Active Shooter Response: On-Site Incident Management

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Active Shooter Response: On-Site Incident ManagementSUMMARYThe Lessons Learned InformationSharing (LLIS.gov) team analyzed30 active shooter After ActionReports (AARs) and identifiedtrends in on-site incidentmanagement procedures during aresponse to an active shooterincident. The active shooter AARresearch and analysis showed thatestablishing on-site incidentmanagement during an activeshooter incident, in order tomaintain situational awareness, isan important aspect of theresponse effort. The analysisacross the AARs indicated that theestablishment of IncidentCommand (IC) can affect thefollowing response capabilities: Trends Across Active Shooter EventsPrimary capabilities referenced across the 30 AARs reviewedOperational CoordinationMedical ResponseOperational CommunicationPublic Information & WarningOn-Scene Security & ProtectionReal-World AARPlanningFull-Scale AARTabletop Ex AARFatality Management0102030After Action ReportsFigure 1 illustrates the frequency in which primary capabilitiesare referenced across the 30 AARs reviewed.Operational CoordinationPlanningOn-Scene Security and ProtectionOperation CommunicationTo assist organizations with addressing the capabilities identified in this document, theLLIS.gov team has provided recommended plans and resources for emergency managers.Key Findings: Establishing an Incident Commander, an Incident Command Post, and a Staging area minimizesresponse delays and enables asset tracking to maintain the safety of responders and promote theeffective use of limited resources. The consistent use of interoperable communications throughout the response efforts ensuresIncident Command and on-scene responder’s situational awareness is maintained as strategies areimplemented and priorities evolve.LLIS.gov describes a Trend Analysis as “an analysis comparing similar events, activities,capacities, or capabilities over a predetermined time period to detect patterns orrelationships between factors or variables.”

DESCRIPTIONAccording to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “an active shooter is an individualactively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; inmost cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to theirselection of victims.”i In 2012 alone, there were nine active shooter incidents that tookplace in a variety of venues, including educational institutions, places of worship, andbusiness and entertainment establishments.The LLIS.gov team analyzed 23 exerciseAARs, published between 2008 and2013, and seven real-world AARs andincident reports, published between 2006and 2013, to identify trending strengthsand areas for improvements. Theanalysis identified trends and issuesregarding on-site IC related to thefollowing topics: Incident Commander andCommand PostsPersonnel and ResourceAccountabilityInteroperable CommunicationsLaw Enforcement during an Active Shooter Exercise(Source: United States Air Force photo library)Trends and RecommendationsOn-Scene Incident ManagementIncident Commander and Command PostsThe response to an active shooter incident israpid and dynamic, making it important that onscene personnel follow emergency responseprotocols to effectively and efficiently carry outoperations. In order to successfully direct andcontrol incident management activities, the firstresponders on the scene should establish anIncident Commander and the location of theICP.Out of the 30 exercise AARs analyzed, 15 AARsdiscussed the effects of establishing an IncidentCommander, setting up an ICP, and forming aUnified Command on the ability to manage theincident. In exercises performed where IC wasnot properly established—whether it wasbecause an Incident Commander was neverestablished, an ICP was not formed or becausecommand and operational staff was notassigned—cascading issues affected subsequentresponse operations.2Incident Commander is the first responderon the scene who automatically takes chargeof the scene. Their job is to task Commandstaff with identifying and assessing theproblem, devising a plan to deal with it, andacquire resources to carry out the plan. Asthe incident progresses, the role of IncidentCommander may be transferred to meet theneeds of the incident.Command Staff is responsible formanagement functions, including settingincident objectives, strategies, and priorities.Additionally, Command staff is responsiblefor incident safety, maintaining liaisons withother participating agencies, and providinginformation to stakeholders.Unified Command (UC) consists of theIncident Commanders from the variousjurisdictions and disciplines operatingtogether to form a single command structurein the field. UC forms a single IAP andcoordinates together to deploy resource tomeet the highest priority objectives.

