Supreme Court Of The United States Riley V. California .

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)189 L.Ed.2d 430, 82 USLW 4558, 42 Media L. Rep. 1925, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7045.arrestees' cell phones was unwarranted undersearch incident to arrest exception to warrantrequirement, since those logs would typicallycontain not only phone numbers, but alsoidentifying information that arrestee might haveadded, such as labels for incoming calls.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.Cases that cite this headnote[17]ArrestPersons and personal effects; persondetained for investigationProposed rule permitting police officers toconduct warrantless search of arrestees' cellphone data if they could have obtained sameinformation from pre-digital counterpart wasunwarranted under search incident to arrestexception to warrant requirement; fact that predigital search could have turned up a fewphotographs in arrestee's wallet or paper bankstatement kept in pocket did not justify searchof potentially thousands of photographs andextensive bank records, rule would permitofficers to search range of information containedon cell phone, even though people wouldbe unlikely to carry such information inphysical form, and rule would force courtsto engage in complex line-drawing exerciseto determine digital to pre-digital analogues.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.123 Cases that cite this headnote[18]Searches and SeizuresEmergencies and Exigent Circumstances;Opportunity to Obtain WarrantExigent circumstances exception to the warrantrequirement applies when the exigencies ofthe situation, such as the need to prevent theimminent destruction of evidence in individualcases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and toassist persons who are seriously injured orare threatened with imminent injury, make theneeds of law enforcement so compelling thata warrantless search is objectively reasonableunder the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.13 Cases that cite this headnote[19]ArrestSearchSearches and SeizuresEmergencies and Exigent Circumstances;Opportunity to Obtain WarrantUnlike the search incident to arrest exceptionto the warrant requirement, the exigentcircumstances exception requires a court toexamine whether an emergency justified awarrantless search in each particular case.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.22 Cases that cite this headnote*2477 Syllabus *In No. 13–132, petitioner Riley was stopped for a trafficviolation, which eventually led to his arrest on weaponscharges. An officer searching Riley incident to the arrestseized a cell phone from Riley's pants pocket. The officeraccessed information on the phone and noticed the repeateduse of a term associated with a street gang. At the policestation two hours later, a detective specializing in gangsfurther examined the phone's digital contents. Based in parton photographs and videos that the detective found, the Statecharged Riley in connection with a shooting that had occurreda few weeks earlier and sought an enhanced sentence basedon Riley's gang membership. Riley moved to suppress allevidence that the police had obtained from his cell phone. Thetrial court denied the motion, and Riley was convicted. TheCalifornia Court of Appeal affirmed.In No. 13–212, respondent Wurie was arrested after policeobserved him participate in an apparent drug sale. At thepolice station, the officers seized a cell phone from Wurie'sperson and noticed that the phone was receiving multiplecalls from a source identified as “my house” on its externalscreen. The officers opened the phone, accessed its call log,determined the number associated with the “my house” label,and traced that number to what they suspected was Wurie'sapartment. They secured a search warrant and found drugs,a firearm and ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search.Wurie was then charged with drug and firearm offenses. He 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)189 L.Ed.2d 430, 82 USLW 4558, 42 Media L. Rep. 1925, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7045.moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the searchof the apartment. The District Court denied the motion, andWurie was convicted. The First Circuit reversed the denial ofthe motion to suppress and vacated the relevant convictions.Held : The police generally may not, without a warrant, searchdigital information on a cell phone seized from an individualwho has been arrested. Pp. 2482 – 2495.(a) A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls withina specific exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrantrequirement. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865. The well-established exceptionat issue here applies when a warrantless search is conductedincident to a lawful arrest.Three related precedents govern the extent to which officersmay search property found on or near an arrestee. Chimelv. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685,requires that a search incident to arrest be limited to the areawithin the arrestee's immediate control, where it is justifiedby the interests in officer safety and in preventing evidencedestruction. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, the Court applied the Chimelanalysis to a search of a cigarette pack found on the arrestee'sperson. It held that the risks identified in Chimel are presentin all custodial arrests, 414 U.S., at 235, 94 S.Ct. 494, evenwhen there is no specific concern about the loss of evidenceor the threat to officers in a particular case, id., at 236, 94S.Ct. 494. The trilogy concludes with Arizona v. Gant, 556U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485, which permitssearches of a car where the arrestee is unsecured and withinreaching distance of the passenger compartment, or where itis reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of *2478arrest might be found in the vehicle, id., at 343, 94 S.Ct. 494.Pp. 2482 – 2484.(b) The Court declines to extend Robinson 's categoricalrule to searches of data stored on cell phones. Absent moreprecise guidance from the founding era, the Court generallydetermines whether to exempt a given type of search fromthe warrant requirement “by assessing, on the one hand, thedegree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotionof legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton,526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408. Thatbalance of interests supported the search incident to arrestexception in Robinson. But a search of digital informationon a cell phone does not further the government interestsidentified in Chimel, and implicates substantially greaterindividual privacy interests than a brief physical search. Pp.2484 – 2491.(1) The digital data stored on cell phones does not presenteither Chimel risk. Pp. 2485 – 2488.(i) Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be usedas a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuatethe arrestee's escape. Officers may examine the phone'sphysical aspects to ensure that it will not be used as aweapon, but the data on the phone can endanger no one.To the extent that a search of cell phone data might warnofficers of an impending danger, e.g., that the arrestee'sconfederates are headed to the scene, such a concern is betteraddressed through consideration of case-specific exceptionsto the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances.See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298–299, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782. Pp. 2485 – 2486.(ii) The United States and California raise concerns about thedestruction of evidence, arguing that, even if the cell phoneis physically secure, information on the cell phone remainsvulnerable to remote wiping and data encryption. As an initialmatter, those broad concerns are distinct from Chimel 's focuson a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to concealor destroy evidence within his reach. The briefing also giveslittle indication that either problem is prevalent or that theopportunity to perform a search incident to arrest would bean effective solution. And, at least as to remote wiping, lawenforcement currently has some technologies of its own forcombatting the loss of evidence. Finally, law enforcement'sremaining concerns in a particular case might be addressed byresponding in a targeted manner to urgent threats of remotewiping, see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696, or by taking action to disable aphone's locking mechanism in order to secure the scene, seeIllinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331–333, 121 S.Ct. 946,148 L.Ed.2d 838. Pp. 2486 – 2488.(2) A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee'spockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacybeyond the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physicalitems, but more substantial privacy interests are at stake whendigital data is involved. Pp. 2488 – 2491.(i) Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitativesense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee'sperson. Notably, modern cell phones have an immense 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5

Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)189 L.Ed.2d 430, 82 USLW 4558, 42 Media L. Rep. 1925, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7045.storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a personwas limited by physical realities and generally constitutedonly a narrow intrusion on privacy. But cell phones canstore millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, orhundreds of videos. This has several interrelated privacyconsequences. First, a *2479 cell phone collects in oneplace many distinct types of information that reveal muchmore in combination than any isolated record. Second, thephone's capacity allows even just one type of informationto convey far more than previously possible. Third, data onthe phone can date back for years. In addition, an elementof pervasiveness characterizes cell phones but not physicalrecords. A decade ago officers might have occasionallystumbled across a highly personal item such as a diary, buttoday many of the more than 90% of American adults whoown cell phones k

phone data, and [2] interest in preventing destruction of evidence did not . cause is a reasonable intrusion under the . provide no practical limit on cell phone searches, given broad, historical information stored on phones. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.