ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military And Security .

CHAPTER ONE: ANNUAL UPDATE“In the next five years, our economy and society will develop faster, boosting comprehensivenational power. The developments will provide an even more stable material base to ourdefense and military buildup.”– PRC Defense Minster Liang GuanglieSeveral significant developments in China over the past year relate to the questions Congressposed in Section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (PublicLaw 111-84).CHINA’S CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES IN 2010The government of China remained focusedon maintaining economic development andenhancing China’s security interests in 2010.The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hasbuilt its legitimacy on the promise ofeconomic growth, stability, and nationalunity. To ensure its position, the CCP closelymonitors potential sources of domestic unrest,from unemployment and rising incomedisparities to pro-democracy movements andethnic tensions. Additionally, Beijing isseeking to balance a more confident assertionof its growing interests in the internationalcommunity with a desire to avoid generatingopposition and countervailing responses fromregional and major powers. An example ofthis could be seen in Beijing’s recalibratedrhetorical approach to regional territorialdisputes such as the South China Seafollowing the June 2010 Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations Regional Forum(ARF).The 11th Five Year Plan concluded in 2010and was marked by new milestones in ted by expandingeconomic and security interests, the PLA isnow venturing into the global maritimedomain, a sphere long dominated by the U.S.Navy. Relations with Taiwan have continuedto improve, but the PLA shows no sign ofslowing its efforts to develop plans andcapabilities for a cross-Strait contingency.Much of the PLA’s success over the nextdecade will be determined by how effectivelyit integrates emerging capabilities andplatforms into the force. By most accounts,the PLA is on track to achieve its goal ofbuilding a modern, regionally-focusedmilitary by 2020.In tandem with the PLA’s improvedcapacities for regional military operations,PRC officials in recent years haveemphasizedChina’ssovereigntyandterritorial interests with greater frequency.Citing a violation of these ―core interests,‖ thePLA suspended military-to-military relationswith the United States in January 2010,following U.S. approval of arms sales toTaiwan.DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’SNATIONAL SECURITY LEADERSHIPVice President Xi Jinping became a vicechairman of the CCP Central MilitaryCommission (CMC) at the 5th Plenum of the17th Central Committee in October 2010.Based on historical precedent, this movecould be the penultimate step to Xi becomingthe General Secretary of the CCP andChairman of the Central Military Commission(CMC). During the leadership transitionprocess that is expected to unfold around the18th Party Congress in the fall of 2012, it isnot clear if President Hu Jintao will relinquishMilitary and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China1

the Party General Secretary and CMCChairman positions, or if he will follow theprecedent set by Jiang Zemin in 2002 andretain the CMC Chairmanship for a numberof months, or even years, to facilitate thepower transition.DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITYSITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAITSince the election in Taiwan of President MaYing-jeou in March 2008, Beijing and Taipeihave made significant progress in improvingcross-Strait relations.Both Beijing andTaipei have emphasized expanding economicand cultural ties as a means of reducingtension and sustaining the current positivecross-Strait atmosphere.Beijing and Taipei signed the EconomicCooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)in 2010. Beijing has at times demonstratedflexibility on the issue of Taiwan’sparticipation in international forums, but hasalso continued to pressure players in theinternational community to restrict thisparticipation.Despite the warming of cross-Strait ties,China continued its military modernization in2010, including specific efforts to provide acredible range of military options ina Taiwan contingency. In the current decadeto 2020, the PLA is likely to steadily expandits military options for Taiwan, includingthose to deter, delay, or deny third partyintervention.DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIZE,LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES OFPRC MILITARY FORCESChina’s long-term, comprehensive militarymodernization is improving the PLA’scapacity to conduct high-intensity, regionalmilitary operations, including ―anti-accessand area denial‖ (A2AD) operations. Theterms ―anti-access and area denial‖ refer tocapabilities that could be employed to deter orcounter adversary forces from deploying to,or operating within, a defined space.Consistent with a near-term focus onpreparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies,China continues to base many of its mostadvanced systems in the military regions(MRs) opposite Taiwan. Although thesecapabilities could be employed for a varietyof regional crisis or conflict scenarios, Chinahas made less progress on capabilities thatextend global reach or power s, for example, China’s Navy has littleoperational experience beyond regionalwaters. Although the PLA’s new roles andmissions in the international domain reflectChina’s expanding set of interests, regionalcontingencies continue to dominate resourcesand planning.Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China hasprioritized land-based ballistic and cruisemissile programs. It is developing and testingseveral new classes and variants of offensivemissiles, forming additional missile units,upgrading older missile systems, anddeveloping methods to counter ballisticmissile defenses.The PLA is acquiring large numbers ofhighly accurate cruise missiles, many ofwhich have ranges in excess of 185 km.This includes the ackcruise missile (LACM); the domesticallyproduced ground- and ship-launched YJ62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM); theRussian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonicASCM, which is fitted on China’sSOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquiredfrom Russia; and, the Russian SS-N27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM onChina’s Russian-built, KILO-class dieselelectric attack submarines.By December 2010, the PLA haddeployed between 1,000 and 1,200 shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBM) to unitsopposite Taiwan.To improve thelethality of this force, the PLA isintroducing variants of missiles withimproved ranges,accuracies,andpayloads.Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China2

