Robert C. Seamans, Jr. - History.nasa.gov

Forewordobert C. Seamans, Jr., has written a uniquely comprehensive report of the Apollo Manned LunarLanding Program. It goes well beyond the normal reporting that we have seen of the events leadingto and results achieved in that major national space program. Bob Seamans has relied on his very personal involvement, responsibility, and experience during his long tenure in the top leadership of the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), first as an Associate Administrator and then as the Agency’sDeputy Administrator, from less than two years after NASA was formed until January 1968, to present adetailed timeline of the key elements of NASA’s extensive analyses, decisions, activities, capabilities, andresponsibilities that led to the creation of the program and its outstanding success. In fact, this manuscriptpresents the most detailed and specific assembly of personal and archival records to identify the comments,events, meetings, decisions, and actions taken in the initiation and conduct of the program. This detailedreport demonstrates NASA’s broad capabilities and, despite his unassuming presentation, also shows BobSeamans’s strong contributions. Both of those demonstrated characteristics have always been clear to all ofus who worked in NASA.RThe report reviews the major Mercury and then Gemini precursors for the Apollo mission program andits development and mission sequence. But, very importantly, it describes the major and often complex deliberations that encouraged inputs from the broad range of informed internal Agency individuals in order toarrive at the resulting actions taken; it recognizes differences among their various views, including even sensitivities within the leadership of the Agency, and it acknowledges NASA’s relationships with the Presidentand key executive branch personnel, as well as the very important and often complex relationships withmembers of Congress. The process of writing this book was searching and comprehensive. The achievementof the world’s first manned lunar landings, after the earlier Mercury and Gemini programs played catch-upto match the Soviet Union’s advanced position, clearly established the United States’ preeminence in space.Early in the book, Bob describes an extended meeting in the White House in which the President’s views andthose of Mr. Webb were seriously discussed. Bob tells how, through Apollo’s lunar landing, NASA clearlymet both President Kennedy’s goal to overcome the Soviets’ leadership image and James Webb’s goal to useApollo as a major part of his program to demonstrate U.S. technological preeminence.FOREWORDix

Apparent throughout this report is the outstanding competence and capability of the NASA organization in its Centers and Headquarters. The Agency’s leadership was clearly committed to providing the budget and other requirements to achieve the clearly defined program goals. The major progress in establishingthe mission flight system elements and facility infrastructure was started under NASA’s first Administrator,Keith Glennan, well before the Apollo mission was defined. This report shows the major new capabilities thatwere required in this still-new organization to achieve this objective—operational Field Centers; entirely newfacility capabilities; the technology development and equipment base; the organizational strengths, includingthe integrated management systems; and overall in-house competence in all of the necessary areas even whilethe Agency relied heavily on significant outside contractor and university capabilities to implement many ofthe required functions. Ultimate responsibility always remained within the NASA organization. The lunarlanding was an outstanding achievement that met all its goals.A clear requirement in achieving this success was establishing the fully integrated management structureand leadership for the various elements of the program. That task obviously received major attention fromNASA’s top leadership, with strong emphasis on management clearly enunciated by Administrator JamesWebb. His focus on management was always very clear to me, especially when he said to me, “How do Imake a technical man like you understand the importance of management?” He then made me a specialadvisory Assistant to the Administrator while I was still serving in my technical program roles. In this newposition, I analyzed the need for changes in procedures and functional alignments in Headquarters. I wasthen appointed the Associate Administrator for Organization and Management, combining the variousAgency management functions, as Bob Seamans describes. But, well before that, with the initiation of theApollo program, there was the need to integrate the activities of the Centers and bring strong in-houseNASA people together into the newly established Office of Manned Space Flight. The need to identify astrong leader was urgent. During extensive consideration by Webb, Hugh Dryden, and Seamans of variouspossible candidates for that position, Bob Seamans suggested and then recruited Brainerd Holmes of RCAas that leader. When he left, George Mueller was identified by Bob Seamans and was the clear leader of Apollothrough its mission achievement. As the program proceeded and as conditions changed, it is apparent throughout this report that there was a continuing emphasis on management and its changing requirements.Clearly indicated throughout this report are the very important free and open discussions and objectiveanalysis of perceived issues, concerns, and alternative approaches, including various mission concepts,among all of the competent technical and management members of the internal staff, even if those discussions might indicate differences of opinion regarding planned approaches. This interchange was certainlystrongly encouraged and pursued by Bob Seamans. The most dramatic example of that open view and theexamination of alternative approaches and suggestions was the result of Bob Seamans’s actions in respondingto the persistent recommendations from John Houbolt that a lunar orbit rendezvous approach was superior tothe then-preferred direct lunar landing flight plans even after extensive analyses had led to that preference.Bob’s willingness to consider recommendations that clashed with previously approved plans led to furtherexamination and decision in favor of what became John’s very successful lunar orbit approach for the mission. This process succeeded in spite of the repeated pessimism of President Kennedy’s Science Advisor aboutthe concept and even his pessimism about the lunar landing mission more generally.Yes, there were tragic and painful events during this period of great progress, and these are alsodescribed in Bob’s report. Certainly, the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963, only sixdays after he had visited the launch facilities and walked around the Saturn I launch vehicle, was devastating to the entire United States, including all of us who had been involved in fulfilling his commitment tospaceflight goals. Bob Seamans’s discussion of that terrible event and of his meeting and correspondencewith Jacqueline Kennedy shortly after the funeral service depicts one of the warmest, most emotional situations imaginable. That period will never be forgotten. In addition, Bob reports comprehensively on theApollo fire during ground testing in January 1967 in which Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffeewere killed. It was a shocking and demoralizing hit to all of us in the space program and to the nation at large.President Johnson’s decision to allow NASA to investigate the accident internally led to a quick, thorough, verysolid report that produced the explanation for the accident and identified ready solutions in its operations. BobSeamans reviews that entire situation in depth, but the recollection of that terrible event is still painful.xPROJECT APOLLO THE TOUGH DECISIONS

