ARMY HISTORY
ARMY HISTORYThe Professional Bulletin of Army HistoryWinter 2006PB 20-05-1 (No. 62) Washing t o n , D . C .In This Issue420From Gentility to Atrocity:The Continental Army’s Ways of WarBy Wayne E. LeeTransformation or Troop Strength?Early Accounts of the Invasion of IraqBy W. Shane StoryCopyright-Protected imageremoved for online version.3 Chief’s Corner29 News Notes30 Commentary41 Book Reviews
Editor’s JournalBy Order of the Secretary of the Army:PETER J. SCHOOMAKERGeneral, United States ArmyChief of StaffOfficial:SANDRA R. RILEYAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the ArmyManaging EditorCharles Hendricks, Ph.D.The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes Army History (ISSN 1546–5330) for the professional development of Army historians. Correspondence should be addressed to Managing Editor,Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C.20319–5058, or sent by e-mail to charles.hendricks@hqda.army.mil. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors, not the Departmentof Defense or its constituent elements. Army History’s contents do not necessarily reflect official Armypositions and do not supersede information in otherofficial Army publications or Army regulations. Thisbulletin is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Armyknowledgeable of developments in Army historyand thereby enhance their professional development.The reproduction of images that were not obtainedfrom federal sources is prohibited. The Departmentof the Army approved the use of funds for printingthis publication on 7 September 1983.Cover illustration: A detail of John Trumbull, The Capture ofthe Hessians at Trenton, 26 December 1776, Yale University ArtGallery, Trumbull Collection Army History Winter 2006This issue of Army History opens with an article byProfessor Wayne E. Lee of the University of Louisville thatcompares the style of warfare employed by the ContinentalArmy during the Revolutionary War against regular Britishforces and their British colonial supporters, on the one hand,with the way the Continental Army campaigned against theIroquois Indian allies of the British. This examination is partof an ongoing historical analysis of the United States military’sway of making war.The issue then turns to more current history. Maj. W.Shane Story of the Center of Military History examines sevencommercially published books issued in 2003 and 2004 thatdiscuss the planning and execution of the invasion of Iraq.While each of these books appeared quite promptly after theoffensive that overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, someprovide more depth than others in analyzing the issues thatmilitary action involved. This essay offers readers an overviewof this literature. After Major Story’s piece, the issue containstwo essays by civilian Center historians examining officialArmy efforts to capture quickly the basic historical outlines ofrecent military campaigns. The first, by Richard W. Stewart,focuses on three accounts of the Gulf War, Afghan War, andIraq War. The second, by Jeffrey J. Clarke, takes a longer view ofofficial military historians’ efforts to evaluate recent campaigns,observing an increasing demand in recent decades for speedieranalysis, to which the Army’s historians have responded. Sadly,the issue also includes a half-dozen obituaries of men whomade significant contributions to the Army’s historical efforts.The issue concludes with nine reviews of individual books onmilitary history from 1776 to the Afghan War.A policy question relating to book reviews arose in theaftermath of the publication of the previous issue of ArmyHistory. While this bulletin has on rare occasions reprintedwith permission reviews of books on military history thatappeared first in other journals, it always acknowledged theirearlier appearance. The Spring 2005 issue of Army History(No. 61) contained a review by Samuel Watson of the bookby Alan Peskin, Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms (Kent,Ohio, 2003), that was very similar to, albeit somewhat moreextensive than, the review Watson contributed to the January2005 issue of the Journal of Military History. I learned ofWatson’s earlier review of this book only after the Spring issuewas published and thus did not acknowledge the earlier piecethere. I regret that omission. To avoid a recurrence, authorsand reviewers are hereby informed that the policy of ArmyHistory is that all articles and reviews appearing in this bulletinwill contain the initial presentation in print of the writer’sanalysis of the subject at hand, unless clear acknowledgment ismade to the contrary.Charles Hendricks, Managing EditorThe Chief’s CornerJohn S. BrownAs I come to the end of my time at the Center ofMilitary History, I think back of course over the past sevenyears and the wonderful experiences I have had as chief ofmilitary history. Most central to my sense of satisfactionand well-being have been the many friendships I have madeand the warm sense of collegiality I have enjoyed the entiretime. I also am buoyed by the demonstrable achievements ofthe entire Army Historical Program in addressing both theroutine and the unique. At the risk of neglecting importantcontributions, let me make a few observations on theseaccomplishments—your accomplishments—here.We have been through war together, each in our owncapacity. Virtually all of the military history detachmentshave deployed, many of them more than once. Theirtraining and preparation was a commendable group effortthat reached well beyond those who deployed. The Armyhas also deployed a great many individual historians andcurators for special purposes and as augmentees. Thehistorical materials returned to the United States by thedetachments and augmentees will provide an invaluableresource that I am confident will be put to excellent use byour Army and its historians for years to come. In preparingfor and gathering this material