Capacity Development In Post-Conflict Countries

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Capacity Development in Post‐ConflictCountriesUNDP 20101 Global Event Working Paper

Acknowledgments‘Capacity is Development' is a call to systematically review, capture and discuss key capacitydevelopment lessons of the past and to look on to the future. Through distilling key policy andinvestment choices made over time to motivate forward planning on capacity development, thisresearch paper helped define the content framework of the ‘Capacity is Development' Global Event. Thispaper was written by Jago Salmon and Eugenia Piza‐Lopez. 2010United Nations Development Programme304 East 45th StreetNew York, NY 10017 USADISCLAIMER: The findings, interpretations and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do notnecessarily represent the views of UNDP or United Nations Member States.2 Global Event Working Paper

Capacity Development in Post‐Conflict Countries1I. Introduction1. The recent Secretary General’s “Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath ofConflict” warns of the threats posed by the failure to restore state authority to lead thepeacebuilding process in early post‐conflict situations.2 This report advocates for coherentand well coordinated early action to support post‐conflict governments to build core statecapacities that will help to restore legitimacy and effectiveness.32. This paper lays out a framework for reconsidering the unique challenges post‐conflictcontexts pose to processes of state capacity development. The purpose is to presentframing questions and identify key issues for a conflict‐sensitive approach to capacitydevelopment of governance in post‐conflict contexts.3. The concept of ‘post‐conflict governance capacity development’ is used in this paper toconvey the combination of peace building, state capacity building and capacitydevelopment required by UNDP to support nationally owned processes of transition in theaftermath of conflict. Section II highlights the importance of developing the foundations for resilient,responsive and legitimate governance as a component of the peacebuildingtransition; Section III presents the ways in which violent conflict affects state institutions andgovernance capacity development efforts; Section IV considers rebuilding capacity in post‐conflict environments, outliningUNDP’s mandated role in supporting a recovery of the foundations for statecapacities to foster sustainable development; Section V explores avenues for enhancing existing efforts in post‐conflict contextsthrough immediate support for post‐conflict planning, leadership development andconflict sensitive governance support; The paper concludes, in Section VI, with initial findings on ways to improve UNDP’sengagement to build legitimate, resilient, responsive states after conflict.1This framework represents an initial result from the Post‐Conflict Governance Capacity Development initiative byUNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. This initiative examines lessons learned from UNDP’s supportcapacity development of governance in post‐conflict countries, substantial inputs have been made by Eugenia PizaLopez, Jago Salmon, Tim Sisk, Cleophas Torori, Susanna Campbell, and Peter Morgan.2“Too often, capacity development is seen in the context of international exit strategies from post‐conflict countries. This is always too late.Inattention to capacity development constrains national actors from taking ownership of their recovery and limits accountability between theState and its people.” p. 7. Para. 19.3Ibid., p.7 para 183 Global Event Working Paper

I. Background: Governance Capacities in Post‐Conflict Contexts4. The scope and complexity of the contemporary peacebuilding challenges for the UN areconsiderable. From 1989‐2008, there have been 128 armed conflicts, 48 of which havereached the threshold scholars use to describe a conflict as ‘war’. Most of these conflicts(93%) have been internal to states.45. Countries emerging from conflict are vulnerable with nearly a quarter of all comprehensivepeace agreements failing in the face of a relapse into conflict, and even a higher proportiondefined by debilitating crises of governance and high levels of armed violence, includingviolence again women.6. Furthermore, many post‐conflict countries are not progressing toward the MillenniumDevelopment Goals and some of the most severely affected are witnessing declines inhuman development.57. Research shows that most armed conflicts today end in a process of peace‐making throughnegotiated settlement.6 In the wake of such accords, war‐affected states and societiesundergo complex transitions in several interrelated areas: The re‐establishment of security, both state security and human and community‐security; Renewal of the rule of law and the creation of mechanisms of accountability and an endto impunity; Reforming, recreating, or building of public governance institutions and processes thatare able to reconcile social conflict and pursue collective goals of prosperity anddevelopment; The establishment of renewed political settlements supported by processes ofconstitutional change or complex power‐sharing frameworks able to garner legitimacyand support from social forces; Economic recovery to include the creation of livelihoods and employment, realizing forall the “peace dividend” of invigorated economic growth, managing collectively naturalresources and fairly distributing the proceeds of national wealth;7 and4Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on the frequency and intensity of armed conflict (Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, 2009.“Armed Conflict 1946‐2008,” Journal of Peace Research 46 (4): 577.5UNDP Human Development Report 2003, Millennium Development Goals: A Global Compact to End Poverty, p. 45.6The 2007 Human Security Brief reports that “Seventeen conflicts were ended by negotiation between 2000 and 2005, and thus far just two ofthem—12 percent—have broken down. Over the equivalent period in the previous decade (1990 to 1995), 48 percent of the negotiatedsettlements had failed. The increased stability of these settlements is very likely the result of the international community’s increased supportfor post‐conflict peacebuilding in recent years.” Andrew Mack. 2007. Human Security Brief 2007 p. 35 (Human Security Centre, Simon FraserUniversity). Available at: www.humansecuritybrief.info/7See UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Post‐Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling Economic Ingenuity,” 2008, athttp://www.undp.org/cpr/content/economic recovery/PCER rev.pdf.4 Global Event Working Paper

