As The World Turns: Ontology And Politics In Judith Butler .
As the World Turns: Ontology and Politics in Judith ButlerStephen K. WhitePolity, Vol. 32, No. 2. (Winter, 1999), pp. 155-177.Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici O%3B2-ZPolity is currently published by Palgrave Macmillan Journals.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/pal.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgTue Dec 4 20:39:14 2007
As the World Turns:Ontology and Politics in Judith Butler*Stephen K. WhiteVirginia TechWhat ought tfoundations'for political thought look like in a postmetaphysical world? I argue for a "weak" ontological model of tfoundations' andemploy it in a critical reconstruction of Judith Butler's work. My spec@intention is to show that this model provides a better understanding of boththe strengths and weaknesses of Butler's writings than does her ownnotion--shared by many poststructuralists-that one does not need ontologyto sustain ethical and political reflection, or, at best, only an austerely minimal one.Stephen K. White is a Professor in the Department of Political Science, 531Major Williams Hall (0130), Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061, andeditor of the journal Political Theory. His most recent work is SustainingAffirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (PrincetonUniversity Press, 2000).A guiding imperative of Judith Butler's thought is the commitment to "a problematizing suspension of the ontological." Drawing upon the momentum ofboth feminist and poststructuralist thought, she understands her task to be an"interrogation of the construction and circulation" of ontological claims. Bythis, she means an investigation of the multitude of ways in which notions ofbeing have traditionally been construed as "pre-linguistic" and thus as havingan uncontestable status in accounts of subjectivity, society and politics:' When*The author would like to thank Rom Coles, Robert Durn, Michael Gibbons, Kathy Jones,Debra Monis, Jacqueline Stevens, and an anonymous referee for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.1. Judith Butler, "The Force of Fantasy: Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and Discursive Excess,"differences 2 (1990): 105-06. The following abbreviations will be used for refemng to Butler'sbooks:BTMESGTPLPBodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (New York: Routledge, 1993).Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997).Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990).The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, California: StanfordUniversity Press, 1997.PolityVolume XXXII, Number 2Winter 1999
156 Ontology and Politics in Judith Butleran account is rooted in an "ontological essentialism," Butler contends, thereis an occlusion of power, for such ontology invariably contains a "normativeinjunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into political discourseThis allows categories of identity, for exampleas its necessary gro nd." gender, to present themselves as beyond contestation.Despite Butler's thoroughgoing critique of ontology, it is neverthelessbecoming increasingly clear, as her work develops, that she is herself affirming an alternative ontology. Such a claim probably sounds like the openingmove in a strategy aimed at demonstrating that Butler is entangled in somekind of performative contradiction: while she understands herself to be critiquing all ontology, she is inconspicuously generating another one as her arguments deploy themselves. But this is not my strategy. Rather, I largely agreewith her critique of "ontological essentialism" or what I call "strong ontology,"and I applaud her tentative-although sometimes almost disavowed-stepstoward a different type of ontology. So my concern in this paper is not withexposing contradictions, but rather with reflecting upon how successful Butleris in shifting from one type of ontological foundation to another-although inthe latter case one would have to speak of 'foundations.'One can envision this alternative type of ontology in different ways. Inorder to have a basis upon which to begin evaluating what Butler is up to,however, I am going to specify this alternative as a "weak ontology." I havelaid out the broad outlines of this idea elsewhere.' In the most general sense,weak ontology refers to what persuasive argumentation in regard to basic concepts should look like in a postmetaphysical world. What is at issue is how weshould now construct pictures of self, other and world, and link them to someaffirmation of ethical and political life; in short, how we ought to configureour most basic affirmative gestures of practical reason.Weak ontologies emerge from the conjunction of two insights: acceptanceof the idea that all fundamental conceptualizations of self, other and world arecontestable, and awareness that such conceptualizations are neverthelessunavoidable for any sort of reflective ethical and political life. The latterinsight demands from us the affirmative activity of constructing foundations,the former prevents us from carrying out this task in a traditional fashion.One of the hallmarks of weak ontology is resistance to portraits of humanbeing and world that assume a "disengaged self."' Weak ontologies articulate2. GT, 16, 20; BTM, 219.3. See my "Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection," Political Theory 25 (August1997); and the "Introduction"to Sustaining Afirmtion: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory (Princeton University Press, forthcoming, 2000).4. The term "disengaged self' comes from Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Makingof Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Haward University Press, 1989), 21.
