Periodical 3/1990 EUROPE- A FRESH START
Periodical 3/1990EUROPEA FRESH STARTThe Schuman Declaration1950-90-- ------·-----·· - - - - - - -, \-1III,. ·- .J. --·- ;. -. , .' ··.,,,.''" -· ·'- '.!:. !.'N EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION. . ---
This publication is also available in the following -826-1217·192-826-1218-X92-826-1219-8FRITNLISDN 92-826-1221-XISDN 92-826-1222-8ISDN 92-826-1223·6PTISDN 92-826-1224-4La declaraci6n Schuman 1950·1990: Una idea nueva para EuropaSchuman-erklrcringen: Nye planer for Europa- 1950/1990Eine neue Ordnung fur Europa- 40 Jahre Schuman· Plan (1950·1990)1950-1990: 40 XP6Vla a1t6 trt taKTjpU Tt Schuman- Mta vf.a tlif.ayta trtV Eupro1trtUne idee neuve pour !'Europe- La Declaration Schuman 1950/1990Una proposta nuova ali'Europa- La dichiarazione Schuman 1950/1990Een nieuw idee voor Europa - De vcrklaring van Schuman 1950/1990Uma nova ideia de Europa- A Dcclaraci!o Schuman- 1950/1990Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990ISDN 92-826·1220·1Catalogue number: CD-NC-90-003-EN-C ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Brussels Luxembourg, 1990Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged.Printed in the FR of Germany
Europe - A fresh startThe Schuman Declaration 1950-90Pascal FontainePascal Fontaine, born in 1948, was Jean Monnet's last assistant, working with him from 1973 to 1977. He wasDirector of the Private Office of the President of the European Parliament from !984 to 1987. Pascal Fontainehas a doctorate in political science and teaches at the Institut d'etudes politiques in Paris.Cover: J.M. Folan, watercolour, for the Commission of the European Communities.Manuscript completed in January 1990.
ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5I - The Schuman Plan: a solution tailored to post·war problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A. The historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D. Jean Monnet's ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. The 9 May Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D. Drafting of the ECSC Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99101214II- The Schuman Plan: the Community's birth certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A. The innovatory principles underpinning the first European Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . .B. The ECSC - the first storey of the European edifice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171722III - Questions and answers for tomorrow's Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A. A strong Europe based on solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .D. A democratic Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C. The Community's response to the upheavals in the East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25253134Conclusion - Prospects following the Strasbourg European Council (8 and 9 December 1989) . . .39Declaration of 9 May 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .472-43
IntroductionThe European Community is celebrating its 40th birthday. On 9 May 1950, when he proposed the creation of a community of peaceful interests to Federal Germany and anyother European countries that wanted to join in, Robert Schuman performed a historicact. In extending a hand to recent enemies he wiped away the bitterness of war and theweight of the past. But he also sparked off a completely novel process in the internationalorder by suggesting to the old nations that they should pool their sovereignty, to regainthe influence that none of them was capable of wielding alone.The European Community, which has been developing day by day since then, constitutesthe grand design of the late twentieth century. It draws its motive force from the generousvisionary dream of the founders, born of the war and inspired by a will to create amongthe. nations of Europe the conditions for a lasting peace. This force is being constantlyrenewed, spurred by the challenges confronting our countries in a world of radical, rapidchange. One has only to consider that the world population will increase from four tosix billion over the next 20 years to gauge the scale of the changes to which our societieswill have to adapt.Consider, too, the tremendous yearning for democracy and freedom that is overturningpolitical structures in Eastern Europe and giving a new dimension to the ideal of Euro·pean unity.For Europeans the issue is clear-cut. Either they continue to organize themselves, pullingtogether to make their voice heard in the world, to uphold the democratic ideal and todefend their economic and strategic interests, in which case Europe will continue to represent more than Paul Valery's 'small cape of Eurasia'. It will be a factor for balance betweenthe superpowers and a factor