Comment Report - NERC
sppComment ReportProject Name:Project 2015-10 Single Points of Failure TPL-001-5Comment Period Start Date:2/26/2018Comment Period End Date:4/23/2018Associated Ballots:2015-10 Single Points of Failure TPL-001-5 AB 2 ST2015-10 Single Points of Failure TPL-001-5 Implementation Plan IN 1 STThere were 70 sets of responses, including comments from approximately 190 different people from approximately 117 companiesrepresenting 10 of the Industry Segments as shown in the table on the following pages.
Questions1. Do you agree with the creation of the proposed P8 event?2. Do you agree with the changes to TPL-001-4 Requirement 1, Part 1.1.2, in order to meet the FERC directive in Order No. 786?3. Do you agree with the proposed implementation plan?4. Do you agree with the proposed revisions to TPL-001-4?5. Are the proposed revisions to TPL-001-4 along with the Implementation Plan a cost effective way of meeting the FERC directives in OrderNo. 786 and Order No. 754?
OrganizationNameBrandonMcCormickACES PowerMarketingNameSegment(s)BrandonMcCormickBrian VanGheemRegionFRCC6NA - NotApplicableGroup NameFMPAGroup MemberNameGroupMemberOrganizationGroupGroup MemberMemberRegionSegment(s)Tim BeyrleCity of New4SmyrnaBeach UtilitiesCommissionFRCCJim HowardLakelandElectric5FRCCLynne MilaCity ofClewiston4FRCCJavier CisnerosFort PierceUtilitiesAuthority3FRCCRandy HahnOcala UtilityServices3FRCCDon CuevasBeachesEnergyServices1FRCCJeffrey PartingtonKeys EnergyServices4FRCCTom ReedyFloridaMunicipalPower Pool6FRCCSteven LancasterBeachesEnergyServices3FRCCMike BloughKissimmeeUtilityAuthority5FRCCChris AdkinsCity ofLeesburg3FRCCGinny BeigelCity of c.3SPP REHoosierEnergy RuralElectricCooperative,Inc.1RFACESGreg FroehlingStandardsCollaboratorsPaul Henderson
ExelonTennesseeValleyAuthoritySeattle CityLightChris Scanlon nUtilitiesSERCWECCTennesseeValleyAuthoritySeattle CityLight BallotBodyGinger MercierPrairie Power, 1,3Inc.SERCTara LightnerSunflower1Electric PowerCorporationSPP REShari HeinoBrazos1,5Electric PowerCooperative,Inc.Texas REJohn ShaverArizona1Electric PowerCooperative,Inc.WECCMichael BrytowskiGreat RiverEnergyMROChris ScanlonBGE, ComEd, 1PECO TO'sRFJohn BeeBGE, ComEd, 3PECO LSE'sRFDeWayne ScottTennesseeValleyAuthority1SERCIan GrantTennesseeValleyAuthority3SERCBrandy SprakerTennesseeValleyAuthority5SERCMarjorie ParsonsTennesseeValleyAuthority6SERCPawel KrupaSeattle CityLight1WECCHao LiSeattle CityLight4WECCBud (Charles)FreemanSeattle CityLight6WECCMike HaynesSeattle CityLight5WECCMichael WatkinsSeattle CityLight1,4WECCFaz KasraieSeattle CityLight5WECCJohn ClarkSeattle CityLight6WECC1,3,5,6
Public UtilityDistrict No. 1of ChelanCountyHaley SousaDTE Energy - JeffreyDetroit Edison DePriestCompanyJEALincolnElectricSystemNational GridUSAJoe McClungKayleighWilkerson5Chelan PUD3,4,53,55Michael Jones 1DTE ElectricFRCCJEA VotersLincolnElectricSystemNational GridTuan TranSeattle CityLight3WECCLaurrie HammackSeattle CityLight3WECCDavis JelusichPublic UtilityDistrict No. 1of ChelanCounty6WECCJoyce GundryPublic UtilityDistrict No. 1of ChelanCounty3WECCJeff KimbellPublic UtilityDistrict No. 1of ChelanCounty1WECCHaley SousaPublic UtilityDistrict No. 1of ChelanCounty5WECCKarie BarczakDTE Energy - 3Detroit EdisonCompanyRFDaniel HerringDTE Energy - 4Detroit EdisonCompanyRFTed HobsonJEA1FRCCGarry BakerJEA3FRCCJohn BabikJEA5FRCCKayleigh WilkersonLincolnElectricSystem5MROEric RuskampLincolnElectricSystem6MROJason FortikLincolnElectricSystem3MRODanny PudenzLincolnElectricSystem1MROMichael JonesNational GridUSA1NPCCBrian ShanahanNational GridUSA3NPCC
ManitobaHydroMike SmithSouthernPamelaCompany HunterSouthernCompanyServices, Inc.BC Hydro and theastPowerCoordinatingCouncilQuintin LeeRuida 9,10 NPCCSouthernCompanyBC HydroEversourceGroupRSC noHydro One,NYISO andEversourceYuguang XiaoManitobaHydro5MROKarim Abdel-HadiManitobaHydro3MROBlair MukanikManitobaHydro6MROMike SmithManitobaHydro1MROKatherine PrewittSouthern1CompanyServices, Inc.SERCJoel DembowskiSouthernCompany AlabamaPowerCompany3SERCWilliam D. ShultzSouthernCompanyGeneration5SERCJennifer G. SykesSouthernCompanyGenerationand EnergyMarketing6SERCPatricia RobertsonBC Hydro and 1PowerAuthorityWECCVenkataramakrishnan BC Hydro and 2VinnakotaPowerAuthorityWECCPat G. HarringtonBC Hydro and 3PowerAuthorityWECCClement MaBC Hydro and 5PowerAuthorityWECCTimothy ReyherEversourceEnergy5NPCCMark KennyEversourceEnergy3NPCCQuintin LeeEversourceEnergy1NPCCGuy V. ZitoNortheastPowerCoordinatingCouncil10NPCC
