The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse 1

3/11/2013Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionThe Kansas City Hyatt RegencyWalkways Collapse1

3/11/2013 NSPE Code of Ethics What Happened Comments from the Engineer National Bureau of Standards Report Some Lessons LearnedDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionOutline2

NSPE Code of EthicsFundamental Canons2. Perform services only in areas of their competence.3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthfulmanner.4. Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees.5. Avoid deceptive acts.6. Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, andlawfully so as to enhance the honor, reputation, and usefulnessof the profession.Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.3/11/2013Engineers, in the fulfillment of their professional duties, shall:3

3/11/2013 1981, newly opened Hyatt Regency Hotel Social function (tea dance) Two suspended walkways collapsed 114 dead, 186 injured In terms of loss of life and injuries, this was themost devastating structural collapse ever to takeplace in the United States. Two structural engineers lost their PE licensesDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionWhat Happened4

3/11/2013 Following the accident investigations, onFebruary 3, 1984, the Missouri Board ofArchitects, Professional Engineers and LandSurveyors filed a complaint against Daniel M.Duncan, Jack D. Gillum, and G.C.E. International,Inc., charging gross negligence, incompetence,misconduct and unprofessional conduct in thepractice of engineering in connection with theirperformance of engineering services in thedesign and construction of the Hyatt RegencyHotel.Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionWhat the Licensing Board Said5

3/11/2013Investigation of theKansas City Hyatt RegencyWalkways CollapseU.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDSDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionNBS BUILDING SCIENCE SERIES 1436

3/11/2013 G.C.E., in preparation of their structural detail drawings, "depicting the boxbeam hanger rod connection for the Hyatt atrium walkways, failed toconform to acceptable engineering practice. [This is based] upon evidence ofa number of mistakes, errors, omissions and inadequacies contained on thissection detail itself and of [G.C.E.'s] alleged failure to conform to theaccepted custom and practice of engineering for proper communication ofthe engineer's design intent." Evidence showed that neither due care during the design phase, norappropriate investigations following the atrium roof collapse wereundertaken by G.C.E. In addition, G.C.E. was found responsible for thechange from a one-rod to a two-rod system. Further, it was found that even if Havens [the structural steel contractor]failed to review the shop drawings or to specifically note the box beamhanger rod connections, the engineers were still responsible for the finalcheck. Evidence showed that G.C.E. engineers did not "spot check" the connectionand that they placed too much reliance on Havens.Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionDetails from the NBS Report7

A Picture is Worth . . .Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session Seconds From Disaster - S03E01 - Hotel SkywalkCollapse9/1/2012Season & Episode : S03E01 Title: HotelSkywalk Collapse Brief synopsis: 1,500 people gather for adance in the Hyatt Regency Hotel in KansasCity.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v oqp4K32sfDE 21:33 – 22:473/11/2013From National Geographic8

3/11/2013 Three suspended walkways 2nd floor suspended from the fourth 3rd floor off-set Probable Cause Load capacity on box beam hangerconnections Per accident investigation, the original designwas 60% below the Kansas City Building Code Construction change doubled load onconnectionDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionWhat Happened?9

Connection DetailDayton ASHRAE Technical Session3/11/2013 Box beam / hanger rod connection10

11Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session3/11/2013

12Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session3/11/2013

Presented By:Jack D. Gillum, P.E.3/11/2013Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionHyatt Regency Walkway Collapse“A Personal Perspective & Insight”13

Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session OWNER: OTHER TEAM MEMBERS:Crown Center Redevelopment Corp. Concordia ProjectManagement DESIGN TEAM: Havens Structural Steel ARCHITECTS Eldridge & Son Patty Berkebile & NelsonConstruction Herbert Duncan General Testing Monroe - LefbvreLaboratories Marshal & Brown STRUCTUAL ENGINEERS: Gillum Colaco3/11/2013The Team Owner/Design &Construction Team14

No rod sizeDayton ASHRAE Technical Session3/11/2013Design Phase – Bridge ConnectionEvolution No reaction No rod strength15

3/11/2013 1st Walkway connection detail shows eccentric hanger toangle on the side of W16 stringers Mid 1978: Architect request rods supporting bridges bechanged from 1 3/4” to 1 1/4”. Plans are revised to 2-MC 8channels in lieu of W8x10. Engineers Revised sketch of detail shows single rod w/ Fy 60centered on 2 channels placed toe to toe with axial load of22k August 1978 Draftsman transfer sketch to final drawingsleaving off the yield strength of the rod and axial load.Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionJack Gillum’s Perspective16