Restoring social cohesion and building ties of civil society connections across lines ofconflict to provide the unity of purpose needed for effective governance.8. The sum of these transitions entails not only a reconstruction of state institutions and corefunctions, but a transformation of governance, with the objective of enabling moreresilient, more responsive and more legitimate states.9. The scope of these transitions, the diversity of post‐conflict contexts and the short‐timehorizons for delivery present challenges to traditional capacity development approaches.a. Impact of Conflict and Fragility on Governance CapacityBox 1: The Post‐conflict situation in SudanOn 9th January 2005, the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army(SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ending a civil war between theNorthern government and Southern rebels. On the 9th October 2006, a similar agreement wassigned with the Eastern Front, and on the 5 May 2006, a final agreement was signed with oneof Darfur’s rebel factions. Despite these agreements, Sudan continues to present a range ofconflict and crisis related priorities for UNDP.Whilst parts of the country, such as Darfur, continue to require complex humanitarianoperations in which early recovery operations are underway, in other areas recoveryinterventions are complicated by local insecurity, natural disasters and political tensions.8 Evenin formally peaceful areas of the country, sporadic violence fuelled by a combination ofpolitical tensions, natural resource competition, and the availability of small arms and lightweapons regularly interrupts development programming and brings the risk of widerescalations of violent conflict.9 Inter‐linking risks crucial to stability are not readily captured byexisting paradigms of ‘transition’ and the geographic overlapping of security, humanitarianand recovery priorities renders the transition from relief to development complex andheterogeneous challenge for UNDP operations.10. All countries face an array of capacity challenges. However, these challenges arequalitatively different in countries emerging from conflict. For example: The range, complexity and interconnections of capacity issues, for example betweensecurity and natural resources management, economic recovery and rule of law;8For example, recent flooding in Sudan effected 14 out of Sudan’s 26 states and approximately 140,00 people. Cf. IFRC Emergency AppealAugust 7, 2007.9For example, throughout 2008 and 2009 serious escalations of violence in South Sudan, Abyei and the attack of Darfurian rebel forces onKhartoum severely impacted on the environment for the delivery of recovery programming.5 Global Event Working Paper