for moderation in relations between the hyper-industrializedcountries and countries with a development problem. Or, alternatively, Europeans willfail to perceive the solidarity which binds them and fail to equip themselves with the in·struments to make their common interests a reality, in which case individual economieswill be reduced to playing a subordinate role and standards of living will decline. Europe,a mere geographical entity, will come under the influence of outside powers which willextort the price of its dependence and its need for protection.With the approach of 1993, the target solemnly set by the Member States and the Community's institutions, Europeans, looking back over the distance travelled since 1950,must still find the answers to some basic questions. What are the fundamental values that5
they hold dear and how best can these be preserved? What degree of union is desirable,and possible, in order to derive optimum benefit from unity while preserving nationalidentity and the individuality which constitutes the richness of our countries, our regionsand our cultures? Can we advance in step, relying on the natural harmony that makesfor consensus between the TWelve, or must we bow to conflicting approaches and differen·tiate the pace of integration? Where are the Community's ultimate boundaries to be set,now that so many nations- Thrkey, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe andthe Balkans- are asking to join us in the process of unification? How can the ordinarycitizen be made to feel part of the Community enterprise, how can an attachment toEurope be fostered to complement and transcend traditional allegiances? These issues ofprinciple must be confronted if Europeans are to avoid running into blind alleys. Theanswers to these basic questions will determine the precise, technical choices faced dayby day by those responsible for running the Community enterprise.In 1990 the European Community is in good shape. It has lived up to the expectationsof those who brought it into being, and has proved worthy of the efforts of those who,over four decades, shielded it from assault from without and helped it to survive in·numerable crises. Today, Europeans settle their differences peacefully, having recourseto the law and conciliation. Discrimination and feelings of superiority have been ban·ished from relations between the Member States, which have given the four Communityinstitutions- the Council, Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice- thetask of arbitrating and managing their gains as well as their clashes. The standard of liv·ing of the ordinary citizen has been substantially raised and is now much higher thanit would have been had individual economies not been able to take advantage ofeconomies of scale and higher growth resulting from the common market and thedevelopment of trade. The European Community has become a pole of attraction, thefocus of the expectations of countries, near or far, that are taking a keen interest in thedynamic of union and want to consolidate their renascent democracies or rebuild theirdevastated economies. Will the Community be the victim of its own success? Is that success so firmly established that the Community can open its doors to others in theforeseeable future, without risking implosion or loosening the essential ties that ensurea minimum of cohesion?At 40 the European Community is maturing. It is on the brink of key decisions that willdetermine its fate. It is well placed to measure how far it has travelled, to reflect on itsorigins, to draw conclusions for the way ahead.Will Europe be a political entity? Will the single European market be rounded off bymonetary union? What policies need a common framework and pooled resources if theyare to find material and effective expression?Adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 marked the beginning of a period of freneticactivity. In February 1988, by adopting the Delors plan, the TWelve swept away there·mains of the past which had poisoned the early 1980s. The ordering of financial resources6
