DISPATCH FROM THE FIELD STANDARDISATION AND QUALITY .
DISPATCH FROM THE FIELDSTANDARDISATIONAND QUALITYCONTROL IN ISLAMICSTATE’S MILITARYPRODUCTIONWeapon manufacturing in the east Mosul sectorDecember 2016
Islamic State rockets, Gogjali, Mosul, November 2016Published online by Conflict Armament Research Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London, 2016First published in December 2016This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. Thecontents of this document are the sole responsibility of Conflict Armament Research and canunder no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of ConflictArmament Research, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with theappropriate reprographics rights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside thescope of the above should be sent to the secretary, Conflict Armament Research(admin@conflictarm.com).Cover Image: 120 mm mortar rounds, manufactured by Islamic State forces, recovered by Iraqisecurity forces near Mosul, in October and November 2016.Design and layout by Julian Knott (www.julianknott.com)Maps produced by Michael Hopfensperger2Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production
CONTENTSINTRODUCTION4KEY FINDINGS7DOCUMENTED MATERIEL9MORTARS10PRODUCTION PROCESS AND ORGANISATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17ROCKETS18PRODUCTION PROCESS AND ORGANISATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24COMPONENT SOURCING25CHEMICAL PRECURSORS AND ANCILLARY PRODUCTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30QUALITY CONTROL, INVENTORY MANAGEMENT, AND PRODUCTION FORECASTING31STANDARDISED PRODUCTION AND QUALITY CONTROL31PRODUCTION FORECASTING33SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PHY37Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production3
INTRODUCTIONFrom 11 to 16 November 2016, a Conflict ArmamentResearch (CAR) field investigation team embeddedwith Iraqi armed forces during the initial phases ofthe assault on Islamic State (IS) forces in easternMosul. The team’s objective was to gather, firsthand, all available information on weapons andammunition recovered from IS forces on thebattlefield. During its deployment, the teamgained unprecedented access to six weaponmanufacturing facilities once operated by ISforces, recorded extensive documentary evidenceof centrally managed weapon production, anddocumented a wide range of IS-manufacturedordnance recovered during ground combatoperations. CAR deployed a second team on418 November 2016, whose work in Mosul continuedat the time of writing.This Dispatch from the Field presents findingson the structure and output of IS forces’ weaponproduction in the eastern Mosul sector. Whileprevious CAR reports used the term ‘quasiindustrial production,’ the phrase does not reflectthe scale and sophistication of manufacturingencountered by CAR in Mosul. Although productionfacilities employ a range of non-standard materialsand chemical explosive precursors, the degreeof organisation, quality control, and inventorymanagement, indicates a complex, centrallycontrolled industrial production system.Iraqi Army 9th Division convoy near Mosul, 14 November 2016
INTRODUCTIONRocket components, GogjaliIn this system, multiple manufacturing facilitieswork to produce weapons according to precisetechnical guidelines issued by a central authority.The production of any one weapon system involvesthe coordinated input of numerous facilities atdifferent stages of the production cycle: fromthe processing of raw materials, to the mixingof chemical explosive precursors, to machining,assembly, and final sign-off by dedicated qualitycontrol personnel.Standardisation serves critical battlefieldrequirements. The directives issued by IS forces toproduction facilities seek to minimise the variationamong weapons and ammunition manufacturedby a multitude of often-distant factories andworkshops. This enables weapon interoperability,which means that mortar rounds manufacturedin one part of IS forces' territory are calibratedto fit mortar tubes produced in facilities locatedelsewhere.To function, this production line requires asophisticated monitoring system, in whichmanufacturing facilities regularly report detailedfigures on production rates and the quality ofoutput to a central procurement and productionauthority—all of which are critical to forecastingmaterial requirements and to ensuring that allmanufactured weapons conform to standardspecifications.Consistency in production also requiresconsistency in the supply of materials used tomanufacture weapons and ammunition. IS forceshave demonstrated repeatedly that, to ensure allweapon systems function identically, they mustbe constructed from the same materials. This isparticularly so of chemical precursors used tomanufacture explosives and propellant.WHILE PREVIOUS CARREPORTS USED THE TERM‘QUASI-INDUSTRIALPRODUCTION,’ THE PHRASEDOES NOT REFLECT THESCALE AND SOPHISTICATIONOF MANUFACTURINGENCOUNTERED BY CAR INMOSUL.IS-manufactured 120 mm mortar rounds, near KaramlaisConflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production5
