PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN .

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PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGY:AN INTRODUCTION TOSOME BASIC ISSUESDonald RothbergGambier, OhioIn this essay, I want to provide some of the groundwork for anarticulation of the philosophical foundations of transpersonalpsychology. I will first show the centrality of the theory of a"hierarchical ontology" in transpersonal work, and the needfor clarification and examination of the core claims associatedwith such a theory. Then I will identify some basic objections toa hierarchical ontology associated with three main approachesin contemporary philosophy. Finally, I willsuggest the outlinesof a response to and resolution of these main objections. Mythesis is that these objections are misguided when directedagainst the most profound aspects of hierarchical ontologies,but that taking the objections seriously can be helpful if theobjections are re-interpreted as pointing to typical distortionsof transpersonal approaches. Hence, it is important toappropriate insights into such distortions while transcendingthe typically reductionistic conclusions and limited frameworks associated with such objections, thus expressing transpersona] insights more clearly in a fully contemporary manner.objectionstohierarchicalontologiesThis work was supported in part by a National Endowment for the HumanitiesFellowship allowing participation in a 1985 summer seminar on "The GreatChain of Being in World Perspective," directed by Huston Smith, ill whichmany of the questions treated in this article were raised and considered. Theauthor wishes to thank Dr. Smith and the members of the seminar for theirwarmth and suggestions.Copyright 1986 Transpersonal InstituteThe Journal of Transpersonal Psychology,1986, Vol. 18, No. 11

THE IDEA OF A aimstheclaimof ahierarchicalnatureof worldand self2ONTOLOGY AND THE NEED FORWORK IN TRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGYAlthough theoretical frameworks in transpersonal psychologyrange from adaptations of the doctrines of classical religioustraditions to use of one or more of many modern psychologicaltheories, there has always been a great attraction to theoriesclaiming to articulate what is usually called the "perennial"philosophy or psychology-what Huston Smith calls the"primordial tradition. "I For here, weseem to have theories ableto identify at least the general contours of ontological,epistemological, and ethical approaches and structures forwhich we might make and defend universalist claims, therebyovercoming the particularity of a given tradition or psychological theory. Commonly, representatives of the perennialphilosophy make at least two basic universalist claims, first thatsuch a perennialist theory can successfully express the "underlying structure" of different transpersonal approaches from awide range of cultures and epochs, and second that such atheory is indeed "valid" and can be shown in different ways tobe valid, or at least to point to what is valid. Given such ageneral theory, transpersonal psychology would then presumably develop the theory and its details more fully. Indeed, somehave taken the work of Ken Wilber to provide at least thebeginnings of such a comprehensive theery.?At the core of the perennial philosophy, according to the workof Schuon (e.g., 1984), Smith (1976, 1982), Nasr (1981), andWilber (1980, 1983, 1984b), is a claim about the hierarchicalnature of both the world and the self. Reality, "what there is"(i.e., the subject matter of "ontology"), is "tiered" or "layered"both in its outer and inner manifestations; there are different"levels" of both world and self, and these exemplify differentgrades of being, power, and value. (We might note that theetymological meaning of "hierarchy" is "sacred [hieros] order[archej"; the word originally had to do with ranks or orders ofholy beings, especially angels.) "Higher" levels of the hierarchyare more "real," more causally effective, and reveal more"good" than lower levels. Although the exact nature of theselogical or causal relations between the different levels is notalways clearly articulated, many hierarchical ontologists, infact, adopt, in terms of movement "upward" (i.e., development,evolution) something like the logical principle of what developmental psychologists in the Piagetian tradition call "hierarchization," or what Hegel calls Aufhebung (generally translatedas "sublation"). According to this principle, a higher levelsomehow "integrates" the achievements of lower levels, overcomes its systematic structural problems, and differentiates anew structure which shifts identity to the higher level.31ntermsThe Journal of Transpersonal Psychology. 1986. Vol. 18, No. I