up to 1992 has created 'budgetary peace' between the institutions and is providing thenecessary solidarity to enable the less prosperous countries to withstand the impact ofthe large market. Ongoing reform of the common agricultural policy is helping to diversify the range of common policies, releasing additional resources for forward-lookingpolicies such as technological research, environmental protection and vocationaltraining.The directives needed to complete the single market are following the timetable programmed by the Commission. The point of no return has already passed, giving all concerned the firm conviction that it is better to prepare for change than to bow to it. TheMadrid European Council in June 1989 approved the main features of an ambitious programme that is to lead to the attainment of economic and monetary union, on the linesof a phased masterplan proposed by the Commission. In July the Western EconomicSummit in Paris gave the European Commission the task of coordinating Western aidto Poland and Hungary, thereby consolidating the Community's role as a committedpartner in a world-scale operation and recognizing the existence in Eastern Europe of asituation without precedent since the war, an omen of hope and major developments.And in June again voters exercised the franchise in the third direct elections to the European Parliament, establishing the vital democratic link between popular legitimacy andEuropean integration. Backed by a mandate designating them as intermediaries betweenthe electorate and the institutions, the 518 MEPs are preparing to give fresh impetus tothe advance towards European union as Parliament did in 1984 when it adopted the draftTreaty fathered by Altiero Spinelli.In 1990 there wiii be further developments on the institutional front as a result of theStrasbourg European Council's decision on 9 December 1989 to convene an intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union.Europe at 40 is flying high. Hopes are commensurate with the ambitions and challenges,but the danger of failure cannot be excluded. At the crossroads of great decisions, optionsare critical. Those who hold Europe's future in their hands must find this inspiration inthe basic method and principles which led to the European Coal and Steel Community,the very first European venture since supplemented by the European Economic Community and Euratom. A 'leaven of change' has been injected into intra-European relations and new effects are being produced every day.Forty years after it was first put to the test, the Community method, the outcome of theorganized dialogue between the Member States and the common institutions, wieldingdelegated sovereignty, is a shining reality. It is making the optimum contribution to solving the major problems confronting Europeans. It, and it alone, is capable of advancingthe cause of European integration.77-8
I - The Schuman Plan: a solution tailored to postwar problemsA. The historical backgroundEuropeans got no respite when the fighting ended. The Second World War was hardlyover and the threat of a third, between East and West, was soon to loom on the horizon.On 24 Apri11947 the breakdown of the Moscow Conference on the German question· convinced the Western powers that the Soviet Union, their erstwhile partner in the fightagainst the Nazis, was about to become the source of immediate danger for the Westerndemocracies. The creation of the Cominform in October 1947, the Prague coup inFebruary 1948, and the Berlin blockade in the spring of 1949 heightened the tension stillfurther. Western Europeans laid the foundations for their collective security with thesigning of the North Atlantic Treaty with the United States in April 1949. But the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 and repeated threats from theKremlin helped to spread the climate of fear that came to be known as the 'cold war:The status of Federal Germany, which had been directing its own internal affairs sincethe Basic Law of 8 May 1949 came into force, became one of the stakes of East-Westrivalry. The United States wanted to speed up economic recovery of a country on the edgeof the continental divide and voices in Washington were already calling for German rearmament. French diplomacy was on the horns of a dilemma: should it yield to Americanpressure and, flying in the face of French public opinion, agree to the resurgence of German industrial power in the Ruhr and the Saar, or should it dig its heels in, clashing withits main ally and deadlocking its relations with Bonn?The moment of truth came in the spring of 1950. Robert Schuman, the French ForeignMinister, was given an urgent assignment by his American and British counterparts: tocome up with a proposal for reintegrating Federal Germany into the Western concert.A meeting between the three governments was scheduled for 10 May 1950 and Francecould not shirk her responsibilities.The political stalemate was compounded by economic problems. A steel crisis appearedto be imminent because of the production potential of the various European countries.Demand was slackening, prices were falling and the signs were that steelmakers, true tothe industry's tradition of the inter-war years, would recreate a cartel to limit competition.In the face of the post-war reconstruction effort, European economies could not allowtheir basic industries to slide into speculation or organized shortage.9