Randy MacDonaldNewBrunswickPower2NPCCWayne SipperlyNew YorkPowerAuthority4NPCCGlen SmithEntergyServices4NPCCBrian RobinsonUtilityServices5NPCCBruce MetruckNew YorkPowerAuthority6NPCCAlan AdamsonNew YorkStateReliabilityCouncil7NPCCEdward BedderOrange &RocklandUtilities1NPCCDavid BurkeOrange &RocklandUtilities3NPCCMichele TondaloUI1NPCCLaura McleodNB Power1NPCCDavid RamkalawanOntario Power 5GenerationInc.NPCCHelen LainisIESO2NPCCMichael SchiavoneNational Grid1NPCCMichael JonesNational Grid3NPCCSilvia MitchellNextEra6Energy Florida Powerand Light Co.NPCCMichael ForteCon Ed ConsolidatedEdison1NPCCDaniel GrinkevichCon Ed 1ConsolidatedEdison Co. ofNew YorkNPCCPeter YostCon Ed ConsolidatedNPCC3
Edison Co. ofNew MRO NSRFBrian O'BoyleCon Ed ConsolidatedEdison5NPCCSean CavotePSEG4NPCCSean BodkinDominion DominionResources,Inc.6NPCCSylvain ClermontHydro Quebec 1NPCCChantal MazzaHydro Quebec 2NPCCKathleen GoodmanISO-NE2NPCCJoseph DePoorterMadison Gas& Electric3,4,5,6MROLarry HeckertAlliant Energy 4MROAmy CasucelliXcel Energy1,3,5,6MROMichael BrytowskiGreat RiverEnergy1,3,5,6MROJodi JensenWestern Area 1,6PowerAdministratinoMROKayleigh WilkersonLincolnElectricSystem1,3,5,6MROMahmood SafiOmaha Public 1,3,5,6Power DistrictMROBrad ParretMinnesotaPower1,5MROTerry HarbourMidAmericanEnergyCompany1,3MROTom BreeneWisconsin3,5,6Public ServiceMROJeremy VollsBasin Electric 1Power CoopMROKevin LyonsCentral IowaPowerCooperative1MROMike MorrowMidcontinentIndependentSystemOperator2MRO
Scott MillerSouthwestPower Pool,Inc. (RTO)Scott MillerShannonMickensPPL Shelby WadeLouisville Gasand ElectricCo.OGE Energy - Sing TayOklahomaGas andElectric Co.SERC21,3,5,66SPP RERF,SERCSPP REMEAG Power Roger BrandMEAG Power 3SERCDavid WeekleyMEAG Power 1SERCSteven GregoMEAG Power 5SERCSouthwestPower PoolInc.2SPP REDon SchmitNebraskaPublic PowerDistrict5SPP REAmy CasuscelliXcel Energy1,3,5,6SPP REMike KidwellEmpire District 1,3,5ElectricCompanySPP REKiet NguyenGrand RiverDamnAuthority1SPP RElouis GuidryCleco1,3,5,6SPP RETara LightnerSunflower1Electric PowerCorporationSPP REKevin GilesWestarEnergySPP RECharlie FreibertLG&E and KU 3Energy, LLCSERCBrenda TruhePPL ElectricUtilitiesCorporationRFDan WilsonLG&E and KU 5Energy, LLCSERCLinn OelkerLG&E and KU 6Energy, LLCSERCSing TayOGE Energy - 6OklahomaGas andElectric Co.SPP REDonald HargroveOGE Energy - 3OklahomaGas andElectric Co.SPP RETerri PyleOGE Energy - 1OklahomaGas andElectric Co.SPP RESPPShannon MickensStandardsReview GroupPPL NERCRegisteredAffiliatesOKGE11
John RheaOGE Energy - 5OklahomaGas andElectric Co.SPP RE
1. Do you agree with the creation of the proposed P8 event?Joe McClung - JEA - 3,5 - FRCC, Group Name JEA VotersAnswerNoDocument NameCommentJEA appreciates the effort of the SDT to address the directives from the Commission on Order No. 786 as well as the recommendation in response toOrder No. 754 from the SPCS and the SAMS from the assessment of protection system single points of failure (Order No. 754 Assessment ofProtection System Single Points of Failure Based on the Section 1600 Data Request which hereafter is called “Joint Report”).However, the proposed addition of the P8 event in Table 1 is overreaching and beyond what is required in the Standards Authorization Request (SAR)which states that the primary goal is to implement the recommendations in the Joint Report. Although the Joint Report listed as one alternative theelevation of the P8 type events ‘to a planning event with its own system performance criteria’ (Joint Report, Chapter 2 – Alternatives, pg 9), it did NOT‐pfaulteh as with a protection system failure is low enoughrecommend this alternative. The Joint Report cited the fact that “Probability of threethat it does not warrant a planning event”. The creation of the proposed P8 event in this version has clearly overlooked this fact.The Joint Report does agree that there is “the existence of a reliability risk associated with the single points of failure in protection system that warrantsfurther action” (JEA agrees with this conclusion). This is why it recommended that additional emphasis in planning studies is needed to assess threephase faults involving protection system single points