause of action against false advertising. The text of thatprovision extends the cause of action to an expansiveclass of potential plaintiffs – indeed, the same categoryof plaintiffs that may bring a cause of action for falseassociation under Section 43(a)(1)(A): “any person whobelieves that he or she is or is likely to be damaged bysuch” false advertising or false association. 15 U.S.C.§ 1125(a)(1). While it is universally acknowledged thatthis language incorporates some prudential standinglimitations, those limitations are fairly minimal; Section43(a) protections are available to those entities whosecommercial interests are adversely affected by falseadvertising or false association. See, e.g., Colligan v.Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir.1971).Of the three prudential standing tests employed by thecircuit courts for false advertising claims under Section43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, the “reasonable interests”test applied by the Sixth Circuit in the proceedingsbelow – and advocated for by respondent Static ControlComponents, Inc. (“Static Control”) – is the only analysisfully consistent with the text and underlying purposesof the Lanham Act. See Static Control Components,Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 697 F.3d 387, 410-11 (6th Cir.2012). Under this flexible and case-by-case approachoriginally developed by the Second Circuit, the Courtinquires whether a plaintiff has “‘(1) a reasonable interestto be protected against the false advertising and (2) areasonable basis for believing that the interest is likelyto be damaged by the alleged false advertising.’” Id. at

5410 (quoting Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc.,624 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2010)). Necessarily built intothis determination is the aforementioned limitation thatonly parties whose commercial interests are affected arewithin the aegis of Section 43(a). See Famous Horse, 624F.3d at 111-12.In contrast, the two alternate tests of prudentialstanding that petitioner Lexmark International, Inc.(“Lexmark”) implores this Court to choose from would,inconsistent with the broad standing mandate of Section43(a)(1)(B) itself, drastically limit the protections that theLanham Act affords to parties with commercial injuries.The “categorical test” misinterprets one of theLanham Act’s general purposes – to protect “againstunfair competition,” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 – as protectingonly direct competitors against false advertising. Butthe notion that Lanham Act protections only extend to“direct” competitors is not found in the text of Section43(a) or the legislative history of the Lanham Act.Nor does such a limitation make any sense. To besure, false advertising may be particularly likely to injurea party’s commercial interests when the advertiser is adirect competitor (because, for example, it may divertsales to a substitute product). But there are instancesin which factual misrepresentations can injure thecommercial interests of non-direct competitors (or evennon-competitors). For example, if a company is expresslyfalsely disparaged, its goodwill and reputation may beinjured irrespective of whether the party making thestatements is a direct competitor. Relatedly, commercialinterests may be injured in cases involving deceptive

6statements about a party’s association or affi liation underSection 43(a)(1)(A), for which no courts – even those thatapply the categorical test for Section 43(a)(1)(B) claims– require that the plaintiff and defendant be directcompetitors for prudential standing to lie. Accordingly,while Lexmark may tout the categorical test as havingthe “virtue of simplicity, resulting in greater consistencyand predictability” in the courts, Pet. Br. at 12, thosepurported benefits are obtained at the steep expense offidelity to the scope and purposes of the Lanham Act.Nor should this Court adopt the balancing factorsset forth by this Court for determining standing to bringan antitrust claim in Associated General Contractors ofCalifornia, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,459 U.S. 519, 538-44 (1983) (the “AGC Factors”), and fi rstadopted in the Lanham Act false advertising contextin Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 233-35 (3d Cir. 1998). While theapplication of the AGC Factors to standing under theLanham Act in Conte Bros. reflects a thoughtful attemptto supplement the “reasonable interests” test by providingadditional guideposts for the courts, those factorsnevertheless have also proven an unduly restrictive toolfor identifying the types of commercial harms that giverise to a cause of action under the Lanham Act. Indeed,because of their origins as a test to determine prudentialstanding under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15, the AGC Factors require a plaintiff to demonstrate aninjury to competition itself – i.e., an antitrust injury – thatis not required under the Lanham Act.In addition, the AGC Factors place great emphasis ona plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate and apportion monetarydamages. Yet monetary damages are not only notoriously

7difficult to prove in Lanham Act false advertising cases,they are not even required by the Lanham Act itself,which permits plaintiffs to pursue, among other remedies,solely injunctive relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Relatedly,the AGC Factors do not properly account for the fact thatfalse advertising can result in damage to a business’sgoodwill separate and apart from measurable, pecuniaryharms. As a result, application of the AGC Factors toSection 43(a) claims leads to inconsistent and confusingresults – including by the District Court in this case,which conflated its analyses of prudential standing forStatic Control’s distinct claims under the antitrust lawsand the Lanham Act.The facts of this case demonstrate the shortcomingsof the categorical test and AGC Factors. While INTAtakes no position with respect to the plausibility of StaticControl’s allegations or the actual merits of its substantiveclaim, it is difficult to imagine that such allegations, ifplausible, would not present the very injury that fallswithin the Lanham Act’s “zone of interests.”4 StaticControl, which “mak[es] and sell[s] the componentsnecessary to remanufacture Lexmark [toner] cartridges,”Static Control, 697 F.3d at 396, has alleged that Lexmark’sadvertising sought to impair Static Control’s activities by4. INTA’s conclusion that the reasonable interest approachshould be adopted is shared by amici the American IntellectualProperty Law Association and Law Professors, whose briefswere submitted to this Court in support of neither petitioner norrespondent. Insofar as Lexmark advocates for the categoricaland AGC Factors test, and Static Control recognizes that anyproper test of prudential standing specific to Section 43(a) of theLanham Act “should use the reasonable interest test applied bythe Sixth Circuit (and the First and Second Circuits) as a model”(Respondent’s Br. at 15), INTA believes that it is appropriate tosubmit this brief in support of the respondent.