All of this very detailed information, upbeat as well as terrible, is conveyed by Bob Seamans in his factual presentation of the sequence of major activities involved and is amplified by his personal and professional anecdotes. This is truly a unique and important record of the Apollo program’s achievements and theUnited States’ demonstrated capability and technological preeminence. I hope this capability will beadvanced broadly as we move forward with innovative and beneficial aeronautics, space exploration, spacescience, and applications activities. This book adds substantially to our knowledge base about the Apolloprogram’s conduct and accomplishments and provides a firm path for further progress.As one who worked closely with Robert C. Seamans during those challenging years, even though I was notdirectly responsible for any Apollo activities, I must add that I benefited and learned greatly from that association. And I have especially appreciated the warm friendship that developed then and has continued since.—Harold B. Finger, NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Organization and Management, 1967–69FOREWORDxi

Chapter 1:INTRODUCTIONhis monograph presents the history of themanned space program during the time I wasthe general manager, from 1 September 1960to 5 January 1968. I’ve outlined chronologicallyand in detail the steps taken from the early Mercurydays, through the operational tests conducted withGemini, to the qualification of Apollo, all against abackdrop of Soviet missions. A chapter on NASAmanagement during my tenure follows. Then, in thefinal two chapters, the U.S. manned circumlunarand lunar landing missions are compared withSoviet attempts. I’ve also included a few thoughtson President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration.Throughout, I have tried to describe the key technical, operational, and management milestones andhow key issues in each phase of the space programwere resolved.TThere was a subtler area that I had to face,namely, NASA’s relationship with the executivebranch, Congress, and the public at large.Appointed officials must always remember that thePresident won his position through a national election; his appointees must support his decisions. Theonly alternative is resignation. Under questioningbefore Congress, the President’s policies, programs,and budgets must be defined and their rationaleexplained. However, if an appointee is askedwhether an item in the President’s program wasrequested at that budget level by an agency such asNASA, it is f

Peacock of the History Division for all their help. Dr. Asif Siddiqi, an expert in Russian space history, also contributed a great deal by reviewing the man-uscript. Thanks also to the various peer reviewers who provided much useful feedback. Special thanks also go to the fine professionals in the NASA Headquarters Printing and Design office.