Stephen K. White 157a "stickier" conception of subjectivity. What exactly this amounts to variesamong weak ontologists, but they all share certain distinctive common qualities. Weak ontologies do not proceed by categorical positings of, say, humannature or telos, accompanied by a crystalline conviction of the truth of thatpositing. Rather, they offer figurations of human being in terms of certainexistential realities, most notably language, mortality or finitude, natality andthe articulation of "sources of the self."5 These figurations are accounts ofwhat it is to be a certain sort of creature: one entangled with language; conscious that it will die; possessing, despite its entanglement and limitedness,the capacity for radical novelty; and, finally, giving definition to itself againstsome ultimate background or "source" that evokes awe, wonder, or reverence.This sense of an unavoidable background is misconstrued when grasped eitheras something with a truth that reveals itself to us in an unmediated way or assomething that is simply a matter of radical choice.I use the term "existential realities" to claim that language, finitude, natality and sources are in some brute sense universal constitutives of humanbeing, but also that their meaning is irreparably underdetermined in any categorical sense. There simply is no demonstrable essence of language or truemeaning of finitude. Weak ontologies offer figurations of these universals,portraits whose persuasiveness is not simply a matter of correspondence toreality, but also of aesthetic attractiveness and historical appropriateness.Since weak ontologies make no claim to reflect the pure truth of being, onecannot derive any determinate, incontestable principles for ethics and politicsfrom it. The fundamental conceptualizations such an ontology provides can atmost prefigure practical insight or judgment, in the sense of providing broadcognitive and affective orientation. Practice draws sustenance from an ontology in the sense of both a reflective bearing upon possibilities for action anda mobilizing of motivational force.With this sketch of an alternative sort of ontology in place, let me turn backto Butler. Along with her thoroughgoing critique of strong ontology, there isThisthe admission that foundations are both "contingent and indi pensable." simple statement embodies, however, a persistent tension, one which frequently manifests itself in the work of poststructuralist and postmodernthinkers. Sometimes they deny the necessity of foundations altogether. Butwhen indispensability is admitted, the affirmative task presents itself asimmensely difficult. Its difficulty results, of course, from the very power ofthe critiques such theorists have offered of prior ontological formulations.5. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 21.6. Butler, "For a Careful Reading," in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange,S . Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell, and N. Fraser, eds., introduction by Linda Nicholson (NewYork: Routledge, 1995). 133.
158 Ontology and Politics in Judith ButlerThose critiques highlight the dangers residing in any attempt at affirmativegestures. The upshot, unsurprisingly, is a tendency to keep ontological affirmations austerely thin or minimal.I want to suggest that ontological thinness ought to be distinguished fromontological weakness. The former refers to a reticence to affirm very muchontologically; the latter to the way one affirms. The problem with the formeris its failure either to figure enough existential universals or to sketch persuasively how the ontology prefigures ethical-political values. In my terms, aA felicitous weakweak ontology that is too thin will not be very "felicitou ." ontology has a kind of richness to it, with that term implying that the ontology satisfies the various criteria I have delineated. Just as with soups, so withweak ontologies: a rich one is usually more satisfying than a thin one.One thing that makes Butler's work so fascinating is how these issues playout in the development of her ideas after Gender Trouble. The tension overontological thinness-although obviously not framed in such terms-arises inthe context of critiques of that work. Gender Trouble unmasks the ontologicalessentialism at work in various conceptualizations of subjectivity, gender andthe body. Butler's point is to expose ontological claims in these domains asnothing more than dissimulation strategies of discursive regimes of power.There is no entity-whether the subject, the gendered subject, the body, orwhatever-which hovers, as it were, behind its acts; rather such entities arealways "produced or generated' in the very performance of linguistic actions.The continual reiteration of social scripts-and thus regimes of power-iswhat gives life and specific shape to what are then mistakenly identified aspre-existing entities with ontological status.' Despite the novelty of Butler'sway of conceiving the relation of power and language, critics have argued thather notion of the "performative" self is so thoroughly embedded within theflows of power, that she (like Foucault) makes it impossible to imagine a subject having the capability of critical agency; that is, the wherewithal to turnagainst power.9Although Butler broaches this problem in Gender Trouble, itis only in succeeding reflections that it receives more adequate treatment. Bytracing this elaboration, one can begin to see her counter-ontology emerge (I).7. I use the adjective "felicitous" to draw attention to the fact that the aptness of a weakontology is not captured by the notion of truth, at least in the sense of a strong ontology's claimto represent the true structure of being. J. L. Austin used "felicitous"to describe speech acts thatwere apt or performed successfully by meeting a variety of conventional expectations. In avaguely analogous way, I take a weak ontology to be more felicitous the more it meets the expectations I have just delineated.8. GT, 136, 143, 147.9. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib, "Feminism and Postmodernism," 20-21; NancyFraser, "False Antitheses," 67-69, in Feminist Contentions; and Peter Digeser, Our Politics, OurSelves: Liberalism, Identiry and Harm (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), ch. four.