The collapse of much of the national educational and knowledge creation systems, such asthe university or vocational training services;The collapse of an enabling environment for and departure of trained personnel for genderempowerment in administration and government, or technical fields such as economicanalysis;The effects of psychosocial trauma on interpersonal and community relationships;The effects of politics, parallel and informal institutions, and patronage networks oninstitutions;11. As a result, post‐conflict states are doubly fragile or vulnerable: the root causes of violenceoften are persistent and the prior experience of conflict and conflict‐related legacies (e.g.weapons in the hands of civilians, mobilized groups, fragmented political systems and deepsocial differences) undermines the endogenous capacity to address these root causes.12. Post‐conflict states vary in the nature and degree of destruction. But in general, all sufferfrom the collapse not just of assets or skills but of the systems – physical, financial,economic, technical, organizational, political, social – that allowed them to function asstates. The challenge for UNDP is to help countries re‐establish or reconfigure thesesystems in ways that can allow the country to begin to move forward.13. Four aspects seem of particular importance and shape the way such systems can be broughtback to life. The physical infrastructure: The degree of infrastructural destruction varies. InRwanda, the infrastructure remained largely intact. In Sierra Leone, the physicallosses were mainly in the countryside. In Liberia, the destruction was pervasiveincluding in Monrovia. South Sudan had very little infrastructure to begin with, inpart because of the duration of the conflict. Impassable roads and destroyedbridges limit inter‐regional movement and communication for months at a time. Thedestruction of government buildings and the loss of basic office equipment preventpublic agencies from being re‐established. The loss of educational institutionscontributes to the inability of the country to replace skilled citizens who have fledthe country or been killed in conflict. Finally, the low or limited capacity ofgovernments to address these deficits undermines their legitimacy with citizens. Thestate finds it difficult to generate the momentum required to make a real difference.Box 2: UNDP Infrastructure Reconstruction in IraqTwo decades of war and sanctions has left Iraq’sinfrastructure in a dilapidated and dysfunctional state. Inaddition, policies in infrastructure rehabilitation need6 Global Event Working Paper

review in order to manage both pressing short‐termissues and prepare for future demands. Institutionalandorganizational destructionis wide spread. Civilservants have been killed orhave emigrated to safety.In Liberia, public agenciesemerged from the conflictlacking every sort ofresource‐includingbuildings, desks, chairs,power and paper. In manycases, the institutionalmemorydisappearedthrough staff loss and filedestruction. The inter‐organizational relationshipsthat are critical to thefunctioningofstateagencies were disrupted.Among UNDP’s interventions in assisting Iraq’sreconstruction and development are the rehabilitationof key infrastructure and the strengthening of access tobasic services. 50 sewage pumping stations, and twowater treatment plants were repaired. A detailedassessment for the rehabilitation of the Al‐Kadhimiyateaching hospital was undertaken, orders for essentialequipment placed, and refurbishment of the hospitalsewerage system started. A total of 106 dieselgenerators were purchased for key humanitarianfacilities of which 92 were installed. Three mobilesubstations, four cable‐test vans, 218 distributiontransformers, 700 km of transmission line conductors,and 200 km of cables were procured and delivered. Therepair of the electrical distribution networks of nine keyhospitals was completed. 20 engineers from the IraqiMinistry of Electricity were trained in distribution systemdata collection techniques, the use and maintenance of Psycho‐social trauma is aGeographical Information System (GIS) databases, andhidden but important partdistribution planning and system analysis using modernof the legacy of conflict thatsoftware packages. Delivery started of safety equipment,affects people at all levels.tools and test equipment for Ministry of Electricity repairResearch in countries suchcrews. Additionally, a theatre for children and the mainas Nicaragua and CambodiaConvention Centre in Baghdad were rehabilitated.suggestsprofoundIn Southern Iraq, UNDP is assisting town councils inpsychological effects onsewage and water network repairs, civil works forcitizens. The attitude ofhospital, and electricity distribution installations.people to uncertainty, risk,learning, decision making, trust, the future changes. The on‐going emotion of fear can affectfamily life and bureaucratic behavior. This kind of damage is unique in its lack of visibility.Box 3: Timor‐Leste – The Impact of the Conflicton change in the Public Service“Building a viable Timor‐Leste public service hasbeen one of the most difficult aspects of the UN’smandate (Report of the Secretary GeneralS/2002/432). Institutions and public records weredestroyed or removed in 1999, and an estimated7 Global Event Working Paper