of movement "downward" (i.e., "emanation," involution),there is commonly a notion of "vertical causation"; a higherlevel somehow brings into being or "causes" a lower level.Huston Smith (1976) proposes a four-fold distinction ofontological levels as the simplest model able to do justice to theperennial philosophy.s (To be sure, Smith [1982, p, 40) admits,as does Wilber, who in his latest work [1984b] proposes tenlevels, that the number of distinctions one makes may beprimarily a pragmatic question.) Smith's model, which I willuse for the purposes of this essay, distinguishes: (1) theterrestrial or material world, in principle knowable through thesenses, and structured by the laws of space, time, and matter;(2) the "intermediate" world of mind and the "vital principle,"invisible to the senses; (3) the "celestial" or "archetypal" worldof the "knowable" God and Platonic forms; and, finally, (4) theInfinite, the "unknowable" God, the Godhead, which isactually not so much a level as a "ground" for the other levels.Complementing this "outward" ontology is a correspondingontology of the levels of the self, which distinguishes: (1) thebody; (2) the mind; (3) the soul, the "final locus of ourindividuality," that which relates to God; and (4) spirit, theat man that is brahman, the Buddha-nature.Smith'smodelofontologicallevelsGiven such a "hierarchical ontology," one can make easy senseof other aspects of the philosophiaperennis. At the highestlevels, world and self, outer reality and inner reality. coincide asthe "ground" of all that is. It is the fundamental humanexistential project to realize this truth, to come increasingly toknow the higher levels of reality, and to express the deeperlevels of the self. Such a project, furthermore, is universal, as isthe hierarchical ontology, and hence beyond any given orparticular spiritual tradition.Despite (or perhaps because of) the attractiveness of such amodel, as well as for a host of other reasons, there has, withintranspersonal psychology, been little critical or systematicattention paid to the questions of (1) whether the claimsassociated with such a model (Le., that the model successfullyidentifies the common structure underlying different traditions,and that such a model is "valid") are in fact acceptable, or (2)how such claims might be expressed and justified. That is, doessuch a hierarchical ontology really point to the underlyingstructure of the various historical and contemporary transpersonal theories? Can a hierarchical ontology, furthermore,be understood as valid in a compelling contemporary manner?questionsofcriticalattentionThere are several reasons why these questions have largely notbeen the starting point for sustained inquiry. Perhaps the mostPhilosophical Foundations of Transpersonal Psychology3

boutfoundationsof"human"sciencessignificant reason has to do with the fact that transpersonalpsychology, although often drawing on ancient sources, hashad much of its attention directed to "data" which is new andunexplored by most contemporary psychological researchers,and only recently has had its attention drawn to rigoroustheoretical formulation and communication with mainstreamtheorists. There has also been some related ambivalence to thetheoretical articulation of transpersonal insights, experiences,and practices. This has sometimes been rooted in a skepticalattitude toward linguistic expression found historically withsome mystics and sages, sometimes related to the suspicion oropposition of mainstream theorists, and sometimes connectedwith the developmental process in consciousness disciplinesthat requires at some point a process of "disidentification" withthe discursive aspects of the intellect, though these aspects arelater "re-integrated.'A final reason for the preliminary level of theoretical articulation in trans personal psychology is the contemporary confusion about the philosophical foundations of the "social" or"human" sciences in general, especially in the wake of thepresent decline of positivist and "scientistic" models. Manyresearchers in the social sciences are not particularly aware ofthis foundational disarray.! The earlier narrowness of positivistand empiricist models of reality and inquiry discouraged thevery possibility of identifying other legitimate domains ofinvestigation such as the higher three of Smith's four ontological levels, or the use of methods of inquiry or knowingsuch as hermeneutical or interpretive, contemplative. andmystical approaches.s Adequate differentiation of these domains and methods has been rendered nearly impossible,leading to confusions evident. for instance, in some discussions attempting to justify transpersonal claims empirically,whether through physics, neurophysiology, or other empiricalsciences,On the positive side, however, it must be said that transpersonal psychology now shows signs of developing increasingly rigorous theory. This is in part due to a certaindevelopmental maturing of the field in which. I would argue,the value and hindrances of theoretical work are moreaccurately seen in balance, and in part due to incorporation ofthe critique of positivism and seientism, and the attempt toclarify the expanded scope of the human sciences.Nonetheless, despite such promising trends, there remain, fromthe point of view of mainstream contemporary work in4The Journal of TranspersonalPsychology, 1986. Vol. 18. No. I