Stephen K. White 159After elucidating this development, I take up the question of Butler's tendency to join her acceptance of the indispensability of ontological foundationswith a reticence to flesh hers out more-the problem of thinness. I show howthis tendency yields some difficulties that show up both in how well the ontology prefigures her ethical-political values and in how well it figures the existential universal of finitude (11).After pushing this issue of ontological reticence against Butler, I concludeby backing off a bit. In her recent work, The Psychic Life of Power, there isan analysis of melancholia and mourning that constitutes a significant enrichment of her ontology, providing a more satisfactory figuration of finitude (111).I. "An ontology of present participle "' If one characteristic of a plausible, weak ontological rendering of humanbeing is an account of language that displaces the disengaged, sovereign conception of subjectivity, then Butler's ontology certainly can make this claim.But the very radicality of that displacement in Gender Trouble creates somedifficulties. One is how the fact that human beings have bodies seems to havebecome an epiphenomenon of performativity. Another problem is that it is notentirely clear how, specifically, discursive power "produces" subjects. Finally,despite her claims that subjects can resist power, her own theory may not infact allow adequate comprehension of the critical agency she wishes to affirm.As I trace Butler's effort to wrestle with these problems, the specific contoursof her alternative to a strong or "essentialist" ontology will become apparent.Once these contours are visible, I can then better assess how well her thinking aligns itself with the other criteria of a felicitous weak ontology.Reflecting upon the constitution of the subject, Butler writes: "That onecomes to 'be' through a dependency on the Other-an Hegelian and, indeed,Freudian postulation-must be recast in linguistic terms. . . ."" For this purpose, she adopts an image employed by Louis Althusser to capture the idea ofsubjectivity being simultaneously constituted by power and given recognition.A policeman on a street yells "Hey you there!" and a passerby stops and turnsin response, acknowledging the policeman's call. In this "interpellation," asAlthusser calls it, the passerby is "hailed" into being in effect; helshe is officially accorded subjectivity and given recognition, but on power's own terms.1210. Butler, "Perfonnative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology andFeminist Theory," Performing Feminisms, ed. Sue-Ellen Case (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). 272.1 1. ES, 26.12. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
160 Ontology and Politics in Judith ButlerThe core of what fascinates Butler here is the idea of being "hailed" or"called" into social or "linguistic life."I3 But the constitutive process apparentin this image seems to be less thoroughgoing than Butler herself demands.After all, isn't there a fully formed subject-the passerby-who enacts theturn to authority? Butler is amply aware that the example is limited in itsheuristic value; she acknowledges that we cannot just think in terms of isolated scenes. She asks us to imagine rather a lifetime of being hailed into discourse, beginning with the doctor who announces: "It's a girl!" Butler wouldhave us reconstnle this familiar speech act as the beginning of a lifelong chainof "girling" utterances that enact certain scripts as normal and others as abnormal. With this expansion of the temporal horizon and application of the notionof performativity, the relatively sovereign subjectivity of the passerby beginsto dissolve. It is replaced by the image of a subjectivity produced or constituted by the insistent, interpellating "demand" of "discursive power."I4Butler also departs from the literal sense of Althusser's scene in that shefinds the image of the call as a sovereign performance of the policeman misleading. Like Foucault, she wishes to displace our propensity to seek a "who"that is responsible for discursive power. The felicity or success of the policeman's utterance does not proceed primarily from his will or intention, as J. L.Austin was aware. but rather from convention:The policeman who hails the person in the street is enabled tomake that call through the force of reiterated convention. This is one ofthe speech acts that police perform, and the temporality of the actexceeds the time of the utterance in question. In a sense, the police citethe convention of hailing, participate in an utterance that is indifferentto the one who speaks it. The act "works" in part because of the citational dimension of the speech act, the historicity of convention thatexceeds and enables the moment of its enunciation."Thus it is the reiterating function of language that is primarily carrying andreproducing dominant norms and creating the effect of sovereign, disengagedsubjects by the continual process of calling them into social existence. We are,in short, "interpellated kinds of beings," continually being called into linguistic life, being "given over to social terms that are never fully one's own."16Butler's ontology then is one in which the basic 'things' are persistentforces. But we must be careful not to imagine these in subjectified terms.13.14.271.15.16.BTM, 121-24;ES, Ch. One; and PLP, Ch. One.GT, 145; ES, 34.49, 155; PLP, 107; and "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,"ES, 33.ES, 26; PLP, 28.
