Y LI. 1 AND APOLLO RELIABILITY - Internet Archive

S-TB StageSpider beam structural failure during load testsSplit tube on engine No. 7 after stage acceptance test firingFailure of sensor mounting brackets during qualification vibrationS-IVB StagePredicted late delivery of flight stage to KSC checkoutWeld failures in H, tank cylinder during structures test0Schedule slippages on battleship programIUFailure of mounting brackets during vibrationPossible slippage in activation schedule of IU checkout station0Schedule slippage of ESE causing late flight unit deliveryCSMShortage of hardware for test slips SC007 test two months0Slippage in SM 004 and C M 004A deliveryService Propulsion System and Reaction Control System problemsdelayed SCOOl test one month2.2.6Mission Success Apportionment Status,Figure 2-2 presents a comparison ofthe relative contributions to unreliability of the five elements of the ApolloSaturn 201 Mission based on apportinned values; The comparison indicates that, as might be expected forthis short non-orbiting mission, thelaunch vehicle performance is considered to have the major effect onsuccess. Apportionment analysis alsoindicates that the major predictableelements of risk are concerned withthe operation of the S-IB and S-IVB.S-IBCSM,”I ESFigure 2-2. Apollo-Saturn 201Mission % Contribution to Unreliability Based onApportionments2-3

Figure 2-3 presents a curve of probable reliability against mission phases based onthe apportioned values. A s shown, the apportioned reliabilities lead to a probabilityof mission success of 0.84.Figure 2-3. Apollo-Saturn 201 Mission Success Based on Apportionments2.2.7Mission Success Prediction Status. Since equipment reliability predictions for the Apollo-Saturn 201 Mission have not been finalized, a prediction of mission success is not included in this report.2.2.8Reliabilitv and Qualitv Program Implementation. Implementation of reliability and quality assurance requirements of NPC 500-5 for theApollo-Saturn 201 vehicle is progressing as shown in Figure 2-4. Therelative degree of implementation f o r all major program phases isshown with the recognition that Apollo-Saturn 201 equipments are currently in the fabrication and ground test phases.Areas of reliability and quality assurance implementation requiring program emphasis are:Improved failure and corrective action reporting, including equipment operating time records.2-4

Reliability and quality assurance training and the implementation ofmotivation programs at all levels.0aAudits at all program levels to promote appropriate reliability andquality assurance plan implementation.Program PhaseS-IBH-1 EngineS-IVBConceDtual% Complete% Initiated% Unreported68680683232032683200Desiw% Complete96 Initiated% Unreported7129057281557430701515Development% Complete96 Initiated% Unreported10006806868032320320Fabrication96 Complete96 Initiated% 515850Ground Test% Complete% Initiated96 Unreported5-2 EngineIFigure 2-4.2.2.9Apollo-Saturn 201 Vehicle Reliability and Quality Program StatusSingle Point Failure Analysis. Single point failure analyses conductedm e C O L I G L U I D ha" --m ;Gnrld u ,thn, tnn mnct r--r i t i p-,2 -1 -items in eachmodule. Failure of any one of these items would cause loss of stage o rmission. Examination of Figure 2-5 indicates that half of these criticalitems a r e related to propulsion aspects of the mission and, that of these,half a r e related to valving. One quarter of the critical items a r e r e lated to guidance and navigation and almost half of these concern gyros.The other quarter a r e related to electrical systems divided equally between power and switching elements.* y1.L---L-------u.Ivly-------2-5