religious studies, psychology, and philosophy, a series ofimportant objections that cast considerable doubt on thevalidity of the two basic claims associated with any hierarchicalontology. Attending to and meeting such objections, whichstand as major barriers to current articulation and communication of transpersonal insights, would seem to be acrucial part of the theoretical work of transpersonal psychology. I want here to mention briefly objections fromreligious studies and psychology, before concentrating onphilosophical objections.Many scholars of religion, for example, seriously question thefirst universalist claim, that there is a common, identifiable,meaningful structure to the different historical transpersonalreligious and philosophical expressions, as wellas the auxiliaryclaim that this common structure is somehow the "core" or the"transcendent unity" of the historical religions and wisdomtraditions. One type of objection to the first universalist claim,for instance, has surfaced especially in the discussion of thedifferent forms of "mysticism." Many scholars of mysticismreject the notion of a common mysticismwhich crosses culturaland religious boundaries, and is relatively autonomous inrelation to culture, history, tradition, and practices, structuredrather by its own "mystical" modes of validity and value. 7Robert Gimello (1983) argues, against the claims of mysticalautonomy and mystical versalistclaimMysticism is inextricably bound up with, dependent upon, andusually subservient to the deeper beliefs and values of thetraditions, cultures, and historical milieux which harbor it. As it isthus intricately and intimately related to those beliefs and values,so must it vary according to them (p, 63).He claims (1983, p, 63), seemingly directly criticizing theperennialist Claim, that mystical experiences are not the sameacross traditions, that the Buddhist experience of sunyata or ofthe Buddha-nature is in no sense the same as the Christianmystic's experience of the Trinity, Christ, or the Godhead, orthe Jewish mystic's experience of En-sof, or the Vedantist'sexperience of the identity of iuman and brahman. Therefore, toaffirm a hierarchical ontology that makes claims about the"core" within different historical traditions requires a responseto the objection that claims of common structure obscure oreven distort the actual details of such historical traditions. Italso requires being clearer methodologically about the natureof such "structures," and more careful about respecting theparticularity of given contexts and details.sPhilosophical Foundations of Transpersonal Psychology5

mIf we turn to the area of psychology and its philosophicalfoundations, we find seriously challenged, where not simplydismissed, the second universalist claim that such a theory isvalid, that it gives the most adequate understanding of realityand the ultimate human good. Leaving aside the strictlymethodological objections concerning what can be studied"scientifically," that come from behaviorist and neurophysiological approaches, I want to mention two psychologicalobjections to the developmental claims explicitly advanced byWilber (1980, 1984), but often implicit in the work of someperennialists. First, there is the well-known psychoanalyticequating of mysticism with regression, and religion withsomething like an infantile illusion (Freud, 1964, 1962).9Secondly, there is the question whether we can posit developmental hierarchies at all in the moral and spiritual domains,even if we accept tentatively Piaget's(Ginsburg&Opper, 1969;Gruber & Voneche, 1977)theory of cognitive development.Very serious questions (Flanagan, 1984, pp. 149-172) have beenraised, for instance, about Kohlberg's (198Ia) theory of moraldevelopment, which might well be raised concerning Wilber'sdevelopmental psychology, and any version of a hierarchicalontology which charts out a schema of "upward" evolutionreversing the "downward" devolution or "emanation." Theseinclude questions of: whether there is actually empiricalevidence and cogent argument for the theory, whether themoral and spiritual domains really manifest the criteria of stagedevelopment and "hierarchization" thematized by Piaget interms of cognitive development (i.e. universality, the presenceof discretely structured stages, the "inclusion" of earlier stages,and the invariance of developmental sequence), and whetherthere is an unjustified bias toward particular cultural values orexpressions (notably Western, individualist, and "masculine"in the case of Kchlbergl.'?Although it is vital to clarify and resolve the objections arisingfrom religious studies and from psychology, I want to focus ona third set of objections. These arise from the main con temporary philosophical schools, which, as I suggested, almostentirely deny the validity of a hierarchical ontology asdescribed by perennialists, even though philosophy itselforiginated with the Greeks as a discipline concerned with a"Loveof wisdom" (philo-sophia) which was cultivated by a kindof ascent to knowledge of higher levels of being. I I Rather,contemporary philosophical objections have almost entirely todo with the second question, that of validity, and can betentatively divided into objections concerning the truth of ahierarchical ontology, and objections concerning its value. 126The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1986, Vol. 18,Vol. 1

