Conflict Prevention And Reconstruction (CPR) Unit

A.Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit Working Papers1. Children, Education and War:Reaching Education for All (EFA)Objectives in Countries Affected byConflictMarc Sommers(June 2002)Conflict’s path of devastation and chaoshas dramatically slowed the ability of wartorn countries to reach the Education forAll (EFA) goals adopted in Dakar in April2000. This paper sketches the situationconfronting children, their families andgovernments in conflict countries anddescribes the challenges of reachinguniversal primary education. Thesechallenges are enormous—in answer to thequestion, “How can countries affected byconflict arrive at EFA objectives?” anemergency education expert answered,“The short answer is, ‘They can’t.’”Whether this is true or not, it is certainlythe case that far more could be done tosupport education in countries sufferingfrom conflict. The most logical startingpoint lies in supporting emergencyeducation where it exists and dramaticallyexpanding access to education where itdoes not.Yet, most primary-school-age childrenin war-affected areas are not in school andhave no realistic hope of enrolling in one.Forced migrant children in refugee andIDP camps and settlements have the bestchance of going to school. Of these two,support for refugee schooling is usually fargreater than anything available forinternally displaced children. Children notliving in camps, whether in their countryof origin or in an asylum country, arelikely not attending formal schools. In allcases, girls generally are far less likely tobe attending school than boys.In addition, education for and efforts toengage with youths, remain limited. Thiscreates a volatile and dangerous situation.Youth programming, when it does exist, isusually poorly supported, and may notoffer much hope in terms of openingemployment and income opportunities. Itgenerally faces stiff competition fromaggressive military or criminal operativeswho recruit (or abduct) children andyouths into their militias or gangs,promising rich and immediate rewards.Periods before and immediately afterconflictsrequirecarefulpolicydevelopment. Preparedness planning andcontingent strategies require attention. Thepaper also warns against top-down,material-based educational solutions.More than any other circumstance, warmakes the case for providing appropriateeducational responses to the needs ofchildren and youth at risk, and exposes thedangers of neglect. Education for childrenwhose lives have been affected by war is avital protection measure. Appropriate formaland non-formal education can provideimportant alternatives to child soldieringand other forms of exploitation (sexual andotherwise), social and cultural alienation,violence and self-destruction. War alsoexposes the dynamics of gender ineducation and socialization, and thevulnerability of boys as well as girls,making responses to gender needs critical.Lack of investment in and creative,participatory work on education for childrenand youth at risk makes a return to peaceextremely difficult if not impossible.2. The East Timor ReconstructionProgram: Successes, Problems andTradeoffsKlaus Rohland, and Sarah Cliffe(November 2002)Pre-mission planning and readiness. TheBank started to plan for East Timor’sreconstruction early in 1999, forging strongrelations with the UN and East Timorese.The Joint Assessment Mission set clearpriorities,costings,andasharedunderstanding on reconstruction prioritiesbetween the Timorese and institutions whichwere to finance reconstruction. Key lessonsinclude the value of early engagement; clearrolesandresponsibilitieswithininternational institutions, and a truly s and donors. Greater continuitybetween the pre and post-ballot periods in1999 and earlier efforts to strengthen therole of nascent Timorese governmentstructures would have increased the benefitof strong, coordinated advance inancialmobilizationachieved high per capita aid, quickdisbursing and consistent over time, withvery few delays in the realization ofpledges.Earlymobilizationofreconstruction funds allowed for a smoothtransition from humanitarian to developmentassistance and avoided gaps in reconstructionactivities.However, East Timor also demonstratesthe inappropriate complexity of aid financingmechanisms for post-conflict countries withlow capacity, which created barriers tonational ownership, and prevented theintegration of all funding sources into thenational budget.Government and donors largely overcamethese constraints through the adoption ofagreed reconstruction benchmarks coveringpolitical, administrative, economic and socialreconstruction. The benchmarks, reviewedand monitored every six months, proved auseful way to maintain reconstructionmomentum and ensure links betweendifferent activities. Regular multi-donorsector missions to identify gaps, duplicationor new priorities helped. Close Governmentand donor discussions over the recurrentbudget also improved sustainability.Reconstruction design and implementation.The paper reviews progress made in each ofthe main reconstruction sectors during thetransition to independence. A key lessonemerging relates to the trade-off betweenspeed of delivery and capacity building. InEast Timor the sectors which made moreprogress in establishing institutions wereoften less strong initially in achievingphysical reconstruction targets. To have realnational ownership of the policy-makingprocess, a fairly long and inclusive process ofpolicy discussion is needed. Intensive effortsto build human and institutional capacity alsotake time away from the management ofemergency rehabilitation and services.Finding the right balance is an importantchallenge. Early involvement of on to political leadership, andunified sectoral programming increase thefocus on sustainable policies and institutions.The use of community-driven ies, and early attention to buildingprocurement and payment systems can helpaccelerate reconstruction and servicedelivery. In deploying non-governmentalservice delivery, care should be taken tostrengthen rather than undermine n arrangements may becombined with explicit transitional sectoralstrategies to strengthen national ownership