S- IVBS- IBSM (not ranked)IUSelector Switch Electrical ControlGyros ST-124MAttitude ControlEngine Assy. - APSYawGyroBattery D10Primary Power scsFuel Additive BlenderUnit - H-1 EngineElectrical DistributioiAccelerometerST-124M4.LOX ReplenishingValveSequencer Mtg. Assy.- Electrical Control5.Main Pump - H-1Engine HydraulicHydraulic Actuator6.Attitude Control RelajSeparation and RetroEBW Trigger Relay - - Electrical ControlMain DistributorGas BearingHelium SquibRegulator Valve - CM/Gas BearingRCSSupplyPropellantBattery D40Primary Power Isolation Valve- CM/RCSServo Amplifier Rocket Eng ine- CM/RCS1.Propellant Pumps andGearbox Assembly H-1 Engine2.Gas TurbineH-1 Engine3.7.-High P r e s s u r e Accum- Actuation Control ulator - H-1 EnginePneumatic ControlHyd r au 1icPitch Gyro-scsMemory "A"LVDC-8.LOX Fill and DrainValveHelium Regulation Propellant Pres s u r izationMemory "B'' LVDC9.Fuel Fill and DrainValveHydraulic PumpSlip RingsST-124M10.F i r e Separation andRetro Relay - MainDistributorPower DistributorMtg. Assy., 28VDCPreamplifierand DetectorST-124M---RateGyrosCM/RCS-Helium Solenoid SPS-Helium Regulator SPS-Helium CheckValve - SPS-Rocket EngineNozzle Extension CWCS-Sir lar information on GSE, ESE, and G O S S is not currently available.Figure 2-5.2.3APOLLO-SATURN MLL MISSION2.3.12-6Apollo-Saturn 201 Mission Critical Single Point Failure Analysis ResultsOverall Apollo-Saturn MLL Mission Status. Analysis of the current reliability and quality program status of the first MLL mission indicatescontinual improvement of the individual efforts of the respective MSFCenters in conducting appropriate reliability and quality assurance activities. There is, however, indication that more emphasis should beapplied to interfaces and consideration of the hardware and requirementsin the total mission context. Inadequate emphasis is being applied to

launch availability and the reliability aspects of logistics and maintainability.Although program documentation i s improving, there is an increasingneed for an effective program-wide data and information exchange. Theincreased effectiveness of inter-center panels and the Apollo Document Index System constitute major improvements.Current failure and corrective action reporting requirements a r e inadequate to provide information for program monitoring. This information provides a key measure of program progress toward scheduledgoals by indicating the degree of convergence o r divergence betweenequipment failure rate and failure correction rate.Good progress has been made in the establishment of equipment reliability apportionments and predictions; however, specific detail profilesof the Apollo-Saturn 500 series missions have not been reported, hencecurrent reliability apportionments and predictions a r e of a genericnature. Reliability mission profiles and system configuration utilizedwere based upon the Apollo-Saturn 504 Mission configuration, ApolloSaturn 500 series missions program information, and the Design Reference Mission established by the Mission Planning Task Force at MSC.From this information a reliability mission profile has been assembledin sufficient detail to define functions which must be accomplished formission success and crew safety. A need has been identified forprogram-wide dissemination of mission ground rules, operational procedures and guidelines for their application, to provide common objectives for all participants in the program.2.3.2Apollo-Saturn MLL Mission Reliabilitv Apportionments. The ApolloProgram Specification, NASA OMSF 005-001-1, establishes the goalsfor the Manned Lunar Landing Mission a t 0.90 for mission success and0.999 for crew safety. Figure 2-6 below summarizes the current stage/module apportionments made by the centers/contractors. Based uponthese apportionments, probability of mission success is 0.73 and crewsafety is 0.96.C u r r m t cecter/cmtractnr reliability apportionments for the S-IC andS-IVB stages are based on engine reliabilities of 0.999/engine. Thestage reliabilities shown in the ''Reconciled Contract Value" column a r ebased on the engine reliability goals established in the engine contracts.The values provided for Apollo-Saturn 500 series Design ReferenceMission, mission success and crew safety (**) apportionments werecomputed using the "Reconciled Contract Value" reliabilities. Reliability apportionments for the Ground Operational Support System andfor Ground Support Equipment have not been identified in programdocumentation.0--**Calculated from above values2-7

Stage/ ModuleApolloProgramSpecifizationw --Zontrac tUorkStatenentlrogram'lansw2- onractor?ublishedU2-aRecon;iled2ontrac tiralue.9071*S-IC Stage.951.9511.9504S-I1 Stage.951.9511.915582 .9155S-TVB Stage.951.9511.9551 .9414*Instrument Unit.991.99211Command ServiceModule.961.963861.963832 .9638Lunar ExcursionModule.981.98461.98797 .987Over allApollo -Saturn(Mission Success).901OverallApollo-Saturn(Crew ual reliability goals f o r engines used in calculation for stage** Calculated from above valuesFigure 2-6.2.3.3Apportionment Status, Mission Success ReliabilityApollo-Saturn Manned Lunar Landing MissionReliabilitv Program Implementation. Implementation of the requirements of NASA Document NPC 500-5 for the Conceptual, Design, andDevelopment phases of the Manned Lunar Landing Mission is progressing as shown in Figure 2-7.