B. Jean Monnet's ideasTo unravel this skein of difficulties, which had proved too much for old·style diplomacy,Robert Schuman sought the help of an inventive genius, a man still unknown to thepublic at large, who had acquired exceptional experience in the course of a long anddistinguished international career. Jean Monnet, then General Commissioner for theModernization Plan, appointed by de Gaulle in 1945 to be the architect of France'seconomic recovery, was one of the most influential Europeans of the Western world. Dur·ing the First World War he had organized the common supply system of the Allied forces.Deputy Secretary·General of the League of Nations, a banker in the United States, inWestern Europe, in China, he was one of President Roosevelt's trusted advisers and theengineer of the Victory Program which ensured the military superiority of the UnitedStates over the Axis forces. Although he never held political office, he had advisedgovernments and had gained a reputation as a pragmatist, whose first concern was ef·ficacy.Robert Schuman spoke of his concern to Jean Monnet: 'What's to be done about Ger·many?' was the obsession of that native of Lorraine who was driven by the resolve to en·sure that war between France and Germany would never happen again.Jean Monnet, head of the little team in the rue de Martignac where the Planning Com·mission had its headquarters, was thinking about the problem too. His main concern wasinternational politics. He believed that the cold war stemmed from rivalry between thebig powers in Europe, the prize being a divided Europe. The strain could be eased by promoting a venture of international dimensions whose main objective would be detente andworld peace thanks to the effective role played by a risen and reconciled Europe.Jean Monnet had watched the various unsuccessful attempts at integration after the1948 Congress organized by the European Movement in The Hague had solemnly calledfor unity.The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, set up in 1948, was only givencoordinating powers and had been unable to prevent economic recovery in Europe proceeding in a purely national context. The creation of the Council of Europe, on 5 May1949, showed that governments were jealous of their prerogatives. The ConsultativeAssembly had no more than deliberative powers and its resolutions, which had to bepassed by a two-thirds majority, could be vetoed by the Committee of Ministers.Monnet became convinced that the idea of erecting a complete institutional edifice atone go was a pipe dream. Resistance from the States would be such that the initiativewould be doomed. It was too much to expect States to consent to massive transfers ofsovereignty, which would have injured national sensitivities only a few years after the endof the war.10
. lLe 6 Jll\1 1950Ln pa1.X rnond1nle ne o.'lLll·n1t litre B·uvorn.rdc e l!l'lnll doB e!!ortor{ntellre h ln Jr.OBLll"1l dC!B dnn,:rera qL11 la roer.noent.Ln oor.trlbL1t1or. qll. 1 Llne Lll.rOpo orp:'lr. tel tl ot v !.vnnto P JLlt nppoterr,ln ClV1llo'lt1:m O:lt lndlopOOO'lbletillr .1llnt!.en dOt' rulnt1008paoi!!. Lleo. En oe !nlnnr.t dopLllD pl:. .e de 2:) ·mu le chnmp!.on d'unel·:ll.ropo un!.n 1 ln irnnoo n toLljoJrn ell. poLlr obJ.lt eoeeotlel de oervlrln pnix. L'i·: .trc ,., n'n pno itt! !nita, nolle nvono 111.1 lnc ! r.-.t. 1 .:Ltrope ned 1 en:lo:r.ulo 1 ollo! .::- 11.1f'Ll rro.pns d'o.tn coLl; , n1 dr no un., o::motiUCt1ondell rl ll1ntlonn o mori:te .'lror{nntd'nlJorll uno ool!.dnrltcl do l'nlt. Lo rnnoemblomont doo nn.tlonl! ei.U'Opl'ennea ex!.,;-e q1.10 1 1 oppool tion otollll1re de ln l:'rnnoe et de L 1 Alle!:t1pueo.)lt ( llmln(el 1 nct1on entroprlofJ dolt toLlohor lhl premier1oh J.t' ln Z'rnnoo et 1 1 Allen'lmo.Dnuo oe b.tt 1 loGo. vornc nt i'r·,u n.1oprop1eo do porter 1m:n{-:ll!lt;: Jnt l 1 nct1on o.1r Llt; point Ur:tlt( m."'iB d(olo1! 1J:.e(;OJV !rn mcr.t ir· nr;nln pr: pnne do plAoc r l' Cltl'ler.tLlo de lnfrodu.ctlor. t'riUJOo-1\llo:n-ct,do do 0!,-;rbon et,\.ttor1t com .llnu 1 chnnLUlOrl 1 olor, 0-'llO t.UlOliOLltOor ·nnlo'ltlon oJv·. rtB t ln v.rtlolpntionden n tr.:!B pn;to d 1Lilr0pc.Ln mice eooorrc .Uldee;·rodo ot!.o''"do ol \rlJon ot l'no1cr no:J'*r"r'l lmm(dlntdrlUI t 1 1 (t·rbll-·fiOr".ent do b"'ll.:o OOWlt.Uloo du .,{voloppe--:ont.'oonomi1Ll:l 1pr:J l ru{t pode ln l(d(r·.tlon oLlrOpc'ur.tiie 1 ct chnmror'llc d Jll!.Ln l!e cell rcr!.ooo lonrtcmpodV0.l(ca pclorre dent '1 tee ont {ttl lee plLll'lln.t' lJrlcntlonoor.ot .ntcndco nr!T'.oovlot1coe.Facsimile ofthe final draft (the ninth) ofthe Schuman Declaration. Schuman's team put thefinishing touches(Jean Monnet Archives)to It on 6 May 1950.II