of failure (Joint Report, Chapter 3 – Conclusion, pg 11). Accordingly, the SAR has defined thescope of the SDT’s work to specifically address only the recommendations from the Joint Report. However, the proposed P8 event in Table 1 goesoutside the scope mandated by the SAR because R2.7 requires the Planning Assessment to have a Corrective Action Plan if the “analysis indicates aninability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1” which would include the P8 event.Except for the proposed R4.5 in draft 2 (Sept. 2017), the SDT addressed all of the recommendations from SPCS and SAMS regarding single points offailure in protection systems in the Joint Report. The clarification of relay to components of a Protection System with the modified Footnote 13 to clarifyP5 and extreme events – stability 2e-2h was a significant improvement to the proposed TPL-001-5.Suggestion: The creation of the proposed P8 event is NOT warranted and should be removed. This occurrence of this type of event is very rare inpower system disturbances. The proposed Footnote 13 in draft 3 (Mar. 2018 version) should be kept. The deleted portions under Requirement R4 subrequirement 4.5 in draft 3 should not be deleted, i.e., this sub-requirement should be kept intact from the original TPL-001-4 (the currently enforceableversion; from Order No. 786). This sub-requirement 4.5 together with clarified P5 (Table 1), extreme events – stability 2e-2h (Table 1, from draft 2) andthe clarified Footnote 13 will adequately address the Commission’s concern, recommendations from the Joint Report as well as the SAR regarding thesingle points of failure in Protection System.Likes1DislikesJEA, 5, Babik John0ResponseSilvia Mitchell - NextEra Energy - Florida Power and Light Co. - 6AnswerDocument NameCommentNo
NextEra does not support P8 events being considered as planning events instead of extreme events. A 3PH fault plus protection system failure is avery low probability event.NeLikes0Dislikes0ResponseAaron Cavanaugh - Bonneville Power Administration - 1,3,5,6 - WECCAnswerNoDocument NameCommentFor the HV BES level, both Categories P5 and the new P8 events require the same performance for both a SLG fault and a 3-Phase fault. BPAbelieves the performance for the existing P5 is more conservative and the P8 Category is not required for the HV BES level. In addition, BPA suggestsdeleting the new P8 and modifying P5 to include a row for 3Ø (three phase) for the EHV BES level only allowing interruption of firm transmission serviceand non-consequential load loss.Likes0Dislikes0ResponseBridget Silvia - Sempra - San Diego Gas and Electric - 3AnswerNoDocument NameCommentAdding P8 changes a an EXTREME contingency to a CREDABLE contingency. A 3 phase fault with delayed clearing was an extreme event undercategory D on Table 1 of the original TPL standards. This contingency has always been an extreme contingency. The question not being addressed is,“what reliability improvement can be accomplished by adding P8?”. If P8 studies show instability, there is no requirement for a corrective action plan.Keeping in mind that this is a required standard, why create a P8 contingency, which will increase the work load and cause additional distractions, whenthe results don’t matter?Likes0Dislikes0ResponseKristine Ward - Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. - 1,3,4,5,6 - FRCC
AnswerNoDocument NameCommentSeminole is in agreement with the comments submitted by JEA but would like to provide additional comments relating to the proposed P8 Event. Inreviewing the Cost Effectiveness document, the Technical Rationale, the SPCS/SAMS Order 754 Report, and the proposed redline to the existing TPL001 Reliability Standard, Seminole does not believe that the proposed P8 Planning Event is prudent and the technical rationale is flawed in light of whatthe SPCS/SAMS documented in their review of the Order 754 Data Request analysis. As documented by JEA, the SPCS/SAMS never recommendedmaking a three-phase fault with a single point of failure a Planning Event unless it included its own performance criteria. Additionally, the SDT and theSPCS/SAMS clearly recognize that a three-phase fault is in and of itself an event that has a low probability of occurrence, and adding a low probabilisticsingle point of failure of a protection system