Supreme Court Of The United States
No. 18-1259IN THESupreme Court of the United StatesBRETT JONES,Petitioner,vs.STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,Respondent.On Writ of Certiorari to theMississippi Court of AppealsBRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THECRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATIONIN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTKENT S. SCHEIDEGGERCounsel of RecordKYMBERLEE C. STAPLETONCriminal Justice Legal Fdn.2131 L StreetSacramento, CA 95816(916) 446-0345briefs@cjlf.orgAttorneys for Amicus CuriaeCriminal Justice Legal Foundation
QUESTION PRESENTEDDoes a life-without-parole sentence imposed undera discretionary sentencing scheme where the sentencerconsiders youth and its attendant characteristics violatethe Eighth Amendment if the sentencer does not makean express, on-the-record finding that a juvenile ispermanently incorrigible?(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTSQuestion presented. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iTable of authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vInterest of amicus curiae. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Summary of facts and case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Summary of argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6IAs a sentence eligibility factor, “irreparablecorruption” or “permanent incorrigibility” would beunconstitutionally vague. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6A. Eligibility factors and vagueness. . . . . . . . . . 6B. Factors mandated by case law. . . . . . . . . . . . 8IIMontgomery contradicts both Miller and itself, andit should be limited to its core holding. . . . . . . . . 10A. Montgomery contradicts Miller. . . . . . . . . . . 10B. Montgomery contradicts Montgomery. . . . . 14IIIThe arc of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence shouldbend back toward the original understanding,not further away from it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16(iii)
ivIVMiller is best understood as importing the Woodsonrule from capital cases plus the Eddings rule asapplied to youth-related mitigation,and nothing more. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20A. Miller and the capital cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20B. The excessive breadth of Lockett. . . . . . . . . 24C. Preserving Montgomery’s core holding,if necessary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
vTABLE OF AUTHORITIESCasesAbdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U. S. 233(2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Alleyne v. United States, 570 U. S. 99(2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 27Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466(2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 16, 27Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . 9Brown v. Sanders, 546 U. S. 212 (2006). . . . . . . . . . 22Carpenter v. United States, 585 U. S. ,138 S. Ct. 2206, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018). . . . . . . 17Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.) 264(1821). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977). . . . . . . . . 8, 20Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004). . . . . 17Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982). . . 15, 21Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982). . . . . . . . . 9Giles v. California, 554 U. S. 353 (2008). . . . . . . . . 17Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980). . . . . . . . . . 7Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461 (1993). . . . . . . 6, 25Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48 (2010). . . . . . . . 9, 20Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987). . . . . . . . 26Haywood v. Drown, 556 U. S. 729 (2009). . . . . . . . . 17
viHildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638 (1989). . . . . . . . . 16Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. , 136 S. Ct. 616,193 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015). . . . . 8Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013). . . 3, 4, 28Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 725(Miss. Ct. App. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Jones v. State, 285 So. 3d 626(Miss. Ct. App. 2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4Jones v. State, 938 So. 2d 312(Miss. Ct. App. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. , 140 S. Ct. 1021,206 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407 (2008). . . . . . 20Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U. S. 375(1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). . . . . . . 6, 21, 24Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971). . . . . 28Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137(1803). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Mathena v. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. 919, 206 L. Ed. 2d 250(Feb. 26, 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988). . . . . . 7McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U. S. , 140 S. Ct. 702,206 L. Ed. 2d 69 (2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
viiMiller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460(2012). . . . . . 3, 6, 8, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U. S. 37 (1996). . . . . . . . . 24Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. , 136 S. Ct. 718,193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016). . . . . . 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 26Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U. S. 719 (1992). . . . . . . . . 18Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . 7Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . 16Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005). . . . . . . 9, 20Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U. S. 66 (1987). . . . . . . . . 28Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . 28Tenet v. Doe, 544 U. S. 1 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U. S. 274 (2004). . . . . . . . . . 6Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . 9Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U. S. 967 (1994). . . . . 7, 8United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005). . . . . . 7United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950). . . . . . 29Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990). . . . . . . . . . 16Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280(1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 28Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . 7