INTRODUCTIONPRODUCTION DATES SPANNINGA RANGE OF YEARS, SUGGESTTHAT IS FORCES HAVE MADEREPEATED ACQUISITIONS OFIDENTICAL PRODUCTS FROMTHE SAME SOURCES—ALMOSTEXCLUSIVELY FROM THETURKISH DOMESTIC MARKET.IS mortar production facility, GogjaliEvidence documented by CAR during 29 monthsof operations along IS frontlines indicates thatIS forces have made one-off, bulk-procurementsof chemical precursors from single suppliers. Inother cases, production dates spanning a range ofyears suggest that IS forces have made repeatedacquisitions of identical products from the samesources—almost exclusively from the Turkishdomestic market. These findings indicate the massdiversion of chemical precursors and a robustsupply chain extending from Turkey, through Syria,to Mosul.The supply of homogenous raw material clearlyassists IS forces in the production of uniformweapon systems. Documents issued by IS forces,and CAR’s physical examination of IS-producedweapons, underscore this. The group’s CentralOrganisation for Standardisation and QualityControl (COSQC) issues blueprints for weaponconstruction, which provide standard parametersfor the manufacture of mortars, mortar rounds,and rockets—in addition to the precise chemicalmixes of explosives and propellant—usingproducts of a specific type and origin. CAR’sexamination of weapons found whilst underconstruction, in addition to those deployedwith IS forces and recovered on the battlefield,confirm that production output conforms to thesestandards—usually to the tenth of a millimetre.The functioning of this quality control system—illustrated by a stream of written directives andperiodic reporting, documented by CAR—providesdeep insights into IS forces’ broader command andcontrol systems. The group is highly bureaucratic,adheres to strict reporting lines, and operates aseries of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.6These are evident, not only in periodic reportingby individual units on weapon production, but alsoin regular updates sent to central authorities onrations, ammunition expenditure rates, weaponholdings by serial number, and the health offighters. This level of bureaucracy is not restrictedto the Mosul area. CAR documented weeklyworkshop schedules and associated documentsissued by the Committee for Military Developmentand Production (CMDP) in production facilitiesduring its June 2016 investigations in Fallujah.1Documentary evidence recorded by CAR alsoproves IS forces provide fighters with sophisticatedinstruction on improvised explosive device (IED)construction, emplacement, and on the operationof complex weapon systems such as anti-tankguided weapons. These are not short courses, butstructured lessons—evidenced by the numerousexamination papers submitted by IS students anddocumented by CAR across the eastern Mosulsector.Whilst technical in nature, these findings mustalso be viewed within the framework of IS forces’political aspirations—notably efforts by thegroup to instil confidence among its fighters in itscapacity as a ‘state’ administration. The uniformpainting, labelling, and branding of weapons andammunition is a critical element. Although thesemeasures, such as defining the calibre and date ofproduction, clearly benefit weapon management—notably accounting—they also speak to IS forces’attempts to mirror the functions of a nationalmilitary force. These factors arguably legitimisethe group’s capacity and coherence in the eyes ofIS fighters as much as they serve clear logisticalfunctions.Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production
KEY FINDINGSSTANDARDISED WEAPON PRODUCTIONSPECIALISATIONIS forces operate a ‘Central Organisation forStandardisation and Quality Control’ (COSQC),which falls under the authority of the group’s‘Soldiers’ Bureau, Committee for MilitaryDevelopment and Production.’ The COSQCissues specific guidelines on weapon productionparameters and controls manufacturing quality.IS forces operate a wide range of specialisedmanufacturing plants. Although these facilitiesmay be distant from one another, they are centrallycoordinated, produce to pre-defined standards,and manufacture separate stages of weaponproduction.PRODUCTION TO MILITARY STANDARDSIS forces adopt similar practices to nationalmilitary forces, which distinguish the groupfrom other groups that manufacture improvisedweapons on an ad hoc basis. The production offactory grade packaging is one example, wherebythe group has constructed palletised woodenboxes for the long-term storage, and long-rangetransport, of rockets and mortar rounds.QUANTITIESWithin a six-day period, CAR investigatorsdocumented more than 5,000 rockets and mortarrounds in various stages of production. CAR alsodocumented more than 500 finished mortarrounds, which Iraqi forces had recovered on thebattlefield. These findings suggest that overallproduction by IS forces in the months leadingup to the Mosul offensive runs into the tens ofthousands.Qaraqosh, Iraq, November 2016Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production7