on top and requiring that this be analyzed as a Planning Event is beyond prudent planning and results indiminishing returns from an analysis and cost effectiveness standpoint. The SDT also made a gross assumption in regards to the amount of workrequired to evaluate these events by stating that the P8 Planning Event does not require steady state evaluation and “ONLY” requires stability analysisas to insinuate that the level of work is somehow lessened by making this statement.The cost effectiveness document falls short of providing any substantive cost effectiveness in regards to the additional analysis that would be requiredby the addition of Planning Event P8Suggestion:The existing Extreme Event within Table 1, 2f., allows for the Transmission Planner to use operating experience to develop a contingency event thatwould result in a wide-area disturbance, such a disturbance that one could presume would cause Cascading, voltage instability or uncontrolledislanding. Operating experience would bring one to the conclusion that the proposed P8 Planning Event is in fact a low probabilistic event and shouldNOT be considered a Planning Event but rather an Extreme event that is already part of the Extreme Event Table within Table 1Likes0Dislikes0ResponseJeff Landis - Platte River Power Authority - 3AnswerNoDocument NameCommentPRPA supports JEA comments.JEA appreciates the effort of the SDT to address the directives from the Commission on Order No. 786 as well as the recommendation in response toOrder No. 754 from the SPCS and the SAMS from the assessment of protection system single points of failure (Order No. 754 Assessment ofProtection System Single Points of Failure Based on the Section 1600 Data Request which hereafter is called “Joint Report”).However, the proposed addition of the P8 event in Table 1 is overreaching and beyond what is required in the Standards Authorization Request (SAR)which states that the primary goal is to implement the recommendations in the Joint Report. Although the Joint Report listed as one alternative theelevation of the P8 type events ‘to a planning event with its own system performance criteria’ (Joint Report, Chapter 2 – Alternatives, pg 9), it did NOTrecommend this alternative. The Joint Report cited the fact that “Probability of three‐phaselowenoughfaultthatwithita pro
does not warrant a planning event”. The creation of the proposed P8 event in this version has clearly overlooked this fact.The Joint Report does agree that there is “the existence of a reliability risk associated with the single points of failure in protection system that warrantsfurther action” (JEA agrees with this conclusion). This is why it recommended that additional emphasis in planning studies is needed to assess threephase faults involving protection system single points of failure (Joint Report, Chapter 3 – Conclusion, pg 11). Accordingly, the SAR has defined thescope of the SDT’s work to specifically address only the recommendations from the Joint Report. However, the proposed P8 event in Table 1 goesoutside the scope mandated by the SAR because R2.7 requires the Planning Assessment to have a Corrective Action Plan if the “analysis indicates aninability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1” which would include the P8 event.Except for the proposed R4.5 in draft 2 (Sept. 2017), the SDT addressed all of the recommendations from SPCS and SAMS regarding single points offailure in protection systems in the Joint Report. The clarification of relay to components of a Protection System with the modified Footnote 13 to clarifyP5 and extreme events – stability 2e-2h was a significant improvement to the proposed TPL-001-5.Suggestion: The creation of the proposed P8 event is NOT warranted and should be removed. This occurrence of this type of event is very rare inpower system disturbances. The proposed Footnote 13 in draft 3 (Mar. 2018 version) should be kept. The deleted portions under Requirement R4subrequirement 4.5 in draft 3 should not be deleted, i.e., this sub-requirement should be kept intact from the original TPL-001-4 (the currentlyenforceable version; from Order No. 786). This subrequirement 4.5 together with clarified P5 (Table 1), extreme events – stability 2e-2h (Table 1, fromUnofficial Comment Form Project 2015-10 and Single Points of Failure