Program PhaseF-1s-ICs-rIwte% Initiated% Unreported6832683200Design% Complete% Initiated% 3232326800100320Develor ment96 Complete96 Initiated96 Unreported32680Figure 2-7.2.3.40Reliability and Quality Program StatusApollo-Saturn Manned Lunar Landing MissionSingle Point Failure Analvsis. Active attention to single point failureanalysis has been reported on all equipment areas except GSE, GOSS,and MCC. Most single point failure analyses of Apollo-Saturn 500 seriesmission hardware have not progressed to the point of identifying themost critical items, with the exception of those presented in Figure 2-8below. S-rVBs-ICFuel PressurizationFluid PowerFuel DeliveryLOX DeliveryRetro RocketLOX PressurizationControl P r e s s u r e8. Engine Purge1.2.3.4.5.6.7.Figure 2-8.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.Selector SwitchAttitude Control EnginesHelium Fill ModulesElectronics AssemblyHydraulic PumpAuxiliary Propulsion EngineElectrical Distribution CableSequencerSeparatorMost Critical Items Apollo-Saturn Manned Lunar Landing Mission2-9

2.3.52.4Manned Lunar Landing Testing and Reliabilitv Prediction Status. Sincethe Apollo-Saturn 504 Mission is still in the design/development stage,testing has not progressed to the point permitting summarization ofcomponent qualification and ground test data. Preliminary reliabilitypredictions have been made on most of the equipments and a r e currentlybeing analyzed.APOLLO RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAMThe individual efforts of the respective MSF Centers in conducting reliability andquality assurance activities a r e effective, and the present plans for further coordination of these activities a r e directed toward more efficient utilization of theavailable resources.2-102.4.1Reliabilitv and Qualitv Assurance Plans. Apollo R&QA plans are progressing toward maturity. The overall R&QA Program Plan is scheduled f o r approval August 1965. The MSFC RWA Program Plan draftwas issued 4 May 1965. MSC and KSC M A plans have been approvedby center management and issued.2.4.2Single Point Failure Analvsis Program, In response to the AssociateAdministrator's draft instruction on Single Point Failure Policy, a r e a sof responsibility have been assigned to Apollo Program Office Directorates and an overall action plan is being prepared to identify thosesingle failures which could have a significant impact on the program.Equipment reliability analyses being performed at all MSF Centersinclude analysis for failure effects and a criticality ranking of all components based on the failure impact. Coordination of procedures employed in these analyses is being undertaken since various criticalityranking methods are currently used.2.4.3Failure Reporting, Each of the Manned Space Flight Centers have initiated closed loop failure reporting systems. Further effort is neededto mature these failure reporting systems to permit adequate visibilityby the centers and APO of critical/major failure and corrective actionstatus.2.4.4Contractual Requirements. Some contracts between NASA and the primecontractors do not include adequate reliability and quality requirements.2.4.5.Reliabilitv and Qualitv Audits. Reliability and quality audits are scheduled and a r e being conducted by MSC and MSFC on major contractors.Implementing divisions a t KSC are performing reliability and qualityaudits of facility and GSE contractors, but schedules are not available.2.4.6Mission Profiles. To assure common design and measurement goals,there is a strong need for the establishment of common mission profilesand ground rules for each mission and guidelines for their utilization byall participants in the program.

2.4.7Reliabilily Modeling. The development of a compatible family of reliability analysis models at the program, center and contractor levels,has been initiated. Effort is presently directed toward establishment ofguidelines and the implementation of technical interchange meetings toa s s u r e overall compatibility of the modeling efforts, particularly ininterface areas. MSC has initiated an integrated modeling effort with itscontractors. MSFC has modeling activities a t all of its contractors.2.4.8Reliabilitv Considerations of GOSS. Launch Complex Equipments andCrew Functions, At the mission level, current reliability analyses donot include meaningful reliability consideration of GOSS, launch complexequipments and crew functions.2.4.9Launch Availability. Studies have been initiated toward evaluation oflaunch availability. However, present plans indicate that summary r e sults will not be available before mid-1966.2.4.10Crew Reliabiliw Studies. Studies a r e being made by the Martin Company(OMSF Contract NASw-1187) to determine crew reliability; for example,(1)how well the crew performs switching functions and (2) how well thecrew navigates and controls the spacecraft including fuel used.2.4.11Training: and Motivation. Training courses a r e being utilized by thecenters to better equip key center personnel to perform critical reliability and quality jobs. Motivation programs at each of the centers (forexample, the Manned Awareness Program at NZSFC) are being developed.Seven contractors a r e reported to have initiated motivation programssuch a s Zero Defects or PRIDE.Closer coordination of training and motivation programs has been initiated and will result in better utilization of available training resources.2-1 1