viiiUnited States Statutes18 U. S. C. § 1111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2718 U. S. C. § 3591 et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2728 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2728 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Rules of CourtFed. Rule Evid. 1002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Fed. Rule Evid. 802. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Secondary AuthoritiesALI, Model Penal Code (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Blackstone, W., Commentaries(1st ed. 1769). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 19Scheidegger, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death:Lessons from a Failure of Judicial Activism,17 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 131 (2019). . 6, 16, 18, 19, 25Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”:The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to CruelInnovation, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1739 (2008). . . . . 19
IN THESupreme Court of the United StatesBRETT JONES,Petitioner,vs.STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,Respondent.BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THECRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATIONIN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTINTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAEThe Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)1 is anon-profit California corporation organized to participate in litigation relating to the criminal justice systemas it affects the public interest. CJLF seeks to bring theconstitutional protection of the accused into balancewith the rights of the victim and of society to rapid,efficient, and reliable determination of guilt and swiftexecution of punishment.Petitioner contends that the Cruel and UnusualPunishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment requiresa specific finding of fact before a murderer who is one1. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Nocounsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. Nocounsel, party, or any person or entity other than amicuscuriae CJLF made a monetary contribution to its preparationor submission.
2or more days short of his 18th birthday may be sentenced to life without parole. The finding supposedlyrequired is itself unusual, having no basis in our legaltradition, and it is likely unconstitutionally vague.Further, this requirement is deemed substantive andtherefore would be retroactive to all cases, no matterhow old.The adoption of a novel, dubious, and unnecessaryfinding as a constitutional requirement would requirereversal and resentencing of most, if not all, judgmentssentencing under-18 murderers to life without parole.It would expose victims’ families to reliving the traumaof a family member’s murder as they must fight forjustice once more at resentencing and possibly manytimes thereafter at parole hearings. Such a ruling wouldbe contrary to the interests CJLF was formed to protect.SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASEThe essential facts of this case are summarized inthe oral ruling of the trial judge on resentencing, in theJoint Appendix (J. A.), and additional information isavailable in the opinions of the Mississippi courts. Atthe age of 15, petitioner Brett Jones left the home of hismother and stepfather in Florida and was taken in byhis grandfather, Bert Jones, in Mississippi “to providehim with a home away from the circumstances inFlorida.” J. A. 151-152. The circumstances includedbehavior by the stepfather that was abusive but shortof “ ‘beatings, per se’ or any injuries that requiredmedical attention.” Jones v. State, 285 So. 3d 626, ¶ 7,630 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (Jones III) (appeal from postMiller hearing). Two months later, Jones stabbed hisgrandfather to death. Ibid., ¶ 8.
3“A fair consideration of the evidence indicates thatthe killing of Mr. Bert Jones was particularly brutal.”J. A. 150. Jones stabbed his grandfather eight times,using a second knife after the first broke. He attemptedto conceal the act. Ibid. Postmortem examination founddefensive wounds on the grandfather’s hands. Jones v.State, 938 So. 2d 312, ¶ 10, 315 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)(Jones I, initial appeal).At trial, Jones claimed self-defense, and the jury wasinstructed on that defense and the lesser-includedoffense of manslaughter. The jury’s verdict of guilty ofdeliberate-design murder constitutes a finding “beyonda reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act inself-defense,” J. A. 150, rejecting Jones’s version of thecircumstances of the killing. There is “no evidence ofmistreatment or threat by Bert Jones, except the selfdefense claim asserted and rejected by the jury.” J. A.151.2Jones was convicted of murder and sentenced to lifeimprisonment, and the judgment was affirmed on directappeal. See 938 So. 2d, ¶ 11, at 315, ¶ 22, 317. The trialcourt subsequently denied post-conviction relief, andthe Court of Appeals affirmed. Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d725, ¶ 9, 729, ¶ 68, 742 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), affirmedin part and reversed in part by Jones v. State, 122So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013) (Jones II).This Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460(2012) the following year. The Mississippi SupremeCourt then granted certiorari limited to the Millerissue. Jones II, 122 So. 3d, ¶ 3, at 699. The Mississippi2. In this Court, petitioner’s brief recites his own self-servingtestimony as if it were the established facts of the case. SeeBrief for Petitioner 3-4. It is not. The jury did not believe him.The trial judge did not believe him. The only other witness isdead because Jones killed him.