February 2018 3draft 2) and the clarified Footnote 13 will adequately address the Commission’s concern, recommendations from the Joint Report as well as the SARregarding the single points of failure in Protection System.Likes0Dislikes0ResponseThomas Foltz - AEP - 5AnswerNoDocument NameCommentAEP does not agree with the creation and inclusion of P8 for the following reasons:1. We see nothing within the project’s final SAR which would accommodate the addition of a completely new Performance Planning Event in Table 1.As a result, we believe its proposed inclusion goes beyond the scope of the SAR.2. The creation of P8 introduces an inconsistent treatment of breaker failure. A 3-phase fault with the failure of a non-redundant component of aProtection System (footnote 13.d, such as the failure of single-control circuitry that would prevent tripping but initiate breaker failure) that results in abreaker failure operation is considered a Planning Event in P8. However, the same 3-Phase fault with a stuck breaker is included under Extreme eventsin the Stability column and results in the exact same event. If a 3-phase fault results in a breaker failure operation, what is the reliability benefit ofdifferentiating the cause between a Protection System component failure or a stuck breaker? While AEP disagrees with many aspects of the recentlyproposed revisions, the concerns expressed in this paragraph are the primary drivers behind our decision to vote negative during this comment/ballotperiod.3. AEP is concerned that the inclusion of P8, coupled with its indistinct relationship to P5, will lead to inconsistent decision-making when using andapplying Table 1. This was well illustrated during the March 22nd webinar by both the questions posed and the responses and insight provided by ChrisColson. A number of possible scenarios were provided by remote attendees seeking insight how the table should be correctly applied in those cases. At
times, Mr. Colson expressed appreciation for the thought process, reasoning, and “logical analysis” used by those who were posing the questions andreferencing Table 1. Our own impressive was different however, as we believe referencing the Table in such a “nonlinear” or “cyclical” way wouldactually lead to inconstant interpretation and application of the table. As a result,
spp Comment Report Project Name: Project 2015-10 Single Points of Failure TPL-001-5 Comment Period Start Date: 2/26/2018 Comment Period End Date: 4/23/2018 Associated Ballots: 2015-10 Single Points of Failure TPL-001-5 AB 2 ST
NERC CIP v5/v6 o Overview of Version 5 NERC Cyber Security Standards o Notable differences between Version 3 and Version 5 NERC CIP reliability standards Tools and resources o A few words about “tools” and NERC CIP compliance o Active vulnerability assessment tools o Danger:
This NPCC whitepaper is not intended to replace or supersede the NERC Implementation Guidance for CIP-012-1. 1. This document is intended to accompany and complement the NERC Implementation Guidance for CIP-012-1. NERC Reliability Standard CIP012- -1 is intended to “protect the confid
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. Mr. Bruce Walker, from the Department of Energy, provided remarks on the Executive Order, noting that the federal government’s efforts will help support NERC’s activities. President’s Report . Mr. Robb acknowledged the work of Mr. Sharp and the NERC officer team on the NERC budget .
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Authority” means NERC or the Regional Entity in their respective roles of monitoring and enforcing compliance with the NERC Reliability Standards. Page 5 of 40 . Standard PRC-005-6 – Protection System, Automatic
Ms. Rayo is a NERC CIP Compliance Program Consultant assisting clients in developing a solid sustainable NERC CIP Program which included a Sabotage Reporting Procedure, Cyber Security Policy, Internal Compliance Program, and othe
The best way to tempt the old to go on working may be to build on such ‘bridge’ jobs: part-time or temporary employment that creates a more gradual transition from full-time work to retirement. Studies have found that, in the United States, nearly half of all men and women who had been in full-time jobs in middle age moved into such ‘bridge’ jobs at the end of their working lives. In .