To succeed, sights would have to be lowered to specific targets, with enormouspsychological significance, and a joint decision-making mechanism introduced whichcould gradually be extended to new areas.C The 9 May DeclarationIt could be said that the Schuman Plan was the result of a conspiracy. Towards the endof April 1950, Jean Monnet and his closest colleagues -Etienne Hirsch, Paul Reuterand Pierre Uri -produced a short paper containing the explanatory memorandum andthe terms of a proposal which was to turn conventional diplomacy on its head. Far fromgoing through the old-style consultations with the appropriate ministries, Monnet tookpains to ensure that the project was handled with the utmost discretion, to obviate theinevitable caveats and counter-proposals, which would have diluted its revolutionary approach and removed the element of surprise. Monnet put his paper in the hands of Ber-9 May 1950: the Schuman Plan is made public in the Salon de /'llorloge at the French Foreign Office. RobertSchuman at the microphone; Jean Monnet on his right.(EC Commission)12
nard Clappier, Schuman's directeur de cabinet, knowing that the Minister's decisioncould influence the course of events. When Schuman returned from a weekend in hisnative Lorraine and announced 'I've read the proposal. I'll use it: the conspirators knewthat their initiative had moved into the political arena. On the morning of 9 May, at thevery moment that Schuman was putting his proposal to his government colleagues, asecret messenger from his staff was handing it personally to Konrad Adenauer in Bonn.The Chancellor's reaction was immediate and enthusiastic. He promptly replied that hewholeheartedly endorsed the proposal.So it was with the dual agreement of the French and German Governments that RobertSchuman made his Declaration at a press conference held at 4 p.m. that afternoon in theSalon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay. He prefaced his announcement with a fewintroductory sentences:'It is no longer a time for vain words, but for a bold, constructive act. France has acted,and the consequences of her action may be immense. We hope they will. She has actedessentially in the cause of peace. For peace to have a real chance, there must first be aEurope. Almost five years to the day since Germany's unconditional surrender, Franceis taking the first decisive step to rebuild Europe and is inviting Germany to play its part.This will transform the situation in Europe. This will open the door to other joint activities inconceivable hitherto. Europe will emerge from all this; a Europe that is firmlyunited and solidly built; a Europe where living standards will rise as a result of the poolingof production and the expansion of markets leading to lower prices . :The scene was set. This was more than a new technical arrangement subject to thehaggling of negotiators. France was stretching out her hand to Germany, offering equalpartnership in a new entity which would assume responsibility for joint managementof the two countries' coal and steel industries and, in a wider perspective, for laying thefoundation stone of a European federation.The Declaration (see text, p. 43) defines a set of principles: Europe will not be built allat once; it will be built by concrete achievements which first create de facto solidarity:(i) The age-old rivalry between France and Germany was to be eliminate J: the venturewould be of immediate concern to France and Germany but would be open to allEuropean nations sharing the same objectives.(ii) Immediate action would focus on a 'limited, but decisive target': Franco-Germancoal and steel production, which would be placed under a common High Authority.(iii) The merging of economic interests would help to raise the standard of living andpave the way for the establishment of an economic community.(iv) The High Authority's decisions would be binding on the countries that joined. Itsmembers would be independent figures, jointly appointed. Its decisions would be enforceable.13
D. Drafting of the ECSC 'J}'eatyIf the French initiative, immediately transformed into a Franco-German initiative, wereto have any chance of becoming a reality, rapid action was essential. On 20 June 1950France convened an Intergovernmental Conference in Paris, chaired by Jean Monnet.The three Benelux countries and Italy responded to the invitation and turned up at thenegotiating table. Jean Monnet explained the purpose of the discussions which wereabout to begin: 'We are here: he said, 'to undertake a common task - not to negotiatefor our own national advantage, but to seek it in the advantage of all. Only if we eliminatefrom our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In so far as we,gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude of all Europeans will likewisegradually change: 1A year after the Schuman Declaration. the first of the three 'Jfeaties establishing the European Communitieswas signed in Ftlris on 18 Apri!/951.(Jean Monnet Archives)114Monnet, Jean: Memoirs, trans. Richard Payne, London, Collins, 1978, p. 323.