When an Incident Commander is not formally established, the risk of information sharinggaps across disciplines increases significantly. Close to 50% of AARs reviewed reported thatthese information sharing gaps caused a substantial delay in what is considered a timesensitive response. The delay is a result of not having a common operating picture toeffectively manage available resources. In addition to these delays, the safety of firstresponders can be compromised if a common operating picture that establishes securezones and provides the status of the shooter(s) is not communicated to all response units.To avoid these operational challenges, AAR recommendations included the following actionsduring response to an active shooter incident: “A plan for staffing a Communications Center or Incident Command Post needs to beformulated and included as part of the Active Shooter Law Enforcement response,and training on any new procedures should be conducted.”ii“Fire and EMS representatives should collocate with law enforcement staff to allowfor a formal unified command structure.”iii“Have all first responding agencies’ personnel that would be identified in the IC/UC tocome together and exercise the transition from IC to UC to make the shift routine.”iv“Create an Incident Action Plan (IAP) and revise it on a regular basis to maintain aconsistent, up-to-date guidance across incident command.”v“In all Active Shooter situations, the first person on scene after the initial entry teamwill establish command, and will transfer that command to a commanding officer ifneeded when further resources arrive.”vi“Utilizing personnel in Command Staff positions, as well as the different sections ofICS, will assist with information overload and dissemination.”viiOn September 28, 2010, an active shooterbegan firing shots on the University of TexasUniversity of Texas at Austinat Austin campus while making his way to theUnified Command Response Objectives:campus library. The shooter, carrying an AK1. Maintain the safety and security of the47 and wearing a ski mask, entered thecommunity in and around the perimeterlibrary and took his own life on the sixth floorof the building. The first responders on scene,2. Hold a perimeter and shelter theUniversity of Texas at Austin Policecommunity while searching all campusDepartment (UTPD), established an IncidentbuildingsCommander and an ICP within minutes of3. Preserve the crime scenetheir arrival. As the incident responseexpanded, the initial Incident Commander(Source: University of Texas at Austintransferred command to a superior officerActive Shooter / Suicide After Actionand assumed the role of Operations SectionReport)Chief (OSC). Additional law enforcementagencies arrived, establishing a UnifiedCommand. Unified Command established three objectives, the first of which was to hold aperimeter and shelter the campus community while searching all campus buildings for apossible second shooter. The OSC was then given the responsibility to coordinate thebuilding searches. Once this objective was actualized, Unified Command shrank theperimeter and coordinated a staggered release of individuals from surrounding buildings.The prompt activation of IC, coupled with the development of an IAP, allowed firstresponders to quickly respond to the incident on campus. Specifically, the efficiency ofestablishing an Incident Commander can impact other components of the response effort,including personnel and resource accountability, and interoperable communications.3

Personnel and Resource AccountabilityThe accountability of personnel and resources during response operations allows IC tostreamline utilization of assets by monitoring needed quantities and the best placementduring operations. Furthermore, as long as the shooter and other threats, such asimprovised explosive devices or a possible second shooter, remain a viable threat,personnel accountability is paramount.In order to manage personnel and resources arriving at the scene, IC is in charge offormally setting up a staging area. The Incident Commander assigns a Logistics Chief todeploy, manage, and keep track of resources. AARs made the following recommendationsregarding staging areas: “Make it clear in policy and procedures that a staging area in a safe location shouldbe established. Assure that all responding units are notified of the staging area andrespond there [when they arrive].”viii“Implement the use of the staging area and staging area managers for all responsesin the city that include response cars, special events, or planned events.”ixAlong with making sure that assets are assembled in the staging area, the Planning SectionChief is responsible for tracking assets once they are deployed to the scene. 13 out of the30 AARs addressed personnel and resource accountability as major factors in both realworld incidents and exercises. These AARs provided the following recommendations tosuccessfully manage assets throughout an incident: “[Responding agencies] should create Personal Accountability Report (PAR) checks.”x“Ensure ICS tracking protocols are established and maintained throughout theincident/event.”xi“Responding units must take their direction at the scene from the IncidentCommander or the Unified Command.”xiiTo keep track of assets conducting on-scene operations, several AARs recommended usingtracking tools. The following methods are recommended when using the tools to maximizeefficiency: “Need to develop and implement aresource tracking system for multiagency use by incident command.”xiii“[A personnel] accountability systemcould consist of a sign in system atthe staging area, a roll call throughradio dispatch, or another identifiedsystem that can be practiced insmaller incidents and can be scaledfor larger events.”xiv“Enhance command staff situationalawareness by identifying resources,their progress and the target/hazardareas on a map or status board.”xvSearch Teams conducting building sweeps duringthe University of Texas shooting incident.(Source: UTPD)4