we have seen remarkableinnovations in organizations such as the modularly builtMilitary History Group; in training such as Exercises Slamand Delbruck and rotations to the Army’s combat trainingcenters; in equipment such as digital recorders and cameras;and in the technology involved in our digital collectionsoftware, which organizes the documents, interviews, andphotos collected on the battlefield.In addition to serving and observing our soldiersaround the world, Army historians have ably served theArmy Staff, Joint Staff, Department of Defense, andCongress as each struggles with the Global War on Terror,defense transformation, the Quadrennial Review, and otherimperatives. This support to decision-makers at the highestlevel has been one of the most visible challenges for theCenter of Military History throughout my tenure hereand one of the most rewarding as well. We have providedextensive historical background and documentation onsubjects as diverse as occupation, denazification, counterinsurgency, advisory efforts, convoy security, force structuredevelopment, code talkers, irregular warfare, the militaryexperiences of Afghanistan and Iraq, and past homelanddefense work. Our involvement with Task Force Modularityhas put historians in the midst of this major structuralreorganization of the Army, particularly since our longstanding responsibilities for naming and perpetuating unitshave broadened to providing more fundamental counseland advice. Oral historians have assisted in providing thesehistorical services, especially when ranking officers wantthe benefit of the thoughts and words of their predecessors.I can honestly say that our senior leaders have listened tous attentively, and it has been gratifying to have historythoughtfully considered at so high a level. It is alsogratifying to know that historians and curators in the fieldare providing similar services to their commanders aroundthe world.The past several years have seen considerable innovationin the goods and services we provide our customers aroundthe world. The Center of Military History continues toproduce definitive official histories of the highest caliber,supported by superb editing, cartography, and graphics.During my tenure Center historians brought to publicationmeticulously researched books on the origins of Armyaviation, the leadership of American troops exercised by thecommand post of General Courtney Hodges in World WarII, ground combat operations in Vietnam, and the Army’srole in the recent decades in restoring peace after episodesof domestic civil disorder. The Center also published bookson the operations of VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War,the Army’s role in reconstructing Kuwait and assistingcontinued on page 58
From Gentility to Atrocity:The Continental Army’s Ways of WarYale University Art Gallery, Trumbull CollectionCopyright-Protected imageremoved for online version.The Capture of the Hessians at Trenton, 26 December 1776, by John Trumbull, 1789–1828. General Washington magnanimously directsMaj. William Stephens Smith, aide de camp to General Sullivan, to assist the mortally wounded Col. Johann Gottlieb Rall, commander of theHessians defeated at Trenton. Sullivan is the seventh person from the right, astride a brown horse. First Lt. James Monroe lies wounded at left,his head partially obscured by Rall’s extended right hand. Smith served in the Iroquois campaign as the lieutenant colonel of Spencer’sAdditional Continental Regiment.“The Indians shall see, that there is malice enough in our hearts to destroyeverything that contributes to their support.”Continental Army Maj. Gen. John Sullivan“Indians were seen as a ‘special’ enemy, not deserving of the usual protectionsfor combatants.”Wayne E. Lee Army History Winter 2006By Wayne E. LeeIn the fall and winter of 1777 to 1778 General GeorgeWashington and the main part of the Continental Armyfought a profoundly conventional campaign against theBritish expeditionary force sent to Philadelphia. The period is traditionally seen as the start of the Continental Army’s transformation into a professional force modeled alongEuropean lines that fought in the traditional European style,with all the Enlightenment-era accouterments that such astatement entails.1 In the summer of 1779 many of thevery same regiments, with the same officers, and followingWashington’s orders, marched into the Iroquois country ofupstate New York and fought a very different kind of campaign—one marked not only by a different strategic use ofviolence, but also by a qualitatively different interpersonalstyle of violence.2 Here were two “American ways of war”coexisting at the same time in the same Army, producingvery different results.The use of the phrase American way of war is of coursedeliberate. Russell Weigley’s landmark volume of that titleargued that Americans since the Civil War have primarily relied upon war of annihilation—seeking to destroy theenemy as a military power. Prior to the Civil War, Weigleyargued, the American military usually lacked the resourcesto undertake such an overwhelming strategic goal and thusdeveloped techniques of limited war. Weigley highlightedtwo different strategies of limited war: Washington’s conventional war of attrition, designed to avoid decisive engagement and keep an “army in being,” and Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene’s more innovative combination of guerrillaand conventional forces in a running war against the Britishin the south. In either case, Weigley saw limited resourcesdictating American strategic choices.3 There is much wisdom here but also some inevitable oversimplification. WhatI would like to do is to suggest an increase in the numberof variables that should be considered and then use thosemultiple variables to compare the choices made in the twocampaigns, Philadelphia 1777–78 and Iroquois 1779, toexamine how the same Army arrived at two very differentways of war.