The Conference made it possible to refine the proposed plan. The powers and independence of the High Authority were not challenged, because they were central to theproposal. At the request of the Netherlands, a Council of Ministers which would represent the States and give its assent in certain cases was added. A Parliamentary Assemblyand a Court of Justice rounded off the institutional structure, which is still the basis ofthe Community system today. The negotiators never lost sight of the fact that they hadbeen given a political mandate to devise an organization which was entirely new in itsobjectives and in its methods. It was essential that the embryonic organization shouldnot be saddled with the shortcomings of traditional intergovernmental agencies:insistence on unanimity; national financial contributions; an executive subordinate tonational representatives .The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed on 18 April1951 for a period of 50 years. It was ratified by the six signatory States, and on 10 August1952 the High Authority, with Jean Monnet as its President, opened for business inLuxembourg.15-1615
II - The Schuman Plan: the Community's birthcertificate'The Schuman proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing . The indispensablefirstprinciple ofthese proposals is the abnegation ofsovereignty in a limited but decisive field. Any plan which does not involve this indispensable first principle can make no usefulcontribution to the solution ofthe grave problems thatface us. Cooperation between nations, while essential, cannot alone meet our problem. What must be sought is afusionof the interests of the European peoples and not merely another effort to maintain anequilibrium of those interests . : 1Jean MonnetA. The innovato-ry principles underpinning the first EuropeanCommunityIt took almost a year to negotiate the Treaty of Paris because the talks raised a whole seriesof basic issues to which Jean Monnet was keen to find the most satisfactory solutions.As we have seen, these were no run-of-the-mill diplomatic negotiations. The delegatesappointed by the six governments had gathered around the table to devise an entirely newpolitico-legal system designed to last. The five short paragraphs of the Preamble encapsulate the philosophy which has inspired advocates of European integration ever since:'Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensuratewith the dangers that threaten it,Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make tocivilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations,Recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which willfirst of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases foreconomic development,Anxious to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard of living andfurther the works of peace,1Jean Monnet, op cit., p. 316.17
Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; tocreate, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations forinstitutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared . :'World peace', 'practical achievements: 'real solidarity: 'merging of essential interests:'community: 'destiny henceforward shared': so many key phrases which embody the embryonic Community spirit and Community method and are as inspirational as ever today.In 1990 the intrinsic importance of the Treaty of Paris for the European economy is notthe same as it was in the 1950s. But the institutional principles defined in it have stoodthe test of time. They initiated a dynamic process which is still bearing fruit, sustaininga political vision which we must cherish lest we jeopardize all that the Community hasachieved.It is possible to identify four principles deriving from the Schuman Plan, which underpinthe present Community edifice:The ECSC'sfirst steel ingot was cast at Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg, on 30 Apri/1953. Jean Monnet andthe other members of the High Authority mark the occasion.(Jean Monnet Archives)18
1. Superiority of institutionsApplication to international relations of the principles of equality, arbitration and conciliation which lie at the very heart of democracy is an advance for civilization. Thefounders had experienced the mindless violence and upheaval which come with war.Their aim was to create a Community where law rather than might would prevail. Mannet frequently quoted the Swiss philosopher Henri-Frederic Arnie!, who said: 'Eachman's experience starts again from the beginning. Only institutions grow wiser: they accumulate collective experience; and, owing to this experience and this wisdom, men subject to the same rules will not see their own nature changing, but their behaviour gradually transformed.' ITo put relations between the States on a peaceful and democr
ISDN 92-826-1223·6 ISDN 92-826-1224-4 La declaraci6n Schuman 1950·1990: Una idea nueva para Europa Schuman-erklrcringen: Nye planer for Europa-1950/1990 Eine neue Ordnung fur Europa-40 Jahre Schuman· Plan (1950·1990) 1950-1990: 40 XP6Vla a1t6 trt taKTjpU Tt Schuman-Mta vf.a tlif.a
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The Sales Tax Act, 1990 6 The Sales Tax Act, 1990. (Act No. III of 1951 as Amended by Act VII of 1990) Chapter I PRELIMINARY 1.Short title, extent and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Sales Tax Act, 1990. (2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan. (3) It shall come into force on such date as the Federal Government may, by
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2.1.6 Adding NDK Hooks Using ACD Support . It is not intended as an API reference. How to Use This Manual The information presented in this document is divided into the following chapters: Chapter 1: Overview introduces the stack and developing network applications. Chapter 2: Network Application Development describes the NDK software, and how to start developing network applications .