THREE TYPES OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTIONSTO PERENNIALIST CLAIMSWhat then arc the main contemporary philosophical objections to hierarchical ontologies? To give a sense of theseobjections, it is necessary to give a brief introduction to themain forms and current state of contemporary philosophy.(The following account, of course, presupposes a rranspersonalperspective and would surely differ from the kind of narrativegiven by those who are the subjects of the account.)Much has happened in the Western philosophical world in thelast twenty-five years. The most crucial process has involved, asI suggested above, the growing untenability of positivistapproaches, and the emergence of alternative approaches tounderstanding the natural sciences, the "human sciences," andthe nature of language. 13 Generally speaking, the developmenthas been a movement from positivism and scientism (the beliefthat the only valid knowledge is that of the "empirical"sciences, both natural and social) to an approach which couldbroadly be called "hermeneutical" and "practical, " involving arecognition of the contextual, normative, interpretive, andmetaphorical dimensions of language, knowledge, and action.Put simply, it is a movement from an ontology whichultimately admits only physical elements to an ontology whichadmits "mental" and "intersubjective" factors of intention,interpretation, history, value, and social norm as irreducible.There is, however, still no transpersonal ontology that wouldaccept and account for (Platonic) "archetypal" (or "celestial")and "infinite" levels. If Huston Smith is right in claiming thatthere have been three great Western epistemologies, those ofBacon (emphasizing the senses and the physical world), ofAristotle (emphasizing as well theoretical and practical reason),and of Plato (emphasizing as wen noetic and mystical insight),then we might say that much of contemporary philosophy hasrecently returned to Aristotle (as is captured in slogansclaiming a return to "practical" and "normative" philosophy)but has not yet produced a contemporary Plato. 14 Indeed, theturn toward a renewed understanding of interpretive andpractical dimensions of reason comes with several strongobjections to any further move to something like a Platonicnotion of a contemplative and mystical reason.abriefaccountof thecurrentstateofcontemporaryphilosophyThe nature of these objections can become clearer if we turn tothree main modes of contemporary philosophizing, and turnespecially to their criticisms of traditional philosophical andreligious metaphysics. For such metaphysics (that is, Plato andPhilosophical Foundations of Transpersonal Psychology7

the ensuing "footnotes" to Plato) was typically rooted in ahierarchical ontology, although not always of the sort specifiedby perennialists.t! Critiques of traditional metaphysics, in fact,furnish the very point of departure for the main types ofemphatically contemporary philosophy, with only a (sizable)minority of current work operating more or less within classicalmetaphysical and religious traditions. Almost all such critiquescan be located within one of the three following approaches,each of which gives special attention to a particular ontologicaldomain and to a particular range of phenomena.questionsabouttheempiricaltruthof ahierarchicalontologyFirst, we have what I will call "philosophical empiricism,"rooted in the twentieth-century analytic philosophy of scienceand (scientific) language, represented by Moore (1962a,1962b), early Wittgenstein (1961), Carnap (1959, 1966), Ayer(1950), and Quine (1961, 1969), among others. Since thisapproach is concerned mostly with the first ontological level, itsobjections mostly emphasize questions about the empiricaltruth and conceptual adequacy of a hierarchical ontology;value questions as such, where not merely empirical questionsof the origin and function of particular values, are not generallypermitted." Secondly, we have what I will call "radicalhermeneutics," represented by Nietzsche (1954), Heidegger(1977), Derrida (Norris, 1982), and Rorty (1979), amongothers. Here, there is attention especially upon interpretation,the limits of language, and the nature of "lived experience,"with the objections concerning both matters of truth andmatters of value

Philosophical Foundations of Transpersonal Psychology 3. ambivalence toward theoretical articulation confusion about foundations of "human" sciences significant reason has to do with the fact that transpersonal psychology, although often drawing on ancient sources, has had much of its attention directed to "data" which is newand

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