Army History Winter 2006Must win their hearts and minds towin,” or even “we Must not kill all thefarmers whose produce feeds us.”A somewhat more sophisticated approach to the level of frightfulness in waracknowledges economic, technological,or social-organizational restraints on violence in the overall capacity of a societyto wage destructive war. Upper limits onthe sizes of armies that can be deployedor the destructive potential of the weapons in play limit the ability, or as I haveabbreviated it, the Can, of a society toescalate the frightfulness of war. Here itis not so much a choice, as an upper limit. The importance of this perspective ina historical analysis is that it allows usto recognize what an army could havedone but did not do; stopping short ofits full capacity for destruction impliesrestraint. There is also a relationship between the limits of the possible and thechoices of strategy. We have already noted how Weigley pointed to the limitedresources of the Continental Army as anexplanation for the calculations of necessity underpinning both Greene’s partisan strategy and Washington’s strategyof attrition.To this two-legged model, I suggestthe addition of a third, and by doing so,open up whole cans of cultural worms.The third component is what I havecalled Should. What level of violenceShould we use? The Shoulds that usually come to mind in this context are either morality in line with conscience orthe more or less formal laws of war, bothacting as restraints on violence. Theseare important considerations, but thereare other kinds of Should as well. Themost obvious example is the commoncultural insistence on retaliation (eitherfrom simple passion or from a broadercultural definition of retaliation as justice). A belief in retaliation may demanda level of violence that Should be done,without regard to issues of necessity.Furthermore, Should encompasses levels or types of violence “authorized” bya society. That is, as a bottom line, societies generally authorize killing armedenemies in wartime. Such authorizationis designed to overcome any natural resistance to killing. The question thenbecomes, once freed to kill by being “atwar,” how is one expected to kill? Andwhat limits exist on who and when onekills? This issue of authorization seemsto me to be separate from personal conscience-based decisions and not easilymade subject to articulated, collectiverules as found in “laws of war.”Fundamentally, these considerationsof Should allow us to consider the waysin which the landscape of violence within war, and thus an army’s overall wayof war, transcends commanders’ choicesor calculations of necessity or possibility. The frightfulness of war is also verymuch affected by the choices of localleaders and individual soldiers, and theirchoices are rooted in broader culturalpredilections. But let us consider theseissues in the light of the two campaignsof the Continental Army in 1777–78and 1779.The Continental Army and“Gentility”As a whole, General Washingtonand the Continental leadership approached the waging of war in a typicaleighteenth-century fashion. Washingtonstruggled to establish a conventional eighteenth-century army capable of fightingon the same field and in the same styleas the British Army. Included in this vision of war was an Enlightenment idealof limiting war’s ravages, and by and largethe Continental Army proved relativelyrestrained in its application of violence.There were always problems with foraging, especially for firewood, but the Continentals avoided the more violent crimesand did pretty well even on the foragingfront.5As evidence for these generalizationsand as a standard against which to compare the second example, let us considerthe campaign around Philadelphia in1777–78 and particularly the decisionsrelated to the winter encampment inValley Forge. Note the situation, whichhas important parallels to the campaignagainst the Iroquois. The British hadmoved into and occupied east-central Pennsylvania, and they threatenedthe surrounding area with devastation.Washington tried to stop them twice inconventional battles at Brandywine andGermantown and then tried and failedto isolate the garrison in Philadelphia bycontrolling forts on the Delaware River.With winter approaching, he reassessedhis strategy for the remainder of the year.By examining both his calculations andhis soldiers’ beliefs and attitudes as reflected in the Can/Must/Should model,we can see how they affected the level ofviolence used in the following months.First, let us ponder the possible. Therange of Washington’s possible strategies was limited primarily by the obvious Atlantic Ocean problem. The enemyBritish population was not accessible toWashington. (The Loyalists are a separate issue.) This simple geographic factrestrained the potential level of wartimeviolence that Continental forces couldinflict. This may seem an obvious point,but it is overwhelmingly