KEY FINDINGSRAPID PRODUCTIONROBUST SUPPLY CHAINLabels affixed to the mortar rounds produced byIS forces, and documented by CAR in the easternMosul sector in early November 2016, show thatmost were manufactured in October 2016, whenIraqi and Peshmerga forces had already begun thebattle to liberate Mosul. These findings indicatevery rapid supply to IS forces, and reinforceCAR’s assertions that the total number of rocketsand mortars produced must run into the tens ofthousands.CAR documented other components that, whileprocured from the same source by IS forces,had been procured on different dates, in largequantities, and over a long period of time. Thisindicates that IS forces have a robust supplychain, whereby the group can repeatedly procurechemicals from the same supplier—almostexclusively from the Turkish domestic market.MASS DIVERSION OF COMMERCIAL GOODSIS forces source most of the products used inthe manufacture of weapons and ammunitionfrom the Turkish domestic market. CAR’s findingscontinuously reinforce evidence that the groupoperates a major acquisition network in Turkeyand has a direct line of supply from Turkey,through Syria, to the Mosul area.CAR documented large quantities of chemicalprecursors used by IS forces in the productionof rocket propellant. Many of these precursorsare either manufactured by the same factory,or supplied by the same distributor. IS forcesprocured them in bulk and sometimes at the sametime. Such bulk buying from single sources is likelyto be highly visible in commercial sales records.TURKISH ORIGINIS production facilities and recovered materiel locations in the eastern Mosul sector8Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production
DOCUMENTED MATERIELBetween 11 and 16 November 2016, a CAR fieldinvestigation team documented six weaponmanufacturing facilities, operated by IS forces,located in the Gogjali and Qaraqosh districts,which lie to the east of Mosul.CAR, indicate that IS forces manufacture to predefined standards. These standards ensure that allproduced weapons operate similarly—in the sameway that a national army would ensure weaponand ammunition interoperability across its forces.The facilities produced a diverse range of products,including cast mortar round casings, rocketcomponents, explosives, and propellant. Asindicated in the map above, these facilities aresituated in numerous locations. They range in sizefrom relatively large (circa 10,000 m2) foundriesused to produce mortar round casings, to small(circa 30 m2) workshops used to machine rocketcomponents and prepare explosives. Althoughthese facilities are numerous and dispersed, CAR’sdetailed measurement of weapons produced onsite, combined with production specifications andquality management documents recovered byThe following sections of this report provide CAR’sfindings from the facilities, including productionprocesses, the sourcing of raw materials andchemical precursors, and IS forces’ inventorymanagement and quality control systems.IS-manufactured rockets, Gogjali, November 2016While this Dispatch references a wide range oftechnical documents issued by IS forces, CAR haselected to withhold some technical informationfrom the public domain—particularly detailedinformation on explosive and propellant formulaeand tactical doctrine documented at the sites.9
DOCUMENTED MATERIELMORTARSPRODUCTION PROCESS AND ORGANISATIONIS forces’ production of mortar rounds and mortartubes is centrally controlled, with different phasesof the production cycle occurring at a numberof specialised facilities. These facilities performdedicated tasks in the manufacture of mortarrounds, including metal forging, machining,explosive filling, and the production of tubes. Atthe completion of a production stage, IS forcesrelocate the unfinished item to another facility,where the production cycle continues. CARpreviously observed this division of labour duringinvestigations in IS forces’ weapon-manufacturingfacilities in Fallujah, in June 2016.2MORTAR TUBESIS forces modify factory produced