4Supreme Court held that Miller was retroactive oncollateral review. See id., ¶¶ 11-12, at 702. It vacated thesentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. See id., ¶ 29, at 703.On resentencing, the trial judge noted the defendant’s age and his family situation. J. A. 151. The judgeevidently did not find that situation to be as violent aspetitioner would have this Court believe. Compare ibid.,with Brief for Petitioner 7.The judge stated expressly that he had “consideredeach of the Miller factors” and found that Jones wasnot entitled to have his sentence reduced “to make himeligible for parole consideration.” J. A. 152. The Courtof Appeals affirmed. See Jones III, 285 So. 3d, ¶ 1, at627. The Mississippi Supreme Court, a nine-justicecourt with a “rule of four,” granted certiorari, but thenthe court dismissed the writ after oral argument, fourjustices dissenting. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-2a. ThisCourt granted certiorari on March 9, 2020, after asimilar case became moot. See Mathena v. Malvo, 140S. Ct. 919, 206 L. Ed. 2d 250 (Feb. 26, 2020).SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTA requirement that the defendant be found “irreparably corrupt” or “permanently incorrigible” as aneligibility condition for life without parole would beexceptionally vague. If tested by the constitutionalrequirements for statutory eligibility requirements, itwould be unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Amendment cannot sensibly be interpreted to impose a requirement that the same amendment would forbid in acapital case or that the Due Process Clause would forbidin a noncapital case.
5Montgomery v. Louisiana did not purport to reexamine whether the Eighth Amendment created a categorical exemption for a subset of juvenile murderers, butrather it claimed to merely say what Miller v. Alabamasaid. Given that Miller unambiguously stated that it didnot create a categorical exemption, statements to thecontrary in Montgomery should not be regarded asprecedent.This Court’s Eighth Amendment cases have wandered far from the original understanding of thatprovision, even while the original understanding hasbeen deemed controlling for other parts of the Bill ofRights. Fidelity to that understanding has been deemedimportant enough to overrule major, long-standingprecedents despite massive reliance on them by theStates. The Court should go no farther away from theoriginal understanding but should bend the arc of itsjurisprudence back toward it.Miller is best understood as importing two rulesfrom capital cases into juvenile life-without-parole: (1)the rule of Woodson v. North Carolina forbiddingmandatory sentencing, thereby lowering the floor ofavailable sentences to something less; and (2) the ruleof Eddings v. Oklahoma to the extent it requiresconsideration of youth and related circumstances inmitigation when determining the sentence within thelegal range. There is no need to import the full Lockettv. Ohio “anything goes” rule, which has had majordetrimental effects in capital cases.Disavowing Montgomery’s bogus categorical exemption does not require overruling the core holding of thatcase that Miller is retroactive on collateral review. Theissue need not be addressed in this case, which is not acollateral review case. There are alternative argumentsavailable to support Montgomery’s result, if the issueever does arise again. The importation of the floor-
6lowering Woodson rule may be considered a rule ofsubstantive law. The issue may not need to be addressed again, however, as the life span of retroactivityissues is limited, and Montgomery will remain bindingprecedent in all other courts unless and until this Courtoverrules it.ARGUMENTI. As a sentence eligibility factor, “irreparablecorruption” or “permanent incorrigibility”would be unconstitutionally vague.A. Eligibility Factors and Vagueness.In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460, 474-477 (2012),this Court relied heavily on its capital cases, finding ananalogy between capital punishment for an adult andlife in prison without parole for a juvenile. See id., at475 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, 89 (2010)(Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)). There isplenty of reason to doubt both the wisdom and thelegitimacy of those capital cases. See Lockett v. Ohio,438 U. S. 586, 623 (1978) (White, J., dissenting in