THIS CONNECTIONWAS NEVERDRAWNNOR SUBMITTEDFOR APPROVALDayton ASHRAE Technical Session3/11/2013Connection As Built17

3/11/2013 These changes are typical to the shortcomings of aFast Track project. When one considers that theconstruction and final design and details for thetower, under construction, as well as the revolvingrestaurant were also being finalized. One mustappreciate the project intensity and projectenvironment which was fundamental tounderstanding the human aspects that led to thefailure. In August of 1978, the drawings and specificationswere issued for Construction. Already a significantamount of the construction was in place.Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionJack Gillum’s Perspective18

General Contractor's attorney reported : “ .fromdate of full dead load loading of 4th and 2nd floorbridges (July 1, 1980), box beams began to distortand distortions were visible to naked eye.”3/11/2013 Walkway deflection of 3/4” observed byworkman who notified architect’s siterepresentative seven weeks B4 July 80 opening.No Follow UpDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionWarning Signs!!!Never Transmitted to Engineer19

Feb 1981 Box Beam Deformations noticed by drywall installer. (No one notified)Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session Handrail Deflection noted on punch list of 130items (Aug, 1980)3/11/2013Warning Signs!!!Never Transmitted to Engineer20

3/11/2013 Design shown on Engr’s Dwg? Yes, but normally not done. Fabricator Design Connection? Absolutely - but He said thatit was designed. During the Administrative Hearing, Wemaintained steadfastly that connection shown on thedrawings was concept only. Experts such as Lev Zetlin,Walter Moore, Kenneth Balk of St. Louis and John Tanner ofDallas concurred.In my opinion, to consider the double rod connection thatfailed as well as the concept shown on the contractdrawings a “designed connection” is ludicrous. Disclaimer on Engr’s Dwg? Yes ! Particularly in Missouri. We requested of the owner that we provide full timeinspection on three separate occasions but were turneddown. This surprised me because when I designed theWestin Crown Center for Crown Center, I was retained toprovide full time inspection for the complete projectDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionJack Gillum’s Perspective21

3/11/2013 As indicated by their stamps, these shopdrawings were reviewed by the contractor,structural engineer and architect.Dayton ASHRAE Technical SessionFrom the NBS Report22

Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session Single Rod Concept detail on engineer’s drawingnoted as conceptual only Fabricator design connection Picked up during shop drawing check as notdesigned After atrium collapse picked up during design recheck which should have been a thorough designdocument check3/11/2013What Should Have Occurred?23

Peer reviews and design checks should include areview of shop drawingsDayton ASHRAE Technical Session Procedures must be implemented that assurethat all connections are designed by acompetent professional3/11/2013Jack Gillum’s Lessons Learned24

EOR should be retained to provide fullinspection during construction of structure Owner needs on-site qualified representationDayton ASHRAE Technical Session When questions come up look at surroundingissues for related problems3/11/2013Jack Gillum’s Lessons Learned25

Dayton ASHRAE Technical Session ALL MEMBERS OF THE DESIGN TEAM ARERESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT THEY DO! Take the time to check your own work! DON’T ASSUME SOMEONE ELSE WILL! Continuing Maintenance and inspections byOWNER ! Final Responsibility? The Engineerof Record!!3/11/2013Jack Gillum’s Lessons Learned26

Connections designed by Fabricator totailor to fabrication methodsEOR has authority & responsibility foroverall Design of ProjectFabricator responsible for connections &detailsDayton ASHRAE Technical SessionPP 17.3.2: Shop Drawings for StructuralComponents3/11/2013ASCE: “Quality in the ConstructedProject”, 2000 (After 20 years)27

The corollary principle is that everyone mustbe responsible for his or her own work anddecisionsDayton ASHRAE Technical Session“Responsibility issues in construction, as inmost endeavors, can be effectively resolvedby adhering to the principle thatresponsibility and authority must be exactlylinked.”3/11/2013Consulting Engineer,Norman Scott recently wrote:28

1981, newly opened Hyatt Regency Hotel Social function (tea dance) Two suspended walkways collapsed 114 dead, 186 injured In terms of loss of life and injuries, this was the most devastating structural collapse ever to take place in the United States. Two structural engineers lost their PE licenses 3/11/2013File Size: 1MBPage Count: 28