Does Emigration Inhibit Reform? Evidence From The Mexican .
Does Emigration Inhibit Reform?Evidence from the Mexican AgrarianMovement, 1910-1945Emily A. SellarsUniversity of Wisconsin–MadisonOctober 26, 2013Does Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Migration and Reform: IntroductionDoes emigration inhibit reform?rExit and voice: Hirschman (1970, 1978, 1993),Gehlbach (2006)rMigration and stability: Fox (2007), Goodman andHiskey (2008), Germano (2010), Ahmed (2013)rMigration and democratization: Pfutze (2012),Spilimbergo (2009), Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2006)Does Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
OverviewMexican Land Reform Program:q Among the largest land reform programs in history: 1916-1980q Began during a time of high emigration from MexicoResearch Design:q Subnational data on migration and land reform petitionsq Examine reform before and after the shock of the Great DepressionFindings:q Large and statistically significant acceleration in reform inhigh-migration states after the Depressionq Migration as “exit valve,” effect of repatriationDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Historical BackgroundMigration:r Mass migration to the US begins before 1900r Major source areas: border and center-west regionsr Accelerates following Mexican RevolutionLand Reform:r Land reform a central motivation for Revolutionr Official agrarian reform program begins in 1916r Incomplete implementation: elite manipulation,anti-agrarian violence, reform prioritiesr Official plans to end reform in late 1920sDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
The Great Depression and Cárdenas RuptureGreat Depression:r Emigration ceases and 350,000 Mexicans repatriatedby 1935r 80% of repatriates return to their village of originAftermath:r Upsurge in popular support and agitation for landreformr Government reverses course and land reformaccelerates during the 1930sDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Model: Migration Options Reduce ReformrCitizens choose to work, migrate, or participate in thepresence of uncertainty (global games model)rModel suggests two channels through which migrationreduces reform:1. Migrants are less likely to participate since they havea profitable outside option.2. The availability of exit options lowers everyone’sestimation of participation, making cooperationriskier.Does Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Data SourcesLand Reform:r Sanderson Land Reform Dataset (1916-1976)q Yearly land reform petitions, beneficiaries, and landredistributed by stateMigration:r State-level migration measures:q Money order destinations 1926 (Gamio 1930)q Migration 1926-30 (Taylor 1934)Controls:r FAO GAEZ potential agricultural productivityr Mexican census data (1910, 1921, 1930)q Population, land area, land tenureDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Empirical Strategies1. Pooled regressions using state and year fixed effects(Bhattacharya et al. 2013)Xriy α βt [(emigrationi yearyt )] δi δy iyt2. Pooled cross-sectional regressions on 1920s petitionsand 1930s petitions:rit α β1 emigi β2 1930st β3 [emigi 1930st ] xit γ itDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Reform Petitions by Migration Level0Land Reform Petitions8002004006001000Land Reform Petitions by Year, 1915-1945191519201925Low MigrationHigh MigrationDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?1930Year193519401945Medium MigrationEmily A. Sellars
Fixed-Effect Model: Petitions Pre- and Post-1930Dependent Variable:PetitionsMigration Measure:Money ration0.16Groups:31Observations:930State FEs:YesYear FEs:YesHacienda Interactions:NoAgr. Interactions:No* p 0.1; ** p 0.05; *** p 0.01Does Migration Inhibit Reform?PetitionsEmigrantsPetitionsHighest QuartilePetitionsMoney sYesYesEmily A. Sellars
Year Effects on Petitions by Migration Quartile050Year FE100150Year Effects by Migration Intensity19101920193019401950YearBottom 75%Does Migration Inhibit Reform?Top 25%Emily A. Sellars
Pooled Models: 1920s and 1930s PetitionsDependent Variable:Migration Measure:MigrationPetitionsMoney 30s214.31***(56.52)Log Density138.50***(37.01)Log Area171.74***(40.58)N62R20.67* p 0.1; ** p 0.05; *** p 0.01Does Migration Inhibit )620.64BeneficiariesMoney **(25.31)129.95***(24.74)620.60Emily A. Sellars
Discussion and ConclusionDoes emigration reduce reform?r Migration as a substitute for reform during the 1920sr Role of repatriates in Mexican politics after theDepressionImplications for future work:r Migration reduces reform in short-run, but Mexicodoes not control the escape valver Distributional effects of migration: availability ofreform to migrants and non-migrantsr Implications for Great Recession and currentrepatriationDoes Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Does Emigration Inhibit Reform?Evidence from the Mexican AgrarianMovement, 1910-1945Emily A. SellarsUniversity of Wisconsin–MadisonOctober 26, 2013Does Migration Inhibit Reform?Emily A. Sellars
Historical Background Migration: r Mass migration to the US begins before 1900 r Major source areas: border and center-west regions r Accelerates following Mexican Revolution Land Reform: r Land reform a central motivation for Revolution r O cial agrarian reform program begins in 1916 r Incomplete implementation: elit
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