Stephen K. White 161Thus, power is not an anonymous subject that initiates discrete acts of constitution or construction. There is rather only "a process of reiteration by whichboth 'subjects' and 'acts' come to appear at all. There is no power that acts,only a reiterated acting that is power in its persistence."17However overwhelming this world of power persisting, insisting, compelling, demanding and hailing may sound, Butler does not think that any ofthis implies that subjects are dopes of discursive power. Reiterating is alwayspotentially open to resignifying in ways that may contest the smooth reproduction of the dominant terms of discourse. Butler has described this subversive potential as "power's own possibility of being reworked." She employssuch a curious locution to keep us from refiguring subjectivity again into aform that is self-causing in its critical agency.Is But, even when one followsthis line of thinking sympathetically,one is left only with the formal idea thatdiscursive power reproduces itself imperfectly or unstably. What is not yetclear in Butler's account is why or how this imperfection might ever be takenadvantage of intentionally by an actor.IYIn her account of subject constitutionso far, there is really nothing one could use for making much headway towardan answer. Before turning directly to the resources Butler develops for suchan answer, I want to consider briefly how she has tried to respond to criticismof her account of the body. This is done in the context of a further augmentation of her ontology of present participles.The criticism in its simplest version takes the form of questions like: if thebody is really thoroughly a constitutive effect of some discourse, how is itthat, regardless of the discourse that is prevalent at any given place and time,I feel pain when colliding with a door frame? What, one asks, is colliding withthat frame?''In response to such objections, Butler suggests:To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates,causes, or exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it is toclaim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the sametime a further formation of that body. . . . In philosophical terms, theconstative claim is always to some degree performative. . . To "refer" naively or directly to . . . an extra-discursive objectwill always require the prior delimitation of the extra-discursive. And17. BTM, 9.18. Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodemism,"' inFeminist Contentions, 47; and BTM, 15. See Nancy Fraser's criticism of this expression in "FalseAntitheses," Feminist Contentions, 67.19. Cf. Butler's defiition of agency, PLP, 15.20. See Digeser, Our Politics, Our Selves, 153-56; and Kathleen Jones, CompassionateAuthority: Democracy and the Represenration of Women (New York: Routledge, 1993), 79, 218.
162 Ontology and Politics in Judith Butlerinsofar as the extra-discursive is delimited, it is formed by the very discourse from which it seeks to free itself.*'Butler's point, then, is not to collapse materiality into a linguistic idealism;but to avoid any ontological positing of materiality that places it firmly outside of language, because that very positing is itself accomplished in language. She tries to express this relation of language and materiality in her ownontological idiom as follows. We should figure the materiality of the bodymanifesting itself in domains as varied as chemical composition, metabolism,illness, death-not as a passive medium, but rather as a persistentdemand in and for language, a "that which" which prompts and occasions. . . [Wlithin the cultural fabric of lived experience, [it calls to be]fed, exercised, mobilized, put to sleep, a site of enactments and passionsof various kinds. To insist upon this demand, this site, as the "that without which" no psychic operation can proceed, but also as that on whichand through which the psyche also operates, is to begin to circumscribethat which is invariably and persistently the psyche's site of operation;not the blank slate or passive medium upon which the psyche acts, but,rather, the constitutive demand that mobilizes psychic action from thestart, that is that very mobilization, and, in its transmuted and projectedbodily form, remains that psyche."The materiality of the body is a "referent" that is not fully capturable bylanguage, but that takes its place in language as an "insistent call" to beattended to. With this notion, Butler installs in her ontology a second site ofinsistence, alongside that of interpellation. Interpellation is an insistence thatsubjects be this or that and continually account for themselves. This additionalsite of insistence, materiality, also presses something toward intelligibility;but that something, materiality, is also conceived as always exceeding thegrasp of language. Thus it seems curiously to be a force that aligns itself withdiscursive power insofar as it is responsible for the inexhaustibility of thelatter's task. The force of interpellation will always be called forth anew, sincethe material referent of naming is always beyond its reach.This postulation of a second ontological force (and thus source of the self)extricates Butler from the anomalies of a linguistic idealism, but it does notseem to have augmented the overall ontological picture to a point where theemergent property of critical agency acquires adequate clarity. Progress onthis front has come in the context of Butler's recent efforts toward "thinking21. BTM,10-1122. BTM,67.23. BTM,67.