2and control of policy decisions, andgradually transfer implementation intogovernment hands.Within the Bank’s portfolio, projectpreparation time was cut from a Bank wideaverage of 15 months to 3.5 months whilemaintaining regular quality standards. TheTFET portfolio achieved fast results on theground in those program componentsexecuted through community or privatesector mechanisms. Larger reconstructionworks lagged, largely due to difficulties inmanagingstandardprocurementprocedures in a post-conflict context.Specific measures are recommended toaddress this for future operations. Overall,the volume of outputs via the TFET hasbeen high in the 2½ year period of itsexistence and it has played a large part inmeeting East Timor’s core reconstructionneeds.The situation at independence providesuseful lessons for the transitional andreconstruction period. There is much goodnews. Main development indicators wereby 2001 at or near pre-crisis levels, whichis a surprisingly fast recovery given thedepth of destruction in 1999. TheGovernment has prepared a medium termnational development plan, three-yearbudget and one-year priority program, onthe basis of which it has secured donorcommitments to meet its external financingrequirement for the next three years. Oiland gas revenues from the Timor Seawould provide an exit strategy fromdependence on external financing by middecade. The future thus looks fairlyoptimistic. The Government faces,however, a backlog of legislative andcapacity-building work to establish keyinstitutions; a serious crisis of capacity inthe judiciary sector; and hard policychoices in relation to veterans’ policy,property rights and cost recovery.Arguably, these issues should have beenaddressed earlier in the transition.3. Humanitarian Assistance,Reconstruction and Development inAfghanistan: A Practitioner’s ViewAlsatair J. McKechnie(March 2003)This paper reviews progress and earlylessons on the transformation ofAfghanistan, as it transitions fromemergency relief to reconstruction anddevelopment. The lessons are preliminarysince the paper has been written only tenmonths after the Interim Authority emergedout of the Bonn agreements, but they doprovide insights into the challenges anddilemmas that government and donors areconfronting.The reconstruction of Afghanistan facedan enormous challenge resulting not onlyfrom two decades of war but also the legacyof decades of failed development and poorpolicies. Moreover, the conflict is not fullyover and the country still confronts manylongstandingissuesregardingmodernization, government structures andthe relation of religion to the state.The needs assessment carried out jointlyby the major international institutionsinvolved in the country’s reconstruction,despite some limitations, provided a goodframework for the initial reconstructioneffort and facilitated a smooth flow ofinformation between humanitarian anddevelopment institutions. Policy prioritieshave been generally appropriate for a postconflict country and the government hasarticulated a coherent strategy to stimulatethe private sector. At the same time andcognizant of its limited absorptive capacity,the government also has a vision on the roleof the state and how it wishes to rationalizegovernment functions.Creating a secure environment remains adifficult challenge and a key nt. While increasing wealth mayhelp to achieve a more secure and lessconflict-vulnerableenvironment,mostAfghan and foreign observers consider thatexpanding military resources to support thecentral government will be necessary foreffective reconstruction. At the same time,aid effectiveness depends on good policiesand institutions.In Afghanistan, goodgovernment will depend on civil servicereform, transparency and accountability ofaid funds, and effective aid coordination rned over the balance betweenhumanitarian and reconstruction anddevelopment assistance. Given large aidcommitments (about one quarter of GDP),government officials are co

A. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit Working Papers . 1. Children, Education and War: Reaching Education for All (EFA) Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict . Marc Sommers (June 2002) Conflict’s path of devastation and chaos has dramatically slowed the ability of war-torn countries to reach the Education for