SECTION 3: APOLLO-SATURN 201 MISSION3.1GENERALThis section discusses the reliability and quality status of the Apollo-Saturn 201Mission equipments. The information presented is intended to provide a basisf o r evaluating progress toward achieving desired mission reliability. The approach taken is one in which both quantitative and qualitative data have beenconsidered to provide in-depth analysis of the probability of successfully performing the mission. This analysis follows three basic paths, Figure 3-1, eachpresenting a different visibility to program status.Quantitative EvaluationWaA Program Status versus Plan201 MissionTest Verification of ConfigurationDifferences Between Saturn I and Saturn IBFigure 3-1.Apollo-Saturn 201 Mission Analysis RoadmapThe probability of the successful completion of the Apollo-Saturn 201 Missionbased on reliability apportionments is estimated to be 0.84. The unconditionalprobability of completing each mission phase is shown on Figure 3-2.The distribution of equipment unreliability contribution to the Apollo-Saturn 201Mission is as follows:S-IB-1 StageS-IVB-201 StageSpacecraft 009S-IU-201 StageGSE31%31%26%6%6%These values are based on the reliability apportionments f o r the stages of theApollo-Saturn 201 vehicle. A summary of the apportionments and predictionsf o r each stage i s tabulated in Figure 3-3.3-1

1.02I,0.95CIsmn0.90020.850.80I Phase 1Comdetion-EventI Phase9Lift-off, Hold Down Release10S-IB Cutoff11S-IB - S-IVB/CSM Separation12S-IVB Ignition (90% Thrust)S-IVB Engine Cutoff1314Coast & Orientation ManeuverS-IVB/IU SLA-CSM Separation1516SPS F i r s t IgnitionFigure 3-2.StageS-IVBIuSpacecraftFigure 3-3.95.95.99.96 Summary of Success Probabilities for Mission PhasesApportionmentS-IBICompletion-EventSPS F i r s t CutoffSPS Second IgnitionSPS Second CutoffSM-CM SeparationEntry 0 . 0 5 GIsForward Heat Shield 7.991*4447.966*.9955*525771NOTE AIRemarksI*Based on no stageloss.1Prediction is due inSeptemberApollo-Saturn 201 Mission Apportionment and Prediction StatusNOTE A: No overall mission success probability based on prediction data is beingpresented in this report since the spacecraft contractor's prediction will notbe available until September 1965. NAA/S&ID has reviewed the test program for the CSM subsystem and has estimated that successful completionof the planned testing will demonstrate 0.99 reliability for the CSM.3 -2

The overall summary of reliability and quality status on those items of flight hardwarewhich have been designated for the Apollo-Saturn 201 Mission appears in Figure 3-4.The measurement yardstick used as a base is derived from the phased program elements of NPC 500-5, "Apollo Reliability and Quality Assurance Program Plan" (2).NPC - 500-5EnginesBoosterCSM5-2 S-IB S-IVB IUProgram ElementsLA1Reliability GoalsR&QA PlanConceptualPhaseReliability PredictionsApportionmentsFMEA' sSpecification Reliability Req.Mission ProfileHuman Eng. and Maint.Parts and MaterialsTest RequirementsChange ControlCritical ItemsFR's and Corrective ActionReliability AssessmentsMRBConfiguration ControlProgram ReviewsContractor Audits by CenterQualification TestsQual. Status ListRelia hility Demo. TestE1 Accept. TestsCheckoutEquipment seFabricationPhaseGround uuIIIKegCIU-

a paragraph table of contents - title section 1 : introduction section 2: summary 2.1 general 2.2 apollo-saturn 201 mission 2.3 apollo-saturn mll mission 2.4 apollo reliability and quality assurance program section 3: apollo-saturn 201 mission 3.1 general 3.2 s-igrrs’i’a -- 3.3 s-ivb-201 stage 3.4 s-iu-201 stage 3.5 spacecraft 009 3.6 3.7 mission re liability analysis