Stephen K. White 163the theory of power'together with a theory of the . . . p yche."' Butler regardsthis task as important not only because it can help us better comprehendagency, but also because it can make clearer the phenomenon of submissionin the constitution of the subject. For Butler, subjectivation in Foucault'ssense is productive (of agency and other things), but it also brings about a submission, and she seeks to understand the specific mechanisms of psychic lifethrough which these effects occur.Psychoanalysis would seem to have a ready answer to the question ofagency and resistance to power: resistance can be traced to some "internal"psychic entity that is prior to, and thus in some sense beyond, "external"power. But Butler is wary of any simple positing of an ontologically distinct,inner sphere of "eternal psychic facts" assuring us that some specific resistance to power is, as it were, built into being as necessary.25Butler turns once more to Althusser's scene to open up this problematic terrain. What she finds unexplained in both Althusser and Foucault is why thepasserby turns to answer the policeman. Power "hails," but why does onesubmit to its call? Any attempt to answer this question is made more difficultby remembering that the process of turning is also constitutive of subjectivity.There is, in short, no fully reflective subject who is choosing to submit. Thesubmission Butler is seeking to explain precedes the reflective self-that is,the self with a conscience.Drawing on both Freud and Nietzsche, Butler understands conscience asforming under the force of the prohibitions of power. Desire turns back uponitself in the form of a will in the service of a regulating regime, that is, of termsnot one's own. The resulting pain of self-denial and self-beratement is compensated for, as Freud saw, by the investment of erotic energy in the prohibitive activity of this emergent entity of conscience. The conscience can thusnever be an adequate site for thinking critical agency, since it is, in its very constitution, in complicity with the violent appropriation of desire by power.A conceptualization of conscience in these terms helps to generate asharper focus on the underlying issue of submission. A more precise phrasingof the question of why the subject turns can now be offered: Why does desirecooperate with its own prohibition? Butler's answer rests on her postulationof a "desire to persist" that characterizes human beings. This is not a desirefor mere physical survival or to align with some metaphysical essence; it israther the desire for social existence, linguistic survival. Moreover, this desirehas as its "final aim" not some particular model of existence, but rather merely"the continuation of itself." It is thus "a desire to desire" that will cooperatewith the prohibition of any particular desire that endangers its continued24. PLP, 3.25. PLP, 127-29.
164 Ontology and Politics in Judith Butleraccess to the terms of social existence. Here, then, is the psychic mechanismof submission: "the desire to desire is a willingness to desire precisely thatwhich would foreclose desire, if only for the possibility of continuing todesire." One attaches to what is painful rather than not attach at all. Thisimpulse, this passionate, "stubborn" propensity to attach is something that"precede[s] and condition[s] the formation of subjects."26This deep embedding of submission in psychic life, would seem to makethe problem of conceptualizing agency more difficult in two senses. First,given one's stubborn attachment to the dominant terms into which one hasbeen interpellated, any resistance to them means risking a kind of social death.This is indeed what Butler wants to claim. Second, the idea of critical agencybecomes more difficult because there seems to be no psychic mechanism bywhich there could even be such a space of possible experience. Stubbornattachment seems unshakable.Butler contends, however, that this is not the case. For if a regulatoryregime is secured only as it calls forth and constitutes a desire for existencewithin a specific set of terms, it means that there is a certain "detachability ofdesire." Desire blocked or foreclosed can invest itself in that very prohibit i n . But' with this capacity of desire there also comes a certain susceptibility of power.If desire has as its final aim the continuation of itself-and here onemight link Hegel, Freud, and Foucault all back to Spinoza's conatusthen the capacity of desire to be withdrawn and to reattach will constitute something like the vulnerability of every strategy of ubjection. "In this moment of detachability there emerges that "formative and fabricatingdimension of psychic life" in terms of which one can conceive a resistance topower that is capable not just of blind recalcitrance, but also of rearticulatingthe dominant terms in which a specific form of social existence is offered."Critical agency, for Butler, thus seems to gain its condition of possibilityfrom a "constitutive desire," the "desire to desire." This desire is potentiallymore stubborn, resourceful and opportunistic than the passionate attachmentthat forms the submissiveness of subjectivity. Butler figures this desire as asort of insistent demand or becoming. Thus it appears to be of a kind with theother two ontological forces I have delineated. Each is a force in the sense ofan insistence; none is an entity in the sense of being fully describable as subjects or objects. Power, materiality, and the desire to desire are thus all refer26.27.28.29.PLP, 27-28, 61-62, 102, 130.PLP, 55,60-6
Judith Butler, "The Force of Fantasy: Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and Discursive Excess," differences 2 (1990): 105-06. The following abbreviations will be used for refemng to Butler's . against power.9 Although Butler broaches this problem in Gender Trouble, it is only in succeeding
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