7,000 Indonesian civil servants fled the territory, Profoundchangestoleaving a vacuum in all areas of government. Therelationships – personal,development of East Timorese skills in the areasorganizational, societal – isof administration and governance was limitedan effect of sustainedduring the years of Indonesian rule, and theconflict. The level of socialmajority of the technical as well as senior andcapital declines especiallymiddle‐level management positions inoutside family or ethnicgovernment were occupied by Indonesiancircles. In particular, theofficials. The human resource base is thereforetype of functional ties thatextremely weak. Training and capacity building tomake complex capabilitiesdevelop a professional and effective publicwork lose effectiveness.administration remains a major challenge in theOrganizationslosecoming years.”coherence as new staff with(Vong, John, Resident Project Adviser, UNDPdifferent educational, socialProject Capacity Development for HRM in the Civilor ideological backgroundsService, Integrating Civil Service Reform intoinsist on new behaviors.Sustainable Capacity Development Framework inMostimportantly,theTimor Leste)relationships between thestate and its citizens,especially that of legitimacy, needs to be rebuilt, something that can be a complextask if the absence of such legitimacy was a factor behind the conflict in the firstplace.14. The extent and nature of these impacts are highly context specific. In the 1994 Rwandangenocide, for example, an estimated one million people were killed, while 3 millionRwandans became refugees, and 4 million were internally displaced. Beyond these grimstatistics, the genocide also led to a collapse of the state and the Rwandan economy leavingthe government ill‐equipped to deal with post‐conflict needs. In the case of Timor Leste (seeBox 3) the conflict “left a vacuum” in terms of public administration which required amassive investment in institutions for the new state, including building up their humanresources and governance systems. In Iraq, the “de‐Baathification” policy of the CoalitionProvisional Authority had extensive effects on the capacity of the state to govern. On theother hand, South Africa, during its transition from conflict in the early 1990s, has seen atransformation of state structures and public administration in efforts to remake statecapacity rather than build it from scratch. Likewise, Ethiopia emerged from conflict in 1991with a relatively strong government with its central level administrative structure intact.b. The Challenges of Capacity Development in Post‐Conflict Contexts8 Global Event Working Paper

15. On top of the scope of the capacity development demands created by violent conflict,designing and delivering capacity development support in post‐conflict contexts ischallenging.Box 4: UNDP Somalia – Supporting CapacityRemotelyCapacity development remains the core andstrategic mandate of UNDP in Somalia.However, ongoing insecurity presents adilemma for international efforts to developnational and local capacity. UNDP andothers must continue to engage to supportthe conditions by which a credible state maydevelop ‐‐ leadership with legitimacy andbasic governance capacities, a trainedadministrative cadre of professionals whocan organize governance and servicedelivery – with extremely fluid andconstrained access.UNDP's capacity development work hastaken the form of an ambitious and creativelocal governance program with a focus onlocal reconciliation process and building upon societal strengths. For example, inSomaliland, the programming has beenconducted under the United Nations JointProgramme on Local Governance andDecentralized Service Delivery (JPLG). UNDPhas also supported election and selection oflocal and regional representatives in SouthCentral Somalia in the context ofparticipation in the Djibouti peace talks andthe agreement that created the TransitionalFederal Parliament. Second, UNDP hasfocused on the full spectrum of localactivities such as capacities for localdevelopment and livelihoods ions and processes (such as local‐NGO monitoring) for early recovery; UNDP9 Global Event Working Paper

16. Post‐conflict countries present “hyper–politicized” environments in which lowlevels of trust make engagement withpartners highly sensitive.17. In many cases state institutions and elitesmay have been compromised by humanrights violations or have been affiliated withthe root causes of the conflict. Thesehistories of conflict raise questions aboutthe feasibility of building on existingsystems as a means of promotingsustainable peacebuilding and democracy.has teamed up with UN Habitat and theInternational Labor Organization oncommunity strengthening and earlyrecovery in conflict‐affected areas of theSouth Central region.Each of theseinitiatives has required has required highlyinnovative delivery mechanisms involving: Extensive training of local councils usinga train‐the‐trainers approach; Through radio to provide remoteprogrammingaimedatcapacitydevelopment for budget, planning,community participation, and servicedelivery; and Workshops in districts to bring togetherregional governments, civil society, andlocal traditional leaders and elders in all‐day sessions that yield d

1 This framework represents an initial result from the Post‐Conflict Governance Capacity Development initiative by UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. This initiative examines lessons learned from UNDP’s support capacity development of governance in post‐conflict countries, substantial inputs have been made by Eugenia Piza

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