For instance, when Unified Command, during the 2011 University of Texas at Austin activeshooter incident, decided to search campus buildings to look for a possible second shooter,personnel and asset tracking was carried out to provide command with situationalawareness. OSC assigned two scribes to record the activity of each search team. Each teamwas assigned a building to sweep and scribes would record the deployment time of eachteam and when the teams returned. As the building sweeps took place, OSC kept UnifiedCommand informed of each team’s progress, allowing them to modify and update objectivesand to provide operations with additional resources to complete their objective.Interoperable Communication SystemsThe response to an active shooter incident often involves multiple agencies across severaldisciplines, coordinating together to meet incident objectives. During response, participatingagencies share valuable information to coordinate activities with one another usinginteroperable communication systems. Inadequate communication can result in a delay inthe response effort, confusion about priorities, and wasteful use of resources.Of the 30 AARs analyzed, 17 identified interoperable communications as an area whereissues occurred. The most frequent issue across AARs stemmed from not having allagencies operate on a common radio frequency. The reasons identified were twofold: someagencies did not have the proper equipment to support an incident command channel, andsome lacked the necessary training and plans to trigger the switch to a command channel.The AARs analyzed recommended focusing on the following areas to address these issues: “All responding agencies should continue to explore avenues that will connectcommunications systems, in order to streamline transmissions and ensure adequateinformation dissemination, and develop a plan for the addition of equipment in thefuture.”xvi“Examine the use of a second radio channel for command communications, and thatFire and EMS commanders/supervisors be included on this command channel tofacilitate unified command.”xvii“Develop planning, training, equipment, and exercises for communicationinteroperability.”xviiiAt the scene of an event where various agencies are present and the situation evolves overtime, information relay between responders and IC is essential. A detailed and timely relayof critical information from response teams ensures that command staff have the knowledgeto manage the incident. Issues arise when IC does not receive necessary information abouton-scene activities. To avoid these problems, AARs recommended the followingconsiderations: “Units dispatched to the incident should move off of their normal dispatch channeland contact the Incident Commander using the county mutual aid channel.” xix“Develop reporting procedures for tactical elements to pass information up if theinformation you are getting is not timely.”xx“By providing very specific information regarding entry point locations, routes oftravel within the structure, the use of stairwells, location of subjects, persons,suspicious devices and other pertinent observations, the efficiency of the operationcan be greatly enhanced.”xxi5

Plans and ResourcesTo learn more about the response considerations discussed in this report, the followingdocuments expand on additional response issues:Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide forActive Shooter and Mass Casualty IncidentsDeveloped as a fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resource, this paper can be usedas a guide to support planning and preparations for active shooter and mass casualtyincidents. In developing this paper, USFA consulted with individuals and groups engaged infire and pre-hospital EMS, law enforcement, and hospital medical and trauma care toformulate guidelines to assist fire/rescue and EMS agencies in preparing for and respondingto an active shooter incident.4 Best Practices for Active Assailant Incident ManagementThis white paper, written for law enforcement and fire/EMS responders, discusses observedbest practices for the management of active shooter incidents and for primers on Staging,Triage, Treatment, and Transport.Firefighter Support Foundation Mass Shootings: Planning and ResponseThis presentation provides first responders, emergency management, school systems, andothers with basic tools and information needed to develop or assess a multi-agency massshooting response plan. This resource can also help familiarize first responders andcommand staffs about trends during active shooter incidents.CITATIONSiActive Shooter Booklet "U.S. Department of Homeland Security Active Shooter Response."iiHood River County Department of Emergency Management. Hood River Sheriff'sDepartment Active Shooter Drill AAR/IP. December 2008.iiiNorth Las Vegas Police Department. Zombies Go Rogue 2013 Full-Scale Exercise AAR/IP.March 2013. Accessed October 2013.ivMcDonough County. WIU Active Shooter Full Scale Exercise AAR/IP. May 2009.vIbid.viPark County Emergency Management. Platte Canyon High School Shooting After-ActionReport. December 2006.viiIbid.viiiMcDonough County. WIU Active Shooter Full Scale Exercise AAR/IP. May 2009. AccessedOctober 2013.ixCity of Minneapolis Police Department. Minneapolis Accent Signage Mass Shooting AfterAction Report. November 2012.xArlington County Office of Emergency Management. Operation Early Dawn AAR/IP. March2012.6