significant inlimiting the potential of the war to getout of hand—and of course the war mostclosely approached a breakdown in theconflicts with the more accessible Loyalist population. Within this case studyof the 1777–78 Pennsylvania campaign,however, the Loyalists were not a majorissue.6 There was another significant restraining factor in terms of “possibility,”although outweighed by the larger geographic one, and that was the extremelylimited coercive and financial powersof the rebel government to raise largearmies. This is essentially Weigley’s pointabout limited resources.Given these limitations, as Washington turned to the question of Must, ofhow to win, he put a strong and repeatedemphasis on three things: keeping hisArmy in being, maintaining at least thetenuous support of the population, andusing a conventional army to do thesethings. All three decisions greatly affected the level of wartime violence, mostlyby restraining it, but with one escalatingeffect. Let us analyze each of these overallgoals within the context of the campaignof 1777–78 around Philadelphia.Keeping the Army alive meant essentially to avoid a crushing defeat. In practice this led Washington not to defendfixed positions unless at an overwhelmingadvantage. It led him to avoid battle or atColonial Williamsburg FoundationIn addition to increasing the numberof variables under consideration, as I willdetail shortly, I would like to alter slightlythe definition of a way of war. Insteadof merely considering strategic choice(annihilation, attrition, etc.), we can define a way of war by analyzing its overalllevel of “frightfulness,” in the determination of which strategic decisions are butone component. In other words, in whatways is violence in warfare restrained orunleashed, both inside and outside thedeliberate, strategic decisions about itsuse? Note that frightful is a more inclusive term than merely destructive, and italso allows us to consider decisions withintheir own cultural norms. Deliberate decisions to destroy resources, for example,can accompany but do not require atrocity-laden interpersonal violence, unlessthat too is chosen in an effort to terrorize a population. Furthermore, specificacts are more or less frightful dependingupon the cultural context. For example,scalping was considered a norm by Native Americans, but a terrible violation byEuropeans. Thus a European decision toscalp implies a clear escalation of violence.Indeed, when analyzing the differences inthese two campaigns, looking at their relative destructiveness will not be enough;we must also qualitatively and contextually assess their frightfulness. Such an assessment requires considering the intersection of three different variables: what itwas possible to do; what it was necessaryto do; and what the participants believedthey should do. For the remainder ofthis article I will abbreviate and capitalize these variables as “Can,” “Must,” and“Should.”The usual historical explanation foran escalation of frightfulness has simplybeen that of necessity. Leaders calculated what level of violence they neededto win. Laws of war, peacetime mora
History. While this bulletin has on rare occasions reprinted with permission reviews of books on military history that appeared first in other journals, it always acknowledged their earlier appearance. The Spring 2005 issue of . Army History (No. 61) contained a review by Samuel Watson of the book by Alan Peskin,
eric c. newman air force 2001-2009 george f. giehrl navy 1941-1945 f conrad f. wahl army 1952-1954 sidney albrecht . william c. westley jr. army 1954-1956 roland l. winters navy 1945-1946 michael a. skowronski army . joseph a. rajnisz army 1966-1971 james l. gsell army army army army army navy army navy air force army army
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Navy Seaman David G. Ouellet* Army Staff Sgt. Robert J. Pruden* Army Staff Sgt. Laszlo Rabel* Army Capt. Ronald E. Ray Army Master Sgt. Jose Rodela Army 1st Lt. George K. Sisler* Navy Engineman 2nd Class (SEAL) Michael E. Thornton Army Capt. Humbert R. Versace* Army 1st Lt. Charles Q. Williams Navy Boatswai
Readers should refer to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, for detailed explanations of the Army leadership principles. The proponent of ADP 6-22 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center - Leader Development and Education.
Readers should refer to Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, for detailed explanations of the Army leadership principles. The proponent of ADP 6-22 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army
Heads of Headquarters, Department of the Army Secretariat and Army Staff agencies 2 - 17, page 6 Commanders and/or the senior Army officials responsible for the Army command, Army service component com-mand, direct reporting unit, and U.S. Army Reserve 2 - 18, page 7 Senior commanders 2 - 19, page 9