8“false[ly] inform[ing] customers that [Static Control’s]products infringe Lexmark’s purported intellectualproperty.” Id. at 409. To the extent that Lexmarkpurportedly disseminated false information about StaticControl’s business by name and in such a manner thatwould impair Static Control’s ability to sell its products,Static Control’s commercial interests were certainlyalleged to have been harmed.Insofar as Lexmark advocates for a test thatwould not permit Static Control to pursue its falseadvertising claim herein, its notions of prudential standingwould not adequately protect brand owners againstmisrepresentations about their businesses. Accordingly,this Court should reject the categorical test and AGCFactors, and adopt the reasonable interests test as theproper analysis of prudential standing for false advertisingclaims under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act.LEGAL BACKGROUNDA.Prudential Standing Under the Lanham ActSection 43(a) of the Lanham Act, on its face, providesthat “any person who believes that he or she is or is likelyto be damaged” may bring a cause of action against anyperson who “uses in commerce any word, term, name,symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any falsedesignation of origin, false or misleading description offact, or false or misleading representation of fact” thatconstitutes either false association or false advertising. 15U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). While this grant of standing is broad,courts throughout the United States have consistentlyagreed that this provision, and the Lanham Act generally,

9imposes on putative plaintiffs additional “prudentialstanding” requirements beyond demonstrating an ArticleIII “case or controversy” – i.e., that the plaintiff’s allegedlyinjured interest is “within the zone of interests” intendedto be protected by the statute. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. Forexample, Section 43(a) protections are available only tothose entities whose commercial interests are adverselyaffected by false advertising or false association, and thusconsumers do not have a cause of action under the statute.See Colligan, 442 F.2d at 692 (explaining that the LanhamAct is intended “exclusively to protect the interests of apurely commercial class against unscrupulous commercialconduct”); see also Made in the USA Found. v. PhillipsFoods, Inc., 365 F.3d 278, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2004) (citingcases for the proposition that “[a]t least half of the circuitshold (and none of the others disagree)” that consumersare barred from suing under the Lanham Act); ConteBros., 165 F.3d at 229 (recognizing that consumers do nothave standing to bring Section 43(a) claims and noting“the expressly commercial purpose of the Lanham Act”);Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1383 n.5 (5thCir. 1996) (“[W]e have found no case which suggests that‘consumers’ as such have standing under § 43(a).”).55. The breadth of the Lanham Act’s protection of commercialinterests is aptly reflected in the language of Section 43(a) itself,referring to “use[] in commerce” and misrepresentations of“goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).The Colligan court also looked to the general purpose language inSection 45 of the Lanham Act concerning protection of “personsengaged in such commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 1127, as reflectingCongressional intention to protect only against commercial harms.See Colligan, 442 F.2d at 691-92.

10Beyond this, however, the various circuit Courts ofAppeals have disagreed as to the prudential standingrequirements for false advertising claims under Section43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, with a three-way circuitsplit on this issue emerging. These three tests have cometo be known as (1) the “categorical” test, (2) the “AGCFactors” test, and (3) the “reasonable interests” test.B. Three-Way Circuit Split for Lanham Act“Prudential Standing”1.Categorical TestThe “categorical” test is the narrowest, most rigidapproach to prudential standing for false advertisingclaims under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act. Itpermits such claims only where the plaintiff is a directcompetitor of the defendant, i.e., the injury is “harmful tothe plaintiff’s ability to compete with the defendant.” JackRussell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club,Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005). This test was fi rstadopted by the Ninth Circuit in Halicki v. United ArtistsCommunications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1987). Relying on one of the general statements of purposein Section 45 of the Lanham Act “to protect personsengaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition,” 15U.S.C. § 1127), the Ninth Circuit narrowed its analysisto the regulation of competition, concluding that forconduct to be actionable under the Lanham Act, it “mustnot only be unfair but must in some discernible way becompetitive.” Halicki, 812 F.2d at 1214. Notably (and asdiscussed below in Section I.A), courts that apply thecategorical test only require direct competition for falseadvertising claims brought under Section 43(a)(1)(B), but

11not for false association claims brought under Section43(a)(1)(A), despite the fact that both causes of action arecovered by the same statutory language concerning whomay sue. See Jack Russell Terrier Network, 407 F.3d at1037; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh andTenth Circuits have also adopted the categorical test. SeeL.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d561, 575 (7th Cir. 1993); Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc.,52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 1995).2.AGC Factors TestThe “AGC Factors” test is so called because itderives from this Court’s decision in Associated GeneralContractors of California, Inc. v. California State Councilof Carpenters (“AGC”), which considered prudentialstanding requirements for bringing an antitrust actionfor treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.See AGC, 459 U.S. at 521 (“The question presented iswhether the complaint sufficiently alleges that t

Oct 12, 2013 · supreme court of the united states on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit a (800) 274-3321 (800) 359-6859 brief of the international trademark association as amicus curiae in support of respondent 249809 lexmark international, inc., petitioner, v. static control components, inc., respondent. ethan .

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