xiNorth Las Vegas Police Department. Zombies Go Rogue 2013 Full-Scale Exercise AAR/IP.March 2013.xiiSan Luis Valley Exercise Design Team. Adams State College Active Shooter/Terrorist FullScale Exercise AAR/IP. January 2007.xiiiIllinois Emergency Management Agency. Eastern Illinois University Active ShooterExercise 2012 AAR/IP. June 2012.xivCity of Minneapolis Police Department. Minneapolis Accent Signage Mass Shooting AfterAction Report. November 2012.xvNorth Las Vegas Police Department. Zombies Go Rogue 2013 Full-Scale Exercise AAR/IP.March 2013.xviPark County Emergency Management. Platte Canyon High School Shooting After-ActionReport. December 2006.xviiCity of Minneapolis Police Department. Minneapolis Accent Signage Mass Shooting AfterAction Report. November 2012.xviiiSanta Clara County Public Health Department. Santa Clara County Hospital ActiveShooter Exercise AAR. March 2011.xixSan Luis Valley Exercise Design Team. Adams State College Active Shooter/Terrorist FullScale Exercise AAR/IP. January 2007.xxNew Hampshire Department of Safety. City of Concord/Central NH SOU 2011 ExerciseAAR/IP. June 2011.xxiMontgomery County. Montgomery County Active Shooter 2010 AAR/IP. December 2010.APPENDIXThe Appendix contains a list of resources that the LLIS.gov research team analyzed for thisdocument.Arlington County Office of Emergency Management. Operation Early Dawn AAR/IP. March2012. Accessed October 2013.California State University Fullerton. California State University Fullerton Active Shooter DrillAAR/IP. January 2011. r-Action-Report-and-Improvement-Plan.Accessed October 2013.Chapman University. Chapman University Active Shooter Exercise AAR/IP. February ion-reportimprovement-plan. Accessed October 2013.City of Aurora. Century Theatre Shooting Aurora Fire Department Preliminary IncidentAnalysis. April 2013. -analysis. Accessed October 2013.7

City of Minneapolis Police Department. Minneapolis Accent Signage Mass Shooting AfterAction Report. November 2012. -Signage-Mass-Shooting-After-Action-Report. Accessed October 2013.Hood River County Department of Emergency Management. Hood River Sheriff'sDepartment Active Shooter Drill AAR/IP. December heriffs-Department-Active-ShooterDrill. Accessed October 2013.Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Eastern Illinois University Active Shooter Exercise2012 AAR/IP. June 2012. Accessed October 2013.Iowa Homeland Security Emergency Management. Aggressive Person in the BuildingTabletop Discussion For Businesses, Schools and Communities Situation Manual.August 2013. d-communities. Accessed October 2013.Luce County. The Tahquamenon Area Schools Active Shooter / Lockdown Exercise AAR/IP.July 2012. Accessed October 2013.McDonough County. WIU Active Shooter Full Scale Exercise AAR/IP. May 2009. AccessedOctober 2013.Missouri Emergency Response Commission. 2010 Chemical Security Active Shooter TabletopExercise AAR/IP. August 2010. g-and-ExerciseActive-Shooter-Scenario. Accessed October 2013.Montgomery County. Montgomery County Active Shooter 2010 AAR/IP. December 2010.Accessed October 201

30 active shooter After Action Reports (AARs) and identified trends in on-site incident management procedures during a response to an active shooter incident. The active shooter AAR research and analysis showed that establishing on-site incident management during an active shooter incident, in order to maintain situational awareness, is

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