part);Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478–500 (1993)(Thomas, J., concurring); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U. S.274, 293 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Lockett line “hasno basis in the Constitution”); see generallyScheidegger, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death:Lessons from a Failure of Judicial Activism, 17 Ohio St.J. Crim. L. 131 (2019). Even so, the body of capital caselaw does provide a useful structure for analyzingsentencing decision processes.One insight that emerged in the capital cases andwas developed further in the jury trial cases is thedistinction between a sentence eligibility factor thatdetermines the range of the sentencer’s discretion and
7the selection factors to be considered in choosing asentence within that range. See Zant v. Stephens, 462U. S. 862, 878-879 (1983); United States v. Booker, 543U. S. 220, 233 (2005); McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U. S., 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-708, 206 L. Ed. 2d 69, 74-75(2020) (slip op., at 4-5).Statutory sentence eligibility factors are “thefunctional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 494, n. 19(2000). They are therefore subject to a number ofconstitutional requirements that either apply differently or do not apply at all to selection factors. Theymust be found by a jury, not the trial judge. SeeMcKinney, 140 S. Ct., at 707-708, 206 L. Ed. 2d, at 7475 (slip op., at 4-5). They must be proved beyond areasonable doubt. Apprendi, at 477. They are alsosubject to a more searching examination for vagueness.Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), considereda death-eligibility circumstance that a crime “wasoutrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman inthat it involved torture, depravity of mind, or anaggravated battery to the victim.” A plurality of theCourt held that this circumstance, as construed andapplied by the Georgia Supreme Court, was invalidbecause it provided “no principled way to distinguishthis case, in which the death penalty was imposed, fromthe many cases in which it was not.” Id., at 433.“Especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” also fails thetest, see Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 363-364(1988), at least when that language is not narrowed byinterpretation. Cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242,255-256 (1976) (lead opinion).Selection factors are different. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U. S. 967, 969, n.* (1994), considered a statutethat instructed jurors to consider “the circumstances ofthe crime.” This consideration came in the selection
8stage after the defendant had been made death-eligibleby the finding of an eligibility factor. See id., at 970. Ifthis circumstance had to meet the standard of Godfreyand Maynard it would fail miserably, but it was upheld.In the selection step it is not only appropriate butdesirable that the jury consider wide-ranging factors.See id., at 977-978. It is enough that a selection factor“instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matterand does so in understandable terms.” Id., at 976.In noncapital cases, a sentencing factor that changesthe range of available punishments violates the DueProcess Clause if it is excessively vague. See Johnson v.United States, 576 U. S. 591, 595-596 (2015).B. Factors Mandated by Case Law.All of the above cases deal with factors enacted instatutes. This case concerns a court-created rule,recently discovered lurking in the Eighth Amendmentafter having gone unnoticed there for over two centuries. See Miller, 567 U. S., at 502 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (no basis in text or precedent). Can this Courtimpose on the states through case law an eligibilitystandard so vague that a statute enacting the same rulewould be unconstitutional?There are now a large number of precedents incapital cases and juvenile life-without-parole (LWOP)c
the killing of Mr. Bert Jones was particularly brutal.” J. A. 150. Jones stabbed his grandfather eight times, using a second knife after the first broke. He attempted to conceal the act. Ibid. Postmortem examination found defensive wounds on the grandfather’s hands. Jones v. State, 938 So. 2d 312, ¶10, 315 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (Jones I .
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