China is developing an anti-ship ballisticmissile (ASBM) based on a variant of theCSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile(MRBM). Known as the DF-21D, thismissile is intended to provide the PLA thecapability to attack large ships, includingaircraft carriers, in the western PacificOcean.The DF-21D has a rangeexceeding 1,500 km and is armed with amaneuverable warhead.China is modernizing its nuclear forces byadding more survivable delivery systems.In recent years, the road mobile, solidpropellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10Mod2(DF-31andDF-31A)intercontinental-range ballistic missiles(ICBMs) have entered service. The CSS10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of11,200 km, can reach most locationswithin the continental United States.China may also be developing a newroad-mobile ICBM, possibly capable ofcarrying a multiple independentlytargetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).and advanced surface combatants, includingaircraft carriers. Submarine tunnel facilitiesat the base could also enable deploymentsfrom this facility with reduced risk ofdetection.China’s aircraft carrier research anddevelopment program includes renovationof the ex-VARYAG, which could beginsea trials in 2011, although withoutaircraft. It will likely serve initially as atraining and evaluation platform, andeventually offer a limited operationalcapability.Chinacouldbeginconstruction of a fully indigenous carrierin 2011, which could achieve operationalcapability after 2015. China likely willbuild multiple aircraft carriers withsupport ships over the next decade.China currently has a land-based trainingprogram for carrier pilots; however, it willstill take several additional years forChina to achieve a minimal level ofcombat capability on an aircraft carrier.Naval Forces. Since the 1990s, the PLANavy has rapidly transformed from a largefleet of low-capability, single-missionplatforms, to a leaner force equipped withmore modern, multi-mission platforms. Incontrast to the fleet just a decade ago, manyPLA Navy combatants are equipped withadvanced air-defense systems and modernASCMs, with ranges in excess of 185 km.These capabilities not only increase thelethality of PLA Navy platforms, particularlyin the area of anti-surface warfare (ASuW),but also enable them to operate beyond therange of land-based air defenses.The PLA Navy is improving its over-thehorizon (OTH) targeting capability withsky wave and surface wave OTH radars.In combination with early-warningaircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), and other surveillance andreconnaissance equipment, the sky waveOTH radar allows the PRC to carry outsurveillance and reconnaissance over thewestern Pacific. The OTH radars can beused in conjunction with reconnaissancesatellites to locate targets at greatdistances from the PRC, therebysupporting long-range precision strikes,including employment of ASBMs.The PLA Navy possesses some 75 principalsurface combatants, more than 60 submarines,55 medium and large amphibious ships, androughly85missile-equippedsmallcombatants. The PLA has now completedconstruction of a major naval base at Yulin,on the southernmost tip of Hainan Island.The base is large enough to accommodate amix of attack and ballistic missile submarinesChina continues to produce a new class ofnuclear-poweredballisticmissilesubmarine (SSBN). JIN-class (Type 094)SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2submarine-launched ballistic missile withan estimated range of some 7,400 km.The JIN and the JL-2 wil

Appendix II: 79 Military-To-Military Exchanges 79. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China V Glossary of Acronyms . disparities to pro-democracy movements and ethnic tensions. Additionally, Beijing is seeking to balance a more confident assertion