steel pipesto construct mortar tubes. These pipes need towithstand the pressures generated by firing a120 mm projectile, which would normally be in theregion of 14,000-14,500 psi.3 Measurements madeby CAR indicate that the pipes have an outsidediameter of approximately 149 mm and an insidediameter of 119.5 mm.4 Although not confirmed atthis stage in CAR’s investigations, oil drill pipe withan outside diameter of 5 7/8 inches (149.225 mm) isa plausible source of the tubes.Oil industry documentation confirms that pipesof this diameter are able to withstand operatingpressures exceeding 15,000 psi, with collapsepressures of around 17,000 psi.5 If the mortarsare built with drill pipes, the tubes would be ableto withstand multiple firings. Some of the tubesdocumented by CAR—which are of various calibres,including 81 mm, 119.5 mm, and 220 mm—arethreaded close to the muzzle, which may providefurther indication that they are constructed usingdrill pipe. All mortar tubes documented by CARfeature threaded caps, which are used to seal thebreach of the mortar.Image 1120 mm mortar tube manufactured by IS forcesNear Karamlais, November 201610Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production
DOCUMENTED MATERIELImage 2A mortar production facilityGogjali, Mosul, November 2016CAR DOCUMENTED NUMEROUS120 MM MORTAR ROUNDSACROSS THE EASTERN MOSULSECTOR, INCLUDING ATPRODUCTION FACILITIES ANDFOLLOWING BATTLEFIELDRECOVERY.MORTAR ROUNDSIS forces in the Mosul sector produce what theydescribe as 120 mm mortar rounds. Measurementstaken by CAR, and notes applied by IS forces tolabels, indicate that the rounds are 119 mm incalibre. This is a non-standard calibre, which ISforces appear to have adopted because the highgrade steel pipes, which they use to constructmortar tubes, happen to have an internal diameterthat is slightly larger than 119 mm (for ease ofreference the following text describes the roundsas 120 mm in calibre).CAR documented numerous such 120 mm mortarrounds across the eastern Mosul sector, includingat production facilities and following battlefieldrecovery. The number of finished roundsdocumented by CAR exceeds 500. The labels on therounds indicate that IS forces manufactured mostof them in October 2016.Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production11
DOCUMENTED MATERIELAdditionally, CAR documented more than 5,000mortar rounds in various stages of manufacture.The scale of recent production—which continuedduring the offensive by Iraqi forces in the districtsconcerned—suggests that IS forces have probablymanufactured tens of thousands of rounds. Thegroup currently deploys many of them in serviceon frontline positions.Image 3120 mm mortars round manufactured by IS forcesGogjali, Mosul, November 2016DetailsLength (with fuse): 570 mmFuse type: Point detonating, with safety pinDiameter: 119 mmFuse length (visible): 45 mmNumber of fins: 12Fuse diameter: 46 mmNumber of gas-check bands: 4Weight: 12-13 kgDistance between gas-check bands: 5 mmThe production of mortar rounds does not requirethe high-grade steel necessary for the manufactureof mortar tubes, which need to withstand repeatedhigh firing pressures. IS forces obtain the steelby melting scrap metal. The two foundriesdocumented by CAR in Gogjali are located nextto large scrap metal yards. IS forces recover thehigher-grade steel components from these yardsby cutting car engine block components into smallpieces and melting them in improvised furnaces.CAR documented five such furnaces (see step 4 ofthe casting process on the next page) of identicaldesign in the two Gogjali production facilities.Image 4Scrap metal near an ordnanceproduction facilityGogjali, Mosul, November 201612Conflict Armament ResearchStandardisation and quality control in Islamic State’s military production
DOCUMENTED MATERIELIS mortar production facility, Gogjali, MosulThe casting process is as follows:123Creation of the mould bypacking sand and cementinto a wooden matrix Creation of moulded sandand cement cores, using ahinged mould in the form ofthe mortar round’s internalcavity.Placement of the corebetween two, symmetricalsand and cement moulds.4Melting of scrap steel in animprovised furnace. which is placed on top ofa metal pattern. The patterndefines the external form ofthe mortar round.A steel rod is placed atthe centre of the cores toenable later removal fromth
Islamic State rockets, Gogjali, Mosul, November 2016. Conflict Armament Research Standardisation and uality control in Islamic State’s military production 3 . This Dispatch from the Field presents findings on the structure and output of IS forces’ weapon production